J-S15039-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NATHANIEL K. GRIFFIN JR. : : Appellant : No. 1247 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 22, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0001630-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JULY 13, 2021
Nathaniel K. Griffin, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County and imposed after a jury
found him guilty of aggravated assault, strangulation, and unlawful restraint.
For these offenses, Griffin was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight to
sixteen years of imprisonment, to be thereafter followed by one year of
reentry supervision. On appeal, Griffin chiefly challenges both the sufficiency
and the weight of the evidence used to convict him. As we see no merit to his
first claim and find waiver as to his second, we affirm his judgment of
sentence.
In summary, Griffin and the victim were familiar with one another as
Waffle House coworkers. After the victim confided in Griffin via text messages
____________________________________________
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S15039-21
that a friend owed her money, Griffin responded by indicating he could obtain
that monetary amount. A short time after this back and forth, Griffin appeared
unannounced in the middle of the night at the victim’s apartment.
While at the victim’s apartment, Griffin attempted to make several calls
to obtain the owed money. Following the passage of some amount of time and
without having received the money, the victim indicated that she wanted to
go to bed. She then attempted to remove Griffin from her residence, but was
met with him grabbing her throat with both hands. Griffin continued choking
the victim to the point of unconsciousness while concurrently moving her to
her bedroom. The victim recalled being unable to move or defend herself
throughout this interaction.
Upon regaining her consciousness, the victim described Griffin as having
raped her. Griffin also threatened to inflict further harm if she attempted to
move from her position in the bedroom. At some point, the victim tried to exit
her apartment while Griffin was in the kitchen. However, Griffin caught up to
her and dragged her back up the stairs to where they had been previously.
Griffin then wrapped an extension cord around her throat and placed her back
in the bedroom. Griffin proceeded to again have nonconsensual sex with the
victim multiple times. Griffin then left the victim’s apartment, and after his
departure, the victim, appearing visibly disheveled, distraught, and bruised,
made her way to her brother’s nearby residence, which then resulted in a
phone call to the police. Upon the police’s arrival, the victim identified Griffin
as the perpetrator of her ordeal. Laboratory testing would later confirm that
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Griffin’s DNA profile was found in sperm samples recovered from a towel left
in the apartment as well as vaginal swabs used on the victim.
Ultimately, although he was charged with, inter alia, rape by forcible
compulsion, rape of an unconscious victim, and involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse by forcible compulsion, the jury found him not guilty of those
offenses. Instead, as indicated above, he was exclusively found guilty of
aggravated assault, strangulation, and unlawful restraint.
Following those guilty verdicts, Griffin timely filed a post-sentence
motion, requesting either acquittal or a new trial. After that motion was
denied, Griffin timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Both he and the
trial court have complied with their respective obligations under Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
While Griffin raises three discrete issues for our consideration, his first
issue, claiming that the trial court erroneously denied his post-sentence
motion, appears to be materially indistinguishable from his latter two claims.
Therefore, we only will address his second and third assertions. Griffin avers:
1) the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to support Griffin’s
conviction at all three counts; or, conversely, 2) the weight of the evidence
compels reversal of his guilty verdicts. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5.
Preliminarily, we note at least one glaring deficiency with Griffin’s brief:
it violates Pa.R.A.P. 2119 insofar as it only has one omnibus argument section
without any further headings or demarcations between his issues. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (indicating that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as
-3- J-S15039-21
many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head
of each part … the particular point treated therein[.]”). In fact, the entire
argument section spans what would appear to be fewer than two pages in
length, contains no record citations, and includes one case citation. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 6-8. Griffin has also failed to include a copy of his
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement as well as a copy of the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111.
Griffin’s insufficiencies largely prevent this Court from conducting
meaningful review. However, as best can be gleaned from his brief, Griffin
describes that at trial, the victim identified the nonconsensual and physically
harmful nature of their sexual encounter whereas Griffin asserted the entire
incident was consensual and lacking in unreasonable physicality. Griffin then
states that because the jury found him not guilty of the sex-related counts, it
“essentially agreed with [his] version of events.” Appellant’s Brief, at 7. Griffin
suggests that the aggregate jury verdict implies that “no strangulation
occurred during a sexual act,” and that it “strains logic as to how the [j]ury
found [Griffin] guilty of [a]ggravated [a]ssault, [s]trangulation, or [u]nlawful
[r]estraint when no facts that would meet the elements of those charges
[were] ever put into evidence[.]” Id. Griffin concludes by proclaiming that
“there was insufficient evidence to find every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id., at 8.
The well-settled standard of review for a claim challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence requires this Court to consider
-4- J-S15039-21
whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder[,] unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered.
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J-S15039-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : NATHANIEL K. GRIFFIN JR. : : Appellant : No. 1247 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 22, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0001630-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JULY 13, 2021
Nathaniel K. Griffin, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County and imposed after a jury
found him guilty of aggravated assault, strangulation, and unlawful restraint.
For these offenses, Griffin was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight to
sixteen years of imprisonment, to be thereafter followed by one year of
reentry supervision. On appeal, Griffin chiefly challenges both the sufficiency
and the weight of the evidence used to convict him. As we see no merit to his
first claim and find waiver as to his second, we affirm his judgment of
sentence.
In summary, Griffin and the victim were familiar with one another as
Waffle House coworkers. After the victim confided in Griffin via text messages
____________________________________________
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S15039-21
that a friend owed her money, Griffin responded by indicating he could obtain
that monetary amount. A short time after this back and forth, Griffin appeared
unannounced in the middle of the night at the victim’s apartment.
While at the victim’s apartment, Griffin attempted to make several calls
to obtain the owed money. Following the passage of some amount of time and
without having received the money, the victim indicated that she wanted to
go to bed. She then attempted to remove Griffin from her residence, but was
met with him grabbing her throat with both hands. Griffin continued choking
the victim to the point of unconsciousness while concurrently moving her to
her bedroom. The victim recalled being unable to move or defend herself
throughout this interaction.
Upon regaining her consciousness, the victim described Griffin as having
raped her. Griffin also threatened to inflict further harm if she attempted to
move from her position in the bedroom. At some point, the victim tried to exit
her apartment while Griffin was in the kitchen. However, Griffin caught up to
her and dragged her back up the stairs to where they had been previously.
Griffin then wrapped an extension cord around her throat and placed her back
in the bedroom. Griffin proceeded to again have nonconsensual sex with the
victim multiple times. Griffin then left the victim’s apartment, and after his
departure, the victim, appearing visibly disheveled, distraught, and bruised,
made her way to her brother’s nearby residence, which then resulted in a
phone call to the police. Upon the police’s arrival, the victim identified Griffin
as the perpetrator of her ordeal. Laboratory testing would later confirm that
-2- J-S15039-21
Griffin’s DNA profile was found in sperm samples recovered from a towel left
in the apartment as well as vaginal swabs used on the victim.
Ultimately, although he was charged with, inter alia, rape by forcible
compulsion, rape of an unconscious victim, and involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse by forcible compulsion, the jury found him not guilty of those
offenses. Instead, as indicated above, he was exclusively found guilty of
aggravated assault, strangulation, and unlawful restraint.
Following those guilty verdicts, Griffin timely filed a post-sentence
motion, requesting either acquittal or a new trial. After that motion was
denied, Griffin timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Both he and the
trial court have complied with their respective obligations under Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
While Griffin raises three discrete issues for our consideration, his first
issue, claiming that the trial court erroneously denied his post-sentence
motion, appears to be materially indistinguishable from his latter two claims.
Therefore, we only will address his second and third assertions. Griffin avers:
1) the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to support Griffin’s
conviction at all three counts; or, conversely, 2) the weight of the evidence
compels reversal of his guilty verdicts. See Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5.
Preliminarily, we note at least one glaring deficiency with Griffin’s brief:
it violates Pa.R.A.P. 2119 insofar as it only has one omnibus argument section
without any further headings or demarcations between his issues. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (indicating that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as
-3- J-S15039-21
many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head
of each part … the particular point treated therein[.]”). In fact, the entire
argument section spans what would appear to be fewer than two pages in
length, contains no record citations, and includes one case citation. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 6-8. Griffin has also failed to include a copy of his
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement as well as a copy of the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111.
Griffin’s insufficiencies largely prevent this Court from conducting
meaningful review. However, as best can be gleaned from his brief, Griffin
describes that at trial, the victim identified the nonconsensual and physically
harmful nature of their sexual encounter whereas Griffin asserted the entire
incident was consensual and lacking in unreasonable physicality. Griffin then
states that because the jury found him not guilty of the sex-related counts, it
“essentially agreed with [his] version of events.” Appellant’s Brief, at 7. Griffin
suggests that the aggregate jury verdict implies that “no strangulation
occurred during a sexual act,” and that it “strains logic as to how the [j]ury
found [Griffin] guilty of [a]ggravated [a]ssault, [s]trangulation, or [u]nlawful
[r]estraint when no facts that would meet the elements of those charges
[were] ever put into evidence[.]” Id. Griffin concludes by proclaiming that
“there was insufficient evidence to find every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id., at 8.
The well-settled standard of review for a claim challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence requires this Court to consider
-4- J-S15039-21
whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder[,] unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Construing his brief as liberally as possible, we note that Griffin has
failed to: 1) enumerate the elements of the crimes in which he is contesting
their evidentiary sufficiency; 2) cite with any kind of particularity which
specific element or elements of those crimes are being challenged; and 3)
reinforce his argument by way of any sort of record, statutory, or case citation.
While there may be some components of his argument that could be worth
further discussion had they been explored to any nonconclusory degree,
because of his deficient brief and the ambiguous nature of his challenge, we
have no basis to delve into any lengthy adjudication of the elements of his
offenses.
-5- J-S15039-21
However, even assuming Griffin has appropriately challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him at any one of his crimes, we
would still find that he is due no relief. Through our independent review of the
record, the evidence used to convict him, being both testimonial and medical
in nature, was sufficient for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
While, seemingly, Griffin asks this Court to reweigh the credibility of the
witnesses, namely that of the victim’s in order to elevate his own testimony,
such a determination is exclusively within the province of the factfinder. As
the trial court opinion dated January 19, 2021, properly and comprehensively
discusses the elements of Griffin’s crimes and individually disposes of any
contention, by way of record citations, that the evidence was somehow
insufficient to convict him, we adopt its conclusions as our own. See Trial
Court Opinion, 1/19/21, at 12-16. As such, Griffin’s sufficiency claim fails.
As to Griffin’s weight of the evidence assertion, even through the most
generous reading of his argument section, we fail to find even one sentence
that could be construed as relevant to this question. Likewise, Griffin provides
no standard of review for this type of challenge, nor does he even use the
words “weight” or “weigh” more than one time. See Appellant’s Brief, at 5
(demonstrating Griffin’s single usage of the word “Weight,” contained within
in his “Statement of Questions Involved”).
“It is Appellant's obligation to sufficiently develop arguments in his brief
by applying the relevant law to the facts of the case, persuade this Court that
-6- J-S15039-21
there were errors below, and convince us relief is due because of those errors.
If an appellant does not do so, we may find the argument waived.”
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 284 (Pa. Super. 2009), see also
Commonwealth v. Walter, 966 A.2d 560, 566 (Pa. 2009) (allowing a finding
of waiver if an appellant fails to develop a claim “in any meaningful fashion
capable of review”). As Griffin’s brief contains no discussion whatsoever on his
weight of the evidence assertion, we find it waived.
Accordingly, in finding no merit to his former claim and waiver as to his
latter one, we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 07/13/2021
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