Com. v. Griffin, L.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 22, 2025
• Docket: 1649 EDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S09003-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LAMAR GRIFFIN : : Appellant : No. 1649 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005753-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED JULY 22, 2025

Lamar Griffin appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, after a jury found him guilty of

kidnapping to facilitate a felony1 and robbery of a motor vehicle.2 After careful

review, we affirm.

On March 17, 2019, at around 2:45 a.m., Lamika Stewart and her

cousins, Shannon Carroll and Samika Stewart (Samika), went to Happy House

Restaurant in Chester. Carroll drove them to the restaurant in her Ford

Expedition, which had tinted windows. After placing their orders, the group

went to Samika’s nearby home to use the restroom while their food was being

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901(a)(2).

2 Id. at § 3702(a). J-S09003-25

prepared. Because Stewart’s food was ready first when they returned, she

decided to wait for the others in the car, which Carroll unlocked and started

for her.

While Stewart was waiting in the car, Griffin, whom Stewart had

previously observed standing in the restaurant, entered the driver’s seat.

Stewart told him he had the wrong car, at which point Griffin pointed a gun at

her and verbally insulted her, saying: “This is what you get for being out this

time” and “You want to be a whore.” N.T. Trial, 3/9/22, at 31-32. Griffin

forced Stewart to throw her phone to the front seat before driving away,

parking between a cement wall and a gate. Griffin drove almost two blocks

and then pulled over in an alley. Griffin threw Stewart’s phone over the gate

into a yard, forced Stewart to fully undress, and then ripped her shirt and bra

off of her. After he bent her over the back seat of the car, Stewart begged

Griffin not to rape her and told him she was “on [her] period.” Id. at 21.

Griffin then ran off, taking Carroll’s purse with him.

Upon seeing the vehicle pulling out of the restaurant parking lot,

Stewart’s cousins called both Stewart and the police, as Stewart does not

drive. Stewart eventually got in touch with her cousins upon recovering her

cell phone after Griffin fled and she was attempting to walk back to the

restaurant. Shannon testified that Stewart was “very upset” and visibly

disheveled. Id. at 75.

On March 9, 2022, a jury found Griffin guilty of the above-named

offenses. The jury acquitted Griffin of criminal attempt—rape forcible

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compulsion, criminal attempt—sexual assault, and robbery—threat of

immediate serious injury. The trial court, sitting without a jury, acquitted

Griffin of possession of a firearm prohibited. The trial court also denied

Griffin’s post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal on robbery of a motor

vehicle and kidnapping.

On the day of sentencing, May 18, 2022, the prosecution notified

Griffin’s counsel of its plan to seek second-strike mandatory minimum

penalties under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 due to Griffin’s prior convictions for

crimes of violence. The court imposed two mandatory minimum sentences

totaling twenty to forty years’ incarceration. Griffin filed a timely notice of

appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. Griffin presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain the kidnapping [] conviction, and the trial court erroneously denied [his motion for] judgment of acquittal, since the prosecution at trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [] Griffin moved [Stewart] a substantial distance, especially where the allegations lasted only about two minutes, occurred within a less than two block area, and were incidental to the robbery of a vehicle charge?

2. Whether the mandatory ten-to-twenty-year confinement sentences pursuant to [section] 9714 [] are illegal, because the prosecution failed to provide reasonable notice of its intent by waiting until moments before sentencing, and[,] in any event, failed to present sufficient, competent evidence of prior convictions at the sentencing hearing?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

Griffin first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

kidnapping conviction. See Commonwealth v. Sunealitis, 153 A.3d 414,

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420 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge[.]”).

Our standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-

established:

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner[,] giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 764 (Pa. Super. 2023), citing

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 175 A.3d 301, 303-04 (Pa. Super. 2017).

A person is guilty of kidnapping if he “unlawfully removes another a

substantial distance under the circumstances from the place where he is

found, or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place

of isolation . . . [t]o facilitate commission of any felony[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

2901(a)(2) (emphasis added). Although courts have not precisely defined

“substantial distance” or “substantial period,” many have assessed these

terms on a case-by-case basis. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 399 A.2d

694, 696 (Pa. Super. 1979) (en banc) (recognizing guilt of abductor “cannot

depend upon the fortuity of the distance he has transported his victim nor the

length of time elapsed”).

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Griffin argues the evidence is insufficient because the prosecution failed

to prove he transported Stewart a substantial distance 3 as required under

subsection 2901(a), where he only drove her roughly 1½ blocks and the entire

incident lasted only about two minutes. He relies upon a dictionary definition

of “substantial” as “considerable in quantity” or “significantly great” to support

his claim that “under any fair definition,” less than two blocks is not a

substantial distance. Appellant’s Brief, at 13, 16. Griffin also argues that the

alleged kidnapping was incidental to the robbery of a motor vehicle and “did

not greatly increase danger.” Id. at 16.

In response, the Commonwealth argues 1½ blocks was a substantial

distance because Griffin “exposed [Stewart] to an increased and different risk

of harm.” Appellee’s Brief, at 13. The Commonwealth assert that surrounding

circumstances, such as unlawfully removing Stewart to a secluded alley

“where he could do with her as he pleased” and forcing her to undress,

establish the fact that Griffin’s actions were not merely incidental to the

robbery of a motor vehicle. Id. Additionally, the Commonwealth argues

Griffin’s plain-language argument disregards existing precedent interpreting

the word “substantial” under the kidnapping statute. Id. at 14. ____________________________________________

3 Griffin also argues that the Commonwealth did not prove that he held Stewart for a “substantial period” in a “place of isolation.” However, the kidnapping statute is disjunctive, and the Commonwealth may prove either that a defendant transported the victim a substantial distance or held her for a substantial period in a place of isolation. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901(a). Here, the Commonwealth proceeded under the “substantial distance” prong of the statute and the jury was instructed accordingly. As such, we do not consider Griffin’s argument as to the alternative means of establishing the offense.

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Substantial distance must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See

Commonwealth. v. Malloy, 856 A.2d 767, 780 (Pa. 2004) (finding ten-to-

fifteen-minute drive met substantial distance requirement because movement

of victim to secluded area facilitated murder); Hughes, supra at 698 (full

Court finding two miles sufficient to constitute “substantial distance” under

circumstances where victim removed from security of familiar surroundings to

completely different and isolated area); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 509

A.2d 394 (Pa. Super. 1986) (finding two blocks substantial distance for

purposes of kidnapping statute).

Here, even though Griffin only removed Stewart about 1½ blocks, the

attendant circumstances cause the incident to rise to the level of a substantial

distance for purposes of the kidnapping statute. See Campbell, 509 A.2d at

397 (concluding two blocks substantial distance for kidnapping of victim).

Similar to the victim in Hughes, supra, Griffin took Stewart to a secluded

alley, where she was unfamiliar with her surroundings, and parked in a “spot

right between a cement wall and a gate.” N.T. Trial, 3/9/22, at 29. Griffin

also threw Stewart’s phone over a gate, preventing Stewart from calling for

help. Id. Moreover, the risk of harm was increased when Griffin pulled out a

gun and forced Stewart to cover her face with her hands and undress. Only

when Stewart begged Griffin not to rape her and told him she was

menstruating did Griffin flee, taking Carroll’s purse with him. Therefore,

because Griffin took Stewart to a secluded area, isolated her, and exposed her

to an increased risk of harm as a result, we conclude that the nearly two blocks

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Griffin transported Stewart satisfies the substantial distance prong of the

kidnapping statute. Campbell, 509 A.2d at 397.

Griffin next contends that the mandatory minimum sentences imposed

under section 9714 are illegal because the Commonwealth’s notice, given

approximately fifteen minutes before the commencement of sentencing, was

unreasonable. Additionally, he argues the notice did not include a “complete

record” of his previous convictions as required by the statute. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(d). Specifically, Griffin argues that “there is no indication

that the [trial] court had [] Griffin’s certified conviction records before it,

where the prosecution offered no testimony or exhibits at sentencing.”

Appellant’s Brief, at 19. He is entitled to no relief.

It is well-established that our standard of review for a legality of

sentence claim is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See

Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013). “A

challenge to the legality of a sentence may be raised as a matter of right, is

not subject to waiver, and may be entertained as long as the reviewing court

has jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Bowers, 25 A.3d 349, 352 (Pa. Super.

2011). A sentence without particular statutory authorization is illegal and

must be corrected and vacated. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 850 A.2d

1268, 1271 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

The purpose of the mandatory minimum sentencing statute is “to deter

violent criminal acts by imposing harsher penalties on those who commit

repeated crimes of violence.” Commonwealth v. Norris, 819 A.2d 568, 573

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(Pa. Super. 2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Eddings, 721 A.2d 1095,

1100 (Pa. Super. 1998), aff'd, 772 A.2d 956 (Pa. 2001). To impose a

mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to section 9714, the defendant must

previously have been convicted of a “crime of violence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9714(a)(1). As is relevant here, Griffin was previously convicted of robbery,

defined as a “crime of violence” in subsection 9714(g).

For section 9714 to apply, the prosecution must give “reasonable notice

. . . after conviction and before sentencing” and provide a “complete record”

of the offender’s previous convictions. Id. at § 9714(d). Moreover, the

statute provides that its applicability will be determined at sentencing and the

court will schedule an evidentiary hearing only if a party contests the accuracy

of the record. Id.

As for what constitutes “reasonable notice” under subsection 9714(d),

Pennsylvania courts have consistently found no specific timeline is mandated.

In Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 523 A.2d 809 (Pa. Super. 1987), the Court

noted that “[w]hat is reasonable must necessarily depend upon the nature,

purpose, and circumstances of each case. To be adequate, notice must be

sufficient to permit an objection or a defense.” Id. at 811. See also

Commonwealth v. Saksek, 522 A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. Super. 1987) (holding

notice given three days before sentencing was reasonable because appellant,

if truly uninformed or unprepared to challenge mandatory sentencing, could

have sought continuance). Additionally, in Norris, supra, the Court

concluded the defendant had reasonable notice of the Commonwealth’s intent

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to seek a mandatory minimum sentence and found it was unnecessary to

specify which section 9714 provision applied, as that decision rests with the

sentencing court. Id. at 570-71, 574-75. Finally, in Commonwealth v.

Freeman, 514 A.2d 884 (Pa. Super. 1986), the Court found sufficient notice

was provided where given twice prior to conviction and once following

conviction but before sentencing. Id. at 886.

Furthermore, subsection 9714(d) requires the sentencing court to have

a “complete record” of the offender’s previous convictions before imposing a

mandatory sentence. Although the court in Norris, supra, found sufficient

notice, it remanded the case because of the lack of a complete record, finding

that “[a] verbal recitation by the Commonwealth of what it considers to be

Norris’s prior ‘strikes,’ without the court having the benefit of Norris’s written

record, is simply insufficient for purposes of [sub]section 9714(d).” Id. at

576.

Here, we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth’s notice of

intent to pursue mandatory sentencing under the second-strike provision was

reasonable under the circumstances and that the record of Griffin’s prior

convictions was sufficient pursuant to subsection 9714(d). Despite Griffin

having new counsel for trial, the record demonstrates he and his prior counsel

had notice of the Commonwealth’s intent to seek the mandatory sentences

prior to trial. Additionally, neither Griffin nor his counsel disputed the accuracy

of the record of his prior convictions at the time of sentencing. See N.T.

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Sentencing Hearing, 5/18/22, at 11-18 (defense counsel arguing against

application of mandatory minimums).

The statute requires notice to be provided “after conviction and before

sentencing.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(d). Although formal notice was provided

to the defense only fifteen minutes before sentencing, Griffin was twice made

aware that he was potentially subject to mandatory minimums should he be

convicted of robbery and/or kidnapping. At Griffin’s suppression hearing on

April 7, 2021, Assistant District Attorney Gorbey stated the following:

MS. GORBEY: Your Honor, I believe at the last listing, I had put [Griffin’s] exposure on the record and withdrawing [sic] that just to reiterate on the record. I don’t need to go through it all again. The only thing that I don’t believe that we addressed at the last listing is that this could be a possible strike, second strike for [] Griffin, which would carry a 10[-]year mandatory minimum. As I already stated on the record at the—prior to the last litigation, his guidelines are higher than what the mandatory is anyway, but I’m prepared to proceed. I just wanted to make sure that we have on the record that we did put that on last time.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/7/21, at 5-6 (emphasis added).

Then, at Griffin’s second preliminary hearing on October 21, 2021, the

following exchange occurred between then-defense counsel and the court:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge[,] if I may? I believe that [Griffin] already has a strike one. So[,] a conviction of a robbery of a motor vehicle or a first[-]degree felony robbery and/or kidnapping[,] if that is added to the charge[,] are all additional crimes of violence.

THE COURT: So[,] what is the mandatory minimum?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ten years.

[ADA GORBEY]: Ten.

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N.T. Second Preliminary Hearing, 10/21/20, at 7 (emphasis added).

Griffin’s argument that the notice was inadequate because he had new

counsel for trial is unpersuasive. At sentencing, Griffin’s counsel stated that

he had read the transcripts of the prior proceedings, did not indicate that he

was unprepared to challenge—and, in fact, did challenge—the application of

section 9714, and did not seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing to

give him additional time to prepare such a challenge. See Commonwealth

v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 661, 667 (Pa. Super. 2003) (challenge to reasonableness

of notice rejected where counsel neither indicated he was unprepared to

address applicability of section 9714 nor requested continuance).

The sentencing court also had a “complete record” of Griffin’s previous

convictions before it imposed the mandatory sentences, as required under

section 9714(d). The Commonwealth attached to its section 9714 notice of

intent a copy of Griffin’s secure court summary reflecting his prior convictions,

see Commonwealth’s Notice of Intent, 5/18/22, at Exhibit A, and the trial

court was in possession of Griffin’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”).

See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 5/18/22, at 4. See also Commonwealth v.

Howard, 281 A.3d 1081 (Pa. Super. 2022) (Table) 4 (secure court summaries

established sufficient evidence of prior felony convictions). Moreover, the

parties stipulated to Griffin’s prior robbery and aggravated assault convictions

at trial. See N.T. Trial, 3/9/22 at 173 (stipulating to prior felony convictions ____________________________________________

4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of this Court

issued after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value).

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rendering Griffin ineligible to carry firearm); see also N.T. Sentencing

Hearing, 5/18/22, at 8 (ADA noting Griffin’s prior convictions for robbery and

aggravated assault without objection). Accordingly, Griffin is entitled to no

relief on this claim.

In sum, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain

Griffin’s kidnapping conviction and provided reasonable notice and a complete

record of Griffin’s prior convictions as required under section 9714.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 7/22/2025

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