J-S42039-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RAHEEM GREEN : : Appellant : No. 179 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 17, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002219-2023
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: JANUARY 21, 2026
Raheem Green (“Green”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his convictions for strangulation and simple assault.1 We
affirm.
We glean the following facts from the testimony and evidence presented
at trial. In 2023, Officer Evan McKenna (“Officer McKenna”) and another
officer responded to a 911 call outside of an apartment building in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, based on a report that a “male and female [were] arguing and
someone saying they . . . had been choked.” N.T., 10/29/24, at 112. After
arriving on the scene, Officer McKenna observed a visibly injured Katherine
Osorio (“Osorio”), who “appeared to be extremely intoxicated [and] had
urinated on herself,” arguing and fighting with her sister at the bottom of a
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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2718(a)(1), 2701(a)(1). J-S42039-25
set of metal stairs leading up to an apartment residence. Upon breaking up
the physical altercation, the officers inquired into Osorio’s injuries, which
consisted of “bruising [and abrasions] on her neck [and] above her eye[.]”
Id. at 117, 136-38. In response, Osorio told police that her boyfriend of one
and one-half years, Green, had strangled her and “threw her into [a bath]tub”
during the birthday party taking place in the upstairs apartment. Id. at 110.
While Osorio additionally told police that she was mad at Green “for leaving
her at the party[,]” she did not mention any other cause for her injuries. Id.
at 111. Additionally, neither Osorio’s sister nor any of the other partygoers
approached police to tell them that Osorio “had [instead] injured them or
assaulted them[.]” Id. at 112, 116.
After giving the above statement to police, an ambulance arrived and
transported Osorio to a hospital for treatment of her injuries. Relevantly,
while she was in the emergency room (“ER”), Osorio reported to the triage
nurse that: (1) she had “rib pain[;]” (2) “it hurt[] to breathe[;]” and (3) she
suffered a “loss of consciousness after being choked.” Id. at 136.2 When the
hospital administered an abuse screening as a result of this report, Osorio
additionally responded “that she feels safe in her home but not safe in her
relationship.” Id. at 138. Police thereafter arrested Green, and the
Commonwealth charged him with strangulation and simple assault.
2 A “CAT scan” of Osorio’s chest revealed that she had “a severely displaced
fracture of . . . her right seventh rib.” N.T., 10/29/24, at 150.
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Following multiple continuances, the matter proceeded to a jury trial,
during which the Commonwealth presented evidence in the form of a
recording of both the 911 call and the police body-worn camera footage from
the night of the incident, as well as a prison phone call between Green and his
cousin following Green’s arrest. The Commonwealth additionally presented
testimony from Osorio, Detective Shawki Lacey (“Detective Lacey”), Officer
McKenna, and Osorio’s ER physician, Doctor Andrea Tydir (“Doctor Tydir”),
who the trial court qualified as an expert in diagnosing and treating traumatic
injuries.
Notably, when the Commonwealth called Osorio as a witness, she
relayed a sequence of events which differed from what she told police and
hospital staff on the night of the incident. In doing so, Osorio testified that
while she was attending the birthday party with Green, she was “[v]ery
belligerent and high” due to her consumption of an ecstasy pill and multiple
forms of alcohol, and that this had resulted in her “cussing[,]” disrespecting
other guests, and “acting in those ways of taking the party down[.]” Id. at
80-81. Osorio explained that although Green was initially “just kind of
cheering [this behavior] on[,]” he eventually led her into the bathroom to tell
her that they should leave the party, as her behavior was concerning to him
and “something he’s never seen before.” Id. at 81. Despite Osorio’s
testimony that she was “in and out of consciousness” at the time, she recalled
that Green’s attempts to get her to leave the party “triggered [her] to get . .
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. real angry[,]” to the extent that she “slapped” his phone out of his hand and
started “punching [and] kicking” such that she was “like beating him up [and]
putting [her] hands on him.” Id. at 81, 83.3 Osorio insisted that Green did
not fight back in response to these attacks, but instead managed to escape
from the bathroom and leave the party without her. Osorio then stated that
when she then attempted to follow Green out of the apartment, she was
“irate[,]” “hitting [her] head on walls[,]” and bumping into people and objects
alike. Id. at 85. Osorio clarified that by the time she finally managed to reach
the exit to the apartment, her inebriated and angered state caused her to fall
down the outside metal staircase. Id. at 86.
Upon reaching the bottom of the stairs, Osorio explained that she asked
her sister to call 911. Although Osorio initially claimed that she could not
remember what she and her sister said during this phone call, she conceded
that it was her on the 911 recording who was “[t]he person who says, I’ve
been assaulted[.]” Id. at 55. Osorio additionally testified that at some point
prior to police arriving on the scene, she and her sister got into “a big, big
fight[,]” such that they were “punching, kicking, [body slamming, pulling hair,
3 At trial, both parties stipulated to the fact that Green “did not have to be
medically cleared and did not have any visible injuries [thirty-six] hours after the incident in this case.” N.T., 10/29/24, at 118-19.
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and] everything you can think of being in a really big fight.” Id. at 56, 86.4
Osorio submitted that this fight ensued in part due to the fact that her sister
“wouldn’t let [her] pull [her] pants down” to urinate in the alleyway, and that
she had defiantly squatted down and urinated in her pants, regardless. Id.
at 57. Finaly, Osorio admitted to telling police that Green had strangled her
the night of the incident, but maintained that she could not remember if she
said the same to the ER triage nurse.5
Following Osorio’s testimony, Officer McKenna provided a contrasting
narrative, as we summarized above. In doing so, however, Officer McKenna
additionally opined, in his capacity as a lay witness and over Green’s objection,
that Osorio’s injuries and symptoms were consistent with that of
strangulation. Specifically, Officer McKenna stated that based on his five years
of employment with the Harrisburg Police Department, and his having
4 Although Osorio initially claimed that this fight took place following the 911
call, she later testified that it instead took place just before, and that the recording of the 911 call captured some of the resulting commotion. See N.T., 10/29/24, at 56, 77, 86.
5 We note that following Osorio’s testimony, the Commonwealth called Detective Lacey, a qualified expert from the Criminal Investigation Division, to assist with the interpretation of a pretrial recorded prison phone call between Green and his cousin, in which the Commonwealth alleged Green had told his cousin via coded language to threaten Osorio to provide false testimony at trial. During the phone call, Green told his cousin that he needed his “muscle” and “someone that’s strong-minded, who knows how to swing a fishing pole, bam bam[,]” to get in touch with and send a message to Osorio. N.T., 10/29/24, at 101. Detective Lacey opined that Green’s usage of the term “fishing pole” in this context was likely in reference “to a firearm.” Id.
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responded to multiple domestic violence cases involving strangulation during
that time, he believed that: (1) urinating oneself can be a sign of
strangulation; and (2) Osorio’s “bruising on her neck [was] consistent with
strangulation.” Id. at 116-17.6 Notably, the Commonwealth thereafter
presented the expert testimony of Doctor Tydir, who confirmed Officer
McKenna’s belief that Osorio’s injuries were the result of strangulation.
Specifically, Doctor Tydir testified that based on her review of Osorio’s patient
history, which noted Osorio’s report to the hospital triage nurse that she had
been strangled, and Doctor Tydir’s visual identification of “very specific” red
marks on Osorio’s neck that she explained are “only seen in cases of
strangulation[,]” her clinical impression was that Osorio’s injuries were caused
by “[a]ssault by manual strangulation[.]” Id. at 164, 166.
Green subsequently presented the testimony of Franklin Williams
(“Williams”), his cousin and a witness to the events at the party that evening,
before testifying himself. Relevantly, Williams testified that he witnessed
Green and Osorio enter into the bathroom during the party, and that while
they were in there, Osorio “went crazy[.]” Id. at 177. Williams elaborated
that because the bathroom door was open at the time, he was able to see
Osorio “yelling, screaming, [and] punching” Green, who “was [in turn] just in
6 On cross-examination, Officer McKenna conceded that another “common reason that someone might urinate on themselves” would be extreme intoxication. N.T., 10/29/24, at 114.
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there screaming . . . with his hands up” and telling her to get off of him. Id.
at 177-78. Green then testified, inter alia, that: (1) he asked Osorio to go
into the bathroom with him so that he could calm her down; (2) while they
were in the bathroom he tried to take a video of her with his cell phone, but
had to stop because he “didn’t want her to throw [his] phone in the toilet[;]”
(3) when he stopped recording and attempted to leave, Osorio “started hitting
[him] on the back of” his head, and eventually hit him “with [a clay/ceramic]
item from [the] bathroom sink[,]” which caused his ear to swell up; (4) he
never strangled, hit, or put his hands on Osorio while they were in the
bathroom; and (5) he never instructed anyone afterwards to either prevent
Osorio from appearing at trial or force her to lie about what happened. Id. at
183-85. Additionally, while Green conceded that “people do use the word
pole” to refer to a gun, he insisted that “a fishing pole is not a gun[,]” and
that he instead used the term to instruct his cousin to reach out to Osorio
regarding the status of his and Osorio’s relationship following the party. Id.
at 186-87. Similarly, Green clarified that he “never said bam bam” during the
phone call, and that he instead “said, wam wam[,] which means quick, fast,
and hurry.” Id. at 187.
At the conclusion of the trial, a jury convicted Green of both
strangulation and simple assault. On January 17, 2025, following the
preparation of a presentence investigation report, the trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of four and one-half to nine years’ imprisonment. Green
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did not file a post-sentence motion, but instead filed a timely notice of appeal,
whereupon both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Green raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court err
when it allowed the investigating officer to testify as to the medical symptoms
and causation, as well as diagnosis of the injuries of the victim, when his
testimony constituted expert testimony which the officer was not qualified
for?” Green’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Green’s sole issue challenges the admissibility of evidence at trial. We
review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings to determine whether the court
abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 325 A.3d 513, 518
(Pa. 2024). “An abuse of discretion is not simply an error of judgment, but is
an overriding misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will, or partiality.”
Id. at 519.
Relevantly, a witness may offer lay testimony in the form of an opinion
if it is: (a) rationally based on the witness’ perception; (b) helpful to clearly
understanding the witness’ testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. See
Pa.R.E. 701(a)-(c). By contrast, an expert must testify in relation to evidence
that requires explanation via “scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge . . . beyond that possessed by the average layperson.” Pa.R.E.
702(a).
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Although our appellate courts have not directly addressed whether a
party must produce an expert witness to testify to the physical processes
accompanying manual strangulation, as is the case here, our Supreme Court
has instructed that such testimony is required to explain those physical
processes accompanying ligature strangulation. See Commonwealth v.
Lopez, 854 A.2d 465, 470 (Pa. 2004) (explaining “[t]he average layperson is
generally unacquainted with the physical processes accompanying ligature
strangulation”). Accordingly, this Court has since required an expert to testify
in response to questions of whether a victim’s injuries were the result of
ligature strangulation. See Commonwealth v. Yocolano, 169 A.3d 47, 63
(Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that the trial court erred by permitting the
Commonwealth to ask a doctor and nurse, who were both testifying in their
capacities as lay witnesses, about whether the victim’s bruising on her ankles
and wrists was consistent with her account of being forcibly bound, as “[t]hese
conclusions required causation expertise[,] and there was no proffered
evidence that [either witness] regularly examined ligature and strangulation
marks[,] or had scientific knowledge on the subject”).
In the event that this Court determines that the trial court abused its
discretion by improperly admitting expert testimony into evidence via a lay
witness, our courts have consistently held that an appellant is only due relief
if the admission does not constitute “harmless error.” Commonwealth v.
Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671 (Pa. 2014). “The harmless error doctrine, as
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adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects the reality that the accused is entitled to a
fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Id. (citation omitted). As our Supreme Court
has explained:
Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
Id. at 671–72 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
Green argues that the Commonwealth improperly elicited expert
testimony from Officer McKenna when it asked him to expound on “the
symptoms of strangulation and whether [Osorio]’s injuries were consistent
with strangulation.” Green’s Brief at 10. Green maintains that because Officer
McKenna was testifying in his capacity as a police officer experienced in law
enforcement, he was not inherently qualified to testify as it relates to “medical
symptoms and diagnoses.” Id. Instead, Green contends that the
Commonwealth could only present this evidence via the testimony of a
medical expert.
In support, Green relies on Cominsky v. Donovan, 846 A.2d 1256,
1257 (Pa. Super. 2004), in which he asserts that this Court ruled the trial
court erred by allowing a comatose woman’s adult children to testify, in their
capacity as lay witnesses, that she “felt pain in a persistent vegetative state.”
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Id. at 12. Green asserts that just as this Court held that the adult children in
Cominsky did not have “the required medical knowledge to discuss the pain
suffered by the[ir] mother[,]” Officer McKenna did not have the requisite
medical knowledge to discuss “whether urination or the injuries [that Osorio]
suffered were caused by strangulation . . . to a degree of medical certainty.”
Id. at 13. Accordingly, Green avers that because Officer McKenna’s testimony
“was in essence a[n unqualified] diagnostic and medical opinion” given without
“a reasonable degree of scientific certainty[,]” it constituted inadmissible
testimony requiring the grant of a new trial. Id. at 14.
Lastly, Green argues that “the Commonwealth cannot meet its burden
to []prove harmless error[,]” as he contends that Officer McKenna’s testimony
was not cumulative with respect to Doctor Tydir’s diagnosis of strangulation,
as it instead “served to gloss over and bolster” the doctor’s conclusions. Id.
at 15. Further, Green insists that “the evidence was not so overwhelming to
establish guilt[,]” given that Osorio “testified that there was no altercation and
[that] she was incorrect in her earlier statements.” Id. Consequently, Green
maintains that because Officer McKenna’s improper assessment as to the
cause of Osorio’s injuries partially resolved the “battle of which testimony
should have been believed[,]” he asserts that “a new trial is necessary.” Id.
The trial court considered Green’s issue and determined that it was
without merit, reasoning as follows:
In the instant matter, Officer McKenna was a witness for the Commonwealth. He is a police officer with the Harrisburg Police
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Department and has been working the midnight shift for approximately five years. He testified that he has responded to numerous domestic incidents over the five years that he has worked as a police officer. He received a 911 call on March 25, 2023 stating that a male and female were arguing, and someone said that they had been choked. He went to the address mentioned in the 911 call and spoke with [Osorio,] the alleged victim. [Osorio] reported that her boyfriend had strangled her and thrown her into a bathtub.
Upon cross[-]examination, Officer McKenna noted [Osorio] urinated on herself. He also acknowledged that a common reason that someone might urinate on themselves is because of extreme intoxication. Thereafter, on re-direct, and over [Green]’s objection, Officer McKenna was asked if, in his experience dealing with strangulation cases, urinating on yourself was a sign of strangulation. Officer McKenna said yes to this question. Also[,] over [Green]’s objection, Officer McKenna was asked if [Osorio’s] injuries matched what she had reported as happening. Officer McKenna testified that [Osorio] had bruising on her neck, which is consistent with strangulation.
Upon review of Officer McKenna’s testimony, we find that he did not provide expert testimony. Rather, he provided permissible lay opinion testimony that was based on his experience as a police officer who has previously responded to strangulation cases. Officer McKenna testified that, in his experience, urinating oneself can be a sign of both extreme intoxication and strangulation. This is permissible lay testimony because it is based on facts within his knowledge, specifically what he has personally observed in other instances involving strangulation.
His testimony was also rationally based on his perception of [Osorio]’s injuries and her report of what occurred on the night in question. It does not require scientific[,] technical[,] or other specialized knowledge to recognize that a bruised neck is consistent with strangulation. Thus[,] it was permissible lay testimony for Officer McKenna to opine that [Osorio]’s bruised neck was consistent with strangulation.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/25, at unnumbered 2-3 (citations omitted).
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In the instant case, we preliminarily determine that we need not address
whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Officer McKenna’s
at-issue testimony into evidence, as we deem that any such error would have
nonetheless been harmless. In doing so, we recognize that we are side-
stepping the unexplored issue of whether the physical processes behind
manual strangulation are so distinct from those associated with ligature
strangulation that a separate analysis is required to determine whether they
are within the general understanding of the average layperson. However, in
reviewing the briefs submitted by both parties, we note that neither side cites
to any authority, either persuasive or controlling, to advance an argument
that directly answers this question.7 Consequently, although this panel is
inclined to agree with the trial court in this instance — that the average
layperson generally understands the physical processes associated with
manual strangulation to the extent that bruising might result from its
occurrence — we do not believe that this case offers the proper venue to make
such a distinguishable ruling. Accordingly, we limit our analysis herein to
determining whether any error made by the trial court in this regard was
nonetheless harmless.
7 Although Green cites to Yocolano in his appellate brief, he only does so to
establish that “[e]xpert testimony must be based on reasonable degrees of certainty.” Green’s Brief at 11.
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Here, we observe that Officer McKenna’s potentially impermissible
testimony, that Osorio’s neck bruising was a result of strangulation and that
her urination could be a symptom of said strangulation, went towards proving
the Commonwealth’s theory that Osorio had been strangled on the night of
the incident. Notably, however, this was not the only evidence that the
Commonwealth presented at trial in support of this fact. We highlight the
Commonwealth additionally presented both the 911 call, in which Osorio
identified herself as “[t]he person who says, I’ve been assaulted[,]” as well as
police body-worn camera footage which captured a visibly injured Osorio
stating to police that Green had strangled her and “threw her into [a bath]tub”
during the birthday party taking place in the upstairs apartment. N.T.,
10/29/24, at 55, 110.
Crucially, the Commonwealth also presented testimony from Doctor
Tydir, Osorio’s treating ER physician and a qualified expert in diagnosing and
treating traumatic injuries, who professionally opined that Osorio’s injuries
were consistent with “[a]ssault by manual strangulation[.]” Id. at 164. In
forming this medical opinion, Doctor Tydir explained that she relied on her
review of Osorio’s patient history, which noted Osorio’s report to the triage
nurse that she had been strangled, as well as Doctor Tydir’s visual
identification of “very specific” red marks on Osorio’s neck, which she
explained are “only seen in cases of strangulation[.]” Id. at 166.
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Given the existence of the above substantially similar, untainted
evidence that the Commonwealth provided to support a finding that Osorio
had been strangled, we discern that Officer McKenna’s testimony in this regard
was “merely cumulative” to other admissible evidence. Thus, any error made
by the trial court in admitting Officer McKenna’s testimony into evidence was
harmless. See Hairston, 84 A.3d at 671. Consequently, because we
determine that Green’s sole issue on appeal does not merit relief, we affirm
his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge King joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 01/21/2026
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