Com. v. Green, C.

Opinion

J-S12022-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CURTIS D. GREEN : : Appellant : No. 2269 EDA 2025 :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 22, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003004-2022

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JULY 6, 2026

Curtis Green (“Green”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following his open guilty plea to corrupt organizations, four counts of selling

firearms to ineligible person, one count of conspiracy, one count of dealing in

unlawful proceeds, and one count of persons not to possess firearms. 1 After

careful review, we determine Green’s challenge to his guilty plea is both

waived and meritless. We therefore affirm.

The facts to which Green pled guilty established the following. On

September 1, 2021, Nicole Duvall (“Green’s girlfriend”) bought two handguns

at a gun store. See N.T., 3/8/23, at 11. Although she indicated on the

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 911(b)(2), 6111(g)(2), 903(a), 5111(a)(1), 6105(a)(2). J-S12022-26

application/record of sale she was buying the guns for herself, she was

actually purchasing them for Green. See id.

Later that month, Green took his girlfriend to a gun store and directed

her to buy a nine-millimeter firearm and a .22-caliber firearm. Green’s

girlfriend again completed a form falsely claiming she was buying firearms for

herself when she was in fact buying them for Green and the criminal

organization he formed with his brother and at least one other person. See

id.

Two weeks later, Green’s girlfriend bought two more handguns and

again falsely completed forms declaring she bought them for herself, rather

than for Green. See id. at 12. On September 30, 2021, Norristown police

arrested Green and found him in possession of one of the guns he directed his

girlfriend to buy. See id. Green admitted that he had a prior conviction that

disqualified him from possessing a firearm. See id.

In March 2023, Green entered an open guilty plea to the above listed

charges.2 Green’s attorney, George M. Griffith, Jr., Esquire (“Attorney

Griffith”), conducted the first part of Green’s oral colloquy. Green testified he

can read, write, and understand English, was not under the influence of drugs

or alcohol, and his then-current mental health treatment did not affect his

ability to understand his plea. See id. at 4-5. Green also testified he

understood the charges to which he was pleading guilty and confirmed he and ____________________________________________

2 At the plea hearing, the Commonwealth introduced into evidence the affidavit of probable cause for Green’s arrest. See N.T., 3/8/23, at 12.

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Attorney Griffith had discussed the charges for several prior months and again

immediately before the plea hearing. Green stated he understood all of the

charged offenses and the maximum sentences he could receive. See id. at

6-7.

Attorney Griffith informed the court he and Green had discussed the

case “ad nauseam” for “the better part of a year.” See id. at 7. Green

confirmed Attorney Griffith had answered all his questions concerning the

plea. See id. at 7-8. Green also testified he reviewed a written guilty plea

colloquy with Attorney Griffith immediately prior to the hearing, which he

signed and dated. See id. at 8. Green then testified he understood he was

giving up the right to a jury trial in favor of an open guilty plea. See id. at 8-

9. Green also stated he had no questions for the judge, the Commonwealth,

or his counsel. See id. at 10.

Following the Commonwealth’s recitation of the charges, the trial court

explained to Green that the decision to plead guilty was his to make, not

counsel’s, and assured itself Green’s plea was not the result of force or

promises. See id. at 14-15.3 The court found Green knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily waived his right to a trial and pleaded guilty. See id. at 19-

20.

3 The court also told Green there was no agreement as to sentence and that

it had total discretion in sentencing. See N.T., 3/8/23, at 14-15. Green stated that he understood. See id.

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Green failed to appear for sentencing; he was later arrested on a bench

warrant. At the sentencing hearing in July, a certified recovery specialist and

re-entry coach testified on Green’s behalf. Prior to imposing sentence, the

court explained to Green that by pleading guilty, he waived all appellate rights

except challenges to the court’s jurisdiction, the legality of the sentence, and

the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of the plea. See N.T., 7/22/25,

at 32-35. The court then imposed an aggregate sentence of seven and one-

half to seventeen years of imprisonment. See id. at 47-51.

Green filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of

sentence. The motion sought a reduction of the sentence but did not challenge

the validity of Green’s guilty plea. See Green’s Post-Sentence Motion,

7/24/25, at 3-4. The trial court denied Green’s post-sentence motion.

Green filed a timely notice of appeal. Ordered to identify his issues on

appeal, Green filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to PA.R.A.P. 1925(b). In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Green

asserted for the first time that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary

because the oral colloquy failed to inform him of all of the rights he waived by

pleading guilty.

On appeal, Green raises one question:

Did the [trial] court err in accepting [Green’s] guilty plea since the plea was not knowing[ly] and voluntarily entered because [Green’s] oral guilty plea colloquy failed to explain [Green’s] right to a jury trial, including: (1) the fact that the jury would be composed of a jury of his peers, (2) that [Green] would have the right to participate in jury selection, (3) that a jury’s verdict would

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need to be unanimous, and (4) that [Green] would be presumed innocent unless the Commonwealth established the elements of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt; and the colloquy, likewise, failed to explain the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses?

See Green’s Brief at 3.

Before addressing the merits of Green’s issue, we must first determine

whether he preserved his challenge to the validity of his guilty plea.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720 permits defendants to file post-

sentence motions “challenging the validity of a plea of guilty.” Pa.R.Crim.P.

720(B)(1)(a)(i). The motion “shall be filed no later than 10 days after

imposition of sentence.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (A)(1).

To preserve an issue related to a guilty plea on direct appeal, “an

appellant must either object at the sentence colloquy or otherwise raise the

issue at the sentencing hearing or through a post-sentence motion.”

Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466, 468-69 (Pa. Super.

2017) (internal citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted). Similarly,

“[a] defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct

appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw

the plea within ten days of sentencing. Failure to employ either measure

results in waiver.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609—10 (Pa.

Super. 2013). Further, raising an issue for the first time in a Rule 1925(b)

statement does not preserve it for appellate review. See Commonwealth v.

Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. Super. 2003); Commonwealth v. Lemon,

804 A.2d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 2002).

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Here, Green did not object during the guilty plea colloquy and did not

challenge the validity of his plea at sentencing. Although Green filed a timely

post-sentence motion, that motion sought only reconsideration of the

sentence; it did not seek withdrawal of the guilty plea or otherwise challenge

the validity of the plea. See Post-Sentence Motion to Reconsider Sentence,

7/24/25, at 3-4. Green did not assert a claim asserting the alleged deficiency

of his plea colloquy until his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Green’s Concise

Statement, 9/12/25. Under these circumstances, Green has not preserved a

challenge to the validity of his guilty plea, and his challenge to his guilty plea

is waived. See Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d at 468-69; Lincoln, 72 A.3d at

609-10; Watson, 835 A.2d at 791. Even if Green had preserved this claim, he would not be entitled to relief.

To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See

Commonwealth v. Felix, 303 A.3d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. 2023). The law

presumes that a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of what he

was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. See

Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 506 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Additionally, a defendant is:

bound by the statements which he makes during his plea colloquy. Therefore, a defendant may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled guilty, and he may not recant the representations he made in court when he entered his guilty plea. Moreover, the law does not require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to plead guilty. The law requires only that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

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Id. at 506 (internal citations and quotations omitted). To ensure a knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent plea, courts accepting guilty pleas are required to

delve into six areas: “(1) the nature of the charges; (2) the factual basis of

the plea; (3) the right to a jury trial; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5)

the sentencing ranges; and (6) the plea court’s power to deviate from any

recommended sentence.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Jamison, 284

A.3d 501, 506 (Pa. Super. 2022); Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. This Court evaluates

the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea

by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that

plea. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016);

Commonwealth v. Knight, 618 A.2d 442, 445 (Pa. Super. 1992). Thus, the

omission of specific language from an oral colloquy does not automatically

invalidate a plea where the record as a whole demonstrates the defendant

understood the rights he waived by pleading guilty. See Mallory, 941 A.2d

at 696-97; Knight, 618 A.2d at 445.

In examining whether a defendant has been adequately apprised of the

right to a jury trial, our Supreme Court has explained that “a waiver colloquy

is a procedural device; it is not a constitutional end or a constitutional ‘right.’”

Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 697 (Pa. 2008). Rather than

focusing on the precise words used during the colloquy, courts examine

whether the defendant understood the “essential ingredients, basic to the

concept of a jury trial,” namely, “the jury must be chosen from members of

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the community (i.e. a jury of one's peers), that the verdict be unanimous, and

that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.”

Id. at 696-697.

Here, the record as a whole refutes Green’s claim that his plea was

unknowing or involuntary. Although the oral colloquy did not separately recite

each jury-trial component Green now identifies, the written guilty plea

colloquy did. In the written colloquy, Green acknowledged that he

understood: the right to a jury trial; that the jury would be selected from

members of the community; that he had the right to participate in jury

selection; that the jury’s verdict would have to be unanimous; and that he

was presumed innocent unless the Commonwealth proved his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Written Guilty Plea, 3/8/23, at 3. Green reviewed the

written colloquy with counsel immediately before the plea hearing, signed and

dated it, and confirmed under oath that he has reviewed it with counsel. See

N.T., 3/8/23, at 8. Therefore, while the oral guilty plea could have been more

comprehensive, Green’s plea is not invalid merely because the oral

examination did not repeat every advisement contained in the written

colloquy. See Kelly, 136 A.3d at 1013; Lincoln, 72 A.3d at 610.

Green’s own sworn statements further defeat his claim. At the plea

hearing, Green confirmed that he could read, write, and understand English;

that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol; that his mental health

treatment did not affect his ability to understand the plea; that he understood

the charges and maximum sentences; that counsel had answered all of his

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questions; that he reviewed and signed the written colloquy; and that no one

forced or promised him anything to induce the plea. See N.T., 3/8/23/ at 4-

10, 14-15. Green is bound by his sworn representations and may not now

obtain relief by contradicting them. See Jabbie, 200 A.3d at 506.

Green’s claim regarding the right to confront and cross-examine

witnesses does not alter our conclusion. Green was represented by counsel,

reviewed the written colloquy with counsel, confirmed that counsel answered

all of his questions, admitted the factual basis for the plea, and repeatedly

stated that he understood the plea proceedings. Moreover, Green has not

cited any contrary authority. Under the totality of the circumstances, Green

has not shown that any alleged omission in the oral colloquy rendered his plea

unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. See Kelly, 136 A.3d at 1013;

Knight, 618 A.2d at 445.

Green’s reliance on cases concerning defective colloquies does not

compel relief. This case is unlike Commonwealth v. Clyburn, 42 A.3d 296

(Pa. Super. 2012), which involved waiver of counsel and not a guilty plea.

Green did not proceed without counsel. Green reviewed the written colloquy

with counsel shortly before entering his plea and confirmed counsel had

answered all of his questions.

Moreover, our review of the record also demonstrates that the trial court

reiterated Green’s remaining appellate rights at sentencing. The trial court

expressly explained that, after the guilty plea, Green retained the right to

challenge whether the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; whether

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the court had jurisdiction; and whether the court imposed a legal sentence.

See Sentencing, 7/22/25, at 32-34. Despite being advised of these rights,

Green’s post-sentence motion challenged only the sentence and did not seek

withdrawal of the plea. Thus, even after the trial court specifically identified

the very category of claim Green now raises, Green did not preserve it.

Finally, the record does not demonstrate “manifest injustice.” Lincoln,

72 A.3d at 610. After sentencing, a guilty plea may be withdrawn only to

correct manifest injustice, which occurs where the plea was not tendered

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. See id. There is no evidence of

manifest injustice here. Green was represented by counsel, reviewed and

executed a written colloquy, gave responsive answers under oath, admitted

the factual basis for the plea, confirmed that he understood he was waiving

his right to trial, and acknowledged that no one forced or threatened him to

plead guilty. The record therefore shows that Green entered his open guilty

plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Accordingly, Green’s challenge

to his guilty plea is waived and, in any event, meritless.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 7/6/2026

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