Com. v. Graeff, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 30, 2026
• Docket: 1257 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Panella

Opinion

J-S05011-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TODD ALAN GRAEFF : : Appellant : No. 1257 EDA 2025 :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 17, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000523-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 30, 2026

Todd Alan Graeff appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County after he was convicted of indecent

assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). Graeff challenges the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence. We affirm.

We glean the following facts from the certified record. Graeff and

Kimberly Geyer worked with each other for about fifteen years at the Manor

Township Police Department. Since about 2007, Graeff served as the chief of

police. During Graeff’s tenure, Geyer was promoted to lieutenant and was

second in command.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S05011-26

Graeff invited Geyer to attend a multi-day police conference at Kalahari

Resort in Monroe County and to stay overnight with him. Geyer declined

Graeff’s invitation to stay overnight but agreed to attend during the daytime

for one day. Geyer attended the conference on July 25, 2022. After some

morning events, Graeff and Geyer decided to go to the water park together.

At trial, Geyer testified to the following. Before going to the water park,

Geyer used the bathroom in Graeff’s room to change into her bathing suit.

When she finished getting changed Graeff told her, “I thought you would

change in front of me.” N.T., 8/14/24, at 37. Geyer stated, “just because some

of the guys think I sucked your dick to get promoted, doesn’t mean it’s true.”

Id. Graeff responded, “let’s prove [th]em right.” Id. This comment made

Geyer uncomfortable, but she laughed it off and the two proceeded to go to

the water park for a few hours.

At the water park, Graeff suggested that they go down a double tube

water slide together. Graeff sat behind Geyer and, despite there being handles

on the tube, he told her that “I’m [going to] be grabbing you the whole way

down the slide[.]” Id. at 38. Geyer remarked to the lifeguard, “he’s probably

going to grab my boobs[.]” Id. When they went down the water slide, Graeff

put both of his arms across Geyer’s shoulders and “grabb[ed]” and

“massag[ed]” Geyer’s breasts while saying “oh yeah, oh yeah, oh yeah[.]” Id.

Geyer was “mortified” about what happened. Id. She went into “survivor

mode” for the remaining time she was at the water park with Graeff. Id.

-2- J-S05011-26

During that time, Geyer commented to Graeff that she could sue him for age

discrimination. Graeff responded, “oh you could get me on more than that.”

Id.

Geyer returned to Graeff’s room to gather her belongings and change

out of her bathing suit so she could leave. When Geyer exited the bathroom,

Graeff was shirtless (he wore a shirt at the water park) and said to her “are

you sure I can’t change you?” Id. at 40. Geyer understood this to be a

reference to her sexual orientation as Graeff was aware that Geyer was

married to a woman.1 As Geyer left, Graeff gave her a hug and kissed her on

the cheek. He told her, “I may have crossed the line today.” Id.

The next day at work, Geyer told the secretary and, later that same day

the township manager, what happened. Geyer was encouraged to put her

statement in writing, which she did. By the end of that week, Graeff was placed

on paid leave pending an internal investigation. About a month later, police

opened a criminal investigation. On September 7, 2022, under the direction

of the lead detective, Geyer made a recorded phone call to Graeff during which

Graeff apologized to Geyer.

Graeff was charged with one count of indecent assault and the matter

proceeded to a jury trial on August 14, 2024. Geyer testified to her version of

1 In 2017, Graeff explicitly asked Geyer about her sexual orientation.

-3- J-S05011-26

events as stated above. Graeff testified to his own version of events. 2

Generally, Graeff testified that he never made any sexually suggestive

comments to Geyer, or he only made them in a friendly joking manner, and

that when they went down the water slide together he lost his balance and

inadvertently touched Geyer’s breasts with an open hand. Further, he testified

that on the recorded phone call he apologized to Geyer because he was

instructed by the township not to discuss the incident with anyone in the police

department and because the incident was an accident. The jury found Graeff

guilty of indecent assault.

On December 17, 2024, Graeff was sentenced to sixty days to two years’

incarceration. Graeff filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied

after a hearing. Graeff timely appealed. Graeff and the trial court both

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. 3 See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)-(b).

Graeff raises the following issues for our review.

1. Was the evidence insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the charge of indecent assault?

2 The remaining testimony came from the lead detective and three character

witnesses who testified on Graeff’s behalf.

3 The trial court wrote a brief statement in which it referred to the portion of

the post-sentence motion hearing transcript where it explained on the record why Graeff’s weight and sufficiency claims lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/15/25, at 1-2.

-4- J-S05011-26

2. Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion in denying [Graeff’s] postsentence motion seeking a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

In his first issue, Graeff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

“Because a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence presents a

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Bettis, 347 A.3d 779, 786-87 (Pa. Super.

2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, the following

well-established principles guide our review:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted). Moreover, “the uncorroborated testimony of the

complaining witness is sufficient to convict a defendant of sexual offenses.”

-5- J-S05011-26

Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 602 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

To establish the crime of indecent assault, the Commonwealth must

prove:

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the complainant and:

(1) the person does so without the complainant’s consent[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1).

Indecent contact is “[a]ny touching of the sexual or intimate parts of

the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any

person.”4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. “[T]he Commonwealth need not establish skin

to skin contact to sustain a conviction of indecent assault.” Commonwealth

v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 268 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Additionally, as with any element of a criminal offense,

“[t]he element that the touching was done for the purpose of arousing or

gratifying sexual desire can be proven by circumstantial evidence.”

4 It is undisputed that a woman’s breasts constitute “sexual or intimate parts.”

See Commonwealth v. Richter, 676 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa. Super. 1996).

-6- J-S05011-26

Commonwealth v. Wood, 346 A.3d 344, 2025 WL 2320254, at *4 (Pa.

Super. filed Aug. 12, 2025) (unpublished memorandum). 5

Graeff argues that there was insufficient evidence that he intentionally

touched Geyer’s breasts for his own sexual gratification. See Appellant’s Brief,

at 18. He argues that the evidence demonstrated that his contact with Geyer

was inadvertent because, during the ride, he did not have a front view of

Geyer and he was not securely seated in the water tube and lost his balance.

See id. at 19-20. Further, he argues that his suggestive comments to Geyer

were insufficient to establish that he touched Geyer’s breasts for sexual

gratification.6 See id. at 21-22.

Graeff’s argument is merely a disagreement with the jury believing

Geyer’s version of events rather than his own. The trial court aptly

summarized the evidence that supported the verdict.

[W]ith respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, there was ample evidence to support this verdict. [. . .] Ms. Geyer testified that as she and [Graeff] went down a waterslide, at the waterpark to which she was invited to a police conference, he grabbed her ____________________________________________

5 Unpublished memorandums filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their

persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

6 Graeff stops short of arguing that Geyer consented to Graeff touching her

breasts and concedes that Geyer did not give Graeff “explicit consent to have sexual contact[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 21. However, he asserts that Geyer’s comments “could have created a belief that she consented to being grabbed by [Graeff] during the slide[,]” and “created a certain tone for the day.” Id. at 18, 21. Because Graeff does not fully argue that Geyer consented to him grabbing her breasts we need not discuss the issue of consent in detail. We merely note that Geyer clearly testified that she did not consent to Graeff grabbing her breasts. See N.T., 8/14/24, at 38, 52.

-7- J-S05011-26

breasts, was making noises, she became mortified, and she also indicated that she did not consent to that touching. By itself, that’s enough to support the verdict and conviction[.]

....

I will also note, as [the Commonwealth] mentioned, that the testimony doesn’t stand alone in this matter. There were other parts of Ms. Geyer’s testimony that if believed by the jury were sufficient to demonstrate the crime and or the elements thereof, but in addition to that there [were], [. . .] statements made by [Graeff] with respect to his knowledge that what had happened wasn’t right, as we heard from [the Commonwealth] and Ms. Geyer, who is in[ . . .] a lesbian relationship and is married, [that Graeff] said he wanted to turn her or change her, or words to that effect. There was also the consensual phone call during which there were apologies made, and there were other statements in which [Graeff . . .] acknowledged enough, that if believed by the jury, that he was at least acknowledging that an incident and the touching occurred.

With respect to the [element of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, . . .] I think that inviting a subordinate to a [police] chief’s meeting at a waterpark, having her change in your room, making the comments that [Graeff] made to her, grabbing and touching her breasts on the waterslide, and making noises at the time, and the effect it had, and then later saying that he was trying to change her sexuality, is much more than enough to support the element of the offense that would require someone to demonstrate that the touching was for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in one or both of them.

N.T., 5/2/25, at 10-14 (paragraphs added).

Geyer testified that Graeff did not merely touch her breasts but

“grabb[ed]” and “massag[ed]” them while saying “oh, yeah.” This testimony

alone was sufficient for the jury to infer that Graeff grabbed and massaged

Geyer’s breasts for the purpose of gratifying his sexual desire. See Gilliam,

-8- J-S05011-26

249 A.3d at 267-68. Geyer’s testimony about Graeff’s suggestive comments

before and after the incident lend further support to this inference. Therefore,

Graeff’s sufficiency claim fails.

In his second issue, Graeff challenges the weight of the evidence.

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. When a trial court considers a motion for a new trial based upon a weight of the evidence claim, the trial court may award relief only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. The inquiry is not the same for an appellate court. Rather, when an appellate court reviews a weight claim, the court is reviewing the exercise of discretion by the trial court, not the underlying question of whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The appellate court reviews a weight claim using an abuse of discretion standard.

At trial, the jury [is] the ultimate fact-finder and the sole arbiter of the credibility of each of the witnesses. Issues of witness credibility include questions of inconsistent testimony and improper motive. A jury is entitled to resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s evidence in the manner that it sees fit.

Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Graeff argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence

because Geyer was not credible and he presented three character witnesses

who testified about his reputation as a law-abiding, peaceful, and truthful

person. See Appellant’s Brief, at 25-32. Graeff argues that Geyer was not

credible because her comments and actions before and after the incident

-9- J-S05011-26

contradicted her testimony that she felt uncomfortable with Graeff and that

he intentionally grabbed her breasts. See id. at 27-30. Further, Graeff claims

that Geyer was motivated to lie because, when he was suspended, she was

promoted to interim chief of police. See id. at 28-29.

At the post-trial motion hearing, after explaining why Graeff’s sufficiency

claim was without merit, the trial court addressed Graeff’s weight claim.

With respect to the weight of the evidence, I really don’t need to say much, it’s really the same thing. The jury heard all the evidence, the jury decided this. There is absolutely no reason, in fact the weight claim to me is frivolous, and there is no reason for this Court, or any other court for that matter, to impact or take away the province of the jury with respect to the weight claim.

N.T., 5/2/25, at 14.

We discern no abuse of discretion with the trial court denying Graeff’s

weight of the evidence claim. The jury clearly credited Geyer’s version of

events. It was the jury’s role to make this credibility determination including

resolving inconsistencies and assessing the witnesses’ motives. See Jacoby,

170 A.3d at 1080. The arguments asserted by Graeff that the verdict is so

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice are unpersuasive.

Therefore, Graeff is not entitled to relief.

Accordingly, we affirm Graeff’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

- 10 - J-S05011-26

Date: 4/30/2026

- 11 -