J-S39019-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
JEFFERY GOODWIN
Appellant No. 2155 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 1, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0527261-1994
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2015
Jeffery Goodwin brings this pro se appeal from the order entered on
July 1, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, that
dismissed as untimely his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA).1 Goodwin contends his petition may be reviewed based
upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 1733 (June 25, 2012). In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional right for juveniles under the age of eighteen,
holding that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at
the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. J-S39019-15
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 132 S. Ct. at 2460. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
The PCRA court has aptly summarized the facts and procedural history
underlying this appeal:
[Goodwin] was found guilty after a jury trial of first degree murder before the Honorable Judge James A. Lineberger on May 8, 1997. On the same day, [Goodwin] was sentenced by Judge Lineberger to serve a life sentence. After [Goodwin] filed his timely appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 4, 1999. The Supreme Court denied allocatur on December 9, 1999. [Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 745 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 749 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1999).]
[Goodwin] filed his first post conviction relief petition through private counsel on December 8, 2000. The petition for relief was denied on February 19, 2003, after a notice of dismissal under criminal Rule 907 was sent by Judge Lineberger advising [Goodwin] that his issues were without merit. [Goodwin] filed his appeal on March 10, 2003. The Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of his PCRA petition on August 16, 2004, and denied [Goodwin’s] application for reargument on October 21, 2004. [Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 863 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. 2004)]. [Goodwin] filed his second PCRA petition on February 18, 2005. The lower court dismissed his second PCRA petition on August 2, 2005. No appeal was filed.
[Goodwin] filed his current post conviction petition on October 17, 2011.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/3/2014, at 1-2.
On November 21, 2011, Goodwin filed a response to the PCRA court’s
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. On April 12, 2012, he filed an amended PCRA
petition, and, on April 20, 2014, filed a memorandum of law in support of
the amended petition. The docket reflects that, on August 7, 2012, Goodwin
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filed an amended PCRA petition with a “Miller claim.” The PCRA Court
determined that Goodwin’s PCRA petition was untimely filed and he did not
prove that any PCRA exception applied to excuse the late filing. This appeal
followed.2
“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
Court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2014)
(quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2695 (2014).
All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the
judgment of sentence becomes final, unless the petition alleges, and the
petitioner proves, that one of the three enumerated exceptions to the time
for filing requirement is met. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is
deemed final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3). Here, Goodwin’s judgment of sentence became final on March
8, 2000, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his
petition for allowance of appeal and no petition for writ of certiorari was filed
in the United States Supreme Court. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13. Therefore,
2 The trial court did not issue an order requiring Goodwin to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
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the present petition, filed on October 17, 2011 is patently untimely.
Because Goodwin’s petition was untimely, he was required to plead and
prove any of three statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Here, the only issue addressed by the PCRA court was whether
Goodwin’s petition satisfied the PCRA’s exception for a new constitutional
right of retroactive effect, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), 3 based on the United
States Court decisions in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) and
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). The PCRA court concluded that
these cases do not establish a time-bar exception.4
In this appeal, however, Goodwin does not contest the PCRA court’s
decision with regard to Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper. Rather, he
3 Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) requires a petitioner to plead and prove “a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). 4 The PCRA court added in a footnote:
All of the claims made by [Goodwin] have not been addressed as they have been previously litigated or waived as “any claim not raised in [his] PCRA petition is waived and not cognizable on appeal.” See 42 Pa.C.S. 9544(a); Pa.R.A.P. Rule 302 (stating “issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/3/2014, at 4.
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presents five issues, claiming that he has satisfied Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)
based upon Miller v. Alabama, supra.5 Specifically, Goodwin raises the
following issues in his Statement of Questions Involved:
A. Did the Common Pleas Court commit an error by not ruling on [Goodwin’s] Miller claim?
B. Does mandatory life-without-parole terms for adults in homicide cases violate state & federal equal protection clauses, as well as Art. 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
C. Does life-without-parole terms for adults in homicide cases violate state & federal equal protection clauses, as well as Art. 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
D. Does mandatory life-without-parole terms for individuals over 17 violate the 8th Amendment & Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as Art. I § 13 of the Pa. Constitution?
E. Should a new trial with a life qualified jury be awarded because [Goodwin’s] age changes the possible punishment for 1st degree murder?
Goodwin’s Brief at 2.
As already mentioned, the docket reflects that, on August 7, 2012,
Goodwin filed an amended PCRA petition with a “Miller claim.” However,
5 We note that Miller v.
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J-S39019-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
JEFFERY GOODWIN
Appellant No. 2155 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 1, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0527261-1994
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2015
Jeffery Goodwin brings this pro se appeal from the order entered on
July 1, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, that
dismissed as untimely his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA).1 Goodwin contends his petition may be reviewed based
upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 1733 (June 25, 2012). In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional right for juveniles under the age of eighteen,
holding that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at
the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. J-S39019-15
‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 132 S. Ct. at 2460. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
The PCRA court has aptly summarized the facts and procedural history
underlying this appeal:
[Goodwin] was found guilty after a jury trial of first degree murder before the Honorable Judge James A. Lineberger on May 8, 1997. On the same day, [Goodwin] was sentenced by Judge Lineberger to serve a life sentence. After [Goodwin] filed his timely appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 4, 1999. The Supreme Court denied allocatur on December 9, 1999. [Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 745 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 749 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1999).]
[Goodwin] filed his first post conviction relief petition through private counsel on December 8, 2000. The petition for relief was denied on February 19, 2003, after a notice of dismissal under criminal Rule 907 was sent by Judge Lineberger advising [Goodwin] that his issues were without merit. [Goodwin] filed his appeal on March 10, 2003. The Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of his PCRA petition on August 16, 2004, and denied [Goodwin’s] application for reargument on October 21, 2004. [Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 863 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. 2004)]. [Goodwin] filed his second PCRA petition on February 18, 2005. The lower court dismissed his second PCRA petition on August 2, 2005. No appeal was filed.
[Goodwin] filed his current post conviction petition on October 17, 2011.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/3/2014, at 1-2.
On November 21, 2011, Goodwin filed a response to the PCRA court’s
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. On April 12, 2012, he filed an amended PCRA
petition, and, on April 20, 2014, filed a memorandum of law in support of
the amended petition. The docket reflects that, on August 7, 2012, Goodwin
-2- J-S39019-15
filed an amended PCRA petition with a “Miller claim.” The PCRA Court
determined that Goodwin’s PCRA petition was untimely filed and he did not
prove that any PCRA exception applied to excuse the late filing. This appeal
followed.2
“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
Court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2014)
(quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2695 (2014).
All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the
judgment of sentence becomes final, unless the petition alleges, and the
petitioner proves, that one of the three enumerated exceptions to the time
for filing requirement is met. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is
deemed final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3). Here, Goodwin’s judgment of sentence became final on March
8, 2000, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his
petition for allowance of appeal and no petition for writ of certiorari was filed
in the United States Supreme Court. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13. Therefore,
2 The trial court did not issue an order requiring Goodwin to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
-3- J-S39019-15
the present petition, filed on October 17, 2011 is patently untimely.
Because Goodwin’s petition was untimely, he was required to plead and
prove any of three statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Here, the only issue addressed by the PCRA court was whether
Goodwin’s petition satisfied the PCRA’s exception for a new constitutional
right of retroactive effect, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), 3 based on the United
States Court decisions in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) and
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). The PCRA court concluded that
these cases do not establish a time-bar exception.4
In this appeal, however, Goodwin does not contest the PCRA court’s
decision with regard to Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper. Rather, he
3 Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) requires a petitioner to plead and prove “a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). 4 The PCRA court added in a footnote:
All of the claims made by [Goodwin] have not been addressed as they have been previously litigated or waived as “any claim not raised in [his] PCRA petition is waived and not cognizable on appeal.” See 42 Pa.C.S. 9544(a); Pa.R.A.P. Rule 302 (stating “issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/3/2014, at 4.
-4- J-S39019-15
presents five issues, claiming that he has satisfied Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)
based upon Miller v. Alabama, supra.5 Specifically, Goodwin raises the
following issues in his Statement of Questions Involved:
A. Did the Common Pleas Court commit an error by not ruling on [Goodwin’s] Miller claim?
B. Does mandatory life-without-parole terms for adults in homicide cases violate state & federal equal protection clauses, as well as Art. 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
C. Does life-without-parole terms for adults in homicide cases violate state & federal equal protection clauses, as well as Art. 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
D. Does mandatory life-without-parole terms for individuals over 17 violate the 8th Amendment & Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as Art. I § 13 of the Pa. Constitution?
E. Should a new trial with a life qualified jury be awarded because [Goodwin’s] age changes the possible punishment for 1st degree murder?
Goodwin’s Brief at 2.
As already mentioned, the docket reflects that, on August 7, 2012,
Goodwin filed an amended PCRA petition with a “Miller claim.” However,
5 We note that Miller v. Alabama, supra, was issued on June 25, 2012, and that Goodwin’s amended petition based upon that decision was filed on August 7, 2012. Therefore, Goodwin complied with Section 9545(b)(2) which requires that “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (emphasis supplied).
-5- J-S39019-15
that amended petition is not part of the certified record, and the PCRA court
did not address this claim. In any event, for the following reasons, no relief
is due.
First, our Supreme Court has held that the right announced in Miller
v. Alabama, supra, does not apply retroactively. See Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724
(2014).6 Consequently, a petitioner cannot rely on Miller v. Alabama or 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) to establish jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA
petition. See Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 243 (Pa. Super.
2014), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 103 (2014).
Furthermore, Goodwin was 25 years old at the time he committed
the offense,7 and therefore Miller v. Alabama, which applies to “those
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes,”8 does not benefit Goodwin.
Finally, none of Goodwin’s remaining Miller v. Alabama-related
claims, issues B through E, satisfy the requirements of Section
9545(b)(1)(iii). See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa.
6 On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015), which again presents the Miller v. Alabama retroactively question. Nonetheless, until the United States Supreme Court issues its decision, Cunningham remains the final word on the issue in Pennsylvania. 7 See Goodwin’s Brief at 7. 8 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
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Super. 2013), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013) (holding contention
that Miller v. Alabama applies to persons over 18 whose brains were
immature at the time of the crime does not bring the matter within Section
9545(b)(1)(iii)).
Therefore, there is no basis upon which to disturb the decision of the
PCRA court that dismissed Goodwin’s third PCRA petition upon the
conclusion that the petition was untimely and Goodwin failed to establish an
applicable exception to the time bar.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/28/2015
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