Com. v. Gillis, Jr., F.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 11, 2025
• Docket: 1499 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A15014-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : FRANKLIN LEE GILLIS, JR. : : Appellant : No. 1499 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004075-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: AUGUST 11, 2025

Franklin Lee Gillis, Jr., appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence

of five to ten years of imprisonment. We affirm.

The trial court provided the following background:

On July 31, 2023, law enforcement responded to a domestic incident[.] . . . Appellant’s girlfriend at the time . . . explained that the night before[,] Appellant had struck her with a closed fist on the left side of her face[,] as was evidenced by swelling and bruising to her left eye. She also reported that Appellant had grabbed her by her hair braids so forcefully that they came out of her head, and he bit her scalp. After officers observed bruising on her neck, [the victim] informed them that Appellant grabbed her by her throat, dragged her across the living room by her throat, and he had squeezed to the point that she had not been able to breathe. During the hours[-]long attack Appellant also told [the victim], “I’ll blow your fucking brains out.”

See Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/24, at 1-2 (cleaned up).

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A15014-25

Appellant was thereafter charged with simple assault, strangulation, and

terroristic threats. A jury convicted him of all counts, and the court deferred

sentencing to obtain a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report. At the

ensuing sentencing hearing, Appellant exercised his right to allocution and the

victim read her impact statement. The court also recited Appellant’s multiple

prior sentences from his PSI report, some of which were subsequently

resentenced, and determined he was prone to recidivism. Ultimately, the trial

court concluded that “due to Appellant’s lifestyle, the horrifying nature of the

assault, and the lasting impact on the victim, a [standard range] sentence of

five to [ten] years [wa]s completely appropriate.” Id.

Appellant did not object at sentencing, but filed a timely post-sentence

motion arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a

manifestly excessive sentence and failing to consider mitigating factors.

Specifically, Appellant contended that the court neglected to acknowledge that

he had a good employment history, contributed to the community, and had

undergone substantial change after his prior non-violent convictions. See

Post-Sentence Motion, 9/11/24, ¶¶ 6-7.

The trial court denied the motion. This timely appeal followed, and

Appellant and the court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following question for our determination: “Was the

aggregate sentence of five to ten years [of] incarceration manifestly excessive

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under the circumstances and an abuse of the court’s discretion?” Appellant’s

brief at 7.

Appellant’s issue implicates the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

See Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912-13 (Pa.Super. 2000).

This Court has recognized that “[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of

sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth

v. Thompson, 333 A.3d 461, 467 (Pa.Super. 2025) (citation omitted).

Rather, in order for this Court to address the merits of this claim, we must

determine:

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id. (cleaned up).

Regarding the second element, “issues challenging the discretionary

aspects of a sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by

presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings.

Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is

waived.” Commonwealth v. Perzel, 291 A.3d 38, 47 (Pa.Super. 2023). This

Court has explained that an appellant must “give the trial judge an opportunity

to reconsider or modify the sentence imposed[,]” and the “failure to do so

deprives the trial court of this chance.” Id. at 48. Additionally, “a post-

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sentence motion only preserves challenges to the discretionary aspects of

sentencing that are specifically included in the post-sentence motion.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 198 A.3d 1181, 1186 (Pa.Super. 2018).

Applying this test herein, we conclude that Appellant did not preserve

the precise issue raised on appeal in his post-sentence motion. As stated, the

issue Appellant preserved was the trial court’s alleged failure to consider

mitigating factors. See Post-Sentence Motion, 9/11/24, ¶¶ 6-8, 10. However,

in his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant shifts to wholly new contentions that

the PSI report contained impermissible, outdated, and confusing information

regarding his prior sentences. See Appellant’s brief at 11-13. None of these

arguments concerning the contents of the PSI report was mentioned in the

post-sentence motion. Thus, we find his issue waived for our review. See

Perzel, 291 A.3d at 47; Williams, 198 A.3d at 1186.

Even if Appellant properly preserved his arguments, we would conclude

that they are meritless. Where a sentencing court has the benefit of a PSI

report, this Court presumes that “the sentencing judge was aware of relevant

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 593 (Pa.Super. 2022). Additionally, “where a sentence

is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the

sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v.

Verma, 334 A.3d 941, 947 (Pa.Super. 2025). Here, the sentencing court had

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Appellant’s PSI report and imposed a sentence within the standard range.

Accordingly, we presume that the court considered all relevant mitigating

factors and imposed a reasonable sentence. For the foregoing reasons, we

affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 08/11/2025

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