Com. v. Gboko, B.
Opinion
2020 PA Super 281
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BERTRAND GBOKO :
:
Appellant : No. 708 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 30, 2020 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002584-2019
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 10, 2020 Bertrand Gboko (“Gboko”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of recklessly endangering another person and possession of an instrument of crime.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual history underlying the instant appeal as follows:
On the night of March 26, 2019, [Gboko] attended a happy hour event with co-workers who dropped him off at Front Street and Girard Avenue when the happy hour ended. While waiting for his trolley, two men approached [Gboko] and attempted to rob him.
[Gboko], who admitted to being “buzzed,” attempted to fight back using a pocket knife. [Gboko] then swung the knife and attacked an uninvolved bystander [(“the Complainant”)], who was forced to use a table leg to defend himself multiple times. Police showed up and arrested [] Gboko[,] who was charged with aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime with the intent to employ it criminally, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. At trial, [] Gboko testified on his own behalf and
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705, 907.
a stipulation was introduced into the record acknowledging [that]
Gboko is a law abiding and peaceful person.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/29/20, at 1 (unnumbered) (citations to record and some capitalization omitted).2 Following a bench trial, Gboko was convicted of recklessly endangering another person and possession of an instrument of crime, and found not guilty of the remaining offenses. On January 30, 2020, the trial court sentenced Gboko to concurrent terms of 18 months of probation. The trial court also ordered Gboko to receive anger management counseling and mental health treatment.3 Gboko filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Gboko now raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [trial] court err when it did not permit the defense to present testimony from good character witnesses, and instead admitted a prosecutor’s objected[-]to stipulation?
2. Did [Gboko] have a right to present evidence of his good character for truthfulness?
Brief for Appellant at 2.
2On May 15, 2019, Gboko filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking suppression of physical evidence, and various discovery orders. From the record, it is unclear whether the Omnibus Motion was ever litigated or resolved.
3 Prior to sentencing, Gboko filed a Motion for Extraordinary Relief, challenging the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence. The trial court entered an Order denying the Motion on the same date that it imposed its sentence.
We will address Gboko’s claims together. In his first claim, Gboko argues that the trial court erred by admitting the Commonwealth’s suggested stipulation, despite objections raised by defense counsel. Id. at 9. Gboko acknowledges that a trial court has discretion in determining whether to admit evidence, but states that this discretion is not absolute. Id. Gboko contends that, essentially, he was forced to abide by a stipulation to which he did not agree, and a one-party stipulation should not be permitted. See id. at 9-13. Further, Gboko asserts that the trial court improperly addressed his challenge as an argument that the court had erred by barring additional character witnesses, when in fact, Gboko was not able to present any character witnesses. Id. at 13.
In his second claim, Gboko contends that the trial court erred by excluding evidence concerning Gboko’s character for truthfulness. Id. at 14. Gboko claims that the trial court improperly interpreted Pa.R.E. 608 to permit evidence of a defendant’s character for truthfulness only after the Commonwealth attacks his reputation for truthfulness. Id. According to Gboko, “[h]is credibility was critical,” because he and the Complainant “presented a dramatically different version of events[.]” Id. at 18.
The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Minich, 4 A.3d 1063, 1068 (Pa. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“A stipulation is a declaration that the fact agreed upon is proven, and a valid stipulation must be enforced according to its terms.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 460 (Pa. 2006) (citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Generally, “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1). However, in a criminal case, “a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant’s pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it[.]” Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2)(A). “When evidence of a person’s character or character trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person’s reputation. Testimony about the witness’s opinion as to the character or character trait of the person is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 405(a); see also Commonwealth v. Kouma, 53 A.3d 760, 769 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that a defendant may “introduce evidence of his or her reputation among associates or within a particular community.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Regarding a witness’s character for truthfulness, Rule 608 provides as follows:
(a) Reputation Evidence. A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation
for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.
Opinion testimony about the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is not admissible.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except as provided in Rule 609 (relating to evidence of conviction of crime),
(1) the character of a witness for truthfulness may not be attacked or supported by cross-examination or extrinsic evidence concerning specific instances of the witness’[s]
conduct; however,
(2) in the discretion of the court, the credibility of a witness who testifies as to the reputation of another witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness may be attacked by cross-
examination concerning specific instances of conduct (not included arrests) of the other witness, if they are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness; but extrinsic evidence thereof is not admissible.
Pa.R.E. 608 (emphasis added).
Further, this Court has addressed the relationship between Rules 404 and 608 as follows:
Rule 608(a) permits a testifying defendant to call witnesses to testify as to his or her truthful character whenever the Commonwealth attacks his or her general reputation for truthfulness during trial. Conversely, Rule 404[(a)(2)(A)] permits a defendant (testifying or non-testifying) to call witnesses to testify as to his or her truthful character when the defendant’s reputation for truthfulness is pertinent to the underlying criminal offense, e.g., perjury.
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2016).
The following exchange occurred during Gboko’s bench trial:
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2020 Pa. Super. 281 (Com. v. Gboko, B.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.