J-A17020-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DEVON GARNES : : Appellant : No. 2125 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 21, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001301-2021
BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2025
Devon Garnes (“Garnes”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
following his convictions for two counts of violating the Uniform Firearms Act
(“VUFA”), and one count of recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”). 1
Garnes claims the police lacked reasonable suspicion supporting a stop and/or
probable cause to search after he summoned them while the police were en
route to a 911 dispatch reporting a shooting on the 7900 block of Pickering
Avenue, asked for their help, tried to lead them away from the direction of the
shooting, and then fled. Because Garnes summoned the officers to him,
delaying their investigation of a reported shooting, and engaged in a course
of conduct during their mere encounter that established reasonable suspicion,
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106, 6108, 2705. J-A17020-23
and because his challenge to the search is outside the scope of our review, we
affirm the denial of suppression and the judgment of sentence.
We summarize the factual background of this appeal from the evidence
at the suppression hearing.2 On March 13, 2020, at approximately 11:40
a.m., Philadelphia Police Officer Jeff Stauffer (“Officer Stauffer”) and his
partner were on patrol in a marked police car in full uniform when they
received a police dispatch about a shooting at the 7900 block of Pickering
Avenue in Philadelphia. See N.T., 6/16/22, at 5-6; Suppression Exhibit C-1
(“Exhibit C-1”) at 0:01-2:58; see also Trial Court Opinion, 10/27/22,
unnumbered at 2. The dispatch indicated that two black men, one wearing a
blue coat, had fled from the scene. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/27/22,
unnumbered at 2. Officer Stauffer, whose body camera was recording, drove
toward the scene of the reported shooting. Garnes, who was not wearing a
blue jacket,3 flagged them down approximately one-and-one-half blocks from
the reported shooting scene. See Exhibit C-1 at 0:01-2:58; see also N.T.,
6/16/22, at 10 (indicating Officer Stauffer’s testimony Garnes did not match
the dispatcher’s description of the shooter); Trial Court Opinion, 10/27/22,
unnumbered at 2; Exhibit C-1 at 2:47-48 (noting Officer Stauffer told his
partner Garnes was “flagging us down”). In response to Garnes’s ____________________________________________
2 See In the Interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013) (holding appellate scope of review of a suppression issue is limited to the suppression hearing record).
3The dispatcher indicated two shooters, so even though Garnes was not wearing a blue jacket, he was not thereby eliminated as a possible suspect.
-2- J-A17020-23
gesticulations, Officer Stauffer stopped his vehicle and got out. Garnes
approached Officer Stauffer and Garnes began speaking first. See
Suppression Exhibit C-1 at 2:49-2:50.
Garnes walked up to the police car and said, “My friends, my friends.
Listen.” He then offered, “They w[ere] just shooting around the corner,” and
pointed to his left. Garnes then said, “Please,” made a gesture that involved
curling both arms toward himself, walked over to Officer Stauffer’s partner
while miming putting a backpack on his shoulders, and said, “I had a bookbag
on me.” See id. at 2:49-56; see also N.T., 6/16/22 at 7. Officer Stauffer
asked Garnes whether he saw who was shooting and whether they were
shooting at him. See Suppression Exhibit C-1 at 2:57-3:01. Garnes started
to answer, “It was a guy,” paused, told Officer Stauffer to “hold on,” looked
at his cellphone, then denied being a target, said he had run from the
gunshots, and again pointed behind himself to indicate where the shooting
occurred. See id. at 3:01-3:03. Garnes then asked the officers, “Can you all
come here for a second, close the door [of the police car] and . . . come here?”
See id. at 3:03-07. Then, inexplicably, Garnes began walking away from the
officers, and in the opposite direction of where he just indicated the shooting
occurred, and waved his hand in a gesture that told the officers to follow him.
See id. at 3:06-3:11. Officer Stauffer remained motionless and repeatedly
asked Garnes to “come here,” as Garnes walked to the end of the block, made
his backpack gesture, said something about insulin, turned the corner, and
-3- J-A17020-23
then continued to walk away in the opposite direction of the shooting he had
reported to the officers. See id. at 3:08-3:16.
Officer Stauffer followed Garnes around the corner, repeating his
requests for Garnes to “come here” with greater insistence and telling his
partner to get into the car. See id. at 3:15-3:21. Officer Stauffer stated,
“Yo,” and “come here” to Garnes repeatedly, and then walked in Garnes’s
direction. See id. at 3:15-21. The officer began to move more quickly;
Garnes looked back at him, then sprinted across the street and into an alley.
See id. at 3:22. Officer Stauffer pursued Garnes on foot for approximately
two blocks, and with the assistance of two officers in a backup car, tackled
Garnes. See id. at 3:22-4:03.
While Garnes was on the ground, officers stated there was “something
in his pocket” and to “check that pocket.” See id. at 4:03-4:30. An officer
appeared to reach into Garnes’s pants pocket and retrieve an unidentified
object. See id. at 4:15-4:17. After handcuffing Garnes, officers began
picking him up to bring him to a seated position. See id. at 4:34. During this
process, an officer grabbed and lifted Garnes’s shirt. See id. 4:34-4:36. An
officer stated, “He’s got a gun,” see id. at 4:37, and the officer who was lifting
Garnes’s sweatshirt reached down, recovered the gun, and passed it to other
officers. See id. at 4:37-4:42. Garnes then said, “I only ran because the cell
[sic] said that. I have a gun.” See id. at 4:50-5:00.
-4- J-A17020-23
The Commonwealth charged Garnes with two counts of VUFA and one
count of REAP related to the shooting on Pickering Avenue. 4 Garnes filed a
motion in which he checked boxes asserting challenges to the legality of his
detention and the search of his person.5 At the suppression hearing, Garnes
argued Officer Stauffer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and did not
have probable cause to arrest and search him. See N.T., 6/16/22, at 3-4, 11,
14. The Commonwealth presented testimony from Officer Stauffer and played
the recording from his body camera. See id. at 4-10. Officer Stauffer testified
Garnes began backing away from him as he was asking about the shooting
and believed Garnes was attempting to flee from his investigation. See id. at
7, 9.6 Officer Stauffer also testified that, following the pursuit, officers
recovered the gun in Garnes’s front waistband. See id. at 8.
The trial court and Garnes’s counsel discussed whether Officer Stauffer
had reasonable suspicion to detain then chase Garnes. See N.T., 6/16/22, at
11-16. The trial court thereafter denied Garnes’s suppression motion. See
id. at 16-17. The court noted that Garnes acted evasively after waving down ____________________________________________
4 Garnes later admitted to being involved in the shooting. See N.T., 6/16/22, at 23-24.
5 Garnes checked boxes indicating that he was arrested without probable cause, subject to a stop and frisk on less than reasonable suspicion, arrested without a lawfully issued warrant or other justification, and searched without probable cause and without a warrant. See Omnibus Motion, 7/26/21, at 1.
6 We note that Officer Stauffer did not testify that he believed Garnes was or
had been involved in criminal activity. Rather, the officer testified only that he believed Garnes was attempting to flee from his investigation. See N.T., 6/16/22, at 7, 9.
-5- J-A17020-23
the police and his requests for assistance were ploys in anticipation of his flight
from an investigation into the shooting and/or to thwart or at least delay the
investigation. See N.T., 6/16/22, at 12-17. Garnes proceeded to a non-jury
trial, and the court found him guilty of all offenses. See id. at 18-33.
On July 21, 2022, the trial court sentenced Garnes to an aggregate term
of three years of probation. Garnes timely appealed, and the trial court
concluded reasonable suspicion existed to detain Garnes because he could
have been a perpetrator, victim, or witness to a shooting. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/27/22, unnumbered at 6-7. Additionally, the trial court
determined officers observed and recovered the gun from Garnes’s waistband
without an “invasion of [Garnes’s] clothing or cavity . . ..” See id. at 7. This
Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Garnes, 311 A.3d 564 (Pa. Super.
2023) (unpublished memorandum).
The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal and remanded to this
Court for reconsideration in light of its unanimous decision in Commonwealth
v. Jackson, 302 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2023) (order per curiam), that investigative
detentions are limited to cases where the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates a “particularized and objective basis for an officer reasonably to
suspect the individual detained was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal
activity, and are not available solely to identify victims of, or witnesses to,
criminal acts.” See Order, 6/20/24 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
-6- J-A17020-23
Garnes raises the following issue for review post-remand:
Where . . . Garnes flagged down police to report that he heard gunshots, which corroborated a recent radio call, and he did not match the shooter’s description contained in the call, did not the police unlawfully stop and chase him after he walked away as they lacked reasonable suspicion he had committed a crime, and did they not lack probable cause to search him after tackling him?
Garnes’s Supplemental Brief at 1.
Garnes’s issue implicates the denial of his motion to suppress. When
reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence,
[o]ur standard of review . . . is limited to determining whether the findings of fact are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. In making this determination, this Court may only consider the evidence of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, and so much of the witnesses for the defendant, as fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, which remains uncontradicted. If the evidence supports the findings of the trial court, we are bound by such findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Gindraw, 297 A.3d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal
citation and brackets omitted).
Garnes’s issue consists of two sub-parts: first, Officer Stauffer lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop and chase him; second, officers improperly
searched his clothing and recovered the gun. We address these claims
separately.
The Commonwealth bears the burden at a suppression hearing of
establishing the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the
accused’s rights. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). The credibility of witnesses and
-7- J-A17020-23
the weight to be accorded their testimony is solely within the province of the
suppression court. See Commonwealth v. Dutrieville, 932 A.2d 240, 242
(Pa. Super. 2007). Although a reviewing court is bound by a suppression
court’s findings of fact if they are supported in the record, it conducts plenary
review to determine if the court properly applied the law to the facts. See
Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 263 A.3d 247, 252 (Pa. 2021);
Commonwealth v. Dales, 820 A.2d 807, 812 (Pa. Super. 2003). This Court
may reverse if the suppression court drew erroneous legal conclusions from
the evidence. See Dunkins, 263 A.3d 252.
“Police officers may not conduct a warrantless search or seizure unless
one of several recognized exceptions applies. If a defendant’s detention
violates the Fourth Amendment, then any evidence seized during that stop
must be excluded as fruit of an unlawful detention.” Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citation and
quotations omitted), appeal denied, 302 A.3d 626 (Pa. 2023)
There is no dispute in this case that the police interaction with Garnes
began as a mere encounter, which requires no quantum of suspicion; Garnes
instead argues the situation escalated into an investigative detention when
police told him to stop as he walked away from them. An investigative
detention may be undertaken where police possess reasonable suspicion of a
person’s involvement in a crime, the detention is temporary, and does not
-8- J-A17020-23
possess the coercive conditions of a formal arrest. See Commonwealth v.
Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).
In reviewing whether reasonable suspicion to support an investigative
detention exists, this Court examines the totality of the circumstances to
determine if there exists “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
an individual of criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Knupp, 290 A.3d 759,
767 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation and brackets omitted). To establish
reasonable suspicion, an officer “must articulate specific observations which,
in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations,
led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity
was afoot.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 311 A.3d 1138, 1145 (Pa. Super.
2024) (citation omitted);see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329
(1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (stating a police officer
has reasonable suspicion when he is “able to articulate something more than
an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch’” that criminal activity is
afoot)); accord Commonwealth v. Hughes, 908 A.2d 924, 927 (Pa. Super.
2006).
Although reasonable suspicion requires something more than an
observation of a person doing something many people can do legally, see
Garcia, 311 A.3d at 1145, the likelihood of criminal activity sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion "falls considerably short of satisfying a
preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
-9- J-A17020-23
266, 274 (2002). Even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together,
may warrant further investigation by the police officer. See Commonwealth
v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Arvizu, 534
U.S. at 277 (stating that reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility
of innocent conduct”); Garcia, 311 A.3d at 1145 (stating “[w]ithout any
possibility of innocence, there would be nothing for the officer to investigate”).
A court assessing reasonable suspicion considers the totality of the
circumstances giving due weight to the specific reasonable inferences the
police officer is entitled to draw from the facts considering his experience.
See Harris, 176 A.3d at 1021.
Garnes asserts Officer Stauffer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
him when he first ordered him to “come here” as he began walking away from
the officers, which occurred well into their interaction. See Garnes’s
Supplemental Brief at 5-8. He states he did not match the description of one
of the shooters,7 but contends his action of flagging down the officers and
asking them to accompany him dispelled any suspicion he was involved in
criminal activity. See id. Garnes contends he exercised his constitutional
right to walk away from Officer Stauffer after the officers declined his request
to accompany him. See id. at 8. Garnes claims the trial court abused its
discretion by finding Officer Stauffer pursued him only after he ran from the
7 As indicated supra, the 911 dispatch reported that there were two shooters
so Garnes was not precluded as a possible suspect.
- 10 - J-A17020-23
officer; he asserts he ran only after seeing Officer Stauffer “charging” at him.
Garnes’s Supplemental Brief at 9.
Following the Supreme Court’s remand for reconsideration in light of
Jackson, we affirm the trial court’s denial of suppression, although we do so
on grounds other than those the trial court cited. 8 The interaction between
Officer Stauffer and Garnes undisputedly began as a mere encounter that
Garnes actually initiated, but ripened into reasonable suspicion based on
Garnes’s words and behavior during the encounter.
The record, which includes Officer Stauffer’s body-worn camera video,
clearly shows Garnes stopped Officer Stauffer and his partner while they were
en route to the scene of a police dispatch they received three minutes before
concerning a shooting approximately one-and-a-half blocks from where
Garnes stopped them. Without prompting from the officers, Garnes walked
up to their patrol car and relayed to the officers there had been a shooting,
then pointed to his left to show the direction where it happened, which was in
the direction where the officers were heading before Garnes stopped them.
Garnes next walked over to Officer Stauffer’s partner and asked for help
retrieving his backpack. When Officer Stauffer asked him about the shooting,
Garnes began to answer the question, then told the officer to “hang on,”
8 This Court may affirm a trial court on any proper basis, whether or not the
trial court cited that basis for its ruling. See Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d 513, 520 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022).
- 11 - J-A17020-23
looked at his cellphone, and again pointed behind him to show where he had
run from the shooting. Garnes then asked the officers, “Can you all come
here for a second, close the door [of the police car] and come here?” See id.
at 303-07. After Garnes’s request to do this and the officer’s capitulation to
this request, Garnes immediately began walking away from the officers, in the
opposite direction from where he said the shooting happened, mumbling
something that was unclear except for a reference to insulin. See id. at 3:06-
3:09. Garnes then turned away from the officers gesturing for them to follow
him but then repeatedly ignored the direction to “stop” or “come here,”
quickening his pace and fleeing upon Officer Stauffer’s pursuit.
The totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity on Garnes’s part, at the very least as an accessory to the
crime or as possibly interfering with a criminal investigation. The facts show
that Garnes’s words and actions delayed the police response to a shooting
nearby; a shooting of which he was aware. A commonsense assessment of
these facts shows Garnes’s knowledge about the shooting and his attempt to
delay the officers’ investigation. Further, when asked to identify the shooter,
Garnes began to answer the question, looked at his phone, and promptly
changed the subject. Unlike Jackson’s, Garnes’s flight was not from the actual
shooting, but specifically from the officers that he had flagged down and
- 12 - J-A17020-23
whose help he had solicited.9 While Garnes’s behavior of flagging down the
officers, which prevented them from reaching the crime scene as soon as
possible, his refusal to answer a direct question put to him about the shooting
after he indicated he was aware of the shooting, then asking the police to
close their car doors, and follow him in the opposite direction from the
shooting may have had an innocent explanation, that possibility does not
defeat reasonable suspicion.10 See Garcia, 311 A.3d at 1145;
Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2019).
9 In Jackson, the Supreme Court rejected the argument a person may be lawfully detained based solely on suspicion they were a victim or a witness of a crime. The record facts elicited that at the time the police commanded Jackson to stop, he had done nothing more than flee from the scene of gunshots. Jackson told them that was what he was doing. See Jackson, 302 A.3d 737, 738. Here, by contrast, Garnes himself initiated a mere encounter with police while they were en route to the scene of the reported shooting, during which he indicated where the shooting happened, asked them for help retrieving a backpack in the opposite direction, delayed the police by declining to answer a question about the shooting after Garnes had indicated knowledge of the shooting, asked the officers to close the door of their patrol car and come to him, and then inexplicably began walking in the opposite direction from the shooting. Plainly the factual scenario this case of a suspect-initiated mere encounter that developed into probable cause is factually distinguishable from the immediate investigative detention that occurred in Jackson.
10 Commonwealth v. Weidenmoyer, 539 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1988), does not
support Garnes’s assertion that his act of stopping the police dispelled, rather than raised, suspicion. See Garnes’s Supplemental Brief at 8. That case holds only that where an unpaid tipster reports observations to police, his trustworthiness may be presumed. See id. at 1295. Nothing in the record indicates Garnes was a “tipster”. He declined to identify the shooter, asked the police to stop their attempt to investigate a shooting that had just occurred, then ran when they did not accompany him in the opposite direction of the shooting.
- 13 - J-A17020-23
The totality of the circumstances provided a reasonable basis to believe
Garnes was not an innocent bystander; rather a commonsense analysis of the
totality of the record facts permits police to conduct a temporary detention to
investigate Garnes’s connection to the shooting to which the officers were
responding. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 277; Garcia, 311 A.3d at 1145;
Harris, 176 A.3d at 1021.11 At the very least, the initial mere encounter after
Garnes waived the officers down certainly ripened into reasonable suspicion
when the circumstances showed the officers that Garnes was attempting to
delay their arrival at a possible homicide scene by speaking incoherently and
trying to physically have them proceed in the opposite direction. After this
initial interaction, it became clear Garnes was likely not an innocent bystander
fleeing the shooting and more likely was involved in a crime that was “afoot.”
See Commonwealth v. Lewis, --- A.3d ---, 2025 WL 2724795 (Pa.,
September 25, 2025); Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 230 (Pa.
Super. 2017).
Garnes’s subsequent headlong flight from the officer, even if the officer
briefly “charged” at him, occurred after there was a reasonable basis to order
11 Because Officer Stauffer had a reasonable basis to stop and detain Garnes,
we need not determine whether Garnes’s walk became a run only after the officer pursued him. Moreover, an officer’s direction to a person to “come here,” unaccompanied by force or threat, does not convert a mere encounter into an investigative detention. See Commonwealth v. Rice, 304 A.3d 1255, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2023); Commonwealth v. Newsom, 170 A.3d 1151, 1156 (Pa. Super. 2017).
- 14 - J-A17020-23
Garnes to stop and briefly detain him. Garnes’s decision to sprint away from
the officer only added to the facts and circumstances justifying the officer’s
pursuit of Garnes. Thus, Garnes’s first claim merits no relief.
Next, Garnes asserts that officers improperly searched his clothing and
recovered the gun. Garnes’s issue is beyond the scope of the remand, which
was expressly limited to the existence of reasonable suspicion. See Order
6/20/24. See Commonwealth v. McCullough, 230 A.3d 1146, 1164 n.9
(Pa. Super. 2020) (recognizing that where a case is remanded for a specific,
limited purpose, a court may not decide issues not encompassed in the
remand); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 789 A.2d 252, 253 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(stating that “where a case is remanded to resolve a limited issue, only
matters related to the issue on remand may be appealed.”) (citation omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of suppression and the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge King joins in this decision.
Senior Judge Pellegrini did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
- 15 - J-A17020-23
Date: 11/13/2025
- 16 -