Com. v. Garcia, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 11, 2025
• Docket: 1640 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A03018-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : DIO GARCIA : No. 1640 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0001892-2023

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JUNE 11, 2025

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Dio Garcia’s motion

to suppress. It maintains that officers had probable cause to arrest Garcia, an

independent source justified the arrest and search of his vehicle, and that

prior stipulations did not preclude the court from crediting subsequent

testimony. We reverse.

The Commonwealth charged Garcia with possession of a firearm

prohibited, firearms not to be carried without a license, receiving stolen

property, two counts of possession of marijuana, and use of drug

paraphernalia.1 Garcia’s charges stemmed from a traffic stop conducted in

Bucks County on March 14, 2023. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing

on pretrial motions on October 17, 2023. Before the hearing, counsel ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 3925(a), and 35 P.S. §§ 780- 113(a)(31)(i), (32), respectively. J-A03018-25

subpoenaed the Bensalem Police Department’s custodian of records and the

arresting officer in Garcia’s case, Officer Raymond Hartman. Counsel also

requested radio room records, Officer Hartman’s cell phone records, and the

department’s dashcam storage policy. The subpoena indicated that if the

requested records were provided in advance, the custodian and Officer

Hartman would not be required to appear at the October 17 hearing. The

department ultimately only provided the dashcam storage policy. The

Commonwealth then filed a motion to quash the subpoena.

At the October 17 hearing, the Commonwealth and defense stipulated

to the testimony of three officers, Detective Cappo and Detective Moulder of

the Philadelphia Northeast Detectives, and Officer Hartman of the Bensalem

Police. See N.T. Stipulation/PreTrial Motions (“October Hearing”), 10/17/23.

The parties stipulated as follows:

[ADA]: And, first, if we could start with some stipulations that the Commonwealth and the defense counsel has [sic] had.

The Court: Okay.

[ADA]: And, Your Honor, there’s a stipulation that if Detective Cappo of the Northeast Detectives in Philadelphia was called to testify today, he would testify that back on March 14, 2023 he was not working that day and he was not contacted or spoke directly with Bensalem Dispatch or Detective Moulder. And then thereafter Northeast Detectives being contacted by Bensalem, that’s when he was called in by his lieutenant on his off day to follow up on the case.

[Defense counsel]: And also he had no contact with Officer Hartman that day as well.

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[ADA]: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Okay. So it’s stipulated by both counsel?

[Defense counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

[ADA]: So stipulated.

The Court: All Right. Very well.

[ADA]: As well as on Detective Moulder, M O U L D E R, Northeast Philadelphia Detectives, he was working that day back on March 14th, 2023 at which time he was – he spoke with Officer Hartman of the Bensalem Township Police, and the extent of Detective Moulder’s involvement is that he checked the – I guess their NCIC2 or PICS3 system and then removed [Garcia’s] vehicle from the system at that time. At the time of that contact with Bensalem there was not a signed judge warrant for the vehicle nor a signed judge warrant for the defendant Dio Garcia.

[Defense counsel]: And also he indicated, and it would also be stipulated that he did not relay any information to Officer Hartman about the case other than to say the vehicle was in the system.

The Court: So stipulated. By both counsel, correct?

[ADA]: As well as, Your Honor, there is a stipulation by and between counsel as far as on – if Officer Hartman of Bensalem Township Police was called to testify, during the traffic stop at issue on March 14 th, 2023 the only phone calls that were made during that time were to Bensalem Dispatch ____________________________________________

2 NCIC is an acronym for the National Crime Information Center. See Commonwealth v. Riley, 425 A.2d 813, 814 (Pa.Super. 1981).

3 Apparently referring to the Pennsylvania Instant Check System. See Navarro v. Pa. State Police, 212 A.3d 26, 45 (Pa. 2019).

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and to Northeast Detectives – Northeast Philadelphia Detectives.

[Defense counsel]: Yes, stipulated, Your Honor.

Id. at 2-4. Regarding the stipulations for Officer Hartman, the Commonwealth

maintained that it resolved counsel’s subpoena request for his cell phone

records. The custodian of records was also present at the hearing and

addressed counsel’s requests. The court determined that the Bensalem Police

Department fully complied with the subpoena.

At a subsequent hearing on pretrial motions, on January 23, 2024,

Garcia moved to suppress any statements made by him and any evidence

recovered from his vehicle. He argued that officers lacked probable cause for

the traffic stop, unlawfully detained him without reasonable suspicion or

probable cause, and conducted an illegal search without a warrant. Garcia

maintained that although officers claimed to have conducted an inventory

search of the vehicle, the search was illegal and exceeded the scope of a legal

inventory search.

The Commonwealth presented testimony from Detective Cappo and

Officer Hartman. Detective Cappo’s testimony as to March 14 resembled the

parties’ earlier stipulation of his testimony. He further testified that he had

been assigned to investigate a March 8 robbery in Philadelphia, where the

complainant identified Garcia as the perpetrator. See N.T., Pretrial Motions

Hearing, 1/23/24 at 11-13. The complainant told Detective Cappo that Garcia

had a gun during the robbery and described Garcia’s vehicle. Id. at 12-13.

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The complainant did not tell Detective Cappo that Garcia used the vehicle

during the robbery.

Detective Cappo testified that based on this information, on March 11,

2023, he added Garcia’s vehicle to the NCIC database. Id. at 15-16. The NCIC

entry included alerts such as “occupant(s) armed,” “used in pt of gun

robbery,” and “contact northeast detectives.” Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1

(“NCIC Report”). Detective Cappo also testified that he submitted an arrest

warrant for Garcia on March 11, three days before Garcia’s traffic stop. N.T.,

Pretrial Hearing, at 19-20. However, the magistrate did not sign the warrant

until after 5 p.m., on the day of Garcia’s arrest. Id. at 21-24.

Detective Cappo confirmed that information in Philadelphia’s “HIT”

messaging system corresponded to the NCIC entry and would be accessible

to any officer running Garcia’s license plate. Id. at 29-30. He further testified

that he did not speak with Officer Hartman, Bensalem dispatch, or Detective

Moulder. Id. at 47, 54.

Detective Cappo explained the HIT system as follows:

So when anybody comes in contact with any subject, as either wanted or a vehicle that is wanted, the officer that -- or whoever made contact with that vehicle sends a hit response to us clarifying that person is still wanted. We get it sent into our queue. We can either confirm it or deny it, in which case it was confirmed and it was sent back. And this is all done through the system, saying, yes, this subject is wanted or this vehicle is wanted. And then, you know, whatever the case, whatever the instructions are from there.

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Id. at 28. For Garcia, the HIT report included the following: “[T]ake the

owner/driver into custody as the pending warrant is a felony. A draft of the

submitted affidavit will be faxed to you. The affidavit has been sent to the

Philly DA charging unit for review/approval.” Id. at 34; Commonwealth’s

Exhibit 3 (HIT Report).

Officer Hartman testified that while on patrol in Bensalem, he observed

Garcia’s vehicle with a rear brake light out. Id. at 63. He initiated a traffic stop

of the vehicle, relayed the license plate number over his police radio, and was

informed “that it was a felony vehicle.” Id. at 70-72. He also testified that he

was aware of the NCIC report indicating the vehicle may have “occupants

armed on a gun robbery” and labeled as “a felony vehicle.” Id. at 75. He did

not mention the HIT report information.

Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Hartman encountered Garcia in

the driver’s seat. During a check of Garcia’s information, Officer Hartman’s

police data terminal displayed that Garcia was wanted for a probation violation

in Florida. Id. at 132. However, the system stated “in-state pickup only for

Florida.” Id. at 73, 75, 79. Officer Hartman did not contact Florida to check

on the status of Garcia’s probation violation. Id. at 133. Nevertheless, based

on the probation violation, Officer Hartman detained Garcia and took him into

custody. Id. at 74-75, 132.

Throughout the stop, Officer Hartman remained in contact with April

from Bensalem Dispatch, who initially told him that Northeast Detectives

wanted the vehicle but later changed their mind and said they “didn’t want

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anything anymore.” Id. at 84-85. Officer Hartman testified that he then called

Northeast Detectives and spoke with Detective Moulder. Id. at 85-87. He

testified that Detective Moulder gave him details about Garcia’s robbery case

and told him to arrest Garcia. Id. at 87. Officer Hartman then gave Detective

Moulder the fax number to Bensalem police dispatch headquarters to fax over

the Philadelphia arrest warrant for Garcia and arrested Garcia. Id. at 90.

Following the arrest, Officer Hartman conducted an inventory search of

the vehicle, since the vehicle had to be towed per Bensalem police policy. Id.

at 97-99. During the search, he found a gun in the back seat. Id. at 104-05.

At that time, he stopped his inventory search and seized the vehicle to obtain

a search warrant which he co-drafted. Id. at 105, 108-09; Commonwealth

Exhibit 8 (Search Warrant). Officer Hartman testified that Florida did not want

Garcia and that he took Garcia into custody at the request of Detective

Moulder. N.T., Pretrial Hearing, at 134, 138. Officer Hartman agreed that when

he arrested Garcia, which was around 10:50 – 11:00 a.m., he did not have

an arrest warrant at the time. Id. at 138. He testified that the arrest warrant

from Philadelphia did not arrive until 5:39 pm. Id. Officer Hartman’s testimony

was corroborated by his body and dashcam footage, including his conversation

with someone from Northeast Detectives. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 5

(Dash and Body Cam Footage).

Defense counsel objected to the officer’s testimony as hearsay based on

the October 17 hearing stipulations. Counsel also introduced the stipulations

which the court admitted into evidence. See N.T., Pretrial Hearing, at 17-18,

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92-93, 141; Defense Exhibit 3. The Commonwealth argued that the stipulation

for Detective Moulder’s testimony was “based on, you know, what Detective

Moulder was relaying to us that day” and any inconsistencies between the

stipulations and the motions testimony would be left up to the court to

determine the weight of “potentially contradictory statements.” N.T., Pretrial

Hearing, at 93-94. The court explained that it would accept the previously

made stipulations but that it was “not going to let people come into the

courtroom, stipulate to what their testimony will be in a case, and then come

in later and testify contrary to that stipulation.” Id. at 95, 96.

The court granted the motion to suppress. Though it found Officer

Hartman’s testimony credible, it concluded that the stipulations negated his

testimony. Based on the stipulations, the court determined that it was

“constrained” to find that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Officer

Hartman had probable cause to arrest Garcia. Decision, filed 5/9/24, at 6

(unpaginated). The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration and the

defense filed a response. The court denied the Commonwealth’s motion and

this timely appeal followed.

The Commonwealth raises the following questions:

1. Are the suppression court’s findings of fact [] not supported by the record where the suppression court found that a prior stipulation of proffered testimony entered at a discovery hearing negated the credible testimony of Officer Hartman at the suppression hearing where that testimony was further corroborated by the incontrovertible video evidence?

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2. Did the suppression court further err in finding that Officer Hartman did not have probable cause to arrest [Garcia] based on the information and directive he received from the Philadelphia Detectives Unit and on the basis of the NCIC “Hit” pursuant to the collective knowledge doctrine[?]

3. Did the suppression court again err in not finding that the Florida probation warrant, despite being marked as non- extraditable, constituted an independent source of the arrest of [Garcia] which would have resulted in the towing and inventory search of [Garcia’s] vehicle such that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered[?]

Commonwealth’s Br. at 4.

When reviewing the grant of a motion to suppress:

[W]e follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations

omitted).

For its first issue, the Commonwealth claims that the stipulations were

not “of fact” but representative of what the officers would have testified to at

the October hearing if called. Commonwealth’s Br. at 20. Since there was no

stipulation of fact, the Commonwealth maintains that the court was not bound

by the stipulations. It notes that Officer Hartman’s testimony is supported by

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the body cam footage and points out that the court found him credible. The

Commonwealth argues that when the evidence presented at the suppression

motion was contrary to the stipulation, the court had “exclusive authority to

weigh the conflicting evidence and make a credibility determination.” Id. at

22. Garcia counters that the stipulations were as to the facts and bound the

trial court.

We agree with the Commonwealth. “A stipulation is a declaration that

the fact agreed upon is proven [, and a] valid stipulation must be enforced

according to its terms.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 460 (Pa.

2006) (citation omitted). Here, although the stipulations were not artfully

phrased, the only “fact” to which the parties stipulated was that the officers

would give certain testimony if they were called to testify. There was no

stipulation to the underlying facts, and a mere stipulation to testimony does

not entail a concession of the underlying facts. See Commonwealth v.

Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 910 (Pa. 2011) (noting distinction). The stipulations here

therefore did not bind the trial court as to the underlying facts, and it was free

to make its own credibility determinations.

The trial court therefore erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, the

stipulations overrode its determination that Officer Hartman’s suppression

testimony was credible. In another case, this Court might be inclined to

remand for the suppression judge to make a credibility determination in the

first instance. Here, we see no need for a remand because the lower court

already determined that Officer Hartman was credible.

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Next, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in concluding

that Officer Hartman did not have probable cause to arrest Garcia. It claims

that Officer Hartman had probable cause based on his conversation with

Detective Moulder and the NCIC report pursuant to the collective knowledge

doctrine. The Commonwealth argues that firsthand knowledge is not needed

for probable cause to arrest where the arresting officer has been:

(1) ordered or directed to perform the arrest by an officer in possession of facts justifying the arrest; (2) received information justifying arrest; or (3) heard information which, coupled with facts he personally observed, provided probable cause to arrest.

Commonwealth’s Br. at 27 (quoting Commonwealth v. Reddix, 513 A.2d

1041, 1043 (Pa.Super. 1986)). Based on the collective knowledge doctrine,

the Commonwealth claims that Officer Hartman could lawfully arrest Garcia

considering “Detective Cappo’s investigation which accumulated probable

cause to arrest [Garcia] for the armed robbery.” Id. at 29. It further claims

that it is irrelevant whether the arrest warrant was approved at the time of

Garcia’s arrest, or which specific detective directed Officer Hartman to arrest

Garcia.

In Pennsylvania, the collective knowledge doctrine allows “an officer

with the requisite level of suspicion [to] direct another officer to act in his or

her stead.” Commonwealth v. Yong, 177 A.3d 876, 889 (Pa. 2018). If “the

arresting officer does not have the requisite knowledge and was not directed

to so act,” the officer may still seize the individual if “the investigating officer

with probable cause or reasonable suspicion was working with the [arresting]

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officer and would have inevitably and imminently ordered that the seizure be

effectuated.” Id. at 890.

There is probable cause for a warrantless arrest when the facts and

circumstances and reasonably trustworthy information within the knowledge

of the officer at the time of the arrest “are sufficient to warrant a man of

reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is

committing a crime.” Commonwealth v. Snowden, 330 A.3d 422, 431

(Pa.Super. 2025) (en banc) (citation omitted). A warrantless arrest that

establishes that “police have probable cause to believe (1) that a felony has

been committed and (2) that the person to be arrested is the felon,” will be

upheld. Commonwealth v. Evans, 494 A.2d 383, 388 (Pa.Super. 1985)

(citation omitted). The determination of whether probable cause exists is

based on the totality of the circumstances and requires only a probable

showing of criminal activity. See Snowden, 330 A.3d at 431.

“[I]nformation contained in a[n] N.C.I.C . report is so inherently reliable

that such information is, in and of itself, sufficient to form the basis of a finding

of probable cause for a police officer who receives such information from an

N.C.I.C. report to make an on the spot arrest.” Commonwealth v.

Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10, 16 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

We again agree with the Commonwealth. We conclude that, pursuant to

the collective knowledge doctrine, Officer Hartman had probable cause based

on his conversation with Detective Moulder and his knowledge of the NCIC

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report. Given our disposition of the first two issues, we do not address the

third.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 6/11/2025

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