J-S31016-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LAMONT FULTON : : Appellant : No. 691 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 28, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0413241-2002
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2025
Appellant, Lamont Fulton, appeals pro se from the February 28, 2025
order entered in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas that dismissed as
untimely his serial pro se petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm. 1
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. On March 10,
2006, after a bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of one count of
First-Degree Murder but mentally ill and two counts of Possessing Instruments
of Crime for the beating death of his girlfriend, Felicia Brockenbrough
(“Victim”). On May 8, 2006, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
sentence of life imprisonment. On November 16, 2007, this court affirmed
Appellant’s judgment of sentence and on August 11, 2010, the Pennsylvania
____________________________________________
1 We also deny Appellant’s June 12, 2025 Application for Remand. J-S31016-25
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Fulton, 944 A.2d 791 (Pa. Super. 2007) (non-
precedential decision), appeal denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010).
On January 30, 2024, more than thirteen years after his judgment of
sentence became final, Appellant pro se filed the instant serial PCRA petition
averring the newly discovered fact that, over ten years prior to her murder,
Victim disclosed to police that individuals were making threats against her life.
Specifically, Appellant averred that Victim witnessed a 1993 kidnapping
resulting in murder and subsequently made a statement to police that “Owen”
informed her that people were going to “shoot at” her because she “set up”
the kidnappers and “can describe the guys who did it.” PCRA Pet., 1/30/24,
at ¶ 8. Appellant argued that this evidence demonstrated that other people
were intending to harm Victim and thus, someone other than Appellant could
have murdered Victim. PCRA Pet. at ¶ 10.
Appellant attached a transcript of that police interview as an exhibit to
his petition and explained that the Commonwealth did not provide him with
Victim’s police interview for his trial that was included in the record in the
unrelated kidnapping/murder case. Id. at ¶ 14, Exhibit 2. Appellant relied
on this fact to invoke both the newly discovered fact and government
interference exceptions to the PCRA time-bar and argued that this fact
constituted exculpatory Brady2 material. PCRA Pet. at ¶ 10.
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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On September 17, 2024, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing, finding
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the underlying merits of Appellant’s claims
because the PCRA petition was untimely and Appellant failed to assert an
applicable timeliness exception.
On October 8, 2024, Appellant filed a pro se response. In his response,
Appellant contended that the PCRA court, in its Rule 907 notice,
mischaracterized the newly discovered fact that he pleaded. Response,
10/8/24, at ¶ 9. Appellant reiterated that his PCRA petition alleged that Victim
provided police officers with information in an unrelated murder investigation
and, in her statement, Victim revealed that there had been threats against
her life as a result of her cooperation. Id. at ¶ 3.
On February 28, 2025, the PCRA dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as
untimely. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Appellant’s PCRA petition met the jurisidictional requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i) & (ii); the lower court erred and abused its discretion in finding otherwise.
2. The lower court erred and abused its discretion in denying Appellant an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant’s Br. at 3.
We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record
supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is otherwise free of
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legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). This
Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if they are
supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.
Super. 2007). “We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal
conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super.
2017).
There is no right to a PCRA hearing; a hearing is unnecessary where the
PCRA court can determine from the record that there are no genuine issues of
material fact. Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super.
2008). “To obtain reversal of a PCRA court's decision to dismiss a petition
without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of
fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that
the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”
Commonwealth v. Hanible, 612 Pa. 183, 204, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 2011)
(citation omitted).
As a preliminary matter, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a
jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 983 (Pa.
2008). Pennsylvania law is clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an
untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161
(Pa. 2003). In order to obtain relief under the PCRA, a petition must be filed
within one year from the date the judgment of sentence became final. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s petition, filed almost two years after his
judgment of sentence became final, is facially untimely.
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Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition, however,
if the petitioner pleads and proves one of the three exceptions to the time-bar
set forth in Section 9545(b)(1), including the government interference, newly
discovered fact, and new constitutional right exceptions. Any petition invoking
a timeliness exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim
could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S § 9545(b)(2).
To satisfy the newly discovered facts exception, a petitioner must plead
and prove “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
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J-S31016-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LAMONT FULTON : : Appellant : No. 691 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 28, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0413241-2002
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2025
Appellant, Lamont Fulton, appeals pro se from the February 28, 2025
order entered in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas that dismissed as
untimely his serial pro se petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm. 1
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. On March 10,
2006, after a bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of one count of
First-Degree Murder but mentally ill and two counts of Possessing Instruments
of Crime for the beating death of his girlfriend, Felicia Brockenbrough
(“Victim”). On May 8, 2006, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
sentence of life imprisonment. On November 16, 2007, this court affirmed
Appellant’s judgment of sentence and on August 11, 2010, the Pennsylvania
____________________________________________
1 We also deny Appellant’s June 12, 2025 Application for Remand. J-S31016-25
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Fulton, 944 A.2d 791 (Pa. Super. 2007) (non-
precedential decision), appeal denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010).
On January 30, 2024, more than thirteen years after his judgment of
sentence became final, Appellant pro se filed the instant serial PCRA petition
averring the newly discovered fact that, over ten years prior to her murder,
Victim disclosed to police that individuals were making threats against her life.
Specifically, Appellant averred that Victim witnessed a 1993 kidnapping
resulting in murder and subsequently made a statement to police that “Owen”
informed her that people were going to “shoot at” her because she “set up”
the kidnappers and “can describe the guys who did it.” PCRA Pet., 1/30/24,
at ¶ 8. Appellant argued that this evidence demonstrated that other people
were intending to harm Victim and thus, someone other than Appellant could
have murdered Victim. PCRA Pet. at ¶ 10.
Appellant attached a transcript of that police interview as an exhibit to
his petition and explained that the Commonwealth did not provide him with
Victim’s police interview for his trial that was included in the record in the
unrelated kidnapping/murder case. Id. at ¶ 14, Exhibit 2. Appellant relied
on this fact to invoke both the newly discovered fact and government
interference exceptions to the PCRA time-bar and argued that this fact
constituted exculpatory Brady2 material. PCRA Pet. at ¶ 10.
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
-2- J-S31016-25
On September 17, 2024, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing, finding
that it lacked jurisdiction to review the underlying merits of Appellant’s claims
because the PCRA petition was untimely and Appellant failed to assert an
applicable timeliness exception.
On October 8, 2024, Appellant filed a pro se response. In his response,
Appellant contended that the PCRA court, in its Rule 907 notice,
mischaracterized the newly discovered fact that he pleaded. Response,
10/8/24, at ¶ 9. Appellant reiterated that his PCRA petition alleged that Victim
provided police officers with information in an unrelated murder investigation
and, in her statement, Victim revealed that there had been threats against
her life as a result of her cooperation. Id. at ¶ 3.
On February 28, 2025, the PCRA dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as
untimely. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Appellant’s PCRA petition met the jurisidictional requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i) & (ii); the lower court erred and abused its discretion in finding otherwise.
2. The lower court erred and abused its discretion in denying Appellant an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant’s Br. at 3.
We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record
supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is otherwise free of
-3- J-S31016-25
legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). This
Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if they are
supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.
Super. 2007). “We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal
conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super.
2017).
There is no right to a PCRA hearing; a hearing is unnecessary where the
PCRA court can determine from the record that there are no genuine issues of
material fact. Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super.
2008). “To obtain reversal of a PCRA court's decision to dismiss a petition
without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of
fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that
the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”
Commonwealth v. Hanible, 612 Pa. 183, 204, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 2011)
(citation omitted).
As a preliminary matter, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a
jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 983 (Pa.
2008). Pennsylvania law is clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an
untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161
(Pa. 2003). In order to obtain relief under the PCRA, a petition must be filed
within one year from the date the judgment of sentence became final. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s petition, filed almost two years after his
judgment of sentence became final, is facially untimely.
-4- J-S31016-25
Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition, however,
if the petitioner pleads and proves one of the three exceptions to the time-bar
set forth in Section 9545(b)(1), including the government interference, newly
discovered fact, and new constitutional right exceptions. Any petition invoking
a timeliness exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim
could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S § 9545(b)(2).
To satisfy the newly discovered facts exception, a petitioner must plead
and prove “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence.” Id. at § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Our Supreme Court has held that this
exception “does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim.”
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1271 (Pa. 2007). Rather the
exception merely requires the petitioner to plead and prove two elements: “1)
the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown and 2) could
not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Id. at 1272
(internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original), citing 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(ii).
Due diligence requires a petitioner to make reasonable efforts to
uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief. Commonwealth
v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 449 (Pa. Super. 2019). A petitioner must
explain why he could not have learned the new facts earlier by exercising due
diligence. Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001).
Finally, “[w]hile the law provides that [an a]ppellant need not provide a nexus
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between the newly discovered fact and his conviction, he still must provide a
connection between the fact and his underlying claim.” Commonwealth v.
Fears, 250 A.3d 1180, 1189 (Pa. 2021).
The government interference exception requires proof that “the failure
to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government
officials[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i). See also Commonwealth v. Abu-
Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008). This requires the petitioner to show
that, due to the interference of a government actor, “he could not have filed
his claim earlier.” Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
***
In his pro se brief to this Court, Appellant avers that the trial court erred
when it concluded that Appellant failed to plead and prove the newly
discovered fact exception pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Appellant’s Br.
at 3, 7, 19-20. Appellant asserts that he satisfied the “unknown fact” prong
by pleading that Victim’s statement was unknown to him until he was informed
of its existence by the “prison’s law clerk,” who had just seen Victim’s name
in another case. Id. at 19. Appellant further contends that he satisfied the
“due diligence” prong by explaining in detail all his efforts to obtain a copy of
Victim’s police interview from the Office of Judicial Records. Id. at 20.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court categorizes the Philadelphia
Police Department’s record of Victim’s out-of-court statement as inadmissible
double hearsay and concludes that it does not satisfy the newly discovered
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fact time-bar exception. Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.3 (unpaginated). We agree. Our
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that:
evidence which purportedly reveals that someone other than [the petitioner] committed the murder is hearsay, not within any exception, and so unreliable as to be inadmissible. A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the newly[]discovered fact exception to the timeliness requirement, nor would such a claim, even if timely, entitle the petitioner to relief under the PCRA.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 501 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 592 (Pa. 1999)). Accordingly, we
discern no abuse of discretion.
Appellant also asserts that the PCRA court erred when it concluded that
Appellant failed to plead and prove the governmental interference exception
pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Appellant’s Br. at 3. We disagree.
In its opinion, the PCRA court emphasized that Appellant failed to
provide evidentiary support to substantiate his assertion that the
Commonwealth withheld Victim’s statement or interfered with Appellant
receiving the statement. PCRA Ct. Op. at 2 (unpaginated). The PCRA court
opined, “[Appellant]’s contention that the Commonwealth concealed [Victim]’s
statement relies on nothing beyond a bald assertion, a single sentence
averring in non-specific terms that the Commonwealth suppression occurred.”
Id. at 3 (unpaginated). We agree that this bald assertion, without more,
does not overcome the PCRA time-bar.
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In sum, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded
that Appellant failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA time-bar
and, thus, dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. We, like the PCRA court,
lack the jurisdiction to entertain the merits of these claims.
Order affirmed. Application for Remand denied. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Date: 11/14/2025
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