J-S27033-25
2025 PA Super 229
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : WILLIAM FRANKLIN : No. 807 EDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 28, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0605611-1980
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 7, 2025
Appellant, the Commonwealth, appeals from the order entered pursuant
to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. (“PCRA”) in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on February 28, 2024, which granted
Defendant/Appellee, William Franklin, a new trial. After a careful review, we
vacate and remand for further proceedings.
Appellee was tried and convicted in 1980 for first-degree murder and
related offenses. Appellee filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed his
judgment of sentence in 1984. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 488 A.2d 1163
(Pa. Super. 1984). Appellee filed his first PCRA petition on June 24, 1986,
which was denied. He appealed, and this Court affirmed the denial of his
petition on August 27, 1990. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 580 A.2d 25 (Pa.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S27033-25
Super. 1990). This Court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history
as follows:
William Franklin[] was arrested because of an incident involving the murder of Joseph Hollis and the attempted murder of John Pickens. The facts adduced at trial, which were set forth by the lower court in an opinion filed May 24, 1983, may be summarized as follows. The relevant crimes were committed during a meeting on October 22, 1976 which occurred between two rival syndicates engaged in illegal narcotics operations, the “North Philadelphia” and “West Philadelphia” groups. The purpose of the meeting allegedly was to reconcile differences between the two syndicates which had arisen two days earlier when Hollis insulted Alfred Clark, the leader of the North Philadelphia organization, by questioning his credentials as a “real gangster” and slapping him in the face with a gun.
The meeting on October 22, 1976 was attended by approximately ten people. During the meeting, [William Franklin] and Major Tillery, a member of the North Philadelphia syndicate, drew weapons from underneath a pool table and shot Hollis and Pickens; Hollis died as a result of the shooting. Emmanuel Claitt, also a member of the North Philadelphia group, testified that he had no prior knowledge of the shooting and that he was standing by the door during the meeting to prevent anyone from entering or leaving. Based on information supplied by Claitt, [William Franklin] was arrested four years later. Claitt’s evidence was given in return for leniency from the Commonwealth relating to other open cases [against Claitt].
Following a trial which began on December 1, 1980, a jury found [William Franklin] guilty of first degree murder, possession of instruments of crime generally, criminal conspiracy, and aggravated assault. [William Franklin]’s post-verdict motions were filed and argued by trial counsel. Subsequently, [William Franklin] raised allegations of ineffectiveness and new counsel assumed representation. [William Franklin] was given additional time to file and brief post-trial motions nunc pro tunc. However, following a second hearing, all of [William Franklin]’s post-verdict motions were denied. On July 7, 1982, [William Franklin] was sentenced to serve life imprisonment for the murder conviction, concurrent terms of five (5) to ten (10) years for criminal conspiracy and two and one-half (2 1/2) to five (5) years on the weapons charge, as
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well as a consecutive term of five (5) to ten (10) years for aggravated assault.
Id. at 27-28. As stated above, Appellee went on to file a direct appeal and a
first PCRA petition.
The instant appeal arises out of Appellee’s second PCRA petition filed
July 18, 2016, in which he claimed that eyewitness Claitt provided false
testimony against him at his 1980 trial. Appellee’s petition raised claims
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i) and (vi), stating that his conviction
was based on a violation of the Constitution by running afoul of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, (1963), and that he had after-discovered exculpatory
evidence unavailable to him at the time of trial. PCRA Petition, 7/18/16, at 3-
4. Appellee conceded that his petition was facially untimely. Id. at 4.
Initially, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss
the petition as untimely and ultimately dismissed the petition on September
12, 2017. Appellee appealed the denial of his second PCRA petition to this
Court. Although facially untimely, Appellee had presented a newly-discovered
fact and alleged governmental interference. On appeal we explained:
The pertinent newly-discovered fact was the recent declaration of Emanuel Claitt, the sole witness against [William Franklin], “that his testimony was entirely false,” and that “it was manufactured by the prosecution with the assistance of police detectives and secured by threats, coercion and favors.” PCRA Petition, 7/18/16, at ¶8. In support of the governmental interference exception, [William Franklin] pled that he was prevented from demonstrating his innocence at trial “because the Commonwealth concealed its actions presenting false evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland[, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963),] and Napue v. Illinois[, 360
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U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959),] and due process principles[.]” Id. at ¶9.
[William Franklin] averred further that Claitt made a sworn declaration on behalf of [William Franklin]’s co-defendant Major Tillery on May 4, 2016, and a supplemental sworn declaration on behalf of [William Franklin] on June 3, 2016, recanting his trial testimony implicating [William Franklin] in the murder. These facts became known to him within sixty days of the filing of the petition when Tillery’s attorney forwarded the declaration to him. He pled further that Claitt’s recantation was unknown to him and could not have been ascertained earlier with the exercise of reasonable diligence. [William Franklin] attached to his petition the declaration by Claitt dated June 3, 2016. [William Franklin] also filed a supplemental PCRA petition in which he provided witness certifications for Helen Ellis and Denise Certain, as well as homicide unit logs and correspondence, that he alleged corroborated Claitt’s claims that the Commonwealth gave him favorable treatment and sexual favors in return for his perjured testimony.
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 201 A.3d 854, 2018 WL 6011209 at *3-4 (Pa.
Super. 2018). This Court found that Appellee had raised genuine issues of
material fact regarding the timeliness of his second PCRA petition and the
applicable exceptions. We vacated the PCRA court’s order dismissing the
instant petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine if
Appellee’s petition proved the timeliness exceptions he pleaded. Id. at *13.
The PCRA court held evidentiary hearings on the timeliness exceptions.
The first hearing was held on July 22, 2019. Appellee was represented by
James Lloyd, Esquire. Testimony was given by three individuals: Appellee,
Robert Mickens, and Rachel Wolkenstein, Esquire. Robert Mickens was a
member of the North Philadelphia group and was associated with the poolroom
shooting that led to Appellee’s and Major Tillery’s murder convictions. While
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he did not testify at Appellee’s 1980 trial, he did testify as a witness for the
Commonwealth at co-defendant Tillery’s 1985 trial. He testified at Tillery’s trial
that he was the lookout who stood outside the poolroom during the gang
meeting and that he observed Appellee running after the surviving victim,
Pickens.
Attorney Wolkenstein is a New York attorney who, since February 2015,
has assisted Appellee’s co-defendant, Tillery, in his efforts to overturn his
conviction. As part of her investigation into Tillery’s case, she met with Mickens
regarding his role in Tillery’s trial. Mickens recanted his trial testimony to her,
asserting that in exchange for sexual favors, he was coerced into falsely
testifying at Tillery’s trial that he saw Appellee and Tillery commit the shooting
at the poolhall. She typed a statement memorializing Mickens’ recantation and
asked him to sign it. She used this statement as evidence in a PCRA petition
she filed for Tillery in 2016.
Mickens led Attorney Wolkenstein to Claitt, the eyewitness who testified
in Appellee’s trial, who also asserted to her that he was coerced into providing
false testimony at Appellee’s trial in exchange for sexual favors. In a manner
similar to how she documented Mickens’ recantation, Attorney Wolkenstein
prepared affidavits which Claitt signed. She also met with Claitt in her car and
created a recorded video of him reading his statement recanting. She is the
attorney referenced above who made Appellee aware of Claitt’s recantation in
2016 by mailing to Appellee Claitt’s declaration recanting the testimony he
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gave in Appellee’s 1980 trial. She reached out to Appellee with these
statements because, although he was not her client, she knew the information
would be beneficial to him.
Notably, while Mickens and Attorney Wolkenstein testified at Appellee’s
PCRA evidentiary hearings, Claitt did not. Instead of Claitt testifying at
Appellee’s PCRA hearing that he lied at Appellee’s trial, Mickens testified at the
PCRA hearing that he lied in Tillery’s trial in an attempt to corroborate Claitt’s
recantation to Attorney Wolkenstein. Further evidentiary hearings were
scheduled for October 7, 2019, and December 18, 2019. Claitt failed to appear
on these dates. On December 18, 2019, the PCRA hearings resumed, and
Claitt failed to appear for a third time. N.T., 10/18/23, at 5. At this hearing,
counsel for Appellee sought to introduce the video of Claitt’s recantation—the
above-mentioned video recorded by Attorney Wolkenstein in her car in 2016.
The Commonwealth objected to the admission of the video as hearsay while
Appellee’s counsel argued that the video constituted a statement against penal
interest, an exception to the hearsay rule. The parties were given time to brief
the issue of admissibility of the video. During this briefing period, on
September 13, 2020, Claitt passed away. He never testified at any evidentiary
hearing for Appellee despite having three opportunities to do so. Nonetheless,
the PCRA court admitted and considered as evidence Attorney Wolkenstein’s
2016 video of Claitt reading the statement recanting his 1980 testimony.
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Evidentiary hearings resumed and were held on June 15, 2023, October
18, 2023, and December 5, 2023, for Appellee to establish the newly-
discovered fact and governmental interference exceptions to the PCRA time-
bar for his instant petition. A summary of the relevant testimony from each
witness at each hearing is as follows: Attorney Wolkenstein testified that when
she met with Claitt during her investigation for Tillery, he gave her a statement
indicating that he was not present for the poolhall shooting. N.T., 7/22/19, at
8, 10. Attorney Wolkenstein stated that she met with Claitt in April or May of
2016 and again in June 2016.1 Id. at 9, 14; 11. Both times Claitt gave her
information about Appellee’s case. Id. at 11. Following each time they met,
she typed a statement summarizing what he had told her and asked him to
sign those statements. She mailed those statements to Appellee on June 15,
2016. Id. at 12. In August 2016, she and Claitt met in her car in a parking lot
in Philadelphia. Id. at 31. She prepared a statement for him to read based on
their prior conversations, which he read as she video recorded him.
Attorney Wolkenstein also submitted an affidavit of her own to the PCRA
court. Tr. Ct. Op. Ex. D. In her affidavit, she stated that Claitt told her how the
detectives allowed him to meet with women for sexual encounters under police
custody in the police investigation rooms and in hotels. He claimed that on
1 The testimony suggests the dates of these meetings were April 3 or May 3
and May 4, and June 3 or June 4, and August 3 or August 30. N.T., 7/22/19, at 9, 14; 11, 18; 13, 18.
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various occasions he met with his wife, Barbara Claitt, a girlfriend, Helen Ellis,
and another girlfriend, Denise Certain. Wolkenstein Declaration, 3/3/20, at 1.
Attorney Wolkenstein stated that she was able to locate Helen Ellis at her
home who confirmed that she did have sex with Claitt in the homicide
interview rooms and was brought there by detectives for that purpose. Id. at
2. Despite being subpoenaed, Hellen Ellis never appeared at an evidentiary
hearing to testify to these facts on behalf of Appellee. N.T., 7/22/19, at 67-
68. Attorney Wolkenstein further stated that she was able to obtain sign-in
logs from the police station which indicated that in 1983, Claitt and Denise
Certain signed in on the same day around the same times, corroborating
Claitt’s story that the detectives allowed them to meet up. Tr. Ct. Op. Ex. B.;
Ex. D at 4.2
Appellee testified that he filed a PCRA petition in July 2016, within a
month of receiving Claitt’s declarations from Attorney Wolkenstein in the mail.
N.T., 7/22/19, at 38-40. The last time Appellee had spoken to Claitt was in the
late 1980s, and Appellee did not know Claitt recanted until he received the
documents in the mail from Attorney Wolkenstein. Id. at 41-42. Appellee
testified that he last saw Tillery in 2003. Id. at 44.
2 It is noteworthy that Appellee’s trial occurred in 1980, and thus, even if the
sign-in sheet can be considered evidence of a sexual rendezvous, it cannot support the claim that Claitt was induced to testify falsely in Appellee’s trial three years earlier.
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Mickens testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had testified in the
Tillery homicide trial. Id. at 52. He was shown a statement that Attorney
Wolkenstein had typed based on their conversation when he had met with her
in April of 2016. Id. at 56. He asserted that although he testified at trial that
he was the lookout for the poolhall shooting, he lied and was not outside the
poolhall and he did not hear3 or see a murder. Id. at 55.
Mickens further asserted that in the 1980s, he was taken from the
detention center and asked by Philadelphia detectives to sign a statement
implicating Appellee in exchange for intimate time with several different
women. Id. at 18. He estimated that he was allowed approximately eight
sexual encounters with three different women in order to fabricate testimony
at Tillery’s trial. Id. at 36. Mickens also stated that although he testified at
Tillery’s trial that he did not have a sentencing agreement with the
Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony, he was in fact given a
guaranteed sentence in regard to rape and robbery charges against him. Id.
at 38-39. Mickens admitted that when he met with Attorney Wolkenstein in
3 Contrarily, at the following evidentiary hearing, Mickens did state that he saw someone run past him with a gun and heard gunshots on the night of the poolhall shooting, but maintained that he did not see Appellee and Tillery. N.T., 10/18/23, at 45-46. The man he claims he saw chasing the surviving victim, Pickens, was allegedly Frank Junius, but because Mickens had children with a cousin of Frank Junius, he did not want to implicate him. Id. at 81. It is relevant that at the time of this evidentiary hearing, Frank Junius was deceased. Id.
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2016 and she typed up his statement, there was false information included,
but he signed it anyway. Id. at 50, 55-56, 82-83.
At the conclusion of all the evidentiary hearings, the PCRA court found
that Appellee pleaded and proved the timeliness exceptions in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(i) and (ii). The PCRA court then vacated Appellee’s convictions and
granted a new trial. The court reasoned that Claitt was the only eyewitness
against Appellee in his 1980 trial, and the court found credible Attorney
Wolkenstein’s testimony that Claitt admitted to lying for sexual favors and that
Helen Ellis confirmed Claitt’s story. Tr. Ct. Op. at 7. The PCRA court relied on
Claitt’s video-recorded recantation and found it reliable. Id. at 9. The court
explained that the same detectives named by Claitt and Mickens as
orchestrating the “Sex for Lies” scandal4 in Appellee’s and Tillery’s cases,
respectively, were implicated in other Pennsylvania cases for the same
conduct. Tr. Ct. Op. at 10-11 (citing Commonwealth v. Lester, 572 A.2d
694, 695 (Pa. Super. 1990), Stokes v. City of Philadelphia, No. 22-0338,
2023 WL 362006, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2023)).
4 A Philadelphia Inquirer article published in 2021 revealed an investigation into claims made by several inmates that they were coerced by certain Philadelphia detectives into providing false testimony in exchange for sexual rendezvous. The article termed these events the “Sex for Lies” scandal. None of the named detectives were ever charged, and none are surviving today. Samantha Melamed, Sex for Lies, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, (July 20, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/news/a/philadelphia-homicide-detectives-bribes- exonerations-murder-20210720.html.
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The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal on March 6, 2024. On May
21, 2024, the Commonwealth filed its concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). This appeal follows.
The Commonwealth raises one issue for our review:
Did the PCRA court err in granting defendant a new trial based on alleged after-discovered evidence of an out-of-court statement prepared for a recanting witness by the co-defendant’s defense attorney, where the statement did not meet the statement against interest exception to the rule against hearsay because (1) it did not expose the witness to criminal or civil liability, and (2) the circumstances of the witness’s recantation were neither trustworthy nor reliable?
Appellee’s Br. at 4.
The following standard governs our review of this appeal:
When reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA relief, this Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 2007 PA Super 125, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). Great deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 2003 PA Super 191, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 576 Pa. 712, 839 A.2d 352 (2003).
Commonwealth v. Rachak, 62 A.3d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Furthermore, this Court is bound by the PCRA court’s credibility
determinations when the record supports them. Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 51 A.3d 237, 242-43 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
We first consider whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that
Appellee’s PCRA petition was timely filed. The timeliness of a post-conviction
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petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651
(Pa. Super. 2013). Here, Appellee’s petition was facially untimely, filed some
thirty years after his judgment of sentence became final. We must determine
if the PCRA court properly found that Appellee established the statutory
exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA. To invoke an exception, a
petition must allege and the petitioner must prove:
(i) the failure to raise a claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or the law of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or law of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provide in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). For claims arising prior to the 2017
amendment to the PCRA, a PCRA petition invoking one of these statutory
exceptions must be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could have
been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, the newly-discovered fact alleged by Appellee in his petition was
that eyewitness Claitt provided false testimony against him at his 1980 trial.
The PCRA court credited Appellee’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing that
he did not know of this alleged fact until he received the documents in the
mail from Attorney Wolkenstein, and that he had not spoken to Claitt since
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the late 1980s, at which time Claitt had not recanted. The PCRA court credited
Attorney Wolkenstein’s testimony that she contacted Appellee regarding
Claitt’s recantation for the first time on June 15, 2016 by mail. Accordingly,
Appellee had sixty days from June 15, 2016 to file a petition presenting this
claim. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Appellee filed the PCRA petition July 18,
2016, within approximately a month of receiving Claitt’s declarations from
Attorney Wolkenstein in the mail. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in
finding that Appellee’s petition was timely filed.
However, the PCRA court committed a crucial legal error when it
summarily granted Appellee a new trial upon deciding Appellee’s claim was
timely, without considering the substantive claims raised in Appellee’s petition.
The PCRA court appears to have conflated the newly-discovered fact exception
to the PCRA time bar with a substantive after-discovered evidence claim. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). However, these are distinct analyses; our
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the newly-discovered facts
exception to the time limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in [Section]
9545(b)(1)(ii), is distinct from the after-discovered evidence basis for relief
delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).” Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d
618, 629 (Pa. 2017). Satisfaction of the newly-discovered fact exception is
merely a prerequisite to a successful substantive PCRA claim, not a basis for
relief in and of itself. See Commonwealth v. Diggs, 220 A.3d 1112, 1117
(Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that we must first discern whether we have
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jurisdiction before proceeding to an analysis of the merits of an after-
discovered evidence claim). Thus, the only thing established at the evidentiary
hearings was that the PCRA court does have jurisdiction to address the claims
in Appellee’s petition. Just because the court has jurisdiction does not mean
Appellee is automatically entitled to a new trial, and the court erred in finding
as such.
Accordingly, we must remand this matter for the PCRA court to
determine if the substantive claims raised in Appellee’s petition merit a new
trial. As stated earlier, Appellee’s petition raised two claims cognizable for relief
under the PCRA: first, he claimed that his conviction was based on a Brady
violation,5 and second, he claimed to have after-discovered exculpatory
evidence.6 PCRA Petition, 7/18/16, at 18, 19. Neither the PCRA court’s 1925(a)
5 To establish a Brady violation, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that:
“(1) the prosecution concealed evidence; (2) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to him; and (3) he was prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 460-61 (Pa. 2015).
6 To determine whether a PCRA petitioner has presented after-discovered evidence that would entitle him to a new trial, he must demonstrate that the new evidence: “(1) could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.” Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 972 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted). The proposed new evidence must be both “producible and admissible.” Id.
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opinion, nor the parties’ briefs, engaged in a meaningful discussion of these
claims.
The remaining issue for this Court to determine on appeal is whether
Claitt’s recantation statement prepared by Attorney Wolkenstein and the video
recorded by Attorney Wolkenstein of Claitt reading the statement are
admissible as evidence to establish Appellee’s Brady claim and after-
discovered evidence claim.
This Court reviews the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480, 489 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(citation omitted). An abuse of discretion is “not merely an error of judgment,
but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of
judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-
will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v.
Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 749 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1188-89 (Pa. Super. 2009)).
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). There is no doubt that
Claitt’s recantation in his signed statement and video recording is hearsay as
it is being offered as proof that he did, in fact, lie at Appellee’s 1980 trial.
“Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible unless they fall under an
enumerated exception.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 68 (Pa.
2012); Pa.R.E. 802.
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Appellee argues, and the PCRA court ruled, that Claitt’s recantation is
admissible under the hearsay exception for a statement against interest,
which reads as follows:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following statements, as hereinafter defined, are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: **** (3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. In a criminal case, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3).7 Thus, this hearsay exception requires (1) that the
declarant is unavailable, (2) that the statement be against interest, and (3)
that there be corroborating circumstances clearly indicative of its
trustworthiness. In the instant case, although Claitt had three opportunities
to appear at Appellee’s evidentiary hearings and testify, he is now unavailable
to testify because he is deceased.8 Therefore, the first prong is met.
7 This rule is identical to F.R.E. 804(b)(3). See Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3) cmt.
8 We note that while the PCRA court blames his failure to appear, in part, on
the COVID-19 pandemic, he was scheduled to appear on three separate dates in 2019, prior to the outbreak of the pandemic in the United States and prior to the closing of the courts. Tr. Ct. Op. at 15-16.
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The second prong is whether the statement was against Claitt’s interest
such that it exposed him to civil or criminal liability. The Commonwealth
argues that Claitt knew he could not have been subject to any liability or
penalty for admitting in 2016 that he committed perjury in 1980 because the
statute of limitations on perjury had long expired. See Appellant’s Br. at 23;
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(b)(1) (prosecution for perjury must be commenced within
five years after it is committed). However, the PCRA court pointed out that in
Pennsylvania, there is no limitations period for the prosecution of murder or
felonies perpetrated in connection with a murder. Tr. Ct. Op. at 23; 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5551. The PCRA court noted that the phrase “in connection with”
does not suggest a limiting term. Tr. Ct. Op. at 24. (citing Commonwealth v.
Dietrich, 260 A.3d 101, *3 (Pa. Super. 2021)9 (unpublished memorandum).
The court explained that, because Claitt perjured himself at Appellee’s murder
trial, it qualifies as a felony perpetrated “in connection with” a murder of the
first degree. Tr. Ct. Op. at 25. Accordingly, the PCRA court decided that there
is no statute of limitations on perjury when the testimony is given by a witness
at a murder trial.
9 In Dietrich, an appellant was convicted under the statute criminalizing false
statements made “in connection with the purchase, delivery, or transfer of a firearm.” Id. at *7; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111(g)(4)(ii). The appellant had made a false statement while attempting to purchase a firearm, and we upheld his conviction stating, “[t]he term ‘in connection with’ connotes activity that is in relation to a purchase, delivery, or transfer of a firearm.” Id. at *8. We did not interpret the statute as requiring the purchase be completed. Id.
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A crime is committed “in connection with” another crime if it “aris[es]
from the same nucleus of operative fact.” Commonwealth v. Russell, 938
A.2d 1082, 1089 (Pa. Super. 2007). While criminal caselaw defining “the same
nucleus of operative fact” is scant, Pennsylvania courts have previously
determined that “‘[t]he same facts’ means any act or acts which the accused
has performed and any intent which the accused has manifested, regardless
of whether these acts and intents are part of one criminal plan, scheme,
transaction or encounter, or multiple criminal plans, schemes transactions or
encounters.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 673 A.2d 962, 967 (Pa. Super.
1996).
For example, a series of charges brought against a defendant for
distributing a controlled substance through many different transactions over
a period of months would be considered to have arisen out of the same factual
nucleus because the illegal conduct would have constituted a single criminal
episode subject to compulsory joinder had all of the charges been filed at one
time. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rocco, 544 A.2d 496, 500 (Pa. Super.
1988). A more obvious example of arising out of “the same facts” would be
when a defendant commits multiple felonies, such as arson and homicide, in
a single criminal episode. See, e.g., Russell, supra. When multiple offenses
are committed as part of an ongoing series of planned incidents carried out
by a single defendant or a defendant along with co-defendants or co-
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conspirators, the crimes arise out of the same criminal occurrence. See
Commonwealth v. Sirbaugh, 500 A.2d 453, 459 (Pa. Super. 1985).
This Court has interpreted similar phrasing in the civil context: “arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence” involves “a common factual
background or common factual or legal questions.” Stokes v. Local Order of
Moose Lodge No. 696, 466 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Pa. 1983). We have stated
that “[w]here the evidence that would establish one complaint is distinct from
the evidence that would establish the other complaint, the complaints do not
arise from the same transaction or occurrence.” Hineline v. Stroudsburg
Elec. Supply Co., 586 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Super. 1991).
Amalgamating the above instructive caselaw, we find that the exception
to the five-year statute of limitations for felonies committed “in connection
with” a murder is intended for felonies that occurred at the same time as a
murder during the same criminal episode; that occurred as part of the same
criminal scheme(s), plan(s), or transactions(s) as the murder; or that involved
a common basis of operative facts as the murder. Where the facts surrounding
the commission of a murder and the facts surrounding the commission of a
felony could reasonably or arguably be charged in the same complaint, the
crimes can be considered “in connection with” one another. While it is not a
requirement that the same individual commits both the murder and the felony
in connection with it, any other involved individual will generally be a co-
conspirator, co-defendant, accessory, or accomplice.
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In the instant case, there is no assertion that Appellee and Claitt were
co-conspirators or co-defendants in the shooting such that Claitt lied as part
of the same criminal plan, scheme, transaction or encounter. The alleged
perjury obviously did not occur at the same time or in the same criminal
episode as the murder. It cannot be reasonably argued that the murder and
the perjury could have been charged in the same complaint or tried in the
same prosecution. There is no evidence indicating Claitt knew of and
participated in the shooting for which Appellee was charged. Thus, we find
that the exception to the statute of limitations for felonies committed “in
connection with” a murder in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5551(4) was not intended to
apply to the instant circumstance.
Accordingly, we find that Claitt could not have been subject to civil or
criminal liability for stating in 2016 that he lied during Appellee’s 1980 trial
because the statute of limitations on perjury had run. Thus, the second prong
of the statement against interest exception to hearsay has not been met. The
PCRA court therefore erred in considering Claitt’s statements which
constituted hearsay.
While our analysis can stop there, we will briefly discuss the last prong
of the statement against interest analysis; whether there are corroborating
circumstances clearly indicative of the statement’s trustworthiness.
“Recantation testimony is one of the least reliable forms of proof, particularly
when it constitutes an admission of perjury.” Commonwealth v. Padillas,
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997 A.2d 356, 366 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2010)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Reliability is determined by referring to the circumstances in which the
declarant gave the statement, not by reference to other corroborating
evidence presented at trial. Commonwealth v. Robins, 812 A.2d 514 (Pa.
2002). The factors a court might consider in determining the reliability of
inculpatory or exculpatory statements are as follows:
the circumstances under which the statements were uttered, including the custodial/non-custodial aspect of the setting and the identity of the listener; the contents of the statement, including whether the statements minimize the responsibility of the declarant or spread or shift the blame; other possible motivations of the declarant, including improper motive such as to lie, curry favor, or distort the truth; the nature and degree of the “against interest” aspect of the statements, including the extent to which the declarant apprehends that the making of the statement is likely to actually subject him to criminal liability; the circumstances or events that prompted the statements, including whether they were made with the encouragement or at the request of a listener; the timing of the statement in relation to events described; the declarant's relationship to the defendant; and any other factors bearing upon the reliability of the statement at issue.
Id. at 525-26.
Here, the PCRA court placed significant weight on Attorney
Wolkenstein’s testimony that she spoke with Helen Ellis who corroborated
Claitt’s statements, Tr. Ct. Op. at 8, and focused much of its analysis on
Mickens’ testimony, finding it corroborative of Claitt’s statements. Id. at 20-
22. However, while the PCRA court very well may have found Attorney
Wolkenstein and Mickens credible, and we do not disturb the PCRA court’s
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credibility findings, the court should have only referred to the circumstances
in which Claitt gave his statement. Robins, supra. The court, however, failed
to engage in a meaningful discussion about the reliability of the circumstances
in which Claitt made his recantation in Attorney Wolkenstein’s car in her
presence. We further find that the PCRA court made a relevant statement
undermining its own credibility finding; the court stated on the record that it
did not believe everything contained in Claitt’s recantation, and that part of
his statements could not be verified as true of false. N.T., 2/28/24, at 7.
Accordingly, the reliability of Claitt’s statements was not properly assessed.
Finally, we note that a sexual misconduct case cited by the PCRA court,
Commonwealth v. Lester, infra, works against the court’s conclusion. In
Lester, similar claims were made by the petitioner about being coerced to
make false statements for sex. There we found the evidence reliable and
granted a new trial. However, in that case, the petitioner who claimed to have
been coerced by the detectives testified to the coercion and the sexual
rendezvous, and all three women who were alleged to have had sex with him
while in custody testified at the hearing. Lester, 572, A.2d 696, 698. This is
distinguishable from here where neither the witness who claimed to have lied
in Appellee’s case in exchange for sex nor the women who he alleged slept
with him testified. Instead, Claitt and Helen Ellis admitted these facts to
Attorney Wolkenstein only and never testified at a hearing for Appellee. This
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is a substantial distinction in the reliability of the statements between Lester
and the instant case.
The order of the PCRA court is vacated and the case is remanded for
proceedings to determine if Appellee’s claims of Brady violations and after-
discovered evidence merit relief under the PCRA. The evidence admitted at
further proceedings must be consistent with this opinion.
Order vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 10/7/2025
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