J-A20045-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CARL LEE FIELDS : : Appellant : No. 1630 WDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013464-1993
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CARL LEE COLLINS : : Appellant : No. 1632 WDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2019 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012112-1993
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2020 J-A20045-20
Carl Lee Collins (“Collins”) appeals from the Order denying his Petition
for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.2
The PCRA court summarized the procedural history relevant to the
instant appeal as follows:
In 1993, [Collins] was charged at the above-referenced docket numbers with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, carrying a firearm without a license, and conspiracy.[3] [Collins] was convicted of second-degree murder and the remaining charges following a jury trial in 1994. At the time [Collins] committed [these] offense[s], [Collins] was 16 years old. On October 11, 2017, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), [Collins] was resentenced before the Honorable Judge Donna Jo McDaniel [(“Judge McDaniel” or “the resentencing judge”)]. At that time, [Collins’s] sentence of life without parole was vacated[,] and Judge McDaniel sentenced [Collins] to serve a period of thirty (30) years to life incarceration.[4] [Collins’s] sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. [See Commonwealth v. Collins, 194 A.3d 714 (Pa. Super. 2018).] On January 16, 2019, [Collins] filed a pro se PCRA Petition. Due to Judge McDaniel’s retirement, this matter was assigned to [the Honorable Thomas E. Flaherty (“the
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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2 Collins properly filed a separate Notice of Appeal at each of the above-stated docket numbers, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). This Court consolidated the proceedings by an Order entered on November 12, 2019. We note that the use of two docket numbers was the result of Collins’s use of two names at the time of the incident: Carl Lee Collins and Carl Lee Fields. On January 6, 1994, the Commonwealth filed a Motion to Join the proceedings as the assignment of two docket numbers was the result of an “administrative error.” See Motion to Join, 1/6/94, at 6. The record reflects no trial court order disposing of this Motion. 3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501, 2702(a), 3701(1)(1), 6106(a), 903.
4 Judge McDaniel imposed no further penalty on Collins’s remaining convictions.
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PCRA judge”)]. Counsel was appointed for [Collins], as it was his first PCRA following his resentencing….
PCRA Court Notice of Intention to Dismiss, 9/4/19, at 1 (footnotes and citation
added). By appointed counsel, Collins filed an Amended PCRA Petition. After
appropriate Notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court dismissed
Collins’s Amended Petition without a hearing. Thereafter, Collins filed the
instant timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise
Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
Collins presents the following claims for our review:
1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [Collins’s] claim that resentencing counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the resentencing court’s reliance on [Collins’s] prior assertions of innocence[,] and [the] prosecution of his third action pursuant to the PCRA[,] as aggravating sentencing factors, impermissibly burdening his federal and Pennsylvania constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and his Pennsylvania constitutional rights to open courts, to appeal, and to seek writ of habeas corpus?
2. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [Collins’s] claim that resentencing counsel was ineffective in failing to tether her demonstration of [Collins’s] rehabilitability to a particular term- of-years sentence by resort to extant comparator cases?
3. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [Collins’s] claim that his sentence is unconstitutional and illegal because it is a de facto life sentence[,] where there is an emerging national consensus that a term of 30 years to life imprisonment is a de facto term of life imprisonment within the meaning of the federal constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, an issue currently before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Felder, [187 A.3d 909 (Pa. 2018)] ?
Brief for Appellant at 4.
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In reviewing the grant or denial of PCRA relief, an appellate court
considers whether the PCRA court’s conclusions are supported by the record
and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Crispell, 193 A.3d 919, 927 (Pa.
2018). Moreover, the factual findings of a post-conviction court, which hears
evidence and passes on the credibility of witnesses, should be given
deference. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 312, 319 (Pa.
2014).
In order to qualify for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2). These errors include, inter alia, a violation of the Pennsylvania or United States Constitutions, or instances of ineffectiveness of counsel that “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Id. § 9543(a)(2)(i) and (ii); Crispell, 193 A.3d at 927….
Additionally, to obtain relief under the PCRA based on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must satisfy the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 … (1984). In Pennsylvania, we have applied the Strickland test by requiring a petitioner to establish that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Pierce, … 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001). Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance, and, if a claim fails under any required element of the Strickland test, the court may dismiss the claim on that basis. Commonwealth v. Ali, … 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010)….
Commonwealth v. Housman, 226 A.3d 1249, 1260-61 (Pa. 2020).
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Collins first claims that the PCRA court improperly dismissed his claim
of ineffective assistance of resentencing counsel. Brief for Appellant at 16.
Specifically, Collins argues that counsel should have objected when the
resentencing court relied on Collins’s prior assertions of innocence, and his
pursuit of a third PCRA Petition, as aggravating sentencing factors. Id. at 16.
According to Collins, his counsel “ably demonstrated that he was already
rehabilitated, much less rehabilitatable.” Id. Collins argues that the
Commonwealth then improperly countered with evidence of his prior
assertions of innocence, and Collins’s prosecution of his third PCRA Petition.
Id. Collins asserts that the resentencing court relied on this evidence as an
aggravating sentencing factor, which impacted his credibility and ability to be
rehabilitated. Id. Collins argues that in doing so, the resentencing court
violated and burdened his federal and state constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, and his right to petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at
16-17.
In particular, Collins directs our attention to the Commonwealth’s
inquiry related to the claims raised in his 2008 PCRA Petition. Id. at 17-18.
According to Collins, the Commonwealth used the averments in his 2008 PCRA
Petition as evidence that he was “still trying to get out and putting forth lies
before the [c]ourt in order to get released[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Collins
asserts that the Commonwealth also referred to this evidence in its closing
argument at the resentencing hearing. See id. at 19. Collins argues that his
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resentencing counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to the
presentation of this evidence, and the Commonwealth’s argument. Id.
According to Collins, the trial court further relied on this evidence as an
aggravating sentencing factor, in its statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed. Id. at 19-21, 21-22.
Collins argues that by considering impermissible sentencing factors, the
resentencing court impermissibly burdened the exercise of his constitutional
rights. Id. at 26. Collins cites North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969), which recognized that “penalizing those who choose
to exercise constitutional rights, would be patently unconstitutional. … And
the very threat inherent in the existence of such a punitive policy would,
with respect to those still in prison, serve to chill the exercise of
basic constitutional rights….” Id. at 724. According to Collins, his counsel
had no reasonable basis for her failure to object to this evidence. See Brief
for Appellant at 30. As a result, Collins argues, he suffered prejudice at
resentencing. Id.
In its Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“PCRA Notice”),
which the PCRA court incorporated into its Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion, the PCRA
court addressed this claim as follows:
At [Collins’s] resentencing, [the resentencing court] permitted the Commonwealth to inquire about [Collins’s] prior PCRA Petition[,] wherein he proffered evidence that purportedly exonerated him. This line of inquiry was taken in the context of challenging [Collins’s] statement at the resentencing hearing that he was remorseful and taking responsibility for his actions. After careful
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review of the resentencing hearing transcript, it is clear that the [resentencing court] did not place an emphasis on this fact when fashioning [the] sentence. [The resentencing judge] merely stated that it was “interesting.” [The resentencing judge] found that the most significant factor was the fact that [Collins] began to take classes and better himself in 1995, which was before Miller [] found mandatory life sentences for juveniles to be unconstitutional. It proved to [the resentencing judge] that [Collins] was sincere in his rehabilitation efforts. As the record fails to establish that [the resentencing judge] used [Collins’s] prior profession of innocence in any manner in fashioning [Collins’s] sentence, it cannot be ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to object to the same.
PCRA Court Notice, 9/4/19, at 2 (citations omitted).
Because the record supports the PCRA court’s determination that
Collins’s underlying claim lacks arguable merit, we affirm on the basis of the
PCRA court’s reasoning, as set forth above, with regard to Collins’s first claim.
See id.; see also Ali, 10 A.3d at 291 (stating that if an ineffectiveness claim
fails under any required element of the Strickland test, the court may dismiss
the claim on that basis).
In his second claim, Collins argues that his resentencing counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing “to tether her demonstration of
[Collins’s] rehabilitability to a particular term-of-years sentence by resort to
extant comparator cases.” Brief for Appellant at 32. Collins sets forth a
summary of the sentences imposed for 16-year-old offenders convicted of
second-degree murder throughout Pennsylvania. Id. at 33. Collins
challenges the PCRA court’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d
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343 (Pa. Super. 2019), in holding that consideration of “comparator’s
sentences” is legally impermissible. Brief for Appellant at 34.
Collins contends that at the hearing, his counsel demonstrated that
Collins was “essentially already rehabilitated,” and that the gravity of his
offense, “essentially a robbery gone wrong[,]” was consistent with cases that
had resulted in lower minimum sentences. Id. at 35. According to Collins,
counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him prejudice, “as there is a reasonable
probability that providing a frame of reference for post-Miller resentencing
would have persuaded the resentencing court to impose a minimum term of
less than 30 years [of] imprisonment.” Id. at 36.
When imposing sentence, a trial court must consider the relevant
sentencing guideline ranges, as well as “the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation
to impact on victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 144 (Pa. Super.
2011) (citation omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670 (Pa. 2003), this Court
addressed whether a sentencing court may consider “factually similar cases in
which plea bargains resulted in sentences below the guideline range,” as a
factor in sentencing the defendant. Id. at 679. In concluding that such
evidence constituted an impermissible sentencing factor, this Court
recognized that “a sentencing court in one case cannot possibly know all of
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the various considerations and factors underlying a negotiated plea in another
case.” Id. at 680.
In Lekka, following the decision in Miller, the trial court resentenced
the defendant to 45 years to life in prison. Lekka, 210 A.3d at 348. The
defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, at which time he sought
to introduce an exhibit analyzing the resentencing of 120 juvenile offenders in
Pennsylvania, following Miller. Id. The resentencing court precluded the
admission of this exhibit, and denied reconsideration of the defendant’s
sentence. Id.
On appeal, the defendant challenged, inter alia, the preclusion of the
exhibit analyzing the sentences imposed on other juvenile offenders, following
Miller. Id. at 353. This Court rejected the defendant’s claim, concluding that
(a) the defendant had failed to present the exhibit at his original resentencing
hearing; and, significantly, (b) the exhibit was not relevant. Id. Regarding
the exhibit’s lack of relevance, this Court explained, in part, that “[t]he
consideration of the sentences[,] by themselves[,] is also contrary to
Pennsylvania’s individual sentencing scheme, which mandates that courts
consider in each case the nature and circumstances of the crime and character
of the defendant[,] rather than only looking to the mere fact of the offense
committed.” Id. Further, “uniformity in sentencing does not obviate the
requirement that the sentence be individualized with respect to the factors of
the particular defendant and criminal offense.” Id. at 354-55.
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Here, as in Celestin and Lekka, we conclude that evidence related to
“comparable cases” would have been irrelevant to the individualized
sentencing of Collins required by Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Code. See
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 966 (Pa. 2007) (stating that
“Pennsylvania’s sentencing system, as evidenced by the Sentencing Code and
our case law, is based upon individualized sentencing.”). As such, comparable
cases evidence would have constituted an impermissible sentencing factor.
See Celestin, 825 A.2d 679. Because there is no arguable merit to Collins’s
underlying claim, this claim of ineffective assistance of resentencing counsel
fails. See Ali, 10 A.3d at 291 (recognizing that if a claim fails under any
required element of the Strickland ineffectiveness test, the court may
dismiss the claim on that basis).
Finally, Collins argues that the PCRA court erred in rejecting his
challenge to the legality of the sentence, as “there is an emergent consensus
that a term of 30 years to life imprisonment is a de facto term of life
imprisonment,” and therefore violates the constitutional prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. Brief for Appellant at 41. Collins directs our
attention to other jurisdictions, arguing that there is a growing national
consensus that, “at least, somewhere between 25 and 30 years [of]
imprisonment is the upper limit before the chance at parole must be provided.”
Id. at 43. Collins also states that the issue is presently before our Supreme
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Court in Commonwealth v. Felder, 181 A.3d 1252 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(unpublished memorandum), appeal granted, 187 A.3d 909 (Pa. 2018).
“[A] claim challenging a sentencing court’s legal authority to impose a
particular sentence presents a question of sentencing legality.”
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 434-35 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts II”)
(citations omitted). “The determination as to whether a trial court imposed
an illegal sentence is a question of law; an appellate court’s standard of review
in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 771 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
In Felder, our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal as to the
following issue:
Does not a sentence of 50 years to life imposed upon a juvenile constitute a de facto life sentence requiring the sentencing court, as mandated by this Court in [Batts II,] first find permanent incorrigibility, irreparable corruption or irretrievable depravity beyond a reasonable doubt?
Felder, 187 A.3d 909 (Pa. 2018) (emphasis added).
Here, Collins was sentenced to a minimum prison term of 30 years.
Thus, on its face, any holding in Felder would be distinguishable from the
instant case.
Upon our review, we agree with the PCRA court’s Notice, which stated
the following:
[W]ith regard to [Collins’s] assertion that a sentence of 30 to life is a de facto life sentence, it is important to remember that [Collins] has been incarcerated since he was 16 years old. At his resentencing, [Collins] was given credit for time served since his
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initial sentence. Thus, [Collins] will be eligible for parole at the age of 47. While a court is prohibited from sentencing a juvenile homicide defendant to a term-of-years sentence that results in a de facto life sentence, a sentence is not a de facto life sentence if a defendant has a “meaningful chance of surviv[ing]” until he has served his minimum sentence. … Lekka, 210 A.3d at 357-58. [Collins] … clearly has a “meaningful chance of survival” to meet his minimum sentence, as he will be 47 years of age when he reaches his minimum sentence. As such, the sentence of thirty (30) [years] to life is not a de facto life sentence.
PCRA Court Notice, 9/4/19, at 3-4.
We agree with the analysis and conclusion of the PCRA court, as set
forth above, and affirm on this basis with regard to Collins’s third claim. See
id.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 11/30/2020
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