Com. v. Farlow, T.

2025 Pa. Super. 76

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 28, 2025
• Docket: 646 EDA 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A06012-25 2025 PA Super 76

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : TAQUINE FARLOW : No. 646 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered February 21, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0004985-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 28, 2025

The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered by the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County affirming the dismissal of charges

against Taquine Farlow by the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County for a

violation of Rule 600.1 The Commonwealth challenges the Court of Common

Pleas’ order affirming the dismissal under Rule 600, asserting the court should

have applied Rule 10132 because the charges were ordered to be tried in the

Philadelphia Municipal Court. We reverse and remand for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

2 Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013. J-A06012-25

Farlow was charged with aggravated assault, simple assault, and

recklessly endangering another person on September 20, 2021, for events

that transpired on August 22, 2021. An arrest warrant was issued on

September 20, 2021. Farlow was arrested on March 21, 2023, and a

preliminary arraignment was held on March 22, 2023. The preliminary hearing

for the charges was held on April 5, 2023. At that time, the aggravated assault

charge was dismissed for lack of evidence and the case remanded to Municipal

Court for trial on the remaining charges.

Trial was scheduled for May 23, 2023. The day before, Farlow filed a

motion to dismiss the charges due to a violation of her speedy trial rights

under Rule 600. Although the Commonwealth was ready to proceed to trial on

May 23, 2023, trial did not commence, and the Municipal Court heard

argument on whether Rule 600 or Rule 1013 applied. The Municipal Court

requested briefs and continued the matter. On July 11, 2023, a hearing was

held wherein the Commonwealth presented a detective from the warrant unit

who explained the backlog of warrants due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but

did not testify to any attempts to arrest Farlow. The Municipal Court dismissed

the charges, agreeing with Farlow that Rule 600 was violated, and the

Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in bringing the case to trial.

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The Commonwealth filed an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas on

August 8, 2023.3 After argument, the Court of Common Pleas affirmed the

dismissal of Farlow’s charges, holding Rule 600 applies to the Philadelphia

Municipal Court where an arrest warrant was issued and there was significant

delay in arresting the defendant.4 The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal to

this Court. The Commonwealth complied with the Court of Common Pleas’

order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

The Commonwealth raises the following question for our review:

Did the [Court of Common Pleas] err by dismissing all charges on purported Rule 600 grounds, where Rule 1013 (not Rule 600) applies to Philadelphia Municipal Court cases, and where fewer than 180 days of includable time allowed by Rule 1013 had elapsed by the date on which the court dismissed the charges?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

The Commonwealth’s claim requires us to interpret certain Rules of

Criminal Procedure and is therefore a question of law. “Accordingly, our

3 While the Commonwealth’s notice referred to the filing as an appeal, the Court of Common Pleas treated the notice as a writ of certiorari. See Commonwealth’s Notice of Appeal (single page, identifying the notice as an “[a]ppeal from the Order of July, 2023 …”); Court of Common Pleas Opinion, 4/12/24, at 2 (noting the Commonwealth filed a petition for certiorari).

4 The Court of Common Pleas consolidated this case with three other petitions

for writs of certiorari filed by the Commonwealth regarding the municipal court dismissing charges under Rule 600. The Court of Common Pleas entered a single order affirming the municipal court and issued one Rule 1925(a) opinion for all four cases. The Commonwealth filed appeals in all four cases. The other three are: Commonwealth v. Salcedo, docketed at 647 EDA 2024; Commonwealth v. Allison, docketed at 710 EDA 2024; and Commonwealth v. Parker, docketed at 693 EDA 2024.

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standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Far, 46 A.3d 709, 712 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).

Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(C), we must, to the extent practicable, construe the Rules of Criminal Procedure in consonance with the rules of statutory construction, which are set forth in the Statutory Construction Act of 1972. The object of all interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the drafters, a task that is best accomplished by considering the plain language of the provision(s) at issue. However, when the words are not explicit, then the court must consider various other indicia of intent, such as the object and necessity of the rule and the mischief meant to be remedied. The rules should be construed to give effect to all their provisions, and a single rule should not be read in a vacuum, especially where there is an apparent interrelationship among rules. We may consult the explanatory comments of the committee that worked on a rule.

Id. at 712-13 (footnote and citations omitted).

The three rules we must evaluate here are Rule 600, Rule 1013, and

Rule 1000. First, Rule 600 is the prompt trial rule which is applicable to

statewide trial courts. See Far, 46 A.3d at 713. Rule 600 provides, in relevant

part:

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

***

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a) (bolding omitted).

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Second, Rule 1013 is the prompt trial rule which is applicable to the

Philadelphia Municipal Courts. Rule 1013 provides, in relevant part:

(A)(3) Trial in a case that commenced as a Common Pleas Court case but was later ordered to be tried in Municipal Court shall commence no later than 180 days from the date on which the preliminary arraignment is held or 60 days from the date on which the order is made, whichever is greater.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(3).

Finally, Rule 1000 defines when the Municipal Court Rules apply:

(A) The rules in this chapter govern all proceedings in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, including summary cases; Municipal Court cases, as defined in Rule 1001(A); the filing of appeals from Municipal Court cases; the filing of petitions for writs of certiorari; and the preliminary proceedings in criminal cases charging felonies, Part A, and govern proceedings in summary traffic cases in Municipal Court Traffic Division, Part B.

(B) Any procedure that is governed by a statewide Rule of Criminal Procedure that is not specifically covered in Chapter 10 or by a Philadelphia local rule authorized by these rules and adopted pursuant to Rule 105 shall be governed by the relevant statewide rule.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1000.

The Commonwealth argues Rule 1013(A)(3) applies because this case

was ordered to be tried in the Philadelphia Municipal Court after the

aggravated assault charge was dismissed. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-11.

The Commonwealth posits the Court of Common Pleas erred in applying Rule

600 after finding Rule 1013 was silent as to the issue of pre-arrest delay. See

id. at 13. As the Commonwealth explains:

Rule 1013 is not “silent” as to the issue of pre-arrest delay; it very clearly begins its calculations with an event that necessarily occurs

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after an arrest is made—i.e., the preliminary arraignment. Indeed, even Rule 600 does not “speak to” pre-arrest delay in the sense the [Court of Common Pleas] meant; it simply begins its calculations with an event that may occur before an arrest is made—i.e., the filing of the criminal complaint.

Appellant’s Brief, at 12-13 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).

Farlow argues that Rule 600 applies because pre-arrest delay is not

specifically covered by Rule 1013, and under Rule 1000(B), it must then be

covered under Rule 600. See Appellee’s Brief, at 8-9. Further, Farlow argues

that interpreting Rule 1013 exactly as it is written, and starting the clock at

the preliminary arraignment, would lead to an absurd result where there is no

time limit governing pre-arrest delay in Philadelphia Municipal Court cases

initiated by an arrest warrant and later transferred to Municipal Court. 5 See

id. at 15-16.

The Court of Common Pleas found the Municipal Court properly applied

Rule 600 because Rule 1013 does not specifically address pre-arrest delay.

See Court of Common Pleas Opinion, 4/12/24, at 4-5, 7. The Court of

Common Pleas, after reviewing Rule 1013, stated:

In the instant matters, a summons was not issued to the [d]efendants and the cases were initiated by an arrest warrant and complaint. There was a delay where the [d]efendants were not arrested until after 365 days had elapsed and there was nothing in the record to indicate that the defendants caused the delay. Rule 1013 does not specifically address this situation.

5 Farlow does concede that although there would be no rule providing a time

limit, the Constitutional guarantees of due process and speedy trial rights would still be applicable. See Appellee’s Brief, at 15.

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Id. at 4. The Court of Common Pleas then went on to evaluate the time under

Rule 600 and affirmed the municipal court. See id. at 4-6.

Upon review, we find that Rule 1013 is unambiguous. “Trial in a case

that commenced as a Common Pleas Court case but was later ordered to be

tried in Municipal Court shall commence no later than 180 days from the date

on which the preliminary arraignment is held or 60 days from the date on

which the order is made, whichever is greater.” 6 Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(3)

(emphases added). Here, because Farlow’s preliminary arraignment was

March 22, 2023, the mechanical run date pursuant to Rule 1013(A)(3) was

September 18, 2023. See Commonwealth v. Staten, 950 A.2d 1006, 1010-

11 (Pa. Super. 2008) (First, one must determine the mechanical run date for

a Rule 1013 claim.); Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 11 (Pa. Super.

2006) (“In a municipal court case, the mechanical run date is ascertained by

counting the number of days from the triggering event—e.g., the date on

which the preliminary arraignment occurred or on which the criminal

complaint was filed—to the date on which trial must commence under Rule

1013[(A)(1), (2) or (3)].” And further finding the triggering event was

Preston’s preliminary arraignment.).

Farlow’s trial was scheduled for May 23, 2023, and was continued to

July 11, 2023, both dates were long before the mechanical run date of

6 Here, the greater time period is 180 days from the preliminary arraignment.

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September 18, 2023. Therefore, the Court of Common Pleas erred in affirming

the dismissal, as Rule 1013 was not violated at the time the Municipal Court

dismissed Farlow’s charges.

Further, unlike the Appellee’s argument, we find when reading Rule

1013 as a whole, that pre-arrest delay was contemplated by the drafters of

the rule, just as it was in Rule 600. See Appellee’s Brief, at 12 (asserting Rule

1013 does not contemplate pre-arrest delay). Rule 1013(A)(2) provides

“[t]rial in a Municipal Court case in which the defendant appears pursuant to

a summons shall commence no later than 180 days from the date on which

the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(2). This is strikingly similar to

Rule 600’s language: “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is

filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on

which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). As such, Rule 1013

contemplates pre-arrest delay when a defendant appears via summons. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(2).

“The rules should be construed to give effect to all their provisions” and

we cannot ignore the fact the drafters chose to use the date the complaint

was filed as the triggering event when a defendant appears by summons but

not when the case is initiated by arrest warrant or transferred from the Court

of Common Pleas to Municipal Court. Far, 46 A.3d at 712 (citation omitted);

see Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(1), (2), (3).

Finally, we are mindful that:

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in interpreting a particular [rule] we must remain always mindful of the principle that, although one is admonished to listen attentively to what a [rule] says; one must also listen attentively to what it does not say. Accordingly, it is not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a [rule], a requirement which the [drafters] did not see fit to include.

Commonwealth v. Gehris, 54 A.3d 862, 864-65 (Pa. 2012) (citations and

quotation marks omitted). As Rule 1013 is not ambiguous, we cannot add a

requirement that the Commonwealth must bring a Philadelphia Municipal

Court case to trial, when transferred from the Court of Common Pleas, within

365 days of the complaint being filed. While we do not condone the actions of

waiting a year and a half to arrest Farlow without any showing of due diligence

on the part of the Commonwealth, we are bound by the plain language of the

rule. As the charges were dismissed prior to the mechanical run date, we are

constrained to reverse and remand for trial.

Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this

opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/28/2025

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