Com. v. Ewell, J.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 6, 2026
Docket1177 MDA 2025
StatusUnpublished
AuthorBowes

This text of Com. v. Ewell, J. (Com. v. Ewell, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Ewell, J., (Pa. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

J-S07012-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JOHNNY WALKER EWELL : : Appellant : No. 1177 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000538-2025

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2026

Johnny Walker Ewell appeals from his negotiated judgment of sentence

of three to twelve months of partial confinement and $768.41 in restitution,

which was imposed in exchange for his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit

retail theft. Since he failed to preserve the single issue he raises on appeal,

we affirm.

We need not detail the underlying facts of this case. Briefly, Appellant

and two other individuals engaged in a scheme in the early spring of 2025 to

return items that they did not purchase to different stores using altered

receipts. As a result, Appellant was charged with multiple theft-related

offenses. He appeared for jury selection on August 4, 2025, at which time the

Commonwealth presented the above-referenced plea agreement for the trial

court’s consideration. Although Appellant contested the Commonwealth’s

characterization of the receipts he used as being forgeries, he otherwise J-S07012-26

agreed with the recitation of the theft scheme detailed by the Commonwealth

and his plea counsel. After that clarification, the court accepted the plea

agreement, conducted a plea colloquy, and sentenced Appellant in accordance

with the agreed-upon terms.

Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea.

Despite being represented by counsel, he filed a pro se notice of appeal,

wherein he alleged, inter alia, ineffective assistance of plea counsel for not

wanting to take the case to trial. Accordingly, the trial court appointed new

counsel to represent Appellant for purposes of his appeal, and directed that

attorney to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. New counsel complied, raising

five issues. In this Court, Appellant presents one issue for our consideration:

“Whether [Appellant]’s plea was knowing[ly], intelligently, [and] voluntarily

made before the Trial Court?” Appellant’s brief at 4. 1 Specifically, he argues

that his “statements at the plea hearing . . . indicate that he did not completely

comprehend the impact of the plea.” Id. at 13. Consequently, he alleges that

the trial court should not have accepted his guilty plea. Id. at 15.

We begin by observing that, “[g]enerally, upon entry of a guilty plea, a

defendant waives all claims and defenses other than those sounding in the

jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has been termed ____________________________________________

1 We note with displeasure that the Commonwealth not only neglected to file

a brief in this matter, but incorrectly stated in its letter that Appellant was appealing from a 2022 order denying a petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. No such petition appears of record in this matter, which began in 2025. We caution the Commonwealth to take greater care in preparation of its writings to this Court.

-2- J-S07012-26

the legality of the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Speed, 323 A.3d

850, 853–54 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up). While Appellant’s attack on the

validity of his plea is otherwise proper despite his plea agreement, it must

have been preserved in the trial court for us to reach its merits on appeal. We

have explained:

A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to employ either measure results in waiver. Historically, Pennsylvania courts adhere to this waiver principle because it is for the court which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first instance, any error which may have been committed.

Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609–10 (Pa.Super. 2013) (some

citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Pitt, 313 A.3d 287, 295

(Pa.Super. 2024) (noting that “because Appellant failed to challenge the

voluntariness of his plea before the trial court, that issue could not be

presented on direct appeal” (cleaned up)).

Our review of the record confirms that Appellant waived any challenge

to the voluntariness of his plea as he did not object during the plea colloquy

to anything beyond the characterization of the receipts as forgeries, and did

not file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. See Lincoln, 72 A.3d

at 611. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

-3- J-S07012-26

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 04/06/2026

-4-

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Related

Commonwealth v. Lincoln
72 A.3d 606 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)
Com. v. Pitt, W.
2024 Pa. Super. 61 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2024)

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Bluebook (online)
Com. v. Ewell, J., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-ewell-j-pasuperct-2026.