Com. v. Ewell, J.
This text of Com. v. Ewell, J. (Com. v. Ewell, J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
J-S07012-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JOHNNY WALKER EWELL : : Appellant : No. 1177 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000538-2025
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2026
Johnny Walker Ewell appeals from his negotiated judgment of sentence
of three to twelve months of partial confinement and $768.41 in restitution,
which was imposed in exchange for his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit
retail theft. Since he failed to preserve the single issue he raises on appeal,
we affirm.
We need not detail the underlying facts of this case. Briefly, Appellant
and two other individuals engaged in a scheme in the early spring of 2025 to
return items that they did not purchase to different stores using altered
receipts. As a result, Appellant was charged with multiple theft-related
offenses. He appeared for jury selection on August 4, 2025, at which time the
Commonwealth presented the above-referenced plea agreement for the trial
court’s consideration. Although Appellant contested the Commonwealth’s
characterization of the receipts he used as being forgeries, he otherwise J-S07012-26
agreed with the recitation of the theft scheme detailed by the Commonwealth
and his plea counsel. After that clarification, the court accepted the plea
agreement, conducted a plea colloquy, and sentenced Appellant in accordance
with the agreed-upon terms.
Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea.
Despite being represented by counsel, he filed a pro se notice of appeal,
wherein he alleged, inter alia, ineffective assistance of plea counsel for not
wanting to take the case to trial. Accordingly, the trial court appointed new
counsel to represent Appellant for purposes of his appeal, and directed that
attorney to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. New counsel complied, raising
five issues. In this Court, Appellant presents one issue for our consideration:
“Whether [Appellant]’s plea was knowing[ly], intelligently, [and] voluntarily
made before the Trial Court?” Appellant’s brief at 4. 1 Specifically, he argues
that his “statements at the plea hearing . . . indicate that he did not completely
comprehend the impact of the plea.” Id. at 13. Consequently, he alleges that
the trial court should not have accepted his guilty plea. Id. at 15.
We begin by observing that, “[g]enerally, upon entry of a guilty plea, a
defendant waives all claims and defenses other than those sounding in the
jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has been termed ____________________________________________
1 We note with displeasure that the Commonwealth not only neglected to file
a brief in this matter, but incorrectly stated in its letter that Appellant was appealing from a 2022 order denying a petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. No such petition appears of record in this matter, which began in 2025. We caution the Commonwealth to take greater care in preparation of its writings to this Court.
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the legality of the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Speed, 323 A.3d
850, 853–54 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up). While Appellant’s attack on the
validity of his plea is otherwise proper despite his plea agreement, it must
have been preserved in the trial court for us to reach its merits on appeal. We
have explained:
A defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to employ either measure results in waiver. Historically, Pennsylvania courts adhere to this waiver principle because it is for the court which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first instance, any error which may have been committed.
Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609–10 (Pa.Super. 2013) (some
citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Pitt, 313 A.3d 287, 295
(Pa.Super. 2024) (noting that “because Appellant failed to challenge the
voluntariness of his plea before the trial court, that issue could not be
presented on direct appeal” (cleaned up)).
Our review of the record confirms that Appellant waived any challenge
to the voluntariness of his plea as he did not object during the plea colloquy
to anything beyond the characterization of the receipts as forgeries, and did
not file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea. See Lincoln, 72 A.3d
at 611. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 04/06/2026
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