Com. v. Evans, D.

Opinion

J-S43008-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DONALD EVANS : : Appellant : No. 254 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 10, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000679-2012

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2026

Donald Evans appeals pro se from the order denying as untimely his

second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42

Pa.C.S.A §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as

follows. On October 5, 2011, police arrested Evans and charged him with

multiple crimes following a traffic stop which ended in a high speed chase

during which Evans struck several vehicles. After Evans fled from his vehicle,

police apprehended him and found large amounts of crack cocaine and money

on his person. On October 4, 2012, a jury convicted Evans of four counts of

aggravated assault, resisting arrest, recklessly endangering another person,

fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, accidents involving damage to J-S43008-25

attended vehicle or property, and possession with intent to deliver a controlled

substance.

On November 7, 2012, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence

of 24½ to 62 years of imprisonment. Evans filed a motion for reconsideration

of sentence, which the trial court denied. Evans appealed. On September 19,

2013, we affirmed his judgment of sentence and, on December 10, 2014, our

Supreme Court denied Evans’ petition for allowance of appeal.

Commonwealth v. Evans, 87 A.3d 386 (Pa. Super. 2013) (non-precedential

decision), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014). Evans did not seek further

review.

On July 29, 2015, Evans filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and the

court appointed counsel. Thereafter, PCRA counsel filed an amended petition,

and the Commonwealth filed an answer. The PCRA court held an evidentiary

hearing on October 2, 2019. By order entered November 22, 2019, the PCRA

court denied Evans’ first PCRA petition. Evans filed a timely pro se appeal

and, following a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d

81 (Pa. 1998), the PCRA court granted Evans’ request to represent himself on

appeal. On July 20, 2021, this Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction

relief. Commonwealth v. Evans, 260 A.3d 98 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non-

precedential decision).

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On September 23, 2024, Evans filed the pro se PCRA petition at issue.1

On November 1, 2024, the PCRA court filed a Criminal Rule 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss Evans second petition as untimely filed. Evans filed a

response. By order entered December 10, 2024, the PCRA court dismissed

Evans’ second petition. This appeal followed.2 The PCRA court did not require

Appellate Rule 1925 compliance.

Evans raises 22 issues on appeal. Before considering Evans’ multiple

substantive claims, we must first determine whether the PCRA court correctly

concluded that Evans’ 2024 petition was untimely filed. The timeliness of a

post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79

A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the

PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year

of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petitioner alleges and

proves that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met. The three

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1 Almost two weeks earlier, Evans filed a pro se “Complaint: Newly-Discovered

Evidence Police and Prosecution Misconduct.” The PCRA court considered this filing together with Evans’ second petition.

2 In its opinion, the PCRA court stated that it was “was without evidence to

make a proper determination whether” Evans’ notice of appeal “was timely filed.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/19/25, at 6. According to the trial court docket, on January 15, 2025, Evans filed a pro se appeal from the PCRA court’s December 10, 2024 order dismissing his second PCRA petition. The trial court record further indicated that notice of the dismissal order was mailed to Evans by first class mail rather than the required notice “by certified mail, return receipt requested.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4). Given this circumstances, we will deem Evans’ notice of appeal timely.

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narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as follows: “(1)

interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly

discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.”

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231-233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s time

bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time on

appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007);

see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Moreover,

a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

Here, Evans’ judgment of sentence became final on March 10, 2015,

ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of

appeal and the time for filing a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme

Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Evans had until

March 19, 2016, to file a timely petition. Because Evans filed his second PCRA

petition in 2024, it is patently untimely, unless he has satisfied his burden of

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pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See

Hernandez, supra.

In his second PCRA petition, Evans acknowledged that the petition was

untimely, but asserted that he could establish all three time-bar exceptions.

Evans has filed a lengthy brief which, at various points, references each

exception. From what we can discern, Evans asserts that his family recently

received a disorderly conduct citation that was issued to a woman who was a

passenger in Evans’ car during the criminal incident for which he was charged

and convicted. According to Evans, he never received this citation from the

Commonwealth and the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose it satisfied both

the newly-discovered-fact and governmental interference exceptions to the

PCRA’s time bar. Additionally, Evans argues that his aggregate sentence

included a mandatory minimum sentence that has since been declared

unconstitutional; he therefore asserts that he has satisfied the newly-

recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s time bar.

The PCRA statute and our precedent established the legal requirements

to meet each time-bar exception. Regarding the governmental interference

exception, Evans claims he can establish this exception because the

Commonwealth committed a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963). Although a Brady violation might fall within the governmental

interference exception to the PCRA’s time bar, to meet this exception, the

PCRA statute requires a petitioner to plead and prove: (1) the failure to

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previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government

officials, and (2) the information on which he relies could not have been

obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v.

Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197. 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021).

We explained the newly-discovered-fact exception as follows:

The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned of those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced. Additionally, the focus of this exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.

The timeliness exception set forth at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) has often mistakenly been referred to as the “after-discovered evidence” exception. This shorthand reference was a misnomer, since the plain language of subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require the petitioner to allege and prove a claim of “after-discovered evidence.” Rather, as an initial jurisdictional threshold, Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to allege and prove that there were facts unknown to him and that he exercised due diligence in discovering those facts. Once jurisdiction is established, a PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discovered evidence claim.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations

omitted).

Finally, we note that the new constitutional right exception has two

requirements: 1) that the right asserted is a constitutional right that was

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recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

after the time restrictions of the PCRA, and 2) the right has been held by that

court to apply retroactively. Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 994

(Pa. Super. 2014).

Here, the PCRA court concluded that Evans failed to establish any time-

bar exception because this assertion as to each exception is refuted by the

record. As the court explained:

Having reviewed the record, [the PCRA court] properly concluded [Evans] did not satisfy any exception under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

Concerning [Evans’] allegation under the [the government interference exception at] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), the record is unequivocal, as [Evans] previously raised the claim and the citation was used by [Evans] during cross examination of Witness Sherry VanVladricken [at trial], there absolutely was no interference by governmental officials in preventing [Evans] from presenting the claim and the citation, and [Evans] cannot demonstrate the exception applies.

Concerning [Evans’] allegation under the [newly- discovered-fact exception at] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), the record is unequivocal, as [Evans] previously raised the claim and the citation was used by [Evans] during cross examination of Witness Sherry VanVladricken, the facts upon which the claim was predicated actually were known and had been ascertained during trial, and [Evans] cannot demonstrate the exception applies. The claim concerning the citation is not newly discovered evidence[.]

Concerning [Evans’] allegations under [the new constitutional right exception at] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(iii), [Evans’ sentencing claims were] raised and addressed in [Evans’] previous PCRA petition and related appeals, and [the 2024] petition having been filed after the one-year time period after the statutes were ruled unconstitutional, [Evans] cannot demonstrate the exception applies.

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PCRA Court Opinion, 3/19/25, at 11-12 (paragraph breaks added).

Given the above, there is no question that Evans has failed to establish

any exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Our review of the pertinent transcript

confirms that Evans cannot establish due diligence because he had to be aware

of the witness’ citation as early as 2012 given its use at his jury trial.

Moreover, Evans’ constitutional sentencing claims were considered when we

affirmed the denial of his first PCRA petition. See Evans, supra, (non-

precedential decision at *14-15) (explaining that a review of the sentencing

transcript revealed the trial court did not impose a mandatory minimum

sentence). Finally, Evans cites no case law that has established a new

constitutional right that has been recognized by the federal or state supreme

court that has been held to apply retroactively.

In sum, because the PCRA court correctly concluded that Evans did not

establish any exception to the PCRA’s time bar, the court properly dismissed

his 2024 petition as untimely filed. As such, neither the PCRA court nor this

Court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of Evans’ second petition.

Derrickson, supra. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying him

post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.

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Date: 2/18/2026

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