J-S35015-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : GABRIEL ESPINAL : : Appellant : No. 1736 MDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001761-2008
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 13, 2024
Gabriel Espinal appeals pro se from the order entered in the Berks
County Court of Common Pleas on November 8, 2023, dismissing his “Motion
to Correct an Illegal Sentence” pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 For the reasons discussed below, we
find the PCRA court properly denied Espinal relief and affirm.
On February 26, 2009, following a two-day jury trial, Espinal was found
guilty of criminal attempt to commit criminal homicide, two counts of
aggravated assault, simple assault, firearms not to be carried without a
____________________________________________
1 As discussed in further detail below, while Espinal did not specifically title his
pro se filing as a PCRA petition, the court correctly treated this post-conviction filing as a petition under the PCRA. J-S35015-24
license, and possessing instruments of crime. On March 27, 2009, the trial
court sentenced Espinal to an aggregate term of 22 to 44 years’ incarceration.
In April 2009, Espinal filed a direct appeal, challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence at trial. This Court sua sponte dismissed Espinal’s appeal due to
counsel’s failure to file a brief. After a few attempts at post-conviction relief,
Espinal’s direct appeal rights were eventually reinstated nunc pro tunc in
2012. We affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal. In January
2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Espinal’s petition for allowance
of appeal. Since then, Powell has filed numerous petitions, including multiple
unsuccessful PCRA petitions.
On September 22, 2023, Espinal filed the instant pro se “Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence.” The PCRA court treated his petition as a PCRA
petition subject to the PCRA’s timeliness provisions. See Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[T]he PCRA provides the
sole means for obtaining collateral review, and … any petition filed after the
judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition”)
(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043
(Pa. 2007) (stating the PCRA incorporates the remedy of habeas corpus if it
offers the petitioner a remedy pursuant to that Act). On that basis, the PCRA
court determined Espinal’s petition was untimely, and he had not pled an
exception to the time bar. After issuing notice of its intent to dismiss the
-2- J-S35015-24
petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the court denied the
petition. This timely appeal followed.
Preliminarily, we note that Espinal does not challenge the treatment of
his motion as a PCRA petition. Instead, he contends his claim involves a
challenge to the legality of his sentence, and that the PCRA court had authority
to consider his claim under its inherent jurisdiction to correct patent errors in
sentences. We disagree.
Whether a PCRA court has jurisdiction to correct allegedly illegal sentencing orders absent statutory jurisdiction under the PCRA is a question of law. Accordingly, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo.
The PCRA provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. When an action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose[.]
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2007), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court created a narrow exception to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
5505 (“a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order
within 30 days after its entry ... if no appeal from such order has been taken
or allowed”), and recognized a trial court's “inherent power to correct patent
errors despite the absence of traditional jurisdiction.” Id. at 65.
-3- J-S35015-24
However, we have since clarified that while “Holmes [ ] recognized the
limited authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences absent
statutory jurisdiction under section 5505; it did not establish an alternate
remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of
the PCRA.” Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521. Under the PCRA, “[w]hen the one-year
filing deadline of section 9545 has expired, and no statutory exception has
been pled or proven, a PCRA court cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction to
correct orders, judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and
obvious.” Id. at 524. Accordingly, although illegal sentencing issues cannot
be waived, they must still be presented in a timely PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2013).
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Because the PCRA’s time limitations implicate the court’s jurisdiction and may
not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition, the
court here was required to start by examining the timeliness of Espinal’s
petition. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa. Super. 2014).
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA
-4- J-S35015-24
petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (citations and
footnote omitted).
Espinal’s judgment of sentence became final in 2013, ninety days after
his petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
J-S35015-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : GABRIEL ESPINAL : : Appellant : No. 1736 MDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001761-2008
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 13, 2024
Gabriel Espinal appeals pro se from the order entered in the Berks
County Court of Common Pleas on November 8, 2023, dismissing his “Motion
to Correct an Illegal Sentence” pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 For the reasons discussed below, we
find the PCRA court properly denied Espinal relief and affirm.
On February 26, 2009, following a two-day jury trial, Espinal was found
guilty of criminal attempt to commit criminal homicide, two counts of
aggravated assault, simple assault, firearms not to be carried without a
____________________________________________
1 As discussed in further detail below, while Espinal did not specifically title his
pro se filing as a PCRA petition, the court correctly treated this post-conviction filing as a petition under the PCRA. J-S35015-24
license, and possessing instruments of crime. On March 27, 2009, the trial
court sentenced Espinal to an aggregate term of 22 to 44 years’ incarceration.
In April 2009, Espinal filed a direct appeal, challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence at trial. This Court sua sponte dismissed Espinal’s appeal due to
counsel’s failure to file a brief. After a few attempts at post-conviction relief,
Espinal’s direct appeal rights were eventually reinstated nunc pro tunc in
2012. We affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal. In January
2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Espinal’s petition for allowance
of appeal. Since then, Powell has filed numerous petitions, including multiple
unsuccessful PCRA petitions.
On September 22, 2023, Espinal filed the instant pro se “Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence.” The PCRA court treated his petition as a PCRA
petition subject to the PCRA’s timeliness provisions. See Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[T]he PCRA provides the
sole means for obtaining collateral review, and … any petition filed after the
judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition”)
(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043
(Pa. 2007) (stating the PCRA incorporates the remedy of habeas corpus if it
offers the petitioner a remedy pursuant to that Act). On that basis, the PCRA
court determined Espinal’s petition was untimely, and he had not pled an
exception to the time bar. After issuing notice of its intent to dismiss the
-2- J-S35015-24
petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the court denied the
petition. This timely appeal followed.
Preliminarily, we note that Espinal does not challenge the treatment of
his motion as a PCRA petition. Instead, he contends his claim involves a
challenge to the legality of his sentence, and that the PCRA court had authority
to consider his claim under its inherent jurisdiction to correct patent errors in
sentences. We disagree.
Whether a PCRA court has jurisdiction to correct allegedly illegal sentencing orders absent statutory jurisdiction under the PCRA is a question of law. Accordingly, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo.
The PCRA provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. When an action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose[.]
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2007), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court created a narrow exception to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
5505 (“a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order
within 30 days after its entry ... if no appeal from such order has been taken
or allowed”), and recognized a trial court's “inherent power to correct patent
errors despite the absence of traditional jurisdiction.” Id. at 65.
-3- J-S35015-24
However, we have since clarified that while “Holmes [ ] recognized the
limited authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences absent
statutory jurisdiction under section 5505; it did not establish an alternate
remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of
the PCRA.” Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521. Under the PCRA, “[w]hen the one-year
filing deadline of section 9545 has expired, and no statutory exception has
been pled or proven, a PCRA court cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction to
correct orders, judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and
obvious.” Id. at 524. Accordingly, although illegal sentencing issues cannot
be waived, they must still be presented in a timely PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2013).
The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Because the PCRA’s time limitations implicate the court’s jurisdiction and may
not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition, the
court here was required to start by examining the timeliness of Espinal’s
petition. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa. Super. 2014).
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA
-4- J-S35015-24
petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (citations and
footnote omitted).
Espinal’s judgment of sentence became final in 2013, ninety days after
his petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, when time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.
The instant petition – filed more than a decade later – is patently untimely.
Therefore, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Espinal’s petition
unless he was able to successfully plead and prove one of the statutory
exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “[E]xceptions to the time-bar must be pled
in the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”
-5- J-S35015-24
Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before
the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Further,
although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citations omitted).
Even liberally construed, Espinal has failed to plead and prove that any
of his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. In fact, Espinal
failed to make any attempt to plead an exception in his filing. See Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence, filed 9/22/23. Even on appeal, he makes no attempt
to argue that a time-bar exception applies. Instead, Espinal only asserts the
merits of his underlying claims.
As Espinal has failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s
timeliness requirement, the PCRA court did not err when it dismissed Espinal’s
PCRA petition without a hearing.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
-6- J-S35015-24
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 12/13/2024
-7-