J-A16009-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ANTHONY JOEL ESPINAL : : Appellant : No. 2136 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002107-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 23, 2026
Anthony Joel Espinal appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, following his convictions
of one count each of person not to possess firearm1 and possession of a
controlled substance (fentanyl) with intent to deliver (PWID). 2 After careful
review, we affirm.
In March of 2022, Detective Edward Fox of the Bethlehem Township
Police Department was contacted by the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s
Office requesting information on Caitlyn Norder, who had connections to
Bethlehem Township and was believed to be the girlfriend of a suspect in a
shooting that occurred in February 2022 in Wilkes-Barre Township. See Trial ____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(b).
2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). J-A16009-25
Court Opinion Sur Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 4/8/24, at 1. Detective Fox, who
had prior knowledge of Norder and was aware of her, discovered Norder was
staying at the Woodspring Suites in Bethlehem Township. Id. at 1-2.
On March 23, 2022, Detective Fox, along with other officers from
Bethlehem Township, Wilkes-Barre Townshp, and the Attorney General’s
office, conducted surveillance of the hotel. See N.T. Jury Trial, 4/30/24, at
36. Detective Fox spoke with the hotel manager, Asael Lopez, who informed
him that Norder and Espinal had engaged in an argument two days earlier,
and that Norder had exited their hotel room screaming that her boyfriend had
a gun. See Trial Court Opinion Sur Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 4/8/24, at 2.
Captain Shaun Powell of the Bethlehem Township Police Department began
preparing an application for a search warrant for Norder and Espinal’s hotel
room based on the information provided by Norder to hotel employees that
her boyfriend—Espinal—possessed a gun and was a felon not to possess a
firearm. Id. at 5-6.
While in the lobby, Detective Fox encountered Norder, and they
recognized each other. See N.T. Jury Trial, 4/30/24, at 39. Norder appeared
nervous and told Detective Fox that there was a gun on the dresser in her
hotel room. See Trial Court Opinion Sur Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 4/8/24, at
3. Taking into consideration the safety of the other occupants in the hotel,
the information that there was a gun present in Norder and Espinal’s hotel
room, the recent argument Lopez overhead regarding a gun, and that Espinal
was potentially connected to the previous shooting in Wilkes-Barre, the police
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decided to enter Norder and Espinal’s hotel room, prior to securing a search
warrant, based on their belief that exigent circumstances existed. Id. Norder
did not have a key to the room, so the police and Norder proceeded to the
hotel room and Norder asked Espinal to open the door for her. See N.T. Jury
Trial, 4/30/24, at 40-41. Espinal, who was naked at the time, opened the
door and was immediately seized and cuffed by police. Id.
Espinal was placed on a chair within the hotel room and asked if he could
put on his pants. See N.T. Jury Trial, 4/30/24, at 65-66. Corporal Jeremy
Anderson with the Bethlehem Police Department patted down the pants prior
to providing them to Espinal and found 11 glassine bags containing what
Corporal Anderson “presumed to be heroin.” Id. at 66. The police also
observed “a marijuana roach” near the hotel room’s kitchen sink. See Trial
Court Opinion Sur Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 4/8/24, at 4. Corporal Anderson
informed Captain Powell of the forementioned discoveries. Id. at 5.
Approximately 30 minutes to an hour after Espinal was handcuffed, a
search warrant for the hotel room was obtained and executed. Id. The search
of the hotel room yielded, inter alia,3 a .9mm Marakov handgun and ____________________________________________
3 The .9mm Marakov handgun was found inside an orange Nike shoe box along
with a cloth bag and an Apple AirPod box that both contained packages of fentanyl. See N.T. Jury Trial, 4/30/24, at 74-78. Police also recovered from the hotel room a container of rubber bands, a female’s pink jacket, a male’s black jacket, a backpack containing blank check stock, four new cases of Apple AirPods, miscellaneous documents and folders, a ledger, a box of .9mm ammunition and loose .9mm ammunition, rolling papers, and a black wallet with Espinal’s driver’s license and a room key for the hotel room. Id. at 84- 104.
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approximately 30 grams of fentanyl, which resulted in Espinal’s arrest, after
which he was charged with the above-mentioned offenses. See N.T. Jury
Trial, 4/30/24, at 88-89; id., 5/1/24, at 99-107.
On March 14, 2023, Espinal filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to
suppress the drugs found in his hotel room. Additionally, on November 8,
2023, Espinal filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
Following a hearing held on January 25, 2024, and submission of briefs by
both Espinal and the Commonwealth, the trial court denied both motions on
April 8, 2024. On April 16, 2024, Espinal filed a motion to sever the person
not to possess firearm charge from the PWID charge. At trial, the trial court
bifurcated the charges, and the PWID charge was tried first before the same
jury. See id., 4/30/24, at 1.
At the PWID trial, the Commonwealth introduced a number of exhibits
extracted from a red iPhone that was obtained following Espinal’s arrest. See
id. at 56-57 (Detective Fox testifying he obtained red iPhone while at police
station and received passcode from Norder); see also id., 5/1/24, at 10-13.
The Commonwealth presented text message exchanges and photos that
proved Espinal operated the red iPhone. See id., 5/1/24, at 25-26; 39-40
(“selfie” photo of Espinal holding red iPhone). Patrick Brehm, an investigator
with the Bethlehem Township Police Department who reviewed and analyzed
the data extracted from the iPhone, testified to authenticate the text
messages and photos extracted from the iPhone. See id. at 20-23.
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Relevant to this appeal, the Commonwealth introduced Exhibits 41, 42,
43, 44, and 45 (text message exhibits), all of which were extracted from the
red iPhone. Exhibit 41 was a screenshot of a February 11, 2022 text message
exchange between an iPhone user with the telephone number +1 (484) 828-
5936 and an individual identified as “Jcruz.” See id. at 45. The iPhone user
sent a thumbnail image,4 which “depict[ed] a number of blue tablets in small
plastic bags,” followed by a text message that stated, “I got perks wtw[.]”
Id.; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit 41. Jcruz answered “Price per pop and
per dozen” and the iPhone user replied, “150 for ten after that number drop
lmk how many we reasonable n they official[.]” Commonwealth’s Exhibit 41.
Exhibit 42 was an enlarged reproduction of the thumbnail image from
the above-mentioned text message exchange. See N.T. Jury Trial, 5/1/24, at
47-57 (parties agreeing Exhibit 42 is only the “left side,” which depicted blue
tablets in small plastic bags).
Exhibit 43 was a screenshot of a March 18, 2022 text message exchange
between the telephone number +1 (213) 348-8408 and a person identified as
“Lopa” regarding the purchase of “30s,” which Investigator Brehm testified
“indicat[ed] prescription medication,” and included a thumbnail image sent
with “three flame emojis.” Id. at 60; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit 43.
Exhibit 44 was an enlarged reproduction of an image from the above
text message exchange, which depicted “blue tablets. . . with the M and the
____________________________________________
4 This term refers to a picture embedded in a text message. See id. at 46.
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square on one side and the 30 over [the] top half of a divided tablet. And
they appear to be packaged, a number of pills in a number of plastic bags.”
See N.T. Jury Trial, 5/1/24, at 64. There was a black mark obscuring some
of the image, which was taken on March 18, 2022. See Commonwealth’s
Exhibit 44.
Exhibit 45 consisted of two images side by side: on the left side was
the image from Exhibit 44 and on the right side was an image of blue tablets,
which Investigator Brehm testified was an image of the fentanyl recovered by
the police from the hotel room during the search. See N.T. Jury Trial, 5/1/24,
at 64.
Prior to and during the Commonwealth’s introduction of the text
message exhibits, defense counsel objected to their admission on grounds of
relevancy and that they were inadmissible as evidence of prior bad acts that
was more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 33-36, 45, 50-51, 56-57. The
trial court overruled defense counsel’s objections and allowed the evidence
because “it was relevant to . . . demonstrate [Espinal’s] possession with [the]
intent to deliver.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/24, at 3.
Additionally, the Commonwealth admitted two exhibits featuring a
firearm (firearm exhibits). Exhibit 46 was an image of a computer on a desk
and other items with a firearm partially visible on the left side of the image.
The photograph was taken by the red iPhone on March 3, 2022. Exhibit 47
consisted of two images side by side: the image from Exhibit 46 was on one
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side and the other side contained a zoomed-in image of the portion of Exhibit
46 depicting the firearm. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 47.
Defense counsel objected to the admission of the firearm exhibits on the
grounds that they were not relevant and were inadmissible as prior bad acts
because they were more prejudicial than probative. See N.T. Jury Trial,
5/1/24, at 72-80. The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objections and
found that the firearm exhibits were “relevant to the ultimate issue [of]
whether or not [Espinal] possessed [drugs] with intent to deliver[.]” Id. at
79.
On May 2, 2024, Espinal was convicted by a jury of the above-mentioned
offenses.5 The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered the preparation of
a presentence investigation report on the same day. On July 3, 2024, the
court sentenced Espinal to an aggregate sentence of 144 to 288 months’
incarceration. On July 15, 2024, Espinal filed a timely post-sentence motion
to modify his sentence, which the trial court denied on July 16, 2024. 6
Espinal filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Espinal and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Espinal asserts that the trial court ____________________________________________
5 The one-day jury trial on Espinal’s persons not to possess a firearm charge
immediately followed his PWID trial. See id., 5/2/24, at 160-99.
6 Generally, a written post-sentence motion shall be filed no later than 10 days
after imposition of sentence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(1). Here, the last day of the 10-day period for Espinal to file a post-sentence motion fell on Saturday, July 13, 2024. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (“Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday . . . such day shall be omitted from the computation.”). Espinal filed his post-sentence motion on Monday, July 15, 2024. Thus, the motion was timely.
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abused its discretion in admitting the text message and firearm exhibits. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
Both of Espinal’s claims challenge evidentiary rulings of the trial court,
which we review for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Brown,
212 A.3d 1076, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2019). “An abuse of discretion exists where
there is an overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment
that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will[,] or
partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Gross,
241 A.3d 413, 418 (Pa. Super. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Relevance is the threshold question for admissibility of evidence.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 612 (Pa. 2008); see also Pa.R.E.
402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible.”). “Evidence is relevant if it logically
tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue
more or less probable[,] or supports a reasonable inference or presumption
regarding a material fact.” Commonwealth v. Semenza, 127 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (citation omitted). However, evidence may be excluded where
its probative value is outweighed by a danger of confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, or unfair prejudice. See Semenza, supra; see also
Pa.R.E. 401 (“[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”).
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Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal activity is
inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in conformity with those past acts
or to show criminal propensity. See Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982
A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 2009), citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of
prior bad acts may be admissible when offered to prove some other relevant
fact, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Sherwood, 982 A.2d at 497,
citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Evidence of other bad acts is admissible only if the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 284 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).
In order to be deemed sufficiently probative, the alleged prior bad acts must
not be too far removed in time and place from the crime at issue. See
Commonwealth v. Reed, 990 A.2d 1158, 1168 (Pa. 2010).
Additionally, evidence of other bad acts must have a logical connection
with the crimes at issue. Commonwealth v. Camperson, 612 A.2d 482,
484 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation omitted). Factors a court should consider
when determining the admissibility to prove intent or motive include “the
proximity in time between the incidents; the similarity in the circumstances
surrounding the incidents; and whether evidence of the prior crime is
necessary to rebut the accused’s evidence or contention of accident,
mistake[,] or lack of required intent.” Id. at 285 (internal citations omitted).
We are also mindful that a trial court is not “required to sanitize the trial to
eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts
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are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural
development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.”
Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 308 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted).
To determine the relevancy of the prior bad acts evidence, we must
review the charges the Commonwealth sought to prove. Here, Espinal was
charged with possession with intent to deliver, which requires the
Commonwealth to prove both unlawful possession of a controlled substance
and an intent to deliver the controlled substance. See Commonwealth v.
Lee, 956 A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In his first issue on appeal, Espinal argues that the trial court erred in
admitting the text message exhibits because there was no connection between
the drugs mentioned in the text messages and the drugs found in Espinal’s
hotel room. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-12. Espinal argues that the exhibits
of the prior drug-sale activity, without a link between the evidence and his
charges, are not probative of whether Espinal possessed drugs on the day of
his arrest and, thus, the evidence only had a “tendency to blacken [his]
character[.]” Id. at 11-12. Specifically, relying on Commonwealth v.
Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc), Espinal contends that
the text message exhibits were inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because there
were no sufficient grounds to believe that his PWID “‘grew out of or was in
any way caused by the prior set of facts and circumstances’” presented in the
text messages. Appellant’s Brief, at 11, quoting Aguado, 760 A.2d at 1186.
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In Aguado, the defendant was on trial for PWID and had been
previously convicted of PWID for a drug transaction that occurred in the same
vicinity as, and nine months prior to, the conduct for which he was on trial.
Aguado filed a motion in limine to preclude the admission of the prior
conviction. The Commonwealth indicated it would not use the conviction
during its case-in-chief. At trial, the court stated that it would defer its ruling
until Aguado testified but suggested that it would allow evidence of the prior
conviction as evidence of intent. Thereafter, Aguado chose not to testify on
his own behalf.
On appeal, this Aguado Court concluded that Aguado’s prior conviction
could not be admitted to establish the element of intent, stating the
Commonwealth presented no evidence the conviction “grew out of or was in
any way caused by” the prior conviction and “we [could not] conclude that
[the defendant] could form and maintain his ‘intent’ over the nine-month
period between the two incidents.” Id. at 1186-87 (citation omitted). The
Court reasoned that since Aguado claimed he was arrested simply because he
was proximate to the drugs, the disputed issue was possession, not intent,
and “the Commonwealth’s need for the prior crimes evidence in order to
establish ‘intent’ was nonexistent.” Id. at 1187. The Court further noted that
the trial court had not weighed the Commonwealth’s need to present the
evidence against its potential prejudicial effect and that the prejudicial impact
was “palpable.” Id.
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Here, a review of the trial transcript reveals that Espinal countered the
Commonwealth’s evidence by repeatedly alleging that he did not intend to
sell the drugs found in the hotel room. See Lee, supra. Specifically, at trial,
the defense’s sole witness, Norder, testified that her “sugar daddy” gave her
and Espinal the drugs found in the hotel room, and that the drugs were for
personal use. See N.T. Jury Trial, 5/2/24, at 50-52 (“[Defense counsel:] I
guess were there a lot of drugs in the room? [Norder:] Yes. . . . [Defense
counsel:] Was [Espinal] using the drugs? [Norder:] Yes.”). Norder also
testified that she and Espinal were not selling the drugs to anyone. Id. at 50-
52. At closing, defense counsel contended that there was no evidence that
Espinal sold or intended to sell the drugs found in the hotel room. Id. at 100.
Thus, in contrast to Aguado, Espinal specifically disputed the element of
intent to sell (versus simple possession) at trial. See Commonwealth v.
Foster, 315 A.3d 63, *12 (Pa. Super. 2024) (Table)7 (distinguishing Aguado
when Commonwealth introduced text messages regarding drug transactions
to rebut defendant’s claim he possessed drugs for personal use, not that he
did not possess them). Therefore, we conclude that Aguado is not controlling
here.
Nor are we persuaded that the prior acts portrayed in the text message
exhibits were too remote or unconnected to the present case to be of any
7See Pa.R.A.P. 126(a)-(b) (unpublished, non-precedential decisions of this Court, filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).
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probative value. The text message exhibits contained references to the sale
of fentanyl, the same drug found in the hotel room. The text message
exchanges and pictures occurred a little over one month or less prior to his
arrest.8 See Foster, supra (finding text messages of prior drug transactions
sent within two days to one month prior to defendant’s arrest for PWID were
“close in time to the conduct at issue”); Reed, supra. Thus, the text message
exhibits regarding the sale of fentanyl were probative of Espinal’s intent to sell
the large amount of drugs found in his hotel room. See Camperson, supra.
The text message exhibits were logically connected to the criminal charges
against Espinal; they supported the Commonwealth’s theory that Espinal
intended to sell fentanyl, not just that he possessed the drug for personal use.
See Commonwealth v. Weeks, 301 A.3d 887, *22-25 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(Table) (text messages involving prior drug transactions admissible because
text messages were logically connected to defendant’s criminal charges and
reflect knowledge of drug dealing).
Although we have concluded that the evidence was admissible, we must
further evaluate whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
potential for unfair prejudice under Pa.R.E. 403. In conducting the probative value/prejudice balancing test, courts must consider factors such as the strength of the “other crimes” evidence, the similarities between the crimes, the time lapse ____________________________________________
8 We note that arguments related to the remoteness of the acts generally go
to the weight, and not the admissibility, of prior bad acts evidence. Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 371 A.2d 186, 191 (Pa. 1977); accord Reed, 990 A.2d at 1168.
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between crimes, the need for the other crimes evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof of the charged crime, and “the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.” McCormick, Evidence § 190 at 811 (4th ed. 1992). See also Commonwealth v. Frank, [] 577 A.2d 609 ([Pa.] 1990) (enumerating balancing test factors, including ability for limiting instruction to reduce prejudice).
Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Espinal contends that, like in Aguado, the trial court failed to weigh the
prejudicial impact of the text message exhibits and, therefore, was unable to
conclude whether the probative value outweighed its potential to prejudice
the jury. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12. We disagree.
When defense counsel objected to admission of the text message
exhibits, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: So, [defense counsel,] doesn’t—and part of the Commonwealth’s case is proving his intent to deliver. And intent to deliver, so wouldn’t messages in his phone, even if it’s several weeks before, be relevant to [its] burden of proving an intent that he delivers these things versus just possesses them? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I don’t believe so. I think they would be relevant to charging him with some PWI[D], you know, in February or early March. But it’s not relevant to whether, with respect to the drugs[] that he was supposedly possessing on March 23[,] 2022 [(the day of his arrest),] that those drugs were possessed with the intent to deliver.
[L]et’s even assume that he was—that he was a drug dealer, that he was selling drugs, [PWID] in February and early March, that is still not probative of [whether], on the day in question, those drugs were possessed with intent to deliver.
***
THE COURT: I understand your concern about certain items in terms of date, but if we’re looking at matters from, this is what, about three to four weeks before, a couple weeks before?
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[COMMONWEALTH]: One is five days before. The other one is four weeks before.
THE COURT: I find it relevant, but noting that the specific messages that will be voluntarily removed by the Commonwealth, I’m going to overrule your objection. I’ll allow that evidence to come in.
Id. at 35-36. The foregoing exchange demonstrates that the trial court
conducted a probative value/prejudice balancing test, considering the time
lapse between the crimes and the Commonwealth’s need to present the
evidence. See Weakley, supra. Therefore, and in contrast to Aguado, the
trial court balanced the Commonwealth’s need for the prior bad acts evidence
against its potential prejudice. See N.T. Jury Trial, 5/1/24, at 35-36 (following
discussion of need for messages to prove intent, trial court stating, “I
understand your concern about certain items in terms of date, but [] I find it
relevant[.]”). See Kinard, 95 A.3d at 286 (holding trial court properly
exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of subsequent bad acts, where
probative value of acts, though “highly prejudicial,” outweighed potential for
prejudice in that it was circumstantial evidence of appellant’s intent,
proof of his motive, and identity as actor in prior PWID charge). Accordingly,
we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the text message
exhibits. As such, Espinal’s first claim fails. See Brown, supra.
In his second issue, Espinal argues two separate theories as to how the
trial court erred in admitting the firearm exhibits. First, he contends that the
firearm exhibits, dated March 5, 2022, were not probative of whether that
firearm was the same firearm found in Espinal’s hotel room on March 23,
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2022, and that the Commonwealth failed to justify an inference under the
similar-weapon exception that the firearm was the same firearm found in
Espinal’s hotel room. See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-14. Secondly, Espinal
argues that the firearm exhibits were inadmissible as evidence of prior bad
acts because a photograph of a firearm was not probative of him possessing
drugs with intent to sell them 18 days later when he was arrested in the hotel
room on March 23, 2022. Id. at 13. Espinal also contends that the trial court
failed to weigh whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its
potential to unfair prejudice. Id. at 14.
“With regard to the admission of weapons evidence, such evidence is
clearly admissible where it can be shown that the evidence was used in the
crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 762 A.2d 382, 386 (Pa.
Super. 2000). However, where the weapon cannot be positively identified as
related to the crime, “[t]he general rule is that . . . such a weapon is not
admissible as evidence.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 351
(Pa. 1998).
A carveout to these precepts is the similar-weapon exception, which our
Supreme Court has explained as follows:
A weapon not “specifically linked” to the crime is generally inadmissible; however, the fact [the] accused had a weapon or implement suitable to the commission of the crime charged . . . is always a proper ingredient of the case for the prosecution. Any uncertainty that the weapon is the actual weapon used in the crime goes to the weight of such evidence. The only burden on the prosecution is to lay a foundation that would justify an inference by the finder of fact of the likelihood that the weapon was used in the commission of the crime.
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Commonwealth v. Christine, 125 A.3d 394, 400 (Pa. 2015) (citations and
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). However, our Supreme Court
also held that mere “similarity” is not enough to satisfy this exception. Rather,
the foundation must support an inference that they were the same weapon.
See id. (“To the extent that cases affirm use of [the similar-weapon
exception] strictly on the basis of similarity, without an inference they were
the weapons used, we reject them.”).
Here, based on our review of the record, we find that the similar-weapon
exception was inapplicable and thus, to the extent that the trial court
concluded otherwise, it erred. While the Commonwealth introduced the
firearm exhibits as well as the firearm found in the hotel room, the
Commonwealth failed to lay a foundation to support an inference that the two
firearms could have been the same. See Christine, supra. Neither
Investigator Brehm nor Corporal Anderson testified to a connection between
the firearm in the exhibits and the firearm found in the hotel room. Moreover,
there was no other evidence introduced to permit the jury to infer that the
two firearms could have been the same. See N.T. Jury Trial, 4/30/24, at 75-
76 (Corporal Anderson testifying as to specific make and model of firearm
found in orange Nike shoebox with cloth bag containing drugs in hotel room
on March 23, 2022); id., 5/1/24, at 82 (Investigator Brehm testifying photo
taken on March 5, 2022 appeared to partially portray black pistol). Without
more, the Commonwealth’s argument rested solely on the fact that the
firearm in the photograph was “similar” to the firearm in the hotel room; such
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a foundation was rejected by this Court in Christine. See Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 2025 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2902, *15-20 (Pa. Super. 2025)
(photograph of firearm from defendant’s phone improperly admitted under
similar-weapon exception when victim’s testimony that assailant possessed “a
black firearm,” without more, did not support inference firearm in photograph
was same weapon used in crime).
Nevertheless, the inapplicability of the similar-weapon exception does
not end our analysis. See Christine, 125 A.3d at 402 (where similar-weapon
exception is inapplicable, “admission on other grounds remain[s] possible”).
In that regard, the trial court found that the firearm exhibits were relevant
and admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove Espinal’s intent to sell the drugs
and not simply possess them. See N.T. Jury Trial, 5/1/24, at 79. See also
id. at 76-78 (Commonwealth arguing firearm exhibits show Espinal’s intent).
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the firearm
exhibits under Rule 404(b) as well. See Gross, supra. While the presence
of a firearm may be a relevant factor for consideration in the context of a drug
possessor’s intent to deliver, see Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d
1233, 1238 (Pa. 2007), the Commonwealth failed to establish how a
photograph depicting part of an unidentified firearm taken 18 days prior to
Espinal’s arrest had any connection to the drugs found in Espinal’s hotel room
or the sale of those drugs. Accordingly, we cannot agree that the firearm
exhibits were relevant to Espinal’s intent on the day of his arrest. See
Semenza, supra. However, we find that the admission of this evidence was
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harmless error, as there was overwhelming properly admitted evidence to
support Espinal’s conviction and the prejudicial effect was insignificant.
“An error may be deemed harmless, inter alia, where the properly
admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the
prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error
could not have contributed to the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 937
A.2d 1062, 1073 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).
All of the facts and circumstances surrounding the possession of a
controlled substance are relevant in making a determination of intent to
deliver. See In re R.N., 951 A.2d 363, 367 (Pa. Super. 2008). Relevant
factors include “the manner in which the controlled substance was packaged,
the behavior of the defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and large[]
sums of cash found in possession of the defendant.” Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at
1237-38 (citation omitted). Further, “the intent to deliver may be inferred
from possession of a large quantity of controlled substance.”
Commonwealth v. Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 39 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
Here, the Commonwealth established, through the detailed testimony
of its witnesses, that a large amount of drugs were found in Espinal’s hotel
room. See N.T. Jury Trial, 4/30/24, at 66 (Corporal Anderson testifying
Espinal’s pants’ pocket contained eleven “baggies” with powder, which tested
as heroin and fentanyl); id., 5/1/24, at 102-105 (Adam Shober, forensic drug
analyst for Pennsylvania State Police, testifying drugs found in shoe box
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comprised of 22 grams of fentanyl and pills in male’s black jacket’s pocket
amounted to 8 grams of fentanyl). See Brockman, supra. The
Commonwealth also presented the text message exhibits referencing drug
sales and testimony discussing the packaging of the drugs and how such
packaging indicates the drugs were packaged for sale. See N.T. Jury Trial,
4/30/24, at 67-69, 82 (Corporal Anderson testifying drugs in shoe box and
drugs found in Espinal’s pants’ pocket were packaged in plastic bags and
stamped with same Superman logo and word “Super” underneath); id.,
5/1/24, at 45 (Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Michael Acevedo testifying
manner in which drugs packaged and labelled indicates drugs being prepared
for sale); id. at 45-67 (Investigator Brehm testifying to text messages found
in Espinal’s phone referencing prior drug sales). See Ratsamy, supra.
Further, the Commonwealth presented evidence that a firearm was discovered
in the same box as the drugs and Trooper Acevedo testified that drug dealers
often carry firearms and keep firearms in close proximity to their drugs. See
N.T. Jury Trial, 4/30/24, at 88-89 (Corporal Anderson testifying Marakov
firearm found in box with drugs in Espinal’s hotel room); id., 5/1/24, at 153
(Trooper Acevedo’s testimony regarding relationship between drug dealers
and firearms). The Commonwealth also presented evidence to connect
Espinal with the firearm found in the hotel room. Id., 4/30/24, at 96-97
(Commonwealth admitting into evidence backpack found in hotel room
containing, among other things, documents with Espinal’s name, box of.9
millimeter rounds for Marakov firearm, and loose .9 millimeter ammunition).
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See Ratsamy, supra. Therefore, the Commonwealth presented
overwhelming evidence that Espinal had the requisite possession and intent
for PWID. See Moore, supra.
Finally, while Espinal contends that the firearm exhibits were unduly
prejudicial, he has failed to show that, against all the other evidence admitted
at trial, the firearm exhibits were so prejudicial as to impact the verdict. See
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671-72 (Pa. 2014) (stating
erroneous admission of evidence may be harmless error if error did not
prejudice defendant or “properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of
guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the
verdict”). Therefore, while the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
the firearm exhibits, we conclude that it was harmless error. Thus, Espinal’s
second claim fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 1/23/2026
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