J-S22028-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : THOMAS EASTER : : Appellant : No. 1232 MDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000526-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JULY 18, 2025
Thomas Easter appeals from the order denying his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.
This matter arises from Appellant’s indecent contact with the victim in
his apartment on July 16, 2021. Appellant was arrested and charged with
aggravated indecent assault as a felony of the second degree. Thereafter,
Appellant entered a nolo contendere plea to indecent assault, a misdemeanor
of the first degree, in exchange for fifteen to thirty months of incarceration to
run concurrently with an existing unrelated sentence.
At the plea hearing, the Commonwealth informed the court that based
on Appellant’s offense, he would be required to register as a sexual offender
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S22028-25
for twenty-five years in accordance with the Sexual Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”). See N.T. Plea Hearing, 3/20/23, at 3. The court
then asked Appellant whether he (1) spoke with his attorney about his case,
(2) understood the nature and consequences of his plea, including that the
Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”) would assess whether he
should be deemed a sexually violent predator (“SVP”), and (3) had any
questions. Id. at 3-4. Appellant confirmed that he was entering his plea
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and denied having any questions. Id.
Following the colloquy, the trial court accepted the plea and deferred
sentencing until the SOAB investigated Appellant’s case. Based upon the
SOAB report, the court determined Appellant to be an SVP and imposed the
standard-range sentence of fifteen to thirty months of incarceration in
accordance with the plea.
Appellant subsequently submitted a post-sentence motion seeking to
withdraw his plea, arguing that he did not understand that he would have to
register as a sexual offender for twenty-five years. The court denied the
motion, and he appealed. Since Appellant failed to file a docketing statement,
this Court dismissed it. Appellant’s appeal rights were thereafter reinstated
through a pro se filing treated as a first timely PCRA petition, and counsel was
appointed. However, counsel did not pursue an appeal. Several months later,
Appellant submitted a pro se petition seeking a hearing pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). Appellant’s counsel
-2- J-S22028-25
thereafter filed the instant timely PCRA petition, and Appellant informed the
court that he no longer wished to proceed pro se. In the petition, Appellant
asserted that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of his sexual
offender registration requirement, and for preventing him from meaningfully
participating in his own defense, leading him to enter a plea that was not
knowing or voluntary. See PCRA Petition, 5/10/24, at ¶¶ 6(a)-(b).
At the ensuing PCRA evidentiary hearing, Appellant and his plea counsel,
Bradon Toomey, Esquire, testified. Appellant first conceded that Attorney
Toomey may have discussed the SORNA registration requirement with him
prior to the entry of his plea. However, he explained that he nonetheless did
not understand it. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 7/26/24, at 4-5. Appellant also
acknowledged that the registration requirement was reviewed at the plea
hearing, but maintained that he did not comprehend what was being said to
him. Id. at 5-6. He contended that Attorney Toomey only met with him one
time to talk about his case, and that he never received a copy of discovery
materials. Id. at 7-9.
Attorney Toomey testified that the discovery in Appellant’s case was
insubstantial and consisted of one witness statement and a police report,
which he reviewed with Appellant. Id. at 15. He also attested that he met
with Appellant numerous times to discuss his case. Id. at 14-15. Attorney
Toomey confirmed that, as in any other case involving SORNA, he discussed
the “broad strokes” of the registration requirements with Appellant. Id. at
-3- J-S22028-25
18-19. Importantly, he handwrote on the written plea colloquy form that a
collateral consequence of Appellant’s plea included SORNA’s twenty-five-year
registration requirement, which Appellant had initialed and signed. See
Written Plea Colloquy, 3/20/23, at ¶ 13.
The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition, and this appeal followed.
Both Appellant and the court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.
1925. Appellant presents one issue for our determination: “Whether [plea
c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to allow Appellant to meaningfully
participate in his own defense, which resulted in Appellant entering a nolo
contendere plea that was not voluntary and knowing?” Appellant’s brief at 6.
This Court reviews an order denying a PCRA petition to determine
“whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are
free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657
(Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). We afford “great deference to the factual
findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have
no support in the record.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 132
(Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). However, we review the court’s legal
conclusions de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id. The appellant
has the burden “to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and that relief is
due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(cleaned up).
-4- J-S22028-25
Appellant challenges plea counsel’s effectiveness, for which the
following principles guide our analysis:
Counsel is presumed to be effective and it is a petitioner’s burden to overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish three criteria: (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) that petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the complained-of action or inaction. The failure to satisfy any one of these criteria is fatal to the claim.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 323 A.3d 611, 620-21 (Pa. 2024) (cleaned up).
As to the first prong, a claim will be deemed to have arguable merit where
“the factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.”
Commonwealth v. Evans, 303 A.3d 175, 182 (Pa.Super. 2023).
A valid plea is one where the defendant, based upon a totality of the
circumstances, “had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of
his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.”
Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 668 (Pa.Super. 2017). It is
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
J-S22028-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : THOMAS EASTER : : Appellant : No. 1232 MDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000526-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JULY 18, 2025
Thomas Easter appeals from the order denying his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.
This matter arises from Appellant’s indecent contact with the victim in
his apartment on July 16, 2021. Appellant was arrested and charged with
aggravated indecent assault as a felony of the second degree. Thereafter,
Appellant entered a nolo contendere plea to indecent assault, a misdemeanor
of the first degree, in exchange for fifteen to thirty months of incarceration to
run concurrently with an existing unrelated sentence.
At the plea hearing, the Commonwealth informed the court that based
on Appellant’s offense, he would be required to register as a sexual offender
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S22028-25
for twenty-five years in accordance with the Sexual Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”). See N.T. Plea Hearing, 3/20/23, at 3. The court
then asked Appellant whether he (1) spoke with his attorney about his case,
(2) understood the nature and consequences of his plea, including that the
Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”) would assess whether he
should be deemed a sexually violent predator (“SVP”), and (3) had any
questions. Id. at 3-4. Appellant confirmed that he was entering his plea
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and denied having any questions. Id.
Following the colloquy, the trial court accepted the plea and deferred
sentencing until the SOAB investigated Appellant’s case. Based upon the
SOAB report, the court determined Appellant to be an SVP and imposed the
standard-range sentence of fifteen to thirty months of incarceration in
accordance with the plea.
Appellant subsequently submitted a post-sentence motion seeking to
withdraw his plea, arguing that he did not understand that he would have to
register as a sexual offender for twenty-five years. The court denied the
motion, and he appealed. Since Appellant failed to file a docketing statement,
this Court dismissed it. Appellant’s appeal rights were thereafter reinstated
through a pro se filing treated as a first timely PCRA petition, and counsel was
appointed. However, counsel did not pursue an appeal. Several months later,
Appellant submitted a pro se petition seeking a hearing pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). Appellant’s counsel
-2- J-S22028-25
thereafter filed the instant timely PCRA petition, and Appellant informed the
court that he no longer wished to proceed pro se. In the petition, Appellant
asserted that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of his sexual
offender registration requirement, and for preventing him from meaningfully
participating in his own defense, leading him to enter a plea that was not
knowing or voluntary. See PCRA Petition, 5/10/24, at ¶¶ 6(a)-(b).
At the ensuing PCRA evidentiary hearing, Appellant and his plea counsel,
Bradon Toomey, Esquire, testified. Appellant first conceded that Attorney
Toomey may have discussed the SORNA registration requirement with him
prior to the entry of his plea. However, he explained that he nonetheless did
not understand it. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 7/26/24, at 4-5. Appellant also
acknowledged that the registration requirement was reviewed at the plea
hearing, but maintained that he did not comprehend what was being said to
him. Id. at 5-6. He contended that Attorney Toomey only met with him one
time to talk about his case, and that he never received a copy of discovery
materials. Id. at 7-9.
Attorney Toomey testified that the discovery in Appellant’s case was
insubstantial and consisted of one witness statement and a police report,
which he reviewed with Appellant. Id. at 15. He also attested that he met
with Appellant numerous times to discuss his case. Id. at 14-15. Attorney
Toomey confirmed that, as in any other case involving SORNA, he discussed
the “broad strokes” of the registration requirements with Appellant. Id. at
-3- J-S22028-25
18-19. Importantly, he handwrote on the written plea colloquy form that a
collateral consequence of Appellant’s plea included SORNA’s twenty-five-year
registration requirement, which Appellant had initialed and signed. See
Written Plea Colloquy, 3/20/23, at ¶ 13.
The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition, and this appeal followed.
Both Appellant and the court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.
1925. Appellant presents one issue for our determination: “Whether [plea
c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to allow Appellant to meaningfully
participate in his own defense, which resulted in Appellant entering a nolo
contendere plea that was not voluntary and knowing?” Appellant’s brief at 6.
This Court reviews an order denying a PCRA petition to determine
“whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are
free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657
(Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). We afford “great deference to the factual
findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have
no support in the record.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 132
(Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). However, we review the court’s legal
conclusions de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id. The appellant
has the burden “to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and that relief is
due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(cleaned up).
-4- J-S22028-25
Appellant challenges plea counsel’s effectiveness, for which the
following principles guide our analysis:
Counsel is presumed to be effective and it is a petitioner’s burden to overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish three criteria: (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) that petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the complained-of action or inaction. The failure to satisfy any one of these criteria is fatal to the claim.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 323 A.3d 611, 620-21 (Pa. 2024) (cleaned up).
As to the first prong, a claim will be deemed to have arguable merit where
“the factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.”
Commonwealth v. Evans, 303 A.3d 175, 182 (Pa.Super. 2023).
A valid plea is one where the defendant, based upon a totality of the
circumstances, “had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of
his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.”
Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 668 (Pa.Super. 2017). It is
presumed that when a defendant enters into a plea, he is aware of what he is
doing. Commonwealth v. Alameda, ___ A.3d ___, 2025 WL 1635561, at
*2 (Pa.Super. June 10, 2025). Additionally, “[a] person who elects to [enter
into a plea] is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under
oath and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which
contradict the statements he made at his colloquy.” Id.
-5- J-S22028-25
Appellant argues that he demonstrated that he did not enter into his
plea knowingly or voluntarily where he testified at the PCRA hearing that plea
counsel did not provide him with a copy of discovery materials, did not review
SORNA’s registration requirement with him prior to the plea, and only met
with him once. See Appellant’s brief at 17-18. He further avers that Attorney
Toomey verified that he did not review SORNA’s registration requirement as
applicable to him where he stated that he only discussed the “broad strokes”
with Appellant. Id. at 11. If Appellant knew about the twenty-five-year
registration requirement, he contends that he never would have entered into
his plea. Id. at 12.
The PCRA court concluded that Appellant did not present a claim with
arguable merit. It explained that, contrary to his current assertions, at the
plea hearing, Appellant testified that he spoke to Attorney Toomey about his
case, had no questions, and understood his plea agreement. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/8/24, at 9. The court further noted that Appellant stated that he
“absolutely” understood that the SOAB would investigate his case to
determine whether he should be considered an SVP. Id. at 10. The court
credited Attorney Toomey’s testimony that he discussed Appellant’s case with
him multiple times and appropriately reviewed the consequences of
Appellant’s plea. Id. at 10-11. Thus, the court found that Appellant did not
meet his burden to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
-6- J-S22028-25
The PCRA court’s conclusion is supported by the record, and we discern
no error of law in its analysis. At the plea hearing, Appellant confirmed that
Attorney Toomey reviewed his case with him, he understood the nature and
consequences of his plea, and he was aware that the SOAB would investigate
his case. See N.T. Plea Hearing, 3/20/23, at 4-6. Appellant’s knowledge of
SORNA’s twenty-five-year registration requirement is also evidenced by
Attorney Toomey’s handwritten note on the written plea colloquy form, which
Appellant initialed and signed. See Written Plea Colloquy, 3/20/23, at ¶ 13.
Appellant cannot now “assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which
contradict the statements he made at his colloquy.” Alameda, 2025 WL
1635561, at *2 (cleaned up). Essentially, Appellant asks this Court to
disregard the credibility determinations of the PCRA court. However, we are
bound by the court’s findings particularly where, as here, they are supported
by the record. See Smith, 194 A.3d at 132. We therefore find no error in
the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant did not present an argument with
any merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
-7- J-S22028-25
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 07/18/2025
-8-