Com. v. Durham, M.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1419 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000652-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1420 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000669-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1421 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001556-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

: :

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1422 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001557-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1423 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001558-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1424 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001559-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

3

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1425 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001560-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1426 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001561-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

MARKEVON DURHAM :

:

Appellant : No. 1427 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001564-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2026

Appellant, Markevon Durham, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his non-

jury trial convictions for third-degree murder and multiple counts of arson,

4

attempted murder, and other related offenses in these nine consolidated

cases. We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts of these cases as follows:

Over the course of more than a year, [Appellant] stalked, harassed and terrorized his ex-girlfriend, Christina Parker, her new boyfriend, Naseem Smith, along with multiple members of their families or individuals that [Appellant] believed had an association with Naseem, comprising of multiple violent incidents, arsons and threats, eventually culminating with the murder of Naseem Smith. On November 6, 2018, [Appellant] shot Naseem Smith nine times, resulting in Naseem’s death three days later. In the course of that homicide investigation, Detective Robert Daly discovered the various police reports detailing [Appellant’s] previous violent conduct directed towards Christina Parker, Naseem Smith, and their families, and began an extensive investigation into each of the incidents leading up to Naseem Smith’s murder, resulting in the nine cases brought against [Appellant].

[Appellant’s] harassment and terror campaign began on October 14, 2017, when he arrived at Christina Parker’s address claiming that he wanted her phone, then drove off with her, against her will, threatened and choked her and held her against her will for hours, while going through her phone to discover who she was dating, leading to kidnapping, strangulation, and related charges against [Appellant]. This incident led her to seek a Protection from Abuse (PFA) Order against [Appellant]. Ms. Parker’s statement was corroborated by [Appellant’s] phone location data, as well as text message conversations where he admitted that he kidnapped and “almost killed” her.

On October 25th, [Appellant] created an account with BeenVerified.com, which allowed him to begin meticulously stalking his soon-to-be victims. His BeenVerified history shows hundreds of searches related to Christina Parker, Naseem Smith, and various family members, providing address information for the individuals later targeted, and [Appellant’s] location data shows him driving back and forth between addresses in the days before the first arsons were

5

committed.

On October 31, 2017, after forcing entry into the rear basement window of the residence of 1338 Jerome Street, [Appellant] set the house on fire. Christina Parker and Naseem Smith as well as Naseem’s cousin, Dominique Polk, and Siedah Foster and a young child were living at the house and were home in the early morning hours when [Appellant] set the fire. It was later determined to be arson and set with the use of an accelerant being poured and ignited.

A week later, in the early morning hours of November 7, 2017, [Appellant] started a different fire at 1514 Glenwood Avenue, where Naseem’s mother, siblings and grandparents lived. Again, the fire was determined to be arson, originating at the rear of the property with the use of an ignitable liquid. The fire caused significant damage to the property, permanently displacing the occupants.

On November 8, 2017, [Appellant] returned to 1338 Jerome Street, where he approached Dominique Polk, Naseem’s cousin and shot at him numerous times … before fleeing. The police recovered 16 fired cartridge casings at the scene.

On December 5, 2017, [Appellant] arrived at Christina Parker’s work, and as she was leaving, followed her into a SEPTA elevator, assaulting her and cutting off her ponytail. Ms. Parker had previously obtained a PFA against [Appellant] and these actions resulted in the assault and violation of the PFA charges.

In January 2018, [Appellant’s] conduct accelerated, committing three arsons in a 24-hour period. On January 10, 2018, between the hours of 5:00 and 6:00 a.m., [Appellant] again returned to 1338 Jerome Street, where he attempted arson while Christina Parker and Naseem Smith were in residence. Fortunately, they smelled the gasoline and could see the smoke and flames. They also witnessed [Appellant] climbing on the roof and then standing in the alleyway while Naseem Smith interrupted and contained the fire. On January 11, 2018, around 2:00 a.m., the Philadelphia Fire and Police Departments were dispatched to a fire at 825 West Stella Street, which was a former address of Naseem Smith, and a property that Joseph Bey, a relative

6

of Naseem’s owned. The prosecution provided [Appellant] searched this address shortly before the arson with his BeenVerified account. The fire again was determined to be arson with the use of an ignitable liquid. Approximately two hours later, [Appellant] went to 3227 West Stillman Street, and again, with the use of an ignitable liquid started a fire there, targeting the ten-day-old son of Naseem Smith, along with the child’s mother, and her family members residing in the house.

After this last arson on January 11th, Christina Parker and Naseem Smith relocated to a different section of the city, and there were no other reported incidents involving these complainants or properties until November 2018. However, [Appellant] continued his searches on BeenVerified.com for Christina Parker and Naseem Smith, along with their family members and their last known residences. Then on November 6, 2018, outside of their home at 6146 Ludlow Street, [Appellant] shot Naseem Smith. The fired cartridge casings that were recovered at the scene matched the ones that were used in the shooting of Naseem’s cousin, Dominique Polk, a year before.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/5/25, at 5-7).

Procedurally, on December 6, 2017, Appellant was arrested for the

simple assault of Christina Parker, and for contempt, at docket No. 652-2019.

On November 15, 2018, Appellant was arrested for the arson and aggravated

assault of Christina Parker and Naseem Smith that occurred on January 10,

2018, at docket No. 669-2019. On October 22, 2019, Appellant was arrested

for the November 6, 2018 murder of Naseem Smith, at docket No. 1559-2020;

for the October 31, 2017 attempted murder of Christina Parker, Naseem

Smith, Dominique Polk, and Siedah Foster, at docket No. 1556-2020; for the

November 8, 2017, attempted murder of Dominique Polk, at docket No. 1557-

2020; for the November 7, 2017 attempted murder of Nashawna Leake,

7

Rickey Hill, Evoine Leake, Ayra Gordon and Yusef Smith, at docket No. 1558-

2020; for the January 11, 2018 attempted murder of Vincent McKnight and

Beneather Ealy, at docket No. 1560-2020; for the January 11, 2018 attempted

murder of Erika Cole, Fahtnah Staples, Assad Cole, Jihad Saunders, and Faraaj

Scott, at docket No. 1561-2020; and for the October 14, 2017 kidnapping and

strangulation of Christina Parker, at docket No. 1564-2020.

The trial court explained:

The case was listed as a three-week jury trial and numerous continuances were granted due to COVID as well as the unavailability of numerous necessary individuals, including [Appellant]. Motions to suppress all search warrants as well [as] to quash were denied on September 13, 2022. Counsel requested a mental health examination of [Appellant], who on April 5, 2023, was found to be competent. On June 7, 2023, counsel was permitted to withdraw, and new counsel appointed. Several continuances were granted for counsel to prepare. [Appellant] requested to self-represent which was granted on August 27, 2024, following a Grazier[1] hearing. More motions were filed and heard, and on October 11, 2024, [Appellant] waived his right to a jury trial, requesting a bench trial.

A three week bench trial was held from October 22, 2024 through November 7, 2024, following which Appellant was convicted of all the charges against him.

(Trial Court Opinion at 2-3).

Specifically, the court convicted Appellant of the following: at docket No.

652-2019: possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”), simple assault, and

contempt; at docket No. 669-2019: two counts each of aggravated assault,

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81 (1998).

8

simple assault, recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), and one

count each of harassment, arson, risking catastrophe, retaliation against

witness or victim, and criminal mischief; at docket No. 1556-2020: five counts

each of attempted murder and aggravated assault, four counts of arson, and

one count each of risking catastrophe, burglary, criminal trespass, criminal

use of a communication facility, stalking, and PIC; at docket No. 1557-2020:

attempted murder, aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a

license, criminal use of a communication facility, stalking, possession of

firearm prohibited, carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, and PIC; at

docket No. 1558-2020: five counts each of attempted murder and aggravated

assault, and one count each of arson, risking catastrophe, criminal use of

communication facility, stalking, and PIC; at docket No. 1559-2020: third

degree murder, conspiracy to commit third degree murder, possession of

firearm prohibited, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying a

firearm in public in Philadelphia, criminal use of a communication facility,

stalking, and PIC; at docket No. 1560-2020: two counts each of attempted

murder and aggravated assault, and one count each of arson, risking

catastrophe, criminal use of a communication facility, stalking, and PIC; at

docket No. 1561-2020: five counts each of attempted murder and aggravated

assault, and one count each of arson, risking catastrophe, criminal use of a

communication facility, stalking, and PIC; and at docket No. 1564-2020:

kidnapping for ransom, strangulation, criminal use of a communication facility,

9

unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, and kidnap to facilitate a felony.

Following a presentence investigation and a mental health evaluation,

on January 31, 2025, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of

sixty-six years and three months’ imprisonment to one hundred seventy-six

years and six months’ imprisonment.2 After sentencing, Appellant asked to

no longer represent himself and the court appointed counsel. Appointed

counsel filed a timely post-sentence motion on January 31, 2025.3 Despite

____________________________________________

2 The court imposed the charges in each case concurrent to each other, but

consecutive to the other cases. At docket No. 659-2019, for the charges of contempt of court, PIC, and simple assault, the court sentenced Appellant to 3 to 6 months each. At docket No. 669-2019, the court sentenced Appellant to 4 ½to 10 years for each of two counts of aggravated assault, 3 to 6 years for arson, and no further penalty for the remaining charges. At docket No. 1556-2020, the court sentenced Appellant to 6½ to 20 years each of the four counts of attempted murder, 3 to 6 years for arson, 2 to 10 years for burglary, and no further penalty for the remaining charges. At docket No. 1557-2020, the court sentenced Appellant to 6½ to 20 years for attempted murder, 4½ to 20 years for possession of a firearm prohibited, and no further penalty for the remaining charges. At docket No. 1558-2020, the court sentenced Appellant to 6½ to 20 years for each of five attempted murder counts, 3 to 6 years for arson, and no further penalty for the remaining charges. At docket No. 1559-2020, the court sentenced Appellant to 20-40 years for third degree murder, 5 to 10 years for conspiracy, and 3 to 10 years each for possession of firearm prohibited and firearms carried without a license. At docket No. 1560-2020, the court sentenced Appellant to 6½ to 20 years for both attempted murder counts, 3 to 6 years for arson, and no further penalty for the remaining charges. At docket No. 1561-2020, the court sentenced Appellant to 6½ to 20 years for each of the five attempted murder counts and 3 to 6 years for arson. Finally, at docket No. 1564-2020, the court sentenced Appellant to 3 to 6 years each for both kidnapping and strangulation. All sentences imposed were within the sentencing guidelines.

3 After filing post-sentence motions, on February 1, 2025, appointed counsel

filed a petition to withdraw and for appointment of new counsel. On February (Footnote Continued Next Page)

10

being represented by counsel, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on

February 3, 2025, and filed additional post-sentence motions on February 10,

2025. On March 31, 2025, this Court quashed Appellant’s appeal as

interlocutory because the appeal was filed while a post-sentence motion was

pending. (See Order, 3/31/25).

On June 2, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying the post-

sentence motions by operation of law. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal

on June 8, 2025. Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed his concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal on June 22, 2025. On July 15,

2025, this Court filed an order notifying counsel that the notice of appeal did

not comply with Commonwealth v. Walker, 646 Pa. 456, 185 A.3d 969

(2018) (requiring appellants to file separate notices of appeal when single

order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket). Appellant

filed counseled amended notices of appeal at each case on July 19, 2025. On

September 9, 2025, this Court granted Appellant’s request to consolidate the

above-captioned nine appeals.

As a preliminary matter, counsel seeks to withdraw his representation

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d

493 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349

(2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: (1) petition the Court for

____________________________________________

4, 2025, the trial court granted the petition and appointed appellate counsel to represent Appellant.

11

leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the record,

counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; (2) file a

brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the

appeal; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of

his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any additional

points the appellant deems worthy of review. See Santiago, supra at 173-

79, 978 A.2d at 358-61. “Substantial compliance with these requirements is

sufficient.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 781 (Pa.Super. 2015).

After establishing that counsel has met the antecedent requirements to

withdraw, this Court makes an independent review of the record to confirm

that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244,

1246 (Pa.Super. 2006). See also Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d

266 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc).

In Santiago, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing requirements

where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw representation:

Neither Anders nor [Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981)] requires that counsel’s brief provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To repeat, what the brief must provide under Anders are references to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.

* * *

Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and counsel’s references to anything in the record that arguably supports the appeal.

12

Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Id. at 178-179, 978 A.2d at 361.

Instantly, appellate counsel filed an application to withdraw, stating that

counsel reviewed the record and determined that the appeal was wholly

frivolous. Counsel supplied Appellant with a copy of the Anders brief as well

as a letter explaining Appellant’s right to retain new counsel or to proceed pro

se to raise any additional points Appellant believes are worthy of this Court’s

attention.

In the Anders brief, counsel summarized the relevant procedural

history of the case. The argument section of the Anders brief refers to

relevant case law and portions of the record that might arguably support an

appeal. Counsel also provided his reasons for concluding that the appeal is

wholly frivolous. Therefore, counsel has substantially complied with the

technical requirements of Anders and Santiago. See Reid, supra.

Counsel raises the following issues on Appellant’s behalf:

1. Whether the [c]ourt erred when it denied Appellant’s suppression motion and Rule 600 Motion?

13

2. Whether Appellant’s convictions were against the weight and credibility of the evidence where there was compelling evidence that Appellant suffered from physical impairments that made it impossible for him to have committed the offenses, where there were numerous contradictory and inconsistent statements from crucial witnesses and where the convictions were based upon conjecture and speculation?

3. Whether Appellant’s convictions were based upon insufficient evidence of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to all charges on all transcripts?

4. Whether there is a substantial question that the [c]ourt erred in sentencing Appellant where the sentence was excessive, unduly harsh, inappropriate and inconsistent with the guidelines and contrary to the norms underlying the Sentencing Code?

(Anders Brief at 6-7).4

The first question presented in the Anders brief presents two issues,

which we discuss separately. The Anders brief first asserts that the court

erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress all evidence procured via the

initial search warrant for a search of Appellant’s cell phone, and accordingly

also erred in denying his motion to suppress the remaining warrants based on

the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Appellant asserts that the four corners

of the warrant do not establish probable cause to search the cell phone and,

to the extent that they do establish probable cause, also claims that the

warrants were overbroad. We disagree.

____________________________________________

4 Appellant has not filed a response to the Anders brief pro se or with private

counsel.

14

The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion

to suppress:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018).

Both the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution

protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const.

amend. IV; Pa. Const. art. 1, § 8. These constitutional protections require

that warrants “(1) describe the place to be searched and the items to be seized

with specificity and (2) be supported by probable cause to believe that the

items sought will provide evidence of a crime.” Commonwealth v. Johnson,

662 Pa. 691, 706, 240 A.3d 575, 584 (2020). Indeed, the Pennsylvania

Constitution requires that the warrant describe the items seized “as nearly as

15

may be,” a more stringent requirement than that of the Fourth Amendment,

which “merely requires particularity in the description.” Commonwealth v.

Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 715-16 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

This Court has recognized that the particularity component subsumes two distinct, although often related, concepts. The first concept addresses the degree of particularity required. A warrant that is not “particular enough” permits “a search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and choose,” which amounts to the rummaging that so offended the drafters of the federal and state constitutions. Commonwealth v. Santner, 308 Pa.Super. 67, 454 A.2d 24, 25 n.2 (1982). This first component thus ensures that the authorities are sufficiently limited in what they can seize. The second concept is overbreadth. A warrant can be clear in terms of what will be seized, thus ensuring that the authorities’ discretion does not permit a general rummaging. But if the warrant allows authorities to seize items for which probable cause does not exist, it may be overbroad. Id.

Id. at 716. An overbroad warrant is “unconstitutional because it authorizes a

general search and seizure.” Commonwealth v. Young, 287 A.3d 907, 919-

20 (Pa.Super. 2022), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 303 A.3d 110 (2023).

As our Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he natural starting place in assessing the validity of the description contained in a purportedly overbroad warrant is to determine for what items probable cause existed. Johnson[, supra at 711,] 240 A.3d at 587. Probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Id. In determining whether probable cause exists to support a search warrant, the issuing authority is “simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 86, 764 A.2d 532, 537-38 (2001) (citing Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921

16

(1986)). A court reviewing the underlying probable cause determination “must view the information offered to establish probable cause in a common-sense, non-technical manner.” Id. “[P]robable cause is based on a probability, not a prima facie case of criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Housman, 604 Pa. 596, 986 A.2d 822, 843 (2009).

Commonwealth v. Green, 61 Pa. 1, 18, 265 A.3d 541, 551 (2021). Next,

“[t]he sufficiency of the description [in the warrant] must then be measured against those items for which there was probable cause. Any unreasonable discrepancy between the items for which there was probable cause [to search] and the description in the warrant requires suppression.” [Commonwealth v. Grossman, 521 Pa. 290, 555 A.2d 896, 899-900 (1989)]. This is because “[a]n unreasonable discrepancy reveals that the description was not as specific as reasonably possible[,]” id., meaning the warrant is overbroad, ambiguous, or perhaps both.

Green, supra at 16, 265 A.3d at 550.

Our Supreme Court has explained that:

[b]ecause a cell phone often contains even more personal information than a home, it logically follows that a warrant should be required to search the contents of a cell phone, just as a warrant is required to search the contents of a home. This rationale, however, does not support the conclusion that, once obtained, a warrant to search a digital device should be held to a higher overbreadth standard than a warrant to search a home simply because of the former's storage capacity. Of course, as discussed supra, our Constitution requires that all warrants, including warrants to search a digital space, (1) describe the place to be searched and the items to be seized with specificity and (2) be supported by probable cause to believe that the items sought will provide evidence of a crime.

Id. at 22, 265 A.3d at 553. As such, an overbreadth challenge applies equally

to the search of a cell phone, and we must look to see whether the warrant

17

described as nearly as may be those items for which there is probable cause.

Id. at 22-23, 265 A.3d at 553-54.

Instantly, Appellant filed a motion to suppress as part of his omnibus

pretrial motion. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress

on September 13, 2022. At the hearing, counsel argued that the search

warrants utilized in his cases did not establish probable cause within the four

corners of the warrants for each of the portions within the cellphone that the

detectives wanted to search; moreover, Appellant complained the search

warrants were overly broad. Counsel specified that the initial warrant,

#214838 seeking information from Appellant’s cell phone related to text

message, call detail records, GPS locations, and various internet searches,

was overly broad; and that all other warrants issued as a result of information

found from the first overly broad warrant should also be suppressed. (See

N.T. Hearing, 9/13/22, at 71-75). After the hearing, the court denied the

motion, explaining that the warrants were not overbroad and that the court

was “satisfied that all four corners have been met in terms of breadth, in terms

of specificity, in terms of probable cause, and in terms of staleness.” (N.T.

Hearing, 9/13/22, at 83).

Upon our independent review, we agree with counsel that Appellant is

not entitled to relief. At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Robert

Daly, who was assigned to the homicide investigation, testified that after

speaking with Christina Parker and learning that the victim Naseem Smith had

18

received threatening text messages from Appellant, he requested a search

warrant for records connected with Appellant’s cell phone. (See N.T. Hearing,

9/13/22, at 15). Our review of the four corners of the initial search warrant

reveals that Detective Daly described his training and experience, including

his employment with the Philadelphia Police Department for approximately 18

years and his current assignment to the Special Investigations Unit. Detective

Daly described the fires that occurred from October 2017 through January

2018, as well as the shooting that occurred in November 2018. Detective

Daly explained that after speaking with Christina and Naseem’s family, he

discovered a phone number for Appellant. Detective Daly stated:

Your affiant is familiar with the information maintained and stored by cellular telephone providers and has conducted numerous investigations as they relate to cellular call activity. Your affiant conducted an investigation of available databases in reference to wireless communication carriers and their assigned cellular phone numbers which lists the vendor for Ph# … as AT&T.

Your affiant believes that the call detail records maintained and stored by AT&T are now material to these aforementioned incidents. Your affiant is seeking transactional records related to the phone number to help establish the device associated with … was possessed by [Appellant] during any of these aforementioned crimes or was utilized to threaten Complainant #2 as stated by Complainant #1. As such your affiant believes probable cause exists to obtain a search warrant for the following information associated with the cellular telephone number … which operates on AT&T Wireless Mobile Network:

Your affiant is requesting any and all toll records including basic subscriber information, call detail records including incoming and outgoing calls, and text messages, to include cell site location and cell site sector information for the time

19

period from 10/29/2017 (04:00 am UTC) until 11/08/18 (03:59 am UTC) for target ….

(Search and Seizure Warrant Application #214838, dated 11/13/18, at 3-4).

Based on the foregoing, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that

the search warrant was not overbroad and that it described with particularity

both the particular information sought (cell phone records), and the time

frame for which that information was sought (October 2017 through

November 2018). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s

motion to suppress the results of the search warrant based on his claim of an

overly broad warrant.5 See Green, supra; Ford, supra.

____________________________________________

5 To the extent Appellant’s challenge extends to subsequent warrants, we have

reviewed all search warrants referenced in the hearing on the motion to suppress and agree with the court that each set forth probable cause to search within the four corners of the warrant, and that each item to be searched was described with particularity. (See, e.g., Search and Seizure Warrant Application #215558, dated 11/22/18 (Appellant’s vehicle); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #215811, dated 12/17/18 (Appellant’s gmail account); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #215812, dated 12/17/18 (google location history); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #216137, dated 1/16/19 (Appellant’s storage unit); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #216371, dated 1/22/19 (apartment and associated storage unit); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #216383, dated 1/23/19 (black Apple iPhone); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #216398, dated 2/13/19 (Appellant’s Apple ID); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #216399, dated 2/13/19 (Appellant’s Lyft account); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #217275, dated 2/18/19 (related to AT&T GPS coordinates); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #217276, dated 2/19/19 (Christina Parker gmail – taken over by Appellant); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #217277, dated 2/19/19 (Christina Parker gmail – taken over by Appellant); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #218914, dated 4/26/19 (T-Mobile account data); Search and Seizure Warrant Application #218915, dated 4/26/19 (AT&T account data); and Search and Seizure Warrant Application #223580, dated 9/23/19 (BeenVerified Inc. account)).

20

In the second part of his suppression challenge, Appellant suggests that

the trial court erred in denying his pro se motion pursuant to Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Specifically,

Appellant claims that the facts presented in the application for the warrant

were false and presented with reckless indifference for the truth. We disagree.

To succeed on a claim that an affidavit was based on false information

that rendered the search warrant defective and mandated suppression, an

appellant must show that police either deliberately, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, made false statements in the affidavit of probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Hoyle, 337 A.3d 544, 569 (Pa.Super. 2025).

In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant may attack the validity of a warrant on the basis that it contained untruthful information. A defendant attacking a warrant on this basis must allege that the warrant contained statements “of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof.” Id.

We applied Franks in Commonwealth v. Gomolekoff, 910 A.2d 710, 715 [(Pa.Super. 2006)]. There, police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s home, based on two emails. When officers executed the search, they seized four computer towers. However, the two emails were not found on the towers. The defendant insisted the warrant was therefore invalid and he was entitled to suppression. We cited the Franks rule regarding challenges to warrants based on the inclusion of false information. We concluded the defendant’s argument lacked merit because he had failed to proffer any evidence that the affiant of the warrant had “made deliberately false statements, or made statements with a reckless disregard for the truth.” Id.

Id. at 569 (quoting Commonwealth v. Adorno, 291 A.3d 412, 417

21

(Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 305 A.3d 951 (2023)).

Additionally, a defendant must show that the misstatements at issue

involved a material fact, one without which probable cause to search would

not exist. Hoyle, supra at 569.

Where a defendant alleges that material facts were omitted from an affidavit, we consider “(1) whether the officer withheld a highly relevant fact within his knowledge, where any reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know” and “(2) whether the affidavit would have provided probable cause if it had contained a disclosure of the omitted information.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 850 A.2d 684, 689 (Pa.Super. 2004)[, appeal denied, 580 Pa. 697, 860 A.2d 123 (2004)]. This type of challenge typically applies where the omission of facts tended to mislead the magistrate as to the veracity of the facts included. The pertinent analysis is whether inclusion of the omitted material facts would have undermined the other facts in the affidavit that gave rise to probable cause. See id. (collecting cases).

Commonwealth v. Gould, 187 A.3d 927, 940 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 648 Pa. 657, 194 A.3d 1040 (2018).

Instantly, on October 11, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on

several discovery motions that Appellant had submitted pro se. At the

hearing, Appellant presented a Franks motion and a motion to reconsider the

earlier denial of his suppression motion. Appellant specified that his Franks

motion related to the search warrant served on AT&T for call records from

October 29, 2017 until November 8, 2018. Appellant alleged that in the

affidavit of probable cause attached to the warrant application, Detective Daly

summarized the statements of the complainants, Naseem Smith and Christina

22

Parker, rather than a verbatim recording of their statements. Appellant

argued that although both statements identified Appellant as being on scene

at the November 6, 2018 shooting, Detective Daly omitted the fact that

Christina Parker said that she identified Appellant on the roof and did not see

him in the rear yard. At the close of the hearing, the court took the matter

under advisement, and, on October 15, 2024, the trial court issued orders

denying Appellant’s motions.

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s

Franks motion. The record reveals that Appellant did not present any

evidence of police fabrication, that police knowingly presented false evidence

to the issuing authority, or that law enforcement tampered with any evidence.

See Hoyle, supra; Gould, supra. To the extent that Appellant noted minor

discrepancies between the statements of Christina Parker and Naseem Smith,

and the summaries of their statements in the affidavit, such as whether

Christina Parker saw Appellant on the yard or on the roof, Appellant did not

establish the materiality of those discrepancies, or that probable cause would

cease to exist if the officer had included the verbatim statements of Christina

Parker and Naseem Smith instead of summarizing their statements. See

Hoyle, supra. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief regarding this claim in

his first issue presented on appeal.

In the second part of the first question presented, Appellant asserts that

the trial court erred in denying his Rule 600 motion. Our standard of review

23

in evaluating speedy trial issues is “whether the trial court abused its

discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court’s findings and

the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing

party.” Commonwealth v. Womack, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 315 A.3d 1229,

1237 (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 605 Pa. 325, 353, 989

A.2d 883, 899 (2010)).

Preliminarily, we must ascertain whether Appellant preserved his motion

by raising it before the trial court. A “defendant who has not been brought to

trial within the time specified in Rule 600(A) may, at any time prior to trial,

‘file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice

on the ground that the rule has been violated.’” Commonwealth v. Harth,

666 Pa. 300, 324, 252 A.3d 600, 615 (2021) (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P.

600(D)(1)). “If the trial court determines that the Commonwealth violated

Rule 600, it shall dismiss the charges and discharge the defendant.” Id.

(citation omitted). Nevertheless, this Court has held that a defendant waives

his Rule 600 claim when he fails to file a written motion in trial court. See

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 337 A.3d 541, 543 (Pa.Super. 2025),

appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 347 A.3d 658 (2025). See also Commonwealth

v. Brock, 619 Pa. 278, 61 A.3d 1015 (2013) (holding that based upon

requirement that copy of Rule 600 motion be served upon attorney for

Commonwealth, Rule 600 clearly presupposes filing of written motion).

Here, on March 31, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled omnibus pre-trial

24

motion, submitted “pursuant to Pa.R.Cr.P. 578, Pa.R.Cr.P. 581, and Pa.R.Cr.P.

583; and Pa.R.Cr.P. 600 seeking discovery from the Commonwealth; the

suppression of evidence; and an Order from the Court severing each of these

cases for trial, and/or dismissal of these cases.” (Omnibus Pretrial Motion,

3/31/21, at 1).6 Aside from the general citation to Rule 600, Appellant did

not elaborate or specify any grounds to support his speedy trial claim. The

trial court thereafter conducted a hearing on Appellant’s omnibus pretrial

motion; however, during the hearing, Appellant’s counsel appeared to

abandon the Rule 600 claim, as counsel proceeded only on the suppression

claims and the motion to quash the charges. Consequently, Appellant’s

speedy trial issue is waived for the purposes of appeal. 7 See generally

____________________________________________

6 On January 26, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se habeas corpus petition, in which he asserted a speedy trial claim. (See Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief, filed 1/26/22, at 1-9; Letter, filed 6/13/22). However, because Appellant was represented by counsel at the time he filed the petition, the petition has no legal effect and is a legal nullity. See Commonwealth v. T. Williams, 241 A.3d 353, 354 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2016) (holding that “[a]s hybrid representation is not permitted in the Commonwealth, our courts will not accept a pro se motion while an appellant is represented by counsel; indeed, pro se motions have no legal effect and, therefore, are legal nullities”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Appellant thereafter filed a written post-trial speedy trial motion pro se on January 31, 2025, which is the same date on which the court appointed new counsel for Appellant and counsel also filed a post-sentence motion. Even if Appellant’s pro se filing did not violate the rule against hybrid representation, this motion failed to preserve the Rule 600 claim, as Rule 600 motions are required to be filed prior to trial. See Harth, supra.

7 To the extent that Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for abandoning the Rule 600 claim, “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (Footnote Continued Next Page)

25

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating issues cannot be raised for first time on appeal).

Moreover, as the court explained:

A review of the entire dockets show[s] the prosecutor had been duly diligent. On February 26, 2019, Paul DiMaio entered his appearance for [Appellant]. On November 18, 2019, Mr. DiMaio was permitted to withdraw and Joshua Scarpello appointed. There were several defense as well as joint continuances, times where [Appellant] was not brought [to court] because he was on medical hold and where a mental health examination was requested, as well as COVID continuances as well. [See Commonwealth v. Lear, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 325 A.3d 552, 563 (2024) (holding pre-trial delay caused by emergency judicial orders issued during COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in closure of courthouses, followed by gradual reopening was not delay caused by Commonwealth and thus prosecution need not demonstrate due diligence during that time)]. On May 30, 2023, upon mutual request, Mr. Scarpello was allowed to withdraw his representation. George Yacoubian was then appointed on June 13th. Appellant then claimed he was unsatisfied with his third counsel and demanded to represent himself. In 2022, defense counsel advised the court that all discovery had been complete. At a hearing on August 27, 2024, the prosecution advised that it had already provided discovery, not only to his two previous attorneys but to [Appellant] as well. [Appellant] was not ready for trial and after filing several motions, was shown that in fact he had been provided discovery. Orders were made to make sure [Appellant] had sufficient time, in the prison with a computer to be prepared for trial. [Appellant’s] motions were heard and ruled upon, after which [Appellant] requested and received a bench trial that lasted three weeks. The majority of continuance requests were made at the request of, or for the benefit of [Appellant], who

____________________________________________

are to be deferred to PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon post-verdict motions; and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 310 A.3d 307, 310 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citing Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002)). This rule is subject to limited exceptions, none of which are applicable here. See id. at 311.

26

continually requested more discovery, claiming he was not given the material, when in fact he had, he just did not seem to have the ability or knowhow to access it. In the instant case, few, if any delays were attributable to the prosecution’s inaction, and the denial of the request for dismissal was proper.

(Trial Court Opinion at 28-29).

Therefore, because Appellant waived his speedy trial claim by

abandoning it at the trial court level, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled

to relief based on the second part of the first issue raised in the Anders brief.

In the second issue posed in the Anders brief, Appellant asserts that

the trial court erred when it denied his post-sentence motion for a new trial

based on the weight of the evidence. Our standard of review of a challenge

to the weight of the evidence is well settled:

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of the fact who is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the ... verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, [435,] 741 A.2d 666, 672-73 (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellant court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408

(2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004)

(most internal citations omitted).

27

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. [Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 435, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (1994)]. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (1976). One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 619 Pa. 423, 432, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (2013)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319, 744 A.2d 745, 751-

52 (2000)) (emphasis in original).

Instantly, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial based

on the weight of the evidence, explaining that “[h]aving reviewed the entire

record, including a thorough reading of the trial transcripts and admitted

exhibits, … the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s

sense of justice, nor was it so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that it shocks

the conscience of the court.” (Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/25, at 26). The court

explained that “the evidence in this case was compelling and substantial, and

strongly supported the verdict,” and concluded that Appellant’s weight claim

was without merit. (See id.)

At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence of Appellant’s repeated

attacks on Christina Parker, Naseem Smith, and their families. This evidence

28

included: Appellant’s actions on October 14, 2017, kidnapping Christina

Parker, driving her to Quakertown and assaulting her; Appellant’s actions on

October 31, 2017, where he set fire to a house in which Christina Parker and

Naseem Smith were present with other family members; Appellant’s actions

on November 7, 2017, setting fire to a home where Naseem Smith’s family

members were asleep; Appellant’s actions on November 8, 2017, shooting

Naseem Smith’s cousin Dominique Polk; Appellant’s actions on December 5,

2017, following Christina Parker from her work and cutting off her ponytail in

a SEPTA elevator; Appellant’s actions on January 10, 2018, setting fire to the

rooftop of the apartment where Christina Parker and Naseem Smith were

sleeping; Appellant’s actions on January 11, 2018, setting fire to the house of

the mother of Naseem Smith’s newborn son, which destroyed the home; and

ultimately, Appellant’s actions on November 6, 2018, where Appellant shot

Naseem Smith ten times in the street outside his home. The Commonwealth

provided evidence of Appellant’s location on the different dates, his use of

BeenVerified to conduct background checks on individuals to reveal their

addresses and associates, and firearms ballistics evidence tying the firearm

used in the attempted murder of Dominique Polk to the firearm used to shoot

and kill Naseem Smith. The trial court credited the Commonwealth’s evidence.

On this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion on

ruling on Appellant’s weight claim. See Champney, supra; Clay, supra.

Appellant’s second issue merits no relief.

29

In the third issue raised in the Anders brief, Appellant claims that the

evidence was insufficient to support Appellant’s convictions of all charges on

all cases. In the argument section of the Anders brief, counsel states that

Appellant would assert that there is no evidence that would identify him as

the shooter, and thus the evidence was insufficient to convict him of third-

degree murder. (Anders Brief at 34). Appellant further avers there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of multiple counts of attempted murder,

arson, kidnapping, burglary, simple assault, and aggravated assault.

Initially, we consider whether Appellant’s sufficiency claims are waived.

This Court has consistently held that to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal must state with specificity the elements upon which

the appellant alleges the evidence was insufficient. Commonwealth v. C.

Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2008) (stating: “If Appellant

wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was insufficient, then the 1925(b)

statement needs to specify the element or elements upon which the evidence

was insufficient”). The specificity requirement is particularly important when

an appellant has been convicted of multiple offenses, each of which the

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v.

Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa.Super. 2013). Therefore, when an appellant’s

Rule 1925(b) statement fails to “specify the element or elements upon which

the evidence was insufficient[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived on appeal.”

30

Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citing C.

Williams, supra at 1257). Furthermore, “[e]ven if the trial court correctly

guesses the issues Appellant… raise[s] on appeal and writes an opinion

pursuant to that supposition the issues are still waived.” Commonwealth v.

Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, 666 Pa. 83,

250 A.3d 468 (2021) (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement contains a blanket statement

wherein he claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of all

charges. The statement fails to specify for which of Appellant’s convictions

the evidence was insufficient, and he does not specify the element or elements

upon which the evidence was allegedly insufficient to support that crime. This

failure is especially significant here, where Appellant was convicted of multiple

counts of over 20 different crimes, across numerous dockets. See Bonnett,

supra. Thus, Appellant has waived his sufficiency challenge. See Tyack,

supra; Garland, supra; C. Williams, supra. See also Commonwealth v.

Cox, 231 A.3d 1011 (Pa.Super. 2020) (holding that appellant’s failure to

identify which of his three murder convictions, or any particular elements

thereof Commonwealth failed to establish, resulted in waiver; and mere filing

of Anders brief and petition to withdraw will not serve to resuscitate claims

that were already waived upon filing of notice of appeal); Commonwealth v.

Garang, 9 A.3d 237 (Pa.Super. 2010) (reiterating that challenge to sufficiency

of evidence must specify element or elements upon which evidence was

31

insufficient to preserve issue for appeal; hence, where concise statement filed

prior to counsel’s submission of Anders brief did not claim that evidence was

insufficient to convict appellant of attempted homicide, this Court did not

review merits of issue challenging attempted homicide, concluding that

appellant had waived claim).8

Finally, regarding Appellant’s challenge to his sentence, we observe that

“challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an

appellant to an appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Perzel, 291 A.3d 38,

46 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 301 A.3d 426 (2023). Prior

to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue:

[W]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal

____________________________________________

8 We acknowledge that this Court may overlook certain waiver-causing procedural errors committed by Anders counsel after the filing of a notice of appeal, to ensure any non-frivolous issues are not missed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 783 A.2d 784, 787 (Pa.Super. 2001) (overlooking counsel’s failure to file court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement). However, Hernandez concerns a complete failure to file a concise statement, which would constitute per se ineffectiveness. The instant case does not concern per se ineffectiveness of counsel, but a concise statement that, by failing to specify any element or any charge within the nine cases on appeal, is so vague that we conclude Appellant has waived this claim. See Bonnett, supra; Garang, supra.

32

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted).

Instantly, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved this issue

in his post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement of reasons

relied on for appeal in the Anders brief. Hence, we turn to whether he raised

a substantial question that the sentence was not appropriate under the

sentencing code.

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). “A substantial question exists only when

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

process.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super.

2011)). This Court has determined that bald claims of an excessive sentence

do not raise a substantial question, “[h]owever, an excessiveness claim in

conjunction with an assertion that the court did not adequately consider a

mitigating factor may present a substantial question.” Commonwealth v.

Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 662 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

Here, in his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant asserted that the

sentencing court abused its discretion and imposed a manifestly unreasonable

and excessive sentence and that the court failed to consider the mitigating

33

factors of Appellant’s unfortunate history and the conditions and choices

presented to him. (Anders Brief at 24). This arguably presents a substantial

question for our review; therefore, we may proceed to consider the merits of

his argument. See Zeigler, supra.

Our standard of review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a

sentence is well settled.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959 (Pa.Super. 2019)). “[W]hen

imposing sentence, the trial court is granted broad discretion, as it is in the

best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based

upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it.” Id. (quoting

Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa.Super. 2020)).

When imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144 (Pa.Super. 2000). The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for rehabilitation. See id. However, where the sentencing judge had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”), it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and

34

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. Id.

[Moreover,] [w]hen imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on the victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.... Furthermore, [a] trial court judge has wide discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing a sentence[.] The sentencing court, however, must also consider the sentencing guidelines.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quotation marks, quotations, and citation omitted).

Clemat, supra at 959–60. Furthermore, “Pennsylvania law affords the

sentencing court discretion to impose [a] sentence concurrently or

consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to

sentences already imposed.” Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808

(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 692, 77 A.3d 1258 (2013) (citation

omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214

(Pa.Super. 1995) (stating appellant is not entitled to “volume discount” for his

crimes by having all sentences run concurrently).

Instantly, the record is clear that the trial court considered all the

appropriate sentencing factors including Appellant’s background, the

likelihood of rehabilitation, and the need for the public to be protected from

Appellant. Additionally, the court had the benefit of a PSI report, so we can

presume the court was aware of and considered the relevant mitigating

35

factors. See Clemat, supra. The sentencing court had the discretion to

impose Appellant’s multiple sentences concurrently or consecutively, and the

court ultimately imposed guideline-range sentences concurrently to each

other within each docket, but consecutive with each additional case. On this

record, we cannot say that the court abused its broad sentencing discretion.

See Bankes, supra. Thus, Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects

of his sentence does not merit relief.

Our independent review of the record does not reveal any additional,

non-frivolous issues preserved on appeal. See Palm, supra. Accordingly,

we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw is granted.

Date: 8/18/2026