Com. v. Dumas, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 29, 2026
• Docket: 2138 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Olson

Opinion

J-S15002-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYREE DUMAS : : Appellant : No. 2138 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered July 23, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-MD-0000119-2025

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2026

Appellant, Tyree Dumas, appeals pro se from the order entered on July

23, 2025 in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne

County. This order dismissed Appellant’s petition for habeas corpus, which

challenged two detainers lodged by the State of Florida. We affirm. 1

In a prior, unrelated criminal matter, Appellant was convicted of multiple

sexual offenses in Philadelphia County and, on February 12, 2025, he was

sentenced to serve an aggregate term of seven to 14 years in prison. See

Commonwealth v. Dumas, 1591 & 1773-1775 EDA 2025. Appellant’s direct

appeal from his February 2025 judgment of sentence is presently pending ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 “[A]bsent unusual circumstances, there is no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings.” Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Russell, 220 A.2d 632, 634 (Pa. 1966). J-S15002-26

before this Court. See Commonwealth v. Dumas, 1591 & 1773-1775 EDA

2025.

Relevant to the instant appeal, Appellant, on July 8, 2025, filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus (hereinafter “Appellant’s Petition” or “the Petition”).

Within the Petition, Appellant alleged that, after he was convicted and

sentenced in Philadelphia in February 2025, he was “committed to the

Department of Corrections, SCI-Waymart, on March 13, 2025,” to begin

serving his sentence. Appellant’s Petition, 7/8/25, at ¶ 3. According to

Appellant, on March 3, 2025, “two detainers were lodged against [Appellant],

due to identical nationwide extradition warrants” that were issued from the

State of Florida.2 Id. at ¶ 4. ____________________________________________

2 Specifically, Appellant alleged that the extradition warrants were originally

issued out of Florida on June 16, 2021 and June 24, 2021 and that both warrants alleged that Appellant had violated the terms of his Florida probation. See Appellant’s Petition, 7/8/25, at ¶ 4. In his brief to this Court, Appellant asserts that he was first arrested on these warrants on April 18, 2022 in Delaware County, and again on April 27, 2022 in Philadelphia County. See Appellant’s Brief at 1. Appellant further alleged that he was granted bail on related fugitive detainers in Philadelphia on December 21, 2023. See id. Appellant claims the Philadelphia bail proceedings “conclusively resolved” his custodial status and placed him on bail pending resolution of the criminal offenses with which he was charged in Pennsylvania. See id. According to Appellant, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections “re-lodged” the Florida detainers in Wayne County on March 3, 2025 after he was transferred to SCI-Waymart to begin serving his Pennsylvania sentences. See id. at 2. Since that time, Florida has not pursued extradition or attempted to obtain a Governor’s Warrant. See id.

Appellant filed his petition for habeas corpus on July 8, 2025, claiming that the March 3, 2025 detainers filed in Wayne County were “expired, procedurally defective, and unconstitutional.” Id.

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Citing the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (“UCEA”), Appellant claimed

that he cannot be held on the Florida detainers for longer than 30 days. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9136. As he has now been held for longer than 30 days,

Appellant requests that the trial court remove the two detainers or schedule

a hearing to consider his claim. See Appellant’s Petition, 7/8/25, at

“Wherefore” Clause.

On July 23, 2025, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s Petition and

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We now affirm the trial court’s order.

“Traditionally, a writ of habeas corpus is a civil remedy that tests the

legality of the detention.” Chadwick v. Caulfield, 834 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa.

Super. 2003). “[O]rdinarily, an appellate court will review a grant or denial

of a petition for writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion, but for questions

of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Harris, 315 A.3d 26, 33 (Pa. 2024) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). “A petition for writ of habeas corpus may be disposed of

without a hearing where the facts averred or the record disclose no ground

for relief.” Commonwealth ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 196 A.2d 861, 863

n.1a (Pa. 1964).

As we have explained:

Under the [UCEA] an accused may be committed to jail for up to thirty days to allow his arrest on Governor’s warrant pursuant to a request by the demanding state. 42 Pa.C.S.A.

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§ 9136.[3] If the accused is not arrested under the Governor’s warrant within the initial thirty-day period, he may be recommitted for a further period not to exceed sixty days. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9138.[4] Although the statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9138, does not expressly require a hearing before an accused may be recommitted for another period of up to sixty days, our case law has imposed such a requirement.

____________________________________________

3 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9136, entitled “commitment to await requisition,” declares:

If from the examination before the judge or issuing authority it appears that the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime alleged, and, except in cases arising under section 9127 (relating to extradition of persons not present in demanding state at time of commission of crime), that he has fled from justice, the judge or issuing authority must, by a warrant reciting the accusation, commit him to the county jail for such a time, not exceeding 30 days, and specified in the warrant, as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the Governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state having jurisdiction of the offense unless the accused give bail as provided in section 9137 (relating to bail), or until he shall be legally discharged.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9136.

4 Section 9138, entitled “extension of time of commitment,” provides:

If the accused is not arrested under warrant of the Governor by the expiration of the time specified in the warrant or bond, a judge or issuing authority may discharge him or may recommit him for a further period, not to exceed 60 days, or a judge or issuing authority may again take bail for his appearance and surrender, as provided in section 9137 (relating to bail), but within a period not to exceed 60 days after the date of such new bond.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9138.

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Commonwealth v. Quackenbush, 435 A.2d 872, 873-874 (Pa. Super.

1981).5

Regarding the purpose of a detainer, as well as the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, et seq., the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified:

The IAD is an agreement between forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States, that establishes procedures for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the temporary custody of another jurisdiction which has lodged a detainer against a prisoner. Unlike a request for extradition, which is a request that the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated transfer custody to the requesting state, a detainer is merely a means of informing the custodial jurisdiction that there are outstanding charges pending in another jurisdiction and a request to hold the prisoner for the requesting state or notify the requesting state of the prisoner's imminent release.

Commonwealth v. Davis, 786 A.2d 173, 175 (Pa. 2001) (quotation marks

and citations omitted).6 “A detainer is an administrative device but does not

bind the authorities to act. It does nothing to commence prosecution nor does

it bring the inmate into custody of the requesting jurisdiction.” 35 C.J.S.

Extradition and Detainers § 89 (footnotes omitted).

5 Florida’s Uniform Interstate Extradition Act, F.S.A. §§ 941.01-941.42, “is based on the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.” Johnson v. State, 422 So.3d 689, 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025); see also F.S.A. § 941.30 (providing: “Sections 941.01-941.29 may be cited as the ‘Uniform Criminal Extradition Law’”).

6 Florida has adopted the IAD. See F.S.A. §§ 941.45-941.50.

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As Appellant admits, Florida has not requested his extradition; rather, it

has merely lodged detainers against him. See Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Moreover, Appellant has conceded that the March 3, 2025 detainers were

lodged after he was convicted of multiple crimes in Pennsylvania and

“transferred to SCI-Waymart to begin serving his sentences.” See id.

Nevertheless, Appellant claims that, since “the[] detainers have been in place

for well over the 90-day statutory maximum [time-frame] permitted for

holding a person pending extradition without a Governor’s Warrant,”

“[c]ontinued enforcement of the detainers violates Appellant’s rights.” 7 See

id. at 1-2. This claim fails.

The purpose of the thirty-day rule with respect to extradition

proceedings is to prevent a person from languishing in jail without judicial

supervision.” Commonwealth v. Heilman, 433 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa. Super.

1981). Here, however, Appellant is serving an aggregate term of seven to

14 years in prison at SCI-Waymart, as a result of his criminal convictions for

multiple sexual offenses. Thus, since Appellant is incarcerated solely because

of his Pennsylvania convictions and judgment of sentence (and not as the

7 Appellant numbers seven separate issues in his pro se brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 1-3. Yet, Appellant’s Petition raised only one claim for relief: whether the trial court must “remove the two detainers . . . in compliance with the [UCEA] due to the failure of obtaining a Governor’s warrant within the applicable time period.” See Appellant’s Petition, 7/8/25, at “Wherefore” Clause. We will thus confine our analysis to the issue Appellant raised in his Petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 302 (“[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

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suspect of a crime subject to an arrest), the time limitations in the UCEA do

not apply to Appellant.

We acknowledge our Supreme Court’s holding in Commonwealth ex

rel. Knowles v. Lester, where our Supreme Court held that the UCEA’s

default, 30-day time constraint applies where “a detainer [is] lodged against

an in-custody accused.” Commonwealth ex rel. Knowles v. Lester, 321

A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1974) (emphasis added). As the Knowles Court

explained, this is because “the lodging of a detainer against one in custody on

another charge is an arrest.” Id. at 639. The Knowles Court reasoned:

Arrest has been properly defined as “a deprivation or restraint of a person's liberty, whether or not it culminates in criminal charges being filed and results in a conviction or an acquittal.” There can be no doubt that a detainer lodged against an in-custody accused constitutes an additional restraint upon his liberty. The Commonwealth concedes as much.

A fugitive detainer is lodged against one already in custody on local charges for the very purpose of ensuring that he will not be released. At argument on the petition for habeas corpus, the Commonwealth admitted that if [Knowles] had posted bail on the local charges the fugitive detainer would have prevented his release. In order to obtain his freedom after posting bail on the local charges, [Knowles] would have had to appear before a judge or magistrate, have bail set on the fugitive detainer, and then post a second bond. Because the detainer imposed a restraint in addition to that exerted by arrest on the local charges, the lodging of the fugitive detainer must be considered an arrest.

Id. at 639-640 (cleaned up).

Knowles’ holding does not apply to the case at bar, as Appellant is not

an “in-custody accused.” See id. at 640. Rather, Appellant is “serving a

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lengthy term of incarceration in a State Correctional Institute here in the

Commonwealth, and he does not even suggest there [is] any chance he [might

be] released but for the detainer.” See In re Garcia, 984 A.2d 506, 509-510

(Pa. Super. 2009); see also Appellant’s Petition, 7/8/25, at ¶¶ 1-14 (raising

no allegation that the detainer caused Appellant prejudice and providing no

claim that he could be released but for the detainer). Given this fact, we

conclude that the time limitations in the UCEA do not apply to Appellant, as

the detainer is not imposing a “restraint in addition to that exerted by” his

lengthy term of incarceration. See Knowles, 321 A.2d at 640. Instead,

Appellant is – and will remain – incarcerated in this Commonwealth solely

because of his Pennsylvania judgment of sentence. See also State ex rel.

Ehlers v. Endicott, 523 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding: “the

thirty-day and optional sixty-day extension periods for detention [under the

UCEA] . . . are inapplicable” to an individual who “was already incarcerated

and serving a sentence for the conviction of another crime”). Appellant’s claim

to the contrary fails.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 5/29/2026

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