J-S30041-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : RICHARD DRZEWIECKI, JR., : : Appellant : No. 79 WDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 1, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000652-2008
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2018
Richard Drzewiecki, Jr. (Appellant) pro se appeals from the December
1, 2017 order denying his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
We provide the following background. In 2007, Appellant was charged
with, inter alia, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) by forcible
compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion. On July 8, 2008, Appellant
entered a guilty plea to IDSI, and the remaining charges were nolle prossed.
On October 27, 2008, Appellant was sentenced to a term of 10 to 20 years
of incarceration. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal to this Court.
On October 9, 2009, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel on Appellant’s behalf. On December 4, 2009, in lieu
of an amended PCRA petition, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and no-
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S30041-18
merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
banc). The PCRA court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissed
Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from that
order.
On March 19, 2010, Appellant pro se filed a second PCRA petition,
which the PCRA court dismissed on May 14, 2010.1 On June 9, 2010,
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, but it was dismissed because
Appellant failed to file a brief.
On November 6, 2015, Appellant pro se filed a third PCRA petition,
which the PCRA court dismissed on December 1, 2015. Appellant filed a
notice of appeal from the PCRA court’s order. The Clerk of Courts returned
the notice for corrections, but Appellant neglected to make those
corrections.
On September 8, 2017, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA
petition, his fourth. In that petition, Appellant asserted that he is serving an
illegal sentence pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (holding that certain
registration provisions of Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) are punitive and retroactive application of those
1 During the pendency of this PCRA petition, Appellant filed a motion for credit for time served, which the PCRA court granted.
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provisions violates the federal ex post facto clause, as well as the ex post
facto clause of the Pennsylvania constitution). On November 9, 2017, the
PCRA court issued an opinion and notice of intent to dismiss without a
hearing pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 907. Specifically, the PCRA court concluded
that Appellant was “properly subject to the registration requirements of
Megan’s Law II, which in this case has not been enhanced or changed under
SORNA.” PCRA Court Opinion, 11/9/2017. Appellant did not file a response,
but he did file an amended PCRA petition. On December 1, 2017, the PCRA
court dismissed Appellant’s petition. This timely-filed appeal followed.2
On appeal, Appellant raises seven issues for review, in which he
contends, inter alia, that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition
because he is serving an illegal sentence pursuant to Muniz. Appellant’s
Brief at 4. Before reaching the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must first
consider whether Appellant has timely filed his petition, as neither this Court
nor the PCRA court has jurisdiction to address the merits of an untimely-filed
petition. Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super.
2011).
Any PCRA petition, including second and subsequent petitions, must
either (1) be filed within one year of the judgment of sentence becoming
2The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) by filing a statement relying on its November 9, 2017 opinion and notice of intent to dismiss. PCRA Court Order, 1/29/2018.
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final, or (2) plead and prove a timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
Furthermore, the petition “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim
could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
“For purposes of [the PCRA], a judgment [of sentence] becomes final
at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(3). Here, Appellant was sentenced on October 27, 2008. He did
not file a direct appeal, and thus his judgment of sentence became final 30
days later, on November 26, 2008, and he had one year, or until November
26, 2009, to file timely a PCRA petition. Thus, Appellant’s September 8,
2017 petition is facially untimely, and he was required to plead and prove an
exception to the timeliness requirements.
In his petition, Appellant attempts to plead the timeliness exception
set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) (“Any petition under this subchapter,
including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of
the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that … the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been
-4- J-S30041-18
held by that court to apply retroactively.”).3 Specifically, Appellant relies on
our Supreme Court’s holding in Muniz in support of his petition. PCRA
Petition, 9/8/2017, at 5.
This Court considered whether Muniz applies under similar
circumstances in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402 (Pa. Super.
2018). In that case, Murphy was convicted of a number of sex-related
crimes in 2007, and after review, his judgment of sentence became final on
July 28, 2009. On October 18, 2017, while a serial PCRA petition was
pending in this Court, Murphy filed a motion asserting that Muniz rendered
portions of his sentence unconstitutional. This Court considered that
argument and offered the following.
Here, we acknowledge that this Court has declared that, “Muniz created a substantive rule that retroactively applies in the collateral context.” Commonwealth v. Rivera–Figueroa, 174 A.3d 674, 678 (Pa. Super. 2017). However, because [Murphy’s] PCRA petition is untimely (unlike the petition at issue in Rivera–Figueroa), he must demonstrate that the
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J-S30041-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : RICHARD DRZEWIECKI, JR., : : Appellant : No. 79 WDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 1, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000652-2008
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2018
Richard Drzewiecki, Jr. (Appellant) pro se appeals from the December
1, 2017 order denying his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
We provide the following background. In 2007, Appellant was charged
with, inter alia, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) by forcible
compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion. On July 8, 2008, Appellant
entered a guilty plea to IDSI, and the remaining charges were nolle prossed.
On October 27, 2008, Appellant was sentenced to a term of 10 to 20 years
of incarceration. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal to this Court.
On October 9, 2009, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel on Appellant’s behalf. On December 4, 2009, in lieu
of an amended PCRA petition, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and no-
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S30041-18
merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
banc). The PCRA court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissed
Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from that
order.
On March 19, 2010, Appellant pro se filed a second PCRA petition,
which the PCRA court dismissed on May 14, 2010.1 On June 9, 2010,
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, but it was dismissed because
Appellant failed to file a brief.
On November 6, 2015, Appellant pro se filed a third PCRA petition,
which the PCRA court dismissed on December 1, 2015. Appellant filed a
notice of appeal from the PCRA court’s order. The Clerk of Courts returned
the notice for corrections, but Appellant neglected to make those
corrections.
On September 8, 2017, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA
petition, his fourth. In that petition, Appellant asserted that he is serving an
illegal sentence pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (holding that certain
registration provisions of Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) are punitive and retroactive application of those
1 During the pendency of this PCRA petition, Appellant filed a motion for credit for time served, which the PCRA court granted.
-2- J-S30041-18
provisions violates the federal ex post facto clause, as well as the ex post
facto clause of the Pennsylvania constitution). On November 9, 2017, the
PCRA court issued an opinion and notice of intent to dismiss without a
hearing pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 907. Specifically, the PCRA court concluded
that Appellant was “properly subject to the registration requirements of
Megan’s Law II, which in this case has not been enhanced or changed under
SORNA.” PCRA Court Opinion, 11/9/2017. Appellant did not file a response,
but he did file an amended PCRA petition. On December 1, 2017, the PCRA
court dismissed Appellant’s petition. This timely-filed appeal followed.2
On appeal, Appellant raises seven issues for review, in which he
contends, inter alia, that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition
because he is serving an illegal sentence pursuant to Muniz. Appellant’s
Brief at 4. Before reaching the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must first
consider whether Appellant has timely filed his petition, as neither this Court
nor the PCRA court has jurisdiction to address the merits of an untimely-filed
petition. Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super.
2011).
Any PCRA petition, including second and subsequent petitions, must
either (1) be filed within one year of the judgment of sentence becoming
2The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) by filing a statement relying on its November 9, 2017 opinion and notice of intent to dismiss. PCRA Court Order, 1/29/2018.
-3- J-S30041-18
final, or (2) plead and prove a timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
Furthermore, the petition “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim
could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
“For purposes of [the PCRA], a judgment [of sentence] becomes final
at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(3). Here, Appellant was sentenced on October 27, 2008. He did
not file a direct appeal, and thus his judgment of sentence became final 30
days later, on November 26, 2008, and he had one year, or until November
26, 2009, to file timely a PCRA petition. Thus, Appellant’s September 8,
2017 petition is facially untimely, and he was required to plead and prove an
exception to the timeliness requirements.
In his petition, Appellant attempts to plead the timeliness exception
set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) (“Any petition under this subchapter,
including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of
the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that … the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been
-4- J-S30041-18
held by that court to apply retroactively.”).3 Specifically, Appellant relies on
our Supreme Court’s holding in Muniz in support of his petition. PCRA
Petition, 9/8/2017, at 5.
This Court considered whether Muniz applies under similar
circumstances in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402 (Pa. Super.
2018). In that case, Murphy was convicted of a number of sex-related
crimes in 2007, and after review, his judgment of sentence became final on
July 28, 2009. On October 18, 2017, while a serial PCRA petition was
pending in this Court, Murphy filed a motion asserting that Muniz rendered
portions of his sentence unconstitutional. This Court considered that
argument and offered the following.
Here, we acknowledge that this Court has declared that, “Muniz created a substantive rule that retroactively applies in the collateral context.” Commonwealth v. Rivera–Figueroa, 174 A.3d 674, 678 (Pa. Super. 2017). However, because [Murphy’s] PCRA petition is untimely (unlike the petition at issue in Rivera–Figueroa), he must demonstrate that the
3 Appellant also attempts to plead the timeliness exception set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) (“Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that … the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]”). However, Appellant’s “newly discovered fact” is the contention that the Commonwealth cannot apply Megan’s Law retroactively. PCRA Petition, 9/8/2017, at 3. This is not a fact, but an attempt to refashion the basis for his subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception into a separate exception under subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). Because Appellant has not pled or proven a newly discovered fact, we review the timeliness of his PCRA petition based on the argument he set forth supra under subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Muniz applies retroactively in order to satisfy section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Because at this time, no such holding has been issued by our Supreme Court, [Murphy] cannot rely on Muniz to meet that timeliness exception.
Murphy, 180 A.3d at 405–06 (emphasis in original; some citations omitted).
In other words, this Court concluded that the holding in Muniz does
not apply at this point to untimely-filed PCRA petitions. This Court
acknowledges that “if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issues a decision
holding that Muniz applies retroactively, Murphy can then file a PCRA
petition, within 60 days of that decision, attempting to invoke the ‘new
retroactive right’ exception in section 9545(b)(1)(iii).” Murphy, 180 A.3d at
406 n.1. The same holds true for Appellant.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s petition was filed
untimely, and he has not asserted an exception to the timeliness
requirements. Thus, he is not entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v.
Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Pa. 2010) (affirming dismissal of PCRA
petition without a hearing because the appellant failed to meet burden of
establishing timeliness exception).
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/6/2018
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