J-A10015-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : ADERLY DOMINGUEZ ALVAREZ : No. 1551 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No: CP-45-CR-0000218-2025
BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 29, 2026
The Commonwealth appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Monroe County (trial court) granting a motion for habeas corpus filed by
Appellee, Aderly Dominguez Alvarez, and quashing a count of receiving stolen
property (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a)). Finding from our review of the record and
applicable law that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case
as to that offense, we affirm.
The relevant facts are as follows. On October 19, 2024, a red Volvo
truck (the truck) was reported as stolen by its owner, Oscar Bolanos. About
two weeks later, on November 4, 2024, Appellee was pulled over by Trooper
Jacob Guzzi while towing the truck on a highway. Appellee only spoke broken
English, but during the traffic stop, he was able to make a telephone call to
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A10015-26
his employer, Jairo Rosado, who had assigned him the task of towing the
truck.
Within earshot of Appellee, Rosado spoke directly to Trooper Guzzi,
explaining that the “owner of the property where [the truck] was stored
contacted him to have it removed because it’s been there for a couple years.”
N.T. Hearing, 5/23/2025, at 24. Once Trooper Guzzi received this explanation
from Rosado, he resumed his discussion with Appellee, this time through a
remote interpreter, Trooper Susan Castillo, who was fluent in both Spanish
and English. Trooper Castillo translated the questions posed to Appellee by
Trooper Guzzi, and she then conveyed Appellee’s responses back to Trooper
Guzzi in English. See id., at 35-36.
In this manner, Appellee informed the troopers that Rosado had given
them a different explanation for his possession of the truck than the one
Appellee had himself previously received. At the time he was dispatched,
Rosado had instructed Appellee to tell any inquiring law enforcement officers
that Rosado had himself purchased the truck, and Appellee’s job was to
transport it to Hazleton, Pennsylvania, for purposes of delivering it to a buyer.
See id., at 33.
Appellee was asked if Rosado’s explanation to Trooper Guzzi was
“truthful,” and Appellee admitted “it was not truthful because the whole
scenario ended up being a different scenario.” Id. Of course, Appellee only
knew that what Rosado told him was false because he had overheard Rosado
contradicting himself when speaking to the troopers. See id.
-2- J-A10015-26
The Commonwealth charged Appellee with three counts: receiving
stolen property, driving without a license, and operating a vehicle on a
highway with no rear lights. Appellee filed a motion for habeas corpus as to
the offense of receiving stolen property, contending that a prima facie case
had not been established because there was no evidence that he had the
requite guilty knowledge. At the hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth
elicited the above facts through the testimony of the arresting officers,
Bolanos (the owner of the truck), and Jose Pena (the brother of Bolanos who
contacted police to report that it was being towed by Appellee).
Appellee, in turn, presented the testimony of Rosado, his employer.
Rosado testified that he owns and operates a towing business in New Jersey,
and that he had purchased the subject truck from a third party a few weeks
prior to the date of Appellee’s arrest. Rosado produced a bill of sale for the
truck, which was entered into evidence, but he was unable to supply the title
for the vehicle. See id., at 39-41. According to Rosado, Appellee had nothing
to do with the purchase of the truck or the means by which Rosado acquired
it. See id., at 42-43, 55-56. It was only Appellee’s job to bring the truck to
a potential buyer in Pennsylvania. See id.1
1 Rosado further recounted that he had arranged for a meeting between himself, the owner of the truck, and the third party who purportedly sold Rosado the truck (Carlos Rubio). See N.T. Hearing, 5/23/2025, at 40, 46, 55. Evidently, the parties were not able to fully resolve their dispute as to whether Rosado had lawfully acquired possession of the truck from Rubio.
-3- J-A10015-26
Appellee moved for habeas corpus, and the motion was granted; the
receiving stolen property charge was then quashed. The Commonwealth
timely appealed, and a single question was posed in its brief: “Did the [trial
court] err as a matter of law in finding that the Commonwealth did not present
a prima facie case for one count of Receiving Stolen Property, graded as a
felony of the third degree?” Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
The evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case is
an issue of law which subject to a de novo standard of review. See
Commonwealth v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092, 1102 (Pa. 2021). At a preliminary
hearing, a defendant may contend that a prima facie case has not been
established, rendering her arrest and detention unlawful. See id. (citing
Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991)). “[T]he
Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing at least a prima facie case
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably the one
who committed it.” Id. (quoting McBride, 595 A.2d at 591) (emphasis in
original).
“[A] prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence
of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable
cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense.
Furthermore, the evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and
accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to be
decided by the jury.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d
505, 514 (Pa. 2005)).
-4- J-A10015-26
It is not the trial court’s role at a preliminary hearing to assign weight
to the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. See id. The trial
court must instead draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See id. “The ‘more-likely-than-
not’ test, must be applied to assess the reasonableness of inferences relied
upon in establishing a prima facie case of criminal culpability.” Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 996 (Pa. 1983) (plurality)).
A person commits the offense of receiving stolen property if she:
“intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen,
unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it
to the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). In other words, a conviction for
receiving stolen property requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
J-A10015-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : ADERLY DOMINGUEZ ALVAREZ : No. 1551 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No: CP-45-CR-0000218-2025
BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 29, 2026
The Commonwealth appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Monroe County (trial court) granting a motion for habeas corpus filed by
Appellee, Aderly Dominguez Alvarez, and quashing a count of receiving stolen
property (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a)). Finding from our review of the record and
applicable law that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case
as to that offense, we affirm.
The relevant facts are as follows. On October 19, 2024, a red Volvo
truck (the truck) was reported as stolen by its owner, Oscar Bolanos. About
two weeks later, on November 4, 2024, Appellee was pulled over by Trooper
Jacob Guzzi while towing the truck on a highway. Appellee only spoke broken
English, but during the traffic stop, he was able to make a telephone call to
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A10015-26
his employer, Jairo Rosado, who had assigned him the task of towing the
truck.
Within earshot of Appellee, Rosado spoke directly to Trooper Guzzi,
explaining that the “owner of the property where [the truck] was stored
contacted him to have it removed because it’s been there for a couple years.”
N.T. Hearing, 5/23/2025, at 24. Once Trooper Guzzi received this explanation
from Rosado, he resumed his discussion with Appellee, this time through a
remote interpreter, Trooper Susan Castillo, who was fluent in both Spanish
and English. Trooper Castillo translated the questions posed to Appellee by
Trooper Guzzi, and she then conveyed Appellee’s responses back to Trooper
Guzzi in English. See id., at 35-36.
In this manner, Appellee informed the troopers that Rosado had given
them a different explanation for his possession of the truck than the one
Appellee had himself previously received. At the time he was dispatched,
Rosado had instructed Appellee to tell any inquiring law enforcement officers
that Rosado had himself purchased the truck, and Appellee’s job was to
transport it to Hazleton, Pennsylvania, for purposes of delivering it to a buyer.
See id., at 33.
Appellee was asked if Rosado’s explanation to Trooper Guzzi was
“truthful,” and Appellee admitted “it was not truthful because the whole
scenario ended up being a different scenario.” Id. Of course, Appellee only
knew that what Rosado told him was false because he had overheard Rosado
contradicting himself when speaking to the troopers. See id.
-2- J-A10015-26
The Commonwealth charged Appellee with three counts: receiving
stolen property, driving without a license, and operating a vehicle on a
highway with no rear lights. Appellee filed a motion for habeas corpus as to
the offense of receiving stolen property, contending that a prima facie case
had not been established because there was no evidence that he had the
requite guilty knowledge. At the hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth
elicited the above facts through the testimony of the arresting officers,
Bolanos (the owner of the truck), and Jose Pena (the brother of Bolanos who
contacted police to report that it was being towed by Appellee).
Appellee, in turn, presented the testimony of Rosado, his employer.
Rosado testified that he owns and operates a towing business in New Jersey,
and that he had purchased the subject truck from a third party a few weeks
prior to the date of Appellee’s arrest. Rosado produced a bill of sale for the
truck, which was entered into evidence, but he was unable to supply the title
for the vehicle. See id., at 39-41. According to Rosado, Appellee had nothing
to do with the purchase of the truck or the means by which Rosado acquired
it. See id., at 42-43, 55-56. It was only Appellee’s job to bring the truck to
a potential buyer in Pennsylvania. See id.1
1 Rosado further recounted that he had arranged for a meeting between himself, the owner of the truck, and the third party who purportedly sold Rosado the truck (Carlos Rubio). See N.T. Hearing, 5/23/2025, at 40, 46, 55. Evidently, the parties were not able to fully resolve their dispute as to whether Rosado had lawfully acquired possession of the truck from Rubio.
-3- J-A10015-26
Appellee moved for habeas corpus, and the motion was granted; the
receiving stolen property charge was then quashed. The Commonwealth
timely appealed, and a single question was posed in its brief: “Did the [trial
court] err as a matter of law in finding that the Commonwealth did not present
a prima facie case for one count of Receiving Stolen Property, graded as a
felony of the third degree?” Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
The evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case is
an issue of law which subject to a de novo standard of review. See
Commonwealth v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092, 1102 (Pa. 2021). At a preliminary
hearing, a defendant may contend that a prima facie case has not been
established, rendering her arrest and detention unlawful. See id. (citing
Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991)). “[T]he
Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing at least a prima facie case
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably the one
who committed it.” Id. (quoting McBride, 595 A.2d at 591) (emphasis in
original).
“[A] prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence
of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable
cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense.
Furthermore, the evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and
accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to be
decided by the jury.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d
505, 514 (Pa. 2005)).
-4- J-A10015-26
It is not the trial court’s role at a preliminary hearing to assign weight
to the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. See id. The trial
court must instead draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See id. “The ‘more-likely-than-
not’ test, must be applied to assess the reasonableness of inferences relied
upon in establishing a prima facie case of criminal culpability.” Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 996 (Pa. 1983) (plurality)).
A person commits the offense of receiving stolen property if she:
“intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen,
unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it
to the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). In other words, a conviction for
receiving stolen property requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt “that the property was stolen, that appellant was in receipt,
possession or control of it, and that appellant had guilty knowledge, that is,
that he knew or had reason to know that the property was stolen.”
Commonwealth v. Grekis, 601 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. Super. 1992).
The guilty knowledge element of the offense may not be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt solely by an inference arising from a defendant’s mere
possession of stolen property. See Commonwealth v. Foreman, 797 A.2d
1005, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Carter, 332
A.3d 867, 874 (Pa. Super. 2025). However, guilty knowledge may be proven
with circumstantial evidence. See Foreman, 797 A.2d at 1012.
-5- J-A10015-26
The Commonwealth may prove a defendant’s guilty knowledge through
circumstantial evidence by several means, including:
the place or manner of possession, alterations to the property indicative of theft, the defendant's conduct or statements at the time of arrest (including attempts to flee apprehension), a false explanation for the possession, the location of the theft in comparison to where the defendant gained possession, the value of the property compared to the price paid for it, or any other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 268 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
banc).
Here, at the preliminary hearing, the parties’ central dispute was
whether the Commonwealth had produced evidence that Appellee knew the
truck he was towing had been stolen. The Commonwealth argues that
Appellee’s guilty knowledge of the truck’s theft could be inferred because he
knew that Rosado gave him a false “story” to tell police about how the truck
was taken into possession. See Appellant’s Brief, at 11-12. The trial court
erred – so the Commonwealth’s argument goes – because the credibility of
witnesses was not yet at issue at the preliminary hearing stage, and the
evidence had to be construed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. See id.
We find that the trial court did not err in granting Appellee’s motion for
habeas corpus on the count of receiving stolen property because there was no
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing which tended to show that he
knew the truck was stolen. Appellee admitted to the arresting officers at the
-6- J-A10015-26
traffic stop that his employer, Rosado, instructed him to tell police the truck
had been abandoned. However, the transcripts of the hearing indicate that it
was only after Appellee heard Rosado speak with troopers over the phone (and
not before) that Appellee learned Rosado had purchased the truck himself.
The Commonwealth did not elicit any evidence that Appellee knew prior
to the traffic stop that the truck was stolen, or that Rosado had given him a
false story to relay to police. See N.T. Hearing, 5/23/2025, at 32-56. In fact,
Rosado testified that Appellee had nothing to do with the truck’s purchase,
see id., at 39-43, and the Commonwealth did not refute Rosado’s account.
Thus, the only evidence of Appellee’s guilty knowledge is the fact that he was
towing a stolen vehicle, and since mere possession is legally insufficient to
prove the guilty knowledge element of receiving stolen property, the
Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of establishing a prima facie case
as to that offense. See Foreman, 797 A.2d at 1012
Order affirmed.
Judge Lane joins the memorandum.
President Judge Emeritus Stevens files a concurring memorandum.
Date: 6/29/2026
-7-