Com. v. Dibble, J.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JONATHAN M. DIBBLE : No. 984 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered June 6, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-SA-0000017-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.* MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MARCH 01, 2019 The Commonwealth appeals from the order dismissing a citation charging Appellee Jonathan M. Dibble with a summary vehicle offense.1 The Commonwealth asserts it timely filed the citation pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5553(c)(3), which provides an exception to the general rule governing the commencement of proceedings for summary vehicle offenses. We reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:
The uncontested evidence is that Erika Valencic, concerned about the safety of her child, hired Dennis Lagan in 2015 to inter alia document [Appellee] driving while his operator’s license was
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The Commonwealth certified that the order terminated or substantially handicapped the prosecution of this matter at the time it filed its notice of appeal from this interlocutory order. See Notice of Appeal, 7/6/18; Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
suspended for a [driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI)]
conviction. Lagan videotaped [Appellee] driving a vehicle along North Main Street in Saegertown on October 13, 2017. Sometime in December, [Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Dale] Gillette “ran into” Lagan, who informed him that he was investigating someone he believed was driving on a suspended license . . . and asked whether this was something that [Corporal Gillette] would investigate. [Corporal] Gillette agreed to look into the matter as soon as Lagan got him the information.
On December 19, 2017, Mr. Lagan sent him [Appellee’s] name and two possible birth dates, and on December 27, 2017, [Corporal] Gillette started his research. He obtained a Certified Driver History for [Appellee], confirming the DUI suspension, and notified Lagan, who offered to provide him with video evidence of a violation. [Corporal] Gillette received the videotape . . . on January 9, 2018, viewed it, and then, unable to locate [Appellee], filed the citation [for driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked― DUI related2] on January 12, 2018.
Trial Ct. Op., 8/9/18, at 3-4 (record citations and footnote omitted).
On March 2, 2018, a Magisterial District Judge found Appellee guilty of driving with a suspended license and sentenced him to sixty days’ imprisonment plus fines and costs. Appellee timely filed a pro se notice of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas on March 28, 2018.3 The trial court
2 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1).
3 Significantly, Corporal Gillette actually filed four citations against Appellee on January 12, 2018. N.T. Trial, 6/6/18, at 18. On March 2, 2018, the Magisterial District Judge also found Appellee guilty of operation following suspension of registration (75 Pa.C.S. § 1371) and operation of a vehicle without an official certificate of inspection (75 Pa.C.S. § 4703). Id. at 3-4. Although Appellee intended to appeal from each of his summary convictions, his lone notice of appeal only listed the citation number for the offense of driving with a suspended license. Id. Because the notice of appeal did not list any additional citation numbers, the trial court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to consider arguments related to Appellee’s other summary convictions. Id. at 5-7.
conducted a de novo trial on June 6, 2018, which included testimony from Lagan and Corporal Gillette. That same day, the court found in favor of Appellee:
[W]ithout addressing the merits of the case, the [c]ourt finds that the provisions of [Section] 5553(a) preclude prosecution of [Appellee] because the commencement of the proceedings was not within 30 days of the commission of the offense nor was it within 30 days after the discovery of the offense by the individual reporting the offense to the Pennsylvania State Police. The offense is alleged to have occurred on October 13, 2017. The police were not notified effectively until December 19, 2017. The citation was filed within 30 days of the December 19, 2017 reporting date, i.e., January 12, 2018, but was not filed within 30 days of the date of the offense and discovery of the evidence of the offense by the reporting citizen.
Order, 6/6/18.
The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. The court filed a responsive opinion, concluding the Commonwealth was not entitled to relief.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following question for our review: “Did the court err when it precluded prosecution of Appellee for a violation of driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked―DUI related . . . due to a failure to timely file the citation [under] 42 Pa.C.S. § 5553(a)?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 (full capitalization omitted). 4
4 Appellee did not file a brief.
The Commonwealth acknowledges the general rule set forth in Section 5553(a), providing that proceedings for summary vehicle offenses must commence within thirty days after the discovery of the commission of the offense or the identity of the offender, whichever is later. Id. at 13. The Commonwealth emphasizes that Section 5553(c)(3) provides an exception to the general rule for cases where law enforcement suspects an offender has committed the offense of driving with a suspended license as one of multiple summary offenses arising from the same criminal episode. Id. In such cases, the Commonwealth contends that proceedings can commence within thirty days after law enforcement receives verification of the basis for the offender’s license suspension. Id. at 14.
The Commonwealth notes that the trial court found Section 5553(c)(3)
inapplicable, because Corporal Gillette “at the time he received [Appellee’s certified driver history], had no evidence of [Appellee] driving other than Lagan’s hearsay report.” Id. at 14 (quoting Trial Ct. Op. at 5 n.8). The Commonwealth insists, however, that law enforcement can issue a citation based solely on information received from a witness. Id. at 14-15. Based upon the foregoing, the Commonwealth argues that law enforcement timely filed the citation charging Appellee with driving with a suspended license where Corporal Gillette 1) received Appellee’s certified driver history sometime between December 27, 2017 and January 9, 2018; and 2) the citation was one of multiple summary offenses arising from the same criminal episode. Id. at 18.
The Commonwealth’s appellate issue “requires this Court to interpret a statute, which implicates a question of law.” Commonwealth v. Andrews, 173 A.3d 1219, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Therefore, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo.
When interpreting a statute, this Court must apply the Statutory Construction Act of 1972. The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature and give effect to all of the provisions of the statute. When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best indication of legislative intent. In reading a statute’s plain language, words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage, while any words or phrases that have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning must be construed according to that meaning.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Com. v. Dibble, J. (Com. v. Dibble, J.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.