Com. v. Diaz, A.

Opinion

J-S01025-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

ANGELA M. DIAZ :

:

Appellant : No. 535 MDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 8, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005090-2017

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: MAY 29, 2025

Appellant, Angela M. Diaz, appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, which denied her first petition filed

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

This Court has previously set forth the relevant facts and procedural

history of this case as follows:

By way of background, the victim, a two-year-old female, died while under the exclusive care of [Appellant]. As would later be determined, death stemmed from the combination of a severe head injury as well as repeated physical abuse. While [Appellant] originally claimed that the victim had fallen off of a bed and hit her head, medical evidence refuted this assertion. In fact, beyond the head injury, a postmortem examination would uncover injuries to the victim’s cheeks, ears, neck, abdomen, back, and buttocks, which

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

J-S01025-25

served to suggest, if not confirm, repeated physical abuse. The victim also appeared to have suffered from nutritional neglect.

Ultimately, [Appellant] pleaded guilty to third-degree murder. At sentencing, having been apprised of, inter alia, [Appellant’s] pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report, the court imposed [a term of] fifteen to thirty years of incarceration. After sentencing, [Appellant] filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was subsequently denied. Thereafter, [Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, No. 151 MDA 2021, unpublished memorandum at

1-2 (Pa.Super. filed Feb. 17, 2022). This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment

of sentence on February 17, 2022. See id. Appellant did not seek further

direct review.

On May 16, 2022, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. The

court appointed counsel (“PCRA counsel”) on September 27, 2023, who

subsequently filed a “no-merit” letter and request to withdraw under

Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc) on

December 19, 2023.2 On February 15, 2024, the court issued notice of its

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 and

granted PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw. In response, Appellant filed a

pro se “Motion to Extend Time To Perfect Appeal.” On March 8, 2024, the

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2 The court had originally appointed a different attorney to represent Appellant

in the PCRA proceedings, but that attorney subsequently withdrew his representation.

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court entered an order indicating that Appellant had not properly responded

to the Rule 907 notice within the time permitted and formally denied PCRA

relief. On March 12, 2024, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which

the court denied on March 19, 2024. Appellant later filed a pro se “Objection

to Dismissal of Order.”

Thereafter, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal.3 On June 5,

2024, the court appointed new counsel, Attorney Andrew Cooper, to represent

Appellant on appeal (“appellate counsel”) and directed counsel to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal on Appellant’s behalf. Appellate

counsel entered his appearance on June 26, 2024, and requested an extension

of time to file the concise statement. The court granted the extension request

on July 2, 2024, and granted an additional extension request on July 30, 2024.

On August 27, 2024, appellate counsel filed a statement under Pa.R.A.P.

1925(c)(4) of counsel’s intent to withdraw and to file a Turner/Finley brief

on appeal. Although counsel filed a Rule 1925(c)(4) statement, counsel did

not subsequently file a Turner/Finley brief in this Court or motion to

withdraw. Instead, Appellant filed a pro se brief on appeal.

Initially, it was not entirely clear from the record why the court deemed

it necessary to appoint new counsel for this appeal. See generally

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied,

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3 The PCRA court did not rule on Appellant’s “Objection to Dismissal of Order,”

presumably due to the pending appeal.

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619 Pa. 714, 64 A.3d 631 (2013) (explaining that when counsel has been

appointed to represent PCRA petitioner and that right has been fully vindicated

following grant of counsel’s petition to withdraw under Turner/Finley, court

shall not appoint new counsel and appellant must look to her own resources

for future proceedings). Regardless, once the court appointed appellate

counsel to represent Appellant on appeal, counsel was obligated to do so.

Thus, this Court retained jurisdiction but remanded for further proceedings to

determine whether Appellant is entitled to representation in this appeal in the

interests of justice, notwithstanding the general prohibition of Appellant’s right

to counsel at this stage in the proceedings.4 See Rykard, supra.

By letter dated March 13, 2025, the PCRA court notified this Court of its

determination that Appellant is not entitled to appointed counsel in this

appeal. Thus, the court permitted appellate counsel to withdraw.

Consequently, we proceed to our review of the issues raised in Appellant’s pro

se brief.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

Did PCRA Court err in ruling Appellant received her Sixth Amendment Right to effective assistance of counsel?

Did PCRA Court err in ruling West Lampeter, PA police properly investigated evidence used in the case and properly Mirandized, arrested, and questioned Appellant?

Did the PCRA Court err in ruling there was no Judicial

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4 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(E) (stating judge shall appoint counsel to represent

defendant whenever interest of justice require it).

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Misconduct on behalf of the Judges who adjudicated Appellant’s case?

Did PCRA Court err in ruling Appellant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).5

“Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The

PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the

relevant law, we conclude that the majority of Appellant’s issues merit no relief

for the reasons stated in the court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice opinion. (See

Rule 907 Notice Opinion, 2/15/24, at 2-19). Specifically, the PCRA court found

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5 Although Appellant presents four issues in her statement of questions presented, she provides only one lengthy argument section, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent).

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that PCRA counsel reviewed Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition, the court file,

notes of testimony from the guilty plea/sentencing hearing, and conducted

additional legal research. Thereafter, PCRA counsel listed in a Turner/Finley

no-merit letter 26 issues that Appellant wanted to present for the court’s

review, and PCRA counsel explained why each issue was meritless. PCRA

counsel sent Appellant a copy of the no-merit letter and informed her that she

had a right to proceed on her own or to hire an attorney of her choosing.

Thus, the court concluded that PCRA counsel satisfied the technical

requirements of Turner/Finley. (See id. at 2-4).

The court then proceeded to conduct an independent review of the

record.6 Specifically, regarding Appellant’s claim that Attorney Christopher

Tallerico failed to explain to her what it meant to waive a preliminary hearing,

Appellant failed to detail how such alleged ineffectiveness affected the

voluntary nature of her guilty plea. Thus, this claim merits no relief. (Id. at

10-11). With respect to Appellant’s claim that Attorney Tallerico “pressured”

her to plead guilty so that the Commonwealth would take the death penalty

off the table, the PCRA court determined that counsel had a factual basis for

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6 The court also initially concluded that Appellant’s current PCRA petition was

timely filed. (See id. at 4-6). We agree that Appellant’s current petition is timely on its face as it was filed within one year of when her judgment of sentence became final. We further agree with the PCRA court that Appellant satisfied the general eligibility requirements for relief under the PCRA and that Appellant’s underlying claims, to the extent they are presented in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel and/or challenges to the validity of her guilty plea, are cognizable under the PCRA. (See id. at 7-10).

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such advice. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with homicide; thus, if

the matter proceeded to trial, the Commonwealth could have pursued a first-

degree murder conviction. The court further noted that the victim was under

12 years of age, and the Commonwealth could have filed a notice of intent to

seek the death penalty. By pleading guilty, the court explained that Appellant

avoided the risk of a first-degree murder conviction and possible death

penalty. Thus, the court concluded this claim merited no relief. (Id. at 11-

12).

As to Appellant’s claim that Attorney Tallerico met with her only a few

times, the PCRA concluded this claim merited no relief where Appellant failed

to detail how such failure induced an involuntary or unknowing guilty plea.

Likewise, the court concluded that Appellant’s claim that Attorney Samuel

Encarnacion failed to meet with her in a timely manner warranted no relief,

where Appellant averred no facts that she was prejudiced by Attorney

Encarnacion’s alleged untimeliness. Appellant does not put forth a possible

defense that was ignored, and Appellant fails to state how Attorney

Encarnacion’s alleged ineffectiveness induced her to plead guilty. (Id. at 12-

13).

Further, the PCRA court found no merit to Appellant’s claim that

Attorney Encarnacion forced Appellant to plead guilty and threatened

Appellant by saying that “if they went to trial they would blame her children

and say they were lying.” Rather, Appellant conceded at the plea hearing that

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she was not threatened to plead guilty and was pleading guilty on her own

volition. Regarding Appellant’s claim that Attorney Encarnacion failed to notify

Appellant of her rescheduled trial dates, Appellant fails to assert how this

alleged ineffectiveness caused her to enter an unknowing and involuntary

guilty plea. Similarly, Appellant fails to develop her claim that Attorney

Encarnacion failed to give her discovery. Appellant does not explain how this

alleged ineffectiveness caused Appellant to enter an unknowing and

involuntary guilty plea. (Id. at 13-14).

Regarding Appellant’s claim that Attorney Courtney Monson threatened

her, Appellant provided no details of this alleged threat. Rather, at the plea

hearing, Appellant confirmed that she was not threatened to plead guilty.

Thus, the record belies this claim. With respect to Appellant’s claim that

Attorney Christopher Sarno advised Appellant that her only option was to

plead guilty, the record belies this claim. The court asked Appellant at the

plea hearing if she understood her right to go to trial, and Appellant responded

affirmatively. (Id. at 14-15). Concerning Appellant’s claim that all prior

counsel failed to listen to her version of events and failed to investigate or

interview witnesses, Appellant does not explain “her version” of events.

Further, Appellant did not provide any witnesses that her attorneys should

have considered interviewing. Thus, the court concluded these claims merited

no relief. (Id. at 15).

Regarding Appellant’s claim that her prior counsel were ineffective for

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failing to request a change of venue due to the high-profile nature of her case,

Appellant failed to provide any evidence of possible prejudicial pretrial

publicity, or a factual basis for her conclusion that her case was “high profile.”

Consequently, the court deemed this issue without merit. (Id. at 15-16).

Further, Appellant’s claim that the police failed to issue her Miranda7

warnings merits no relief where Appellant pled guilty. Appellant provides no

argument about how this failure impacted her voluntary and informed guilty

plea.8 (Id. at 16).

Concerning Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth lacked adequate

evidence to prosecute a case against her, the record belies this claim. The

police conducted interviews of everyone that had contact with the decedent

on May 17, 2017, and Appellant was the only adult who had contact with the

decedent. An autopsy revealed that the decedent suffered multiple traumatic

injuries to her brain and spinal cord and that she had suffered from

malnutrition, starvation, and failure to thrive.9 (Id. at 16-17).

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7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

8 It is unclear whether Appellant purports to raise this claim in the context of

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a challenge to the voluntariness of her plea. In any event, we agree with the PCRA court that the claim merits no relief.

9 Again, it is unclear whether Appellant purports to raise this claim in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a challenge to the voluntariness of her plea. In any event, we agree with the PCRA court that the claim merits no relief.

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Appellant’s claims of police ineptitude are also belied by the record.

More importantly, Appellant fails to explain how any errors in the police

investigation impacted her decision to plead guilty.10 (Id. at 17). Appellant’s

claim that police interviewed her son without a parent present is irrelevant to

the voluntariness of her guilty plea. Even if true, Appellant fails to explain

how this claim has relevance to either Appellant’s attorney’s capabilities or as

to the voluntary nature of her guilty plea. (Id. at 17-18).

Regarding Appellant’s claims of judicial misconduct, Appellant failed to

explain how any alleged judicial misconduct resulted in her entry of an

unknowing or involuntary guilty plea. Further, the court concluded that there

was no basis for Judge Knisely to recuse himself. (Id. at 18). With respect

to Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to turn over discovery,

Appellant fails to articulate what discovery was allegedly not turned over to

her. Without any further details, the court concluded Appellant’s claim was

conclusory and merited no relief.11 (Id. at 18).

Appellant’s claim that the prosecutor threatened to make Appellant’s

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10 Once again, it is unclear whether Appellant purports to raise this claim in

the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a challenge to the voluntariness of her plea. In any event, we agree with the PCRA court that the claim merits no relief.

11 Again, it is unclear whether Appellant purports to raise this claim in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a challenge to the voluntariness of her plea. In any event, we agree with the PCRA court that the claim merits no relief.

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son testify if the case proceeded to trial also merits no relief. Had the case

proceeded to trial, the Commonwealth could have subpoenaed Appellant’s son

to testify, where Appellant’s son had stated during an interview that Appellant

was the sole adult caretaker of the decedent at the time the incident occurred.

Thus, this claim lacks merit.12 (Id. at 19). Regarding Appellant’s claim that

her Eighth Amendment rights were violated, Appellant does not detail how her

living conditions are unconstitutional. Thus, this claim lacks merit.13

Therefore, as to the claims discussed above, we affirm on the basis of

the PCRA court’s well-reasoned opinion.14 Additionally, Appellant now

purports to raise claims challenging the effectiveness of direct appeal counsel,

Attorney Benjamin Vanasse. Appellant did not challenge appellate counsel’s

effectiveness in her PCRA petition, so these claims are waived. See generally

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 579 Pa. 46, 62, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (2004)

(stating claims not raised in PCRA petition are waived and not cognizable on

appeal). Notably, Appellant does not appear to raise this issue in a layered

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12 Presumably, Appellant is contending that this statement by the prosecutor

coerced her to plead guilty.

13 Again, it is unclear whether Appellant purports to raise this claim in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a challenge to the voluntariness of her plea. In any event, we agree with the PCRA court that the claim merits no relief.

14 We direct the parties to attach a copy of the PCRA court’s February 15, 2024

Rule 907 Notice Opinion to this decision in any future proceedings involving this appeal.

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fashion, by contending that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. To the extent Appellant meant to do so,

such a claim is underdeveloped and precludes our review. See

Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 587, 832 A.2d 1014, 1022 (2003)

(stating that where petitioner alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, she is

required to plead and prove each of three prongs for each counsel who was

allegedly ineffective). Moreover, Appellant fails to explain what other claims

appellate counsel should have raised that would have been meritorious on

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 569 Pa. 405, 804 A.2d 625

(2001) (explaining that boilerplate allegations of ineffectiveness are

insufficient to warrant relief).

With respect to Appellant’s new claims on appeal concerning the

effectiveness of PCRA counsel, Attorney Christopher Lyden,15 Appellant claims

that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate with her, failing

to investigate whether a recusal motion was proper, whether a motion for

change of venue should have been filed by prior counsel, and failing to

investigate the circumstances of her plea. Nevertheless, the PCRA court has

properly rejected the underlying claims regarding the propriety of a recusal

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15Appellant presents these claims for the first time on appeal pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bradley, 669 Pa. 107, 261 A.3d 381 (2021) (stating that PCRA petitioner may, after PCRA court denies relief and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal).

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motion and change of venue as set forth above, and PCRA counsel cannot be

ineffective for pursuing meritless claims. See Commonwealth v. Maddrey,

205 A.3d 323 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 398, 218 A.3d 380

(2019) (stating counsel is not ineffective for failing to pursue meritless

claims). Further, regarding Appellant’s claims that PCRA counsel failed to

communicate with her or investigate the circumstances of her plea, Appellant

fails to adequately develop these claims. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence,

309 A.3d 152 (Pa.Super. 2024) (stating that to be entitled to remand hearing

under Bradley, appellant must explain how further development of record

would satisfy all three prongs of ineffectiveness test). Accordingly, we affirm

the order denying PCRA relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 05/29/2025

Circulated 05/05/2025 03:39 PM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCAS ll~R COUNTY, PFNNSYLVANIA LANCASTER PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL DI VISION

DIVISION

COMMONWEAL COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA I'll 01·

v, v. NO. CP-36-CR-5090-2017

ANGELA DIAZ

PA.R.CRIM.P. PA. NOTICE R.CRIJ\:1.P. 907 NO T TCE

BY: BY: REINA KER, J REINAKER, FEDRUAR FEBRUARY 5 ,,2024 Y //5 2024

I. Introduction

On May 16, 2022, Angela Diaz (hereinaJler "Movant) filed a pro se Motion for Post (hereinafter ''Movanf')

Conviction Collateral Relief (hereinafter ''Movanfs "Movants PCRA Motion") seeking relief under the

Post Conviction Relief Act, (hereinafter "PCRA"). On September 27, 2023, this Court appointed

Christopher Lyden, Esquire (hereinafter "Mr. Lyden'') On Oecember Lyden") to represent the Movant. On December

Mr. Lyden filed a No-Merit Letter and a Motion to Withdraw a~ 19, 2023, Mr. Counsel'1 pursuant to as Counsel

Commonwealth v.

• 1Turner,

urner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998) and Commonwealth v.

• Finley, 550 A.2d 213

(Pa. (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).

[◄ Foror the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes that Mr. Lyden has complied with

as Counsel. Further, after a review Turner and Finley, and thus grants his Motion to Withdraw a,;;

of the entire record, this Court concludes the Movant's PCRA Motion is meritlcss, meritless, and there are

no genuine issues concerning a material fact. No purpose would be served by further

proceedings. Therefore, this Court intends to dismiss the Movanfs Movant's PCRA Motion ,vithout without a

hearing. hearing.

1 ' No-Merit Letter and Motion to Withdraw as Counsel were filed as a singular document. for For brevity, except when specifically addressing the Motion to \Vithdraw, Withdraw, the Court will cite 10 to this document as the ;'No-Merit 'No-Merit Letter."

II. Procedural Requirements

For PCRJ\ PCRA counsel to withdraw. certain requirements must be met. First.

First, counsel must

submit a No-Merit Letter. detailing the nature and extent of his review of the case. Finley. 550

A.2d at 215. The Jetter letter must also list the issues a movant has raised, along with counsel's

explanation or of why each is meritlcss. Id. The PCRA court then conducts a thorough and

independent review of the record.

record. Id.

Id. If the court agrees with counsel that the motion is

meritless, only then can counsel withdraw. Id. ·1'The meritlcss, he court may then dismiss the motion ~ithout without

proceedings. Id. Stated another way, the court must provide ''an further proceedings. "an independent expression

of its reasons" for dismissing the motion without a hearing. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 876 A.2d

342, 345 (Pa. 2002).

If the court finds dismissal without a hearing is appropriate, it must give notice of its

intention to do so and state the reasons for the dismissal. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1 ). A movant can 907(1).

twenty (20) days. d.

respond to the proposed dismissal within t~•enty Id If the court finds after that period

the dismissal remains appropriate, it must then enter an order dismissing the motion and advising

the movant of the right to appeal and the time within which the appeal must be taken.

Pa.R.Crim.P. Pa R.Crim.P. 907(4).

II. Counsel's No-Merit Letter Ill.

In his No-Merit Letter, Mr. Lyden detailed the nature and extent of his review. Mr.

Lyden stated he reviewed: the Movant's PCRA Motion, the court file, notes of testimony from

the guilty plea/sentencing hearing.

hcaring, and additional legal research. See No-Merit Letter at 1.

I.

Mr. Lyden also listed the Movant's issues she wished to have reviewed along with an

explanation ac;;

as to why they were meritless. Mr. Lyden addressed twenty-six (26) claims claims:2 : 1)

2 Although Mr. Lyden only numbered twenty-five (25) numbered claims, there were twenty-six (26) claims listed in Although the No-Merit Letter.

33

Attorney Chris Tallerico (hereinafter "Attorney Tallerico)

l allerico•·) never discussed v.,. hat it meant lo what to

waive a preliminary hearing; 2) Attorne)

Attorney Tallerico tried to persuade the Movant to take takc a plea

pica by

telling her that the death penalty ,,,ould would be taken off the table: 3) Attorney Tallerico met with the

Movant only a few times; 4) Attorney Samuel Encarnacion (hereinafter ••Attorney "Attorney Encarnacion'')

Encarnacion")

did not meet with the Movant before she was incarcerated for a year and had no plan for a

defense; 5) Attorney Encarnacion failed to inform the Movant about trial dates being cancelled;

6) Attorney Encarnacion failed to provide the Movant with discovery documents; 7) Attorney

Cour1ney Courtney Monson \fonson (hereinafter "Attorney Monson"')

Monson") threatened the Movant to try to make her

take the plea;

pica; 8) Attorney Christopher Sarno (hereinafter (hereinafter·•Attorney

Attorney Sarno") told the Movant that

she could not have a trial and had to plead guilty; 9) all the Jattorneys tlomeys failed to seek a recusal of

Judge Howard Knisely (hereinafter --Judge "Judge Knisely"); II0)

0) all of the attorneys failed to listen to

the Movant's version of the events, foiled failed to investigate evidence, and failed to interview

witnesses; 11) all attorneys failed to request a change of venue because the case was high-profile

with exorhitant exorbitant amount of publicity; 12)

I2) the police did not provide the Movant with \Vith Miranda

rights after her arrest; 13) the police did not have any incriminating evidence that justified the

Movant's arrest; 14) the police refused to investigate other suspects; 15) the police never

investigated witnesses; 16)

I6) the

thc police spoke with the Movant's nine (9) year old son without \Vilhout a

guardian present; 17) the police did not investigate the victim's medical history or history ,vith with

Child and Youth Services (hereinafter "CYS"); 18) the police officer did not have the degree of

skill needed to handle the case; 19) Judge Knisely refused to recuse himself after receiving an

infonnation packet from Justice and Mercy; 20) Judge Kn Knisely

isely had lunch with members from

Justice and Mercy; 21) members of Justice and Mercy gave money to Judge Knisely for his

campaign; 22) Judge Knisely removed the matter from the District Attorney's Office (hereinafter

"D.A.'s Office'') ''D.A.'s "A.G.'ss Ot1ice");

Office") and gave it to the Attorney General's Office (hereinafter "A.G.' Oflice"); 23)

the Assistant District Attorney, Karen Mansfield (hereinafter "Attorney Mansfield"), refused to

provide the Movant the entirety of the discovery; 24) Attorney Mansfield threatened the well-

heing being of the Movant's son; 25) Attorney Mansfield prosecuted a case that had no viabk viable evidence

based on the coroner and hospital reports; and 26) the Movant has been subjected to living

conditions in violation of the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. See No-Merit Letter at 1-2. Mr. Lyden provided an in-depth analysis of why all

questions should be concluded in the negative. Consequently, he concluded the Movant's PC RA PCRA

Motion is without merit.

Because of Mr. Lyden's review and analysis of the issues, this Court is satisfied that he

sufticiently sufficiently complied with the mandates of Finley in his No-Merit Letter. Mr. Lyden sent a copy

of the No-Merit Letter to the Movant. In it, it. he infonned the Movant that she may proceed on her

own or hire an attorney to pursue his claims. See No-Merit Letter at 9. Suhscquent Suhsequent Mr. Lydcn's

Lyden's

satisfaction of his requirements, this Court now turns to their 0own \\111 independent review of the

Movant's PCRA Motion and the record.

IV.'T'Ihis JV. his Court's Independent Review

A) Timeliness of the Movant's PCRA Motion

I his Court's first act is to determine whether the Movant's PCRA Motion is timely. lhis timely. A

movant can file a PCRA motion, including a second or subscliuent subsequent one, so long as the motion is

timely. timely. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b). A movant must file a PCRA motion within one year of the date

the judgment becomes final unless the movant proves that one of the exceptions to the timeliness

Pa.C.S.A. §

requirement applies. 42 .Pa.C.S.A. $ 9545(b)(l).

9545(b)(1). The PCRA lists three exceptions: 1) failure to

raise the claim previously was the result of government interference with the presentation of the

5

claim; 2) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant and could

not have hecn been ascertained by due diligence; or 3) the right asserted is a Constitutional right that

was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

after the time period provided in the PCRA and was held by the court to apply retroactively. 42

Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(1 )(i-iii). A motion invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within $9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

one year of the date that the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(h )(2).

$9545(b)(2).

The PCRA's time-limit requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and this

v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 222 Court may not disregard them to reach the merits. Commonwealth v.

(Pa. 1999). This Court has no authority to extend the filing process except as the statute permits.

permit'>.

Commonwealth v. Howard, 788 A.2d 351 (Pa. 2002). This Court does not have the authority to

"fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions

expressly delineated in the Act." Cmmnomvealth Commonwealth v. Rohinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003).

• Robinson,

Generally, a movant must file his motion seeking relief under the PCRA ·within within one year

of the date that his judgment of sentence hecomes becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §$ 9545(b Pa.C.S.A. )(I). A judgment 9545(b)(1).

of sentence becomes final upon the expiration of a defendant's direct appel1ate appellate rights. 42

Pa.C.S.A. §$ 9545(b)(3). A judgment becomes "final" fbr for PCRA purposes at the conclusion of

direct review or at the expiration of the time for seeking the review. Commonwealth v.

Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94 (Pa. 200 I). Therefore, if a de 2001). fondant does not file a direct appeal, the defendant

judgment of the sentence becomes fifinal nal thirty days after the imposition of a sentence.

Commonwealth v.• Brown, 767 A.2d 576 (Pa. Super. 2001).

2001). If a defendant seeks an allowance of

appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and then fails to Petition for Certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court, the judgment becomes final 90 days after the denial of a request for an

allowance of appeal. Commomvealth Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291 (Pa. Super. 2002).

When faced with a PCRA motion, no other matters may be addressed if the motion is

untimely.. Commonwealth v. untimely • Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. 1998): see also Comnumwealth (Pa. 1998)~ Commonwealth v.

v.

Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000) (courts cannot ignore the mandatory and jurisdictional

nature of the PCRA's timeliness requirements, which apply to all PCRA motions. regardless of

the nature of the claims raised in the motion).

motion). This is because, in the context of the PCRA,

a jurisdictional issue. Commonwealth v.

timeliness is ajurisdictional • Williams, 35 A.Jd A.3d 44, 52 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citing Commonwealth v.

• Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 983 (Pa. 2008)); Commonwealth v•. .Jackson, Jackson,

30 A.3d 5516, I 6, 518-19 (Pa. Super. 2011 )).

2011)). \Vhere

Where a movant's PCRA motion is untimely, the

Commomwealth ,v.•. Abu-Jamal, PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of his claim. Commomvealth Ahu-Jama/,

1267-68 (Pa. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v.

941 A.2d 1263, l267-68 • Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa.

1999)); Commonwealth v. 1999))~ v. Gandy.

Gandy, 38 A.3d 899, 903 (Pa. Super. 2012). "Pennsylvania law

[motion]." Williams, 35 A.3d at makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA lmotion]."

52 (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson. 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)).

v. Robinson,

After review, this Court determines the tv1ovant'

Movant'ss PCRA Motion is timely on its face.

The Movant was sentenced on Deccmher On December 15, 2020. she fiJed December 9, 2020. On filed a post-

sentence motion, which was denied on December 28, 2020. The Movant appealed the denial on 1

January 27, 2021. On Febmary 17, 2022, the Superior Court affinned the decision.

decision. Thus, the

judgment became fi nal on March 21, 2022. The Movant ha<l final had until March 21 21,, 2023, to tile

file a

PCRA Motion. The Movant's PCRA Motion was tiled filed on May 16, 2022.

2022. Therefore, the

Movant's PCRA Motion is timely and ripe for review.

ll) B) Eligibility for Relief under the PCRA

ro be eligible for relief under the PCRA. a mm·ant fo movant must plead and prove the required

*

elements listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A §$ 9543(a). In summary, 42 Pa.C.S.A. $ 9543(a) states:

1) A movant must have been convicted of a crime under Pennsylvania law;

2) that the conviction resulted from one of the conditions listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. $ Pa.C.S.A. §

9543(a)(2); 9543(a)02);

3) that the allegation of error has not heen been previously litigated or waived; and

4) that the failure to litigate the issue, either prior to trial, during trial, or on direct appeal appeal,, "could not have heen been the result of any rational strategic or tactical decision by counsel.''

counsel."

42 Pa.C.S.A. $ 9543(a).

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a).

This Court will \.vill address each individual facet of the tv1ovant's Movant's claims to determine if she pleaded

and proved each element by a preponderance of evidence.

evidence.

42 Pa.C.S.A §$ 9543(a)( I) was satisfied as the Movant was convicted and sentenced under 9543(a)(1)

Pennsylvania la\V. $ 9543(a) requires that a movant I) be convicted and 2) is law. 42 Pa.C.S.A §

currently serving imprisonment, probation, or parole. Id.

Id. On September 16, 2020, on Criminal

Information 5090-2017, the Movant pleaded guilty to one (l) count of Murder of the Third

3 Degree Degree'. . On December 9, 2020, the Movant was sentenced to fifleen fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years of

incarceration. Thus, this Court is satisfied the Movant meets the requirl!ments requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A.

Pa.C.S.A. §

{$

9543(a)(l 9543(a)1).).

The Movant averred she is eligible for relief under the PCRA because of ineffective

assistance of counsel, which is cognizable under 42 Pa.C.S.A. $§ 9543(a)(2).

9543(a)02). See Movant's

PCRA Motion at 2. She also claimed various other issues, e.g. misconduct by Judge Knisely, the

3 18 Pa.C.S.A.

Pa.C.S.A. 2502(c)

D.A.'s Office, and the police. Id. at 4-5. In supporting her eligibility for relief, the Movant police. Id.

claimed the following errors:

1) Attorney Tallerico never discussed with the Mo\'ant Movant what it meant to waive the preliminary hearing.

2) Attorney Tallerico tried to persuade the Movant to take a plea deal by telling her that if she di

didd then the death penalty would be taken off the table.

3) Attorney Attomey Tallerico only met with the tv1ovant Movant a few times.

4) Attorney Encarnacion did not meet with the Movant until she wa,;;

was incarccrat0d

incarcerated for

more than a year and he had no plan at that initial initial meeting.

5) Attorney Encarnacion tried to force the Movant to take a plea deal by telling her if she went

\Vent to trial then "they would blame her children and say they were lying."

6) Attorney Encarnacion neve, never communicated with the Movant about trial dates heing being

cancelled.

7) Attorney Encarnacion would not give the Movant any of the discovel)· D.A.s discovery the D.A.'s

Office had provided.

8) Attorney Encarnacion had Attorney Monson threaten the Movant to try and make her plead guilty.

9) The Movant was assigned Attorney Samo Sarno alter

after the case was transferred Lo to the A.G.'s

Office.

I10)

0) Attorney Samo Sarno spoke to the Movant tv.:ice twice before telling her it wa,;;

was too late to go to

trial and thus she would have to take a plea deal.

11) 1I) All attorneys failed to ask the judge fllr for a recusaJ.

recusal.

12) All attorneys failed to listen to the Movant 's version of the events, investigate Movant's

evidence, or interview witnesses.

13) All attorneys failed to request a change of venue due to the case being high-profile.

14) The police never provided the Movant with her Miranda rights.

15) The police had no incriminating evidence to arrest the Movant.

16) The police refused to investigate other possible suspects.

17) The police never investigated witnesses.

18) The police interviewed the Movanf Movant'ss son without a parent or guardian present.

19) The police failed to investigate prior abuses based on the hospital report and corner's reports.

20) The police never investigated the victim's medical or CYS CVS histories.

21) The police did not have the skill required to handle this type of case. 21)The

22) Judge Knisely refused to recuse himself due to his relationship \Vith 22)Judge with Justice and ~,tercy Mercy..

23) lunch with Judge Knisely had lunch'"

23)Judge itl1 Justice and Mercy on several occasions.

24) Members of Justice and Mercy gave money to Judge Knisely's campaign.

25) Judge Knisely transferred the case from the D.A. 's Office to the AG.'s D.A.'s A.G.'s O llice.

Oflice.

26) Attorney Mansfield refused to tum over the entirety of discovery to the Movant.

27) Attorney Mansfield threatened the welfare or of the Movant's child by threatening to caJ callI him as a witness if the case \Vent went to trial.

28) Attorney Attomey Mansfield had no viable evidence.

29) The Movant is suffering from cruel and unusual living conditions, which is in violation of the Eight Amendment.

See tv1ovant's Movant's PCRA Motion.

As will be discussed further below, the Movant must sullieiently sufficiently develop each claim to

overcome any potential waiver issues pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §$ 9522(h).

9522(b)

In revie\ving reviewing the Movant's claims, all could have been litigated and thus are deemed

waived unless the Movant overcomes the waiver by showing that counsel provided ineffective

legal assistance. Per 42 Pa.C.S.A $§ 9543, '"the "the allegation of error [must!

[must] not !have]

[have] been

previously litigated or waived." 42 Pa.C.S.A § $ 9522(b), any issue 8$ 9543. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

"is waived if the petitioner could have raised it hut failed to do so before trial, at trial, during

postconviction proceeding." 42 Pa.C.S.A. $§ 9522(b).

unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconvietion

The Movant's claims listed in the Movant's PCRA ~fotion Motion could have hcen

been litigated prior to her

pleading guilty or on direct appeal. Thus, the claims are waived unless the Movant overcomes

by pleading and proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 them hy

A.2d 232, 239-240 (Pa. 2001 ).

2001).

The standard of review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in a PCRA

motion is the Slriclland standard. Commonwealth v.

Strictland standard. Dadario. 773 A.2d 126.

• Dadario. 126, 128 (Pa.

(Pa. 200

2001).

I).

The Strictland standard invokes a "totality of the circumstances test" that requires a movant to

show: "1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 2) the particular course of conduct pursued

by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and 3) but for

counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings

would have been different." Lambert at 243-244.

243-244. Furthermore.

Furthermore, specifically regarding guilty

pleas, "[a]Uegations "[allegations ol"

of ineffectiveness . .. will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness ineffectiveness...will

caused appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.'' Commonwealth v. Allen, 732 A.2d unkno,ving plea."

582, 587 (Pa.

(Pa, 1999).

1999). To successfully pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant

must develop every claim "with respect to each individual facet" of the Strictland standard. Id.

standard. Id.

at 243 (emphasis added).

added).

lbc Movant's claims must be more than "boilerplate The boilerplate allegations ... to meet !her]

allegations...to [her] burden of

demonstrating fcounsel's]

[counsel's] ineffectiveness." Id. at 245. The Movant must sufficiently develop

her claims in order to provide this Court with the ability ability to e1Teclivdy them.. Id effectively review them Id. at 242.

242.

It is the responsibility of PCRA counsel to "develop, to the extent possible, the nature of the claims asserted with ·respect standard]." d.

respect to each individual facet [of the Strictland standardJ." Id. HO\vcver, However,

it is recognized by this Court that not all claims are able to be developed. For instance, claims

that amount to nothing more than boilerplate allegations utterly devoid of arguable merit cannot

he be developed. These deficient claims that fail to forward any "relevant argumentation as to each

necessary 'individual facet' of the Strictland standard''

standard" are doomed to fail. Id Id. at 243.

The Movant's fi rst claim that Attorney Tallerico failed to notify her about waiver details first

fails to show ineffective assistance of counsel as the Movant failed to plead and prove facts

relief.

sufficient to warrant relief. counsel's Relating specifically to guilty pleas, allegations of counsel 's

inetlectivencss ineffectivencss would serve as the basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the Movant

to enter an involuntary or unknowing pica.

plca. Allen at 587 (emphasis added). The Movant claimed

that Attorney Tallerico failed to notify her what it meant to waive the preliminary hearing. See

Movant's PCRA Motion at 4. However, the tv1o\/ant Movant fail ed to detail how this affected the failed

voluntary nature of her guilty plea. Assuming, ar~uendo, arguendo, that Attorney Tallerico did not infonn inform

the thc Movant of possible waiver conseq uences, this Court cannot sec consequences, see how it would move the

Movant to involuntarily or unknowingly plead guilty to Murder of the Third Degree. Thus, this

Court holds this claim was made without any arguable merit and thus docs not warrant relief.

The tvfovant's Movant's second claim that At1orney Attorney Tallerico pressured her into pleading guilty

fails to show ineffective assistance of counsel as there wa<;

was a facn1al

factual basis for his advice. For a

first-degree murder charge pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2501, the Commonwealth could have filed a

notice of an intent to seek the death penalty. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 971 l(d)(l6). The Movant claimed

that Attorney Tallerico pressured her to plead guilty a-;

as it would ta1ce

take the death penalty off the

table. See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4. The Movan Movantt was charged with homicide.

homicide. If the matter

proceeded to trial.

trial, the Commonwealth could have pursued a first-degree murder conviction

11

H

pursuant lo to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2502.

2502. The victim was under the age of twelve ((12)

12) years old.

old. Pursuant

9711(d)(16),

to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 971 l(d)(l 6). the Commonwealth could have filed notice of an intent to seek the

death penalty. On Septemher September 16, 2020.

2020, the Movant accepted the plea offer of Murder of the

Third Degree.

Degree. Ry By doing this, the Movanl Movant avoided the risk of a first-degree murder conviction

and the possibly of the death penalty. Thus.

Thus, this Court holds the MO\•ant's Movant's claim is without

merit.

The Movanf Movant'ss third claim that Attorney Tallerico failed to meet with her fails to show

ineffective assistance of counsel as the Movant failed to plead and prove facts sufficient to

warrant relief. The Movant is required to shO\V show that Attorney Tallerico was not functioning as

'counsel' and this ineffectiveness caused the Movant to plead involuntarily or unknowingly.

Pierce at 975. Allen at 587. The Movant stated that Attorney Tallerico only met with her a few

times. times. See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4. The Movant did not detail how this induced an

involuntary or ignorant guilty plea.

plea. Thus,

Thus, this Coun

Court holds this claim lacks arguable merit.

The Movant's fourth claim that Attorney Encarnacion failed to meet with her fails to

show ineffective assistance of counsel as the Movant failed to plead and prove facts sunicient sufficient to

\varrant warrant relief. The Movant is required to show that Attorney Encarnacion was not functioning

as 'counsel' and this ineffectiveness caused the Movant to plead involuntarily or unknowingly.

Pierce at 975 The Movant stated that Attorney 975.. Allen at 587. lbc Attomey Encarnacion met with her for the

first time after she had already been incarcerated for more than a year and that he was

unprepared \Vilh with a defense. See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4. The Movant averred no facts that

she was prejudiced by Attorney Encarnacion perceived untimeliness. She also does not put forth

a possible possihle defense that wa.:;

was not considered. Finally, she does not state how this induced her to

plead guilty involuntarily or unknowingly. Therefore.

Therefore, this Court holds this claim is without

merit.

The Movant's fifth claim that Attorney Encarnacion forced her to plead guilty by

fails as rtit was made in a conclusory fashion.

invoking her children tails fashion. To obtain relief under the

PCRA, a movant must plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant rclie relief.C 42 Pa.C.S.A.§ 9543(a).

Encarnacion threatened her by stating "if [they l went to trial they The Movant claimed Attorney F.ncarnacion

would blame her children and say they were lying." See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4.

4. This

Court does not have any record of that conversation. Rather, the Movant stated on the record

that she was not threatened in any way to plead guilty and that she ,-..as was doing it on her own

volition. N.T. 9-16-20 at 9.

9. As such, this Court holds the Movant's claim is without merit as the

record contradicts her claim claim..

'lThe

he Movant's sixth claim that Attorney Encarnacion failed to notify her of rescheduled

trial dates fails to show ineffective assistance of counsel as the Movant failed to plead and prove

relief. To obtain relief under the PCRA.

facts sufficient to warrant relief PCRA. a movant must plead and

prove facts sufficient to ·warrant warrant relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A.* Pa.C.S.A.$ 9543(a). The Movant stated that Attorney

Encarnacion failed to notify her of rescheduled trial dates. See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4.

4.

However, she did not detail how this caused her to plead involuntarily or unknowingly.

unkno\\-ingly. Thus,

this Court holds that this claim is without merit.

merit.

The Movant's seventh claim that Attorney Encarnacion tailed failed to provide the Movant with

discovery documents fails as the Movant failed to plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant

relief. rhe \fovant is required to show that Attorney Encarnacion was not functioning as The Movant

•counsel' 'counsel and this ineffectiveness caused the Movant to plead involuntarily or unknowingly.

Pierce al at 975. Allen at 587 587.. The Movant claimed Attorney Encarnacion ,vould would not gi,·c

give her any

of the Discovery that the D.A. 's O D.A.'s tlke had provided.

Oflice See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4.

4.

However, she did not argue why this prejudiced her. Furthermore, she did not detail how this

caused her to plead p1ead guilty involuntarily or unknowingly. Thus, this Court dctennines determines the

Movanfs Movant's claim is without merit.

'lbe l'v1ovant's eighth claim that Attorney Monson threatened the Movant fails ac; The Movant's as; it was

made in a conclusory fashion. lo To obtain relief under the PCRA, a movant must plead p ead and prove

facts sufficient to warrant re1ief.

relief. 42 Pa.CS.A.§

Pa.C.S.A.$ 9543(a). The Movant claimed Attorney I\fonson Monson

threatened her to induce her to plead guilty. ,'-i'ee See f'v1ovant's

Movant's PCRA 'f\fotion

Motion at 4. However, the

Movant provided no details on this a11eged alleged threat. Contrastingly, ontrastingly, the Movant stated that she was

not threatened in any way to take the plea agreement. N.T. 9-16-20 at 9. Considering this, this

Court concludes the Movant desired to plead guilty pursuant to the plca pica agreement. As such, this

Court holds the Movant's claim claim is without merit a<.

as the record contradicts her claim.

The MovanCs Movant's ninth and tenth claims that Attorney Sarno wac;;

was assigned to the case and he

advised her that her only option was to plead guilty fails as these claims were made in a

conclusory fashion. To obtain relief under the PCRA, a movant must plead p1ea<l and prove facts

sufficient to warrant relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A.§ 9543(a).

9543(a). The Movant claimed that Attorney Samo

was assigned to her case and that he said after a considerable delay that her only option '"'as was to

plead guilty. See Movant's PCR..1\ PCRA Motion at 4. The Movant does not make any argwnents arguments why

Attorney Sarno heing being assigned to her case was prejudicial or would cause her to involuntarily or

unknowingly plead guilty. Regarding the Movant's claim ahout about Attorney Sarno's 'advice,' the

record contradicts this claim. When reviewing her guilty plea, p1ea, the Court asked the Movant if she

understood her right to go to trial and the Movant answered affirmatively. N.T. 9-16-20 at 6. As

15

such. this Court holds these claims do not warrant relief as they were made in a conclusory and

contradictory fashion.

claim4 that all attorneys failed to listen to her version of events The Movant's twelfth claim

fails as the l\fovant Movant failed to plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant relief. To ohlain obtain relief'

relief

under the PCRA, a movant must plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant \Varrant relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A.§ Pa.C.S.A.$

9543(a). The ~vtovant Movant claimed that .."all all attorneys failed to listen to lher]

[her] version or

of events,

witnesses." See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4. However, the investigate evidence, or interview Vvitnesses."

Movant does not explain what "her version" of events is. She does not indicate what \Vhat evidence

was not considered. She does not provide any witnesses that her attorneys should have

considered interviewing. Finally, the tact fact remains that she voluntarily and infonnedly informedly pleaded

guilty. N.T. 9-16-20 at 9. Thus. this Court holds this claim was made in a solely conclusory

fashion and does not warrant relief.

The Movant's thirteenth claim that attorneys failed to request a change of venue fails as

the Court of Common Pleas of Lanca~ter Lancaster County has jurisdiction to hear criminal cases pursuant

to 42 Pa.C.S.A..

Pa.C.S.A. 931 (a). ..]

931(a). "Thehe courts of common picas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction

of all actions and proceedings, including aH all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by

law or usage in the courts of common pleas."

picas:· 42 Pa.C.S.A. 931 (a). The Movant claimed her 931(a).

attorneys failed to request a change of venue due to the high-profile nature of her case. See

Movant's PCRA Motion at 4. In certain circumstances, a defendant may claim denial of a fair

trial because of the prejudicial pretrial publicity. In these cases, the defendant must show actual

prejudice in empaneling the jury. Murphy v.

Florida. 421 U.S. 794 (1975). ln Afurphy v. Florida, In rare instances, the

"pretrial publicity [is] so sustained, so pervasive, so inflammatory, and so in cul patory as to culpatory

4 The Movant's eleventh claim of her attorneys failing to ask for Judge Kniscly's 'The Knisely's recusal will be addressed along with the claims of judicial judicial impropriety.

impropriety.

without putting the defendant to any burden of establishing a nexus demand a change of venue vv·ithout

• Frazier, 471 Pa. 121

between the publicity and actual jury prejudice." Commonwealth v. 121,, 127

1977). However, the Movant did not provide any evidence of possible ((1977). possihle prejudicial pretrial

puhlicity. She also did not provide a factual basis that her case was in fact ·'high publicity. "high profile."

Without further evidence, this Court concludes that according to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 931 'Without 931(c), (c), the Court

of Common Pleas of Lancaster County was the proper venue to resolve the Movant's ca~.

case.

'II hus, this Court holds the Movant's claim is without merit.

The Movant's fourteenth claim that police did not provide her with her Miranda rights

fails as it has no hearing obtain relief under the PCRA. a movant must bearing on her guilty plea. To ohtain

plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A.§ Pa.C.S.A.$ 9543(a). The Movant claimed

[her] after the arrest." See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4. From this the police "never Mirandized fher]

facts provided to support the validity of that statement. However, Court's analysis. there were no !acts

in considering any possible merits of the claim. it is recognized that Miranda warnings arc

crucial to eliciting incriminating statements during a custodial interrogation. cmcial interrogation. This would become

a critical aspect if the case went to trial. As noted ahove, above, the Movant voluntarily pleaded guilty.

Thus, the analysis shifts from the admissibility of the statements to whether the action impacted

the voluntary nature of the Movant'

Movant'ss guilty plea.

plea. The Movant provided no arguments ahout about how

this impacted her voluntary and infonned informed guilty plea. Thus, this Court holds this this claim is

without merit.

The Movant's fifteenth and twenty-eighth claims regarding the existence of incriminating 'l11e

fail as the record belies her contentions.

contentions. The Movant claims that police and Attorney Mansfield l'he :Movant

5

case.

did not have enough evidence for a viable case . See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4-5. A

A

s• More specifically, claim fifteen stared stated police had no incnminatmg evidence. Cla incriminating evidence. Claim twenty-cight stated Attorney 'm twenty-eight

casc.

Mansfield did not have viable evidence to prosecute her case.

thorough rcviev,:

review of the record shows that on May 17, 2017, the decedent became unresponsive

and was flov,:n flown toLo Hershey I\.· 1edical Center for treatment. Medical The decedent was pronounced

deceased on t\.fay May 20, 2017. The police conducted interviews of everyone that came in contact

with the decedent on May 17, 2017. The police detem1incd determined that the Movant wac;

was the only adult

that came into contact with the decedent. An autopsy revealed the decedent suffered multiple

traumatic injuries to her brain and spinal cord. This led lo to her incapacitation. Also, regarding

her condition. the autopsy stated she suffered from malnutrition, starvation, and a lailure failure to

thrive. There wac;

was enough evidence for Attorney Mansfield to have probable cause that the

Movant was responsible for the aforementioned actions. Thus, this Court determines that these

claims are v.'ithout without merit.

The tv1ovanf

Movant'ss sixteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth.

nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first claims of

police ineptitude fail fail as the Movant foiled failed to plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant relief.

To obtain relief under the PCRA, a movant musl must plead and prove facts sufficient sutlieient to warrant

relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A.§ Pa.C.S.A.$ 9543(a). The Movant took issue with several parts of the investigation 6.

investigation.

See Movant's PCRA Motion at 4-5. However, the T\.fovant Movant provided this Court with no evidence

that could be seriously entertained. The police conducted an investigation that included

interviev"-ing interviewing witnesses and obtaining expert opinions on the cause of death. As stated above, the

evidence implicated the Movant in the murder of the decedent. More importantly, the Movant

voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime. Thus, this Court holds these claims are without me1it.

merit.

The Movant's eighteenth claim that police interviewed her son without a parent present

fails as it is irrelevant to her voluntary guilty plea.

pica. To obtain relief under the PCRA, a movant

must plead and prove facts faets sufficient to warrant relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A.§ Pa.C.S.A.$ 9543(a). The Movant

6 More specifically, claim sixteen stated that the police failed to interview other possible suspcCL'i.

suspects. Claim nineteen

stated that the police failed to investigate prior abuse.

abuse. Claim twenty slated stated police failed to investigate prior CYS claims. Claim twenty-one stated the police did not have the requis ite training to handle her case.

requisite

claimed that police interviewed her son, son, then nine (9) years old, ,1,,ithout without a parent or guardian.

See Movant's PCRA Motion at 5. Assuming, arguendo, that this is the case.

Assuming. ar,:uendo, case, it has no pertinence

to either her attorney's capabilities or on her voluntary guilty plea. Thus, this Court holds this

claim was made in condusory conclusory fashion and is without merit.

The \fovant's Movant's eleventh, twenty-second, t,vcnty-third, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and rnenty-fifth twenty-fifth

claims regarding judicial misconduct fail because they are without merit. Io lo obtain relief under

the PCRA.

PCRA, a movant must plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant relief relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A.§

Pa.C.S.A.&

9543(a). The Movant claimed there werc ,..,.ere several instances of judicial ju<licial misconduct that required

Judge Knisely to recuse himself7.

himself'. See Movant's PCRJ\ PCRA Motion at 4-5. However, the Movant did

not provide any argument or justification on ho,v how this led to her involuntarily or ignorantly

pleading guilty. Assuming. arguendo, these assertions are true about Judge Knisely, this Court

cannot discern any prejudice from these actions. Thus, there was no cause for the \fovant's Movant's

attorney to request Judge Knisely to remove himself from the case. fhus, Thus, this Court determines

there is no basis for the Movant's claims and they do not warrant relief.

The Movant's twenty-sixth claim that Attorney Mansfield failed to turn over the entirety

of discovery fails as the Movant failed to plead and prove facts suflicient sufficient to warrant relief. To 'To

obtain relief under the PCRA, a movant must plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant relief.

42 Pa.C.S.J\.§ Pa.C.S.A.8$ 9543(a). The Movant claims that Attorney Mansfield refused to provide her with

the entirety of discovery. See Movant's PCRA Motion.

Motion. However, the Movant failed to provide

any specifics specifies on what was not turned over. Without any further details, this Court determines

this claim is conclusory and thus does not warrant relief.

7 Movant's attorneys failed to a-;k More specifically, claim eleven stated that the Movar1t's ask Judge Knisely to remove himself from the case. Claim twenty-two stated Judge Knisley failed to remove himself from the matter after receiving a packet from Justice and Mercy. Claim twenty-three stated that Judge Knisely had lunch with members or of Justice Mercy. Claim twenty-four stated that members of Justice and Mercy were campaign donors to Judge Knisely.

and Mercy. Claim twenty-fi,,e Claim twenty-five stated that Judge Knisley transferred the case to the A.G.'s Office.

I he Movant's twenty-seventh claim that Attorney Mansfield threatened The threatcned the Movant's son

fails as the Movant failed to plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant relier.

relief. To obtain relief

under the PCRA PCRA,, a movant must plead and prove facts sullicient sufficient to warrant relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A§ Pa.C.S.A.$

9543(a). The Movant claimed that Attorney Mansfield threatened the well-being of the

testify if the matter went to trial. See Movant's PCRA Movant's son stating she would make him testit)'

at 5 Motion. The Movant's son was intcrvie,ved interviewed hy

by an employee of the Lancaster County

Children's Alfomce.

Alliance. During that interview, the Movant's son made statements about how the

l'vlovant Movant was the sole adult caretaker or of the decedent al

at the time the incident occurred.

occurred. Had the

cac;;c case proceeded to trial.

trial, Attorney Mansfi eld could have subpoenaed the son to testify. Thus, this Mansfield

Court holds this claiin claim is without merit.

The Movant's twenty-ninth claim that her Eight Amendment rights were violat~d violated fails as

the Movant failed to plead and prove facts sufficient to warrant relief relief. To obtain relier

relief under the

PCRA, a movant must plead and prove facts sutlicient sufficient to warrant relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A§ Pa.C.S.A.$ 9543(a).

9543(a).

The Movant stated that her Eight Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment ,vas was

violated. See Movant's PCRA tvfotion Motion at 5. The Movant does not provide any evidence for this

claim. She docs does not detail her living conditions or slate state why they are unconstitutional. Thus,

this Court holds this claim is v,•ithout without merit.

Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, Counsel's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel is GRANTED. ror GRANTED.

Furthem,ore, Furthermore, notice is hereby given to the ~fovant Movant that this Court intends to dismiss the

Movant' Movant'ss PCRA tv1otion Motion without a hearing.

hearing. The Movant has twenty (20) days from the date of

this Notice to respond and provide the Court with any relevant information or documentation for

review. review.

BYTHE ~-✓-L BY THE COURT: /

Vi-4 ~DENNIS E. RE!NAKER JUDGE

REINAKER

ATTEST:

Angela Diaz, PD8509, SCI Cambri dge Springs, 451 Fullerton Avenue, Cambridge Spri11gs, Cambridge oval Springs, PA fV'a,J2

16403 Esquire, 53 North Duke St., Suite 205, lLancaster, Christopher Lyden, Fsquire, gc ancastcr, PA 17602 f Y ' ~ Attomey ,O

Office of the District Attorney O Clerk of Courts

It

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