NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARK DEVLIN :
:
Appellant : No. 2209 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 5, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006383-2021
BEFORE: SULLIVAN, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2026 Mark Devlin (“Devlin”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”) following his conviction of indecent assault against a person less than thirteen years of age and corruption of minors.1 Devlin challenges the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions, as well as the trial court’s decision to prohibit the admission of certain evidence under the Pennsylvania Rape Shield Law. 2 Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Devlin’s weight of the evidence claim or by denying admission of the complained-of evidence, we affirm.
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1)(i). 2 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104.
S.W., the complainant, (born in January 2009) met Devlin when she was approximately five years old when Devlin was dating her grandmother. N.T., 11/8/2024, at 14. She stated Devlin sexually assaulted her for the first time when she was six. Id. S.W. claimed Devlin took her into the bathroom in her grandmother’s apartment, away from her little sister, and made her touch his penis on five different occasions when she was six years old. Id. at 14-15, 17. She further testified that Devlin touched her breasts and vagina when she stayed at his house when she was eleven. Id. at 18, 19. She said Devlin would climb into bed with her and touch her while her little sister was asleep in the room with them. Id. at 20. S.W. also stated Devlin would put his penis between the lips of her vagina and did so more than once. Id. at 23-24; see also id. at 26 (stating Devlin did this for the last time when S.W. was twelve). Additionally, she testified Devlin would force her to watch pornography and wanted her to reenact the videos with him. Id. at 21. According to S.W., Devlin told her he wanted her to put his penis in her mouth. Id. at 22.
In April 2021, S.W. informed her mother of the abuse. Id. at 25-26.
She subsequently gave a videotaped statement to the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance (“PCA”). Id. at 30, 40. In the PCA interview, S.W. claimed she never saw Devlin in her grandmother’s apartment and all the abuse had occurred at Devlin’s residence. Id. at 33. Further, while S.W. estimated the ages at which she experienced the alleged abuse, she was unable to identify the years the events occurred. Id. at 37.
3
The police arrested Devlin, and the Commonwealth charged him with numerous crimes. The case proceeded to a bench trial, at which S.W. and Devlin testified. During cross-examination of S.W., Devlin’s counsel questioned her about a statement she allegedly made to her father regarding sexual abuse that was committed against her by another person:
[Devlin’s Counsel]: Do you remember your father asking you … if anybody had touched you?
A: Yeah.
Q: Do you remember what your response was to that question?
A: I probably told him “no,” like –
Q: Do you remember telling him that Tiana’s (ph.) son is the only person that touched you, and “nobody else touched me”?
Id. at 39. The Commonwealth objected to the question on the basis that it violated the Rape Shield Law and the trial court sustained the objection. Id. Devlin’s counsel responded, “[u]nderstood, Your Honor.” Id. Devlin testified on his own behalf, denying S.W.’s allegations. Id. at 49-58.
The trial court found Devlin guilty of the aforementioned crimes and not guilty of the remaining charges. On February 5, 2025, it sentenced him to five years of reporting probation for each conviction, to run consecutively, for a total of ten years of reporting probation. On February 13, 2025, Devlin filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence. On July 30, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying the post-sentence
4
motion by operation of law. Devlin then filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 3 On appeal, Devlin raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying [Devlin’s]
post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sustaining an objection on the basis of the Rape Shield Law where the question met a valid exception?
Devlin’s Brief at 4.
Weight of the Evidence
____________________________________________
3 It is well settled that a trial court has 120 days to decide a post-sentence motion, and if it fails to decide the motion within that period, the motion is deemed denied by operation of law. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c) (“When a post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law, the clerk of courts shall forthwith enter an order on behalf of the court, and, as provided in Rule 114, forthwith shall serve a copy of the order on the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, that the post-sentence motion is deemed denied.”). The 120-day period for deciding Devlin’s post-sentence motion expired on June 13, 2025. The trial court, however, entered an order denying the post-sentence motion by operation of law on July 30, 2025, 167 days after Devlin filed his post-sentence motion. Although Devlin’s appeal, filed on August 12, 2025, was facially untimely, see Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. Super. 2005) (explaining appellant has thirty days to file a timely appeal once their post-sentence motion is denied), the trial court’s failure to enter a timely order deeming the motion denied by operation of law was a breakdown in court operations. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 499 (Pa. Super. 2007). Thus, we decline to quash the appeal. See Commonwealth v. Khalil, 806 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding this Court will address an otherwise untimely appeal if a breakdown in the trial court’s processes resulted in an untimely appeal).
5
Devlin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions. Id. at 8. He claims S.W.’s testimony “was riddled with inconsistencies and logical absurdities.” Id. In particular, Devlin argues that she testified inconsistently about the place of the abuse, when it had occurred, and who was present. Id. at 9; see also id. (questioning S.W.’s testimony that her eight-year-old sibling was in the bed when the abuse occurred). Devlin further notes there was no forensic evidence or corroborating witnesses supporting the allegations. Id. at 8.
The following legal principles apply to a trial court’s consideration of a challenge to the weight of the evidence supporting a conviction:
An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
Thus, to allow an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1046-47 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Our standard of review for weight of the evidence claims raised on appeal, however, differs from that of the trial court:
6
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
Id. at 1047 (citation omitted).
The Crimes Code defines indecent assault, in relevant part:
A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the complainant and … the complainant is less than 13 years of age.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7). Further, the Crimes Code defines corruption of minors:
[W]hoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor in violating his or her parole or any order of court, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.
Id. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
The trial court concluded that Devlin’s “conviction[s were] not against the weight of the evidence, and Devlin cannot meet the ‘unquestionably high standard’ for a successful challenge to a conviction as against the weight of the evidence.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/2025, at 4 (quoting
7
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1223 (Pa. 2009)). Although there were inconsistencies between S.W.’s testimony and her PCA interview, the trial court found that S.W. was a credible witness. Id. at 6. The trial court emphasized that this Court should defer to its credibility determination, and the verdict, based on S.W.’s credible testimony, did not shock one’s sense of justice. Id.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination.
Although Devlin relies on inconsistencies between S.W.’s testimony and her statements at the PCA, the trial court clearly heard these inconsistencies and decided that S.W. was nonetheless credible in her testimony. See Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 809 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating it is within the exclusive province of the factfinder to weigh inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony and make credibility determinations). Here, the trial court weighed the differences between her testimony at trial and the statement she gave at the PCA, and rendered the guilty verdicts. See Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1078 (Pa. 2017) (explaining the ultimate factfinder is “free to resolve any inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony in either party’s favor”) (citation omitted).
Further, the absence of physical evidence to support the convictions does not negate the charges against Devlin because a sexual assault victim’s uncorroborated testimony is sufficient. See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding the trial court did not abuse its
8
discretion in denying a weight challenge where the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim was found credible by the trier of fact); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 3106 (the testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in sexual assault prosecutions). Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Devlin’s challenge to the weight of the evidence. See Izurieta, 171 A.3d at 809-10; Diaz, 152 A.3d at 1047.
Rape Shield Law
Devlin also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding certain evidence was precluded by the Rape Shield Law. Devlin’s Brief at 9. Devlin contends that the evidence that S.W. disclosed someone other than Devlin touched her inappropriately attacked S.W.’s credibility, not her chastity or virtue. Id. at 9, 12. He highlights that the testimony would have provided an alternate suspect to the crimes for which he was charged, as well as show that S.W. had a motive to fabricate. Id. at 9. Thus, Devlin claims the question fit within exceptions to the Rape Shield Law. Id. at 10. He also argues that he did not waive his claim by failing to object to the trial court’s sustaining of the Commonwealth’s objection, noting counsel accepted the trial judge’s decision with respect and there is no requirement that he continue to object in this circumstance. Id. at 10 (citing Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/2025, at 8). Conversely, Devlin baldly contends that the excluded testimony does not fall under the protection of the Rape Shield Law and was thus improperly excluded. Id. at 12.
9
We employ the following standard for a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence:
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence of the sexual history of a sexual abuse complainant will be reversed only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.
Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 684, 689 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Rape Shield Law states:
Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, past sexual victimization, allegations of past sexual victimization, opinion evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in prosecutions of any [enumerated] offense ... except evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a). “The Rape Shield Law is intended to exclude irrelevant and abusive inquiries regarding prior sexual conduct of sexual assault complainants.” Burns, 988 A.2d at 689.
A defendant who proposes to offer evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, past sexual victimization, allegations of past sexual victimization, opinion evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct and reputation evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct pursuant to subsection (a) shall file a written motion and offer of proof at the time of trial.
10
18 Pa.C.S. § 3104(b); see also Burns, 988 A.2d at 690 (“[A] defendant who desires to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct must file a written motion and make a specific offer of proof prior to trial.”). A “defendant’s oral motion during trial rather than a written motion and specific offer of proof, [i]s wholly inadequate.” Burns, 988 A.2d at 690 (citation omitted).
The record reflects that Devlin failed to file a written motion seeking to introduce evidence of S.W.’s prior sexual conduct as required by section 3104(b). Thus, his claim in this regard is waived on that basis. See id. at 690-91; see also Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 623 A.2d 336, 339-40 (Pa. Super. 1993) (holding the trial court acted within its discretion in precluding evidence regarding the prior sexual assault of the victim where appellant did not file a written motion to pierce the Rape Shield or present a specific offer of proof regarding the evidence he wanted to present and explaining why it was relevant to the defense).4 Moreover, while Devlin states in his brief that the question asked during cross-examination does not trigger the Rape Shield Law, he fails to provide any analysis or citation to caselaw to support his claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)
____________________________________________
4 Although this was not the reasoning provided by the trial court, the law is clear that we may affirm the trial court’s decision on any legal basis supported by the record. See Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 607 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating that “[w]e are not limited by the trial court's rationale and may affirm its decision on any basis”).
11
(stating an argument must include discussion and citation of authorities that are deemed pertinent); see also Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 377 (Pa. 2023) (“Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived. It is not the obligation of an appellate court to formulate [an] appellant’s arguments for him.”) (citation omitted). Furthermore, Devlin raises this contention for the first time on appeal, and it is waived for that reason as well. See Commonwealth v. Fink, 791 A.2d 1235, 1244-45 (Pa. Super. 2002) (concluding appellant’s claim was not properly preserved because appellant’s counsel did not raise the Rape Shield question at the trial court level); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
None of the claims raised by Devlin on appeal entitle him to relief. We therefore affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 8/25/2026