NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSHUA DAWBER :
:
Appellant : No. 1070 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 29, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000458-2024
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2026 Joshua Dawber (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor (18 Pa.C.S. § 2903(b)). Appellant avers that the court erred in admitting evidence at his trial under the Tender Years Act and under Pa.R.E. 404(b). In addition, he asserts that the trial court erred by imposing his sentence without first ordering a mental health evaluation. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the background of this appeal as follows:
By criminal information docketed to number CP-36-CR-0000458-
2024, Appellant was charged with allegedly having committed the offense of false imprisonment of a minor where offender is not victim’s parent. This charge resulted from an incident that occurred on January 16, 2024. At approximately 3:00 p.m. that day, the 13-year-old minor victim was walking her dog in the Hemlock Acres Court mobile home park in Manheim, Pennsylvania when Appellant approached her from behind and grabbed her by the wrist. Appellant then dragged her by the wrist off the road, through a field, and into a secluded area behind a barn nearly 350
2
yards away. At one point, the child was able to wrestle free, at which time Appellant grabbed her other wrist and continued to yank her towards a secluded location while she continued to attempt to escape. Eventually, he let her go and wordlessly walked away.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/9/25, at 2 (citations omitted, some formatting altered).
Following a jury trial on March 10, 2025, Appellant was convicted on the sole offense charged. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report and, on May 29, 2025, sentenced Appellant to a term of 25 months to 8 years of incarceration. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on June 9, 2025.1 The motion was denied by the order filed on July 7, 2025.2 Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal on August 6, 2025. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises three issues in this appeal:
I. Did the trial court err in admitting portions of the tender years recorded statement that contained hearsay within hearsay and prior bad acts that were improperly used as substantive identification evidence without adequate consideration of their prejudicial effect?
II. Did the trial court err in permitting police officer testimony regarding [Appellant’s] identification based on his previously yelling at a mailman, yelling at random people, and peering into windows, as these behaviors constituted prior bad acts and
____________________________________________
1 Because the 10th day following his sentencing fell on a weekend, the post-
sentence motion filed on the following Monday, June 9, 2025, is deemed to be timely. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (for computations of time, if the last day of any such period falls on a weekend or a legal holiday, “such day shall be omitted from the computation.”).
2 The order was dated June 10, 2025, but not filed until July 7, 2025.
3
negative character traits, after the trial court specifically barred such testimony pretrial?
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in proceeding to sentencing without an appropriate mental health evaluation and in imposing an aggravated-range sentence despite [Appellant’s]
history of Huntington’s Disease and without proper determination of [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs or consideration of potential rehabilitative needs?
Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the court improperly admitted evidence pursuant to the tender years exception to the hearsay rule. The victim’s tender years interview, played at trial, included hearsay information that the victim’s mother had heard from neighbors about the man who walked around in a neck brace – neighbors said that the man had yelled into windows in the neighborhood and had an incident with a mailman where he threw items out of the mail truck. Appellant argues that these statements include multiple layers of hearsay and were more prejudicial than probative. Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1060 (Pa. 2001).
The tender years exception is set forth in our Judicial Code, as follows:
§ 5985.1. Admissibility of certain statements (a) General rule.--
(1) An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was 16 years of age or younger, describing any of the offenses enumerated in paragraph (2), not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if:
4
(i) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(ii) the child either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or (B) is unavailable as a witness.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1. The child victim herein testified at Appellant’s trial.
“Statements admitted under [the tender years exception] are substantive evidence against the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Copenhaver, 316 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 330 A.3d 1248 (Pa. 2024) (citation omitted). This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to admit evidence under the tender years exception for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Appellant maintains that the court erred in admitting the statements at issue because they contained hearsay within hearsay and were evidence of prior bad acts which caused him undue prejudice. “Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060. Hearsay testimony is inadmissible in court except as provided for by our Rules of Evidence, by other rules promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute. Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa. Super. 2003). Moreover, “[a]n out-of-court declaration containing another out-of-court declaration is double hearsay. In order for double hearsay to be admissible, the reliability and trustworthiness of each declarant must be independently established. This requirement is satisfied
5
when each statement comes within an exception to the hearsay rule.” Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060 (citations omitted).
Importantly, however, evidence is not considered hearsay if not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. See Pa.R.E. 801(c) (defining hearsay as a “statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”). Laich, supra. Moreover, various exceptions to the hearsay rule exist, and these exceptions permit the introduction of hearsay testimony in those instances where the surrounding circumstances enhance the reliability of the statement. For example, as pertinent herein, “an out-of-court statement offered to explain a course of conduct is not hearsay.” Dent, supra.
Herein, Appellant challenges that part of the tender years testimony played at his trial where the victim told the interviewer that her mother had spoken with their neighbors, and the neighbors said that Appellant had behaved strangely by occasionally screaming in people’s windows for no reason. Neighbors also told the victim’s mother that Appellant had an incident where Appellant yelled at the local mailman and threw items out of the mail truck. See Appellant’s Brief at 34-35 (citing Commonwealth’s Video Exhibit 8 (the tender years interview), N.T. Trial, 3/10/25, at 148). As the victim had recognized the man who grabbed her wrist as living in her neighborhood, but only knew him by his first name, “Joshua,” the Commonwealth asserted that this additional information assisted law enforcement in associating the victim’s
6
description to Appellant. The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim by stressing that the information was pertinent to the natural development of the facts and explained the officer’s course of conduct in focusing upon Appellant in this case.
Appellant is correct that these two challenged statements involve multiple layers of hearsay. The tender years act permits entry of the victim’s statement into evidence, even though it was made outside of the courtroom, as long as the victim’s statement to the interviewer is relevant and the court finds the circumstances reliable. However, even if the victim’s recorded statement to the interviewer satisfied Section 5985.1, the tender years act does not automatically render admissible the additional statements which originated with her mother and the neighbors that were embedded within it. Each additional layer had to independently qualify under a hearsay exception or be offered for a legitimate non-hearsay purpose. See Copenhaver, supra.
Although the Commonwealth offered the statements for the ostensibly non-hearsay purpose of explaining the officers’ course of conduct, that purpose did not justify disclosing their full and prejudicial content. Police could explain that they associated the victim’s description with Appellant based upon information obtained during the investigation without repeating allegations that Appellant screamed into neighbors’ windows, yelled at random people, or had an altercation with a mailman. Because those details were unnecessary to provide a reasonable understanding of the investigation and created an appreciable risk that the jury would consider them as substantive evidence of
7
Appellant’s character, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in permitting their admission. See Commonwealth v. Palsa, 555 A.2d 808, 810-11 (Pa. 1989) (finding that a highly incriminating hearsay statement which contained specific assertions of criminal conduct was inadmissible as an explanation of subsequent police conduct, as police could easily have explained the course of their conduct without reference to the prejudicial statements). However, because these same underlying allegations were later repeated during Detective Kiesel’s testimony, we defer consideration of whether the error was harmless until after addressing Appellant’s related second claim.
In his second issue on appeal, Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in permitting police officer testimony about Appellant’s prior bad acts of yelling in windows and yelling at or having an incident with the mailman as the testimony violates Pa.R.E. 404(b). As noted, we review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Laich, supra. Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is inadmissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that, on a particular occasion, the person acted in accordance with that character. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be admissible for another legitimate purpose, but, to be admissible in a criminal case, its probative value must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).
Specifically, Appellant maintains that the officers had immediately identified Appellant from the description “tall white guy who walks around the neighborhood sometimes wearing a neck brace,” and they did not need the
8
additional information about the mailman incident or peering into windows to identify him. Thus, Appellant argues that there was no necessity for these additional anecdotes, and the evidence was prejudicial because it encouraged jurors to convict him based upon him generally being an odd person:
The additional prejudicial descriptive contained in Commonwealth video exhibit at 19:28 through 20:00 should have been redacted.
The specific prior bad acts contained in those 32 seconds did nothing to further the officer’s identification of [A]ppellant, as police knew exactly who the alleged perpetrator was from description outlined in Mother’s 911 call. Moreover, as unnecessary information, it only served to paint [A]ppellant as a creep based on specific prior bad acts that had no probative value as to identity.
Appellant’s Brief at 39.
Appellant asserts that the trial court specifically had ruled before trial began that the Commonwealth could not use evidence of specific prior bad acts at trial, but then during trial the court erroneously let the evidence in. At the pre-trial hearing, the court stated:
With respect to testimony regarding the officer’s awareness of the defendant, I will note that there are no specific prior bad acts or negative character traits referenced. This information is probative as to the natural development of the facts and the officer’s course of conduct in identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. As such, in dealing with the appropriate balancing, finding probative value outweighs any prejudicial impact. Accordingly, the defendant’s objection is overruled and I’ll find such testimony admissible, however I will note that the Commonwealth is not permitted to delve into any specific prior bad acts or any negative character traits of the defendant to suggest conformity with such traits, and if requested by the defendant the Court will entertain giving a limiting instruction with respect to those or negative character traits.
N.T., supra, at 82.
9
At trial, Detective Kiesel testified about identifying the defendant based upon the victim’s description as a tall, skinny, white male who walked the neighborhood at night wearing a neck brace. N.T., supra, at 194. However, he further explained that the victim had described her attacker as previously “yelling at a mailman, yelling at random people, [and] peering into windows[.]” Id. Detective Kiesel then stated that, based upon the information he had, he was positive in his identification of Appellant. Id.
We cannot agree with the trial court that the challenged incidents were admissible to explain the natural development of the case or the officer’s course of conduct in identifying Appellant. The recounted events were not a part of the natural development of the charged offense of false imprisonment. Nor was their specific content necessary to explain the police officer’s course of conduct in identifying Appellant. Rather, Detective Kiesel’s testimony exceeded the scope of the trial court’s pretrial ruling. Although the court permitted testimony that officers were generally familiar with Appellant and recognized him from the victim’s description, it expressly prohibited testimony concerning specific prior acts or negative character traits. Detective Kiesel nevertheless repeated that Appellant had yelled at a mailman and random people and peered into neighborhood windows. Moreover, the specific accusations were unnecessary to explain why police focused upon Appellant once officers had already identified him from the victim’s description of a tall, thin, white man who walked through the neighborhood sometimes wearing a
10
neck brace. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion by permitting this portion of the testimony.
Having concluded that the challenged information was improperly admitted through both the recorded interview and Detective Kiesel’s testimony, we consider whether the combined errors were harmless. An evidentiary error is harmless only where the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 286 A.3d 1288, 1300-01 (Pa. Super. 2022). Relevant here, an error is harmless where the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the error so insignificant by comparison, that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Id. at 1300.
We note that the victim personally observed Appellant at close range during an extended physical encounter. Appellant grabbed her wrist, dragged her through a field toward a secluded area approximately 350 yards away, grabbed her other wrist after she temporarily freed herself, and continued pulling her while she resisted. Thus, the victim had ample opportunity to observe the person who restrained her.
Moreover, the victim recognized her assailant as a man she had previously seen walking in her neighborhood before police confirmed Appellant’s full identity or before hearing the challenged neighborhood anecdotes. Based upon her own observations, she described him as a tall white man who regularly walked through the neighborhood and sometimes
11
wore a neck brace. N.T., Trial, 3/10/25, at 99-103. Officer Kirk Colwell testified that this description caused police to identify Appellant as the person whom the victim was describing. Id. at 158-59, 161. Most importantly, the victim testified at trial, recounted the circumstances of the offense, and unequivocally identified Appellant in the courtroom as the person who restrained her. Id. at 111. The victim was also subject to full cross- examination concerning her opportunity to observe him and the accuracy of her identification.
Against this properly admitted identification evidence, the prejudicial effect of the references to other acts committed by Appellant was comparatively insignificant. The references to Appellant’s alleged conduct involving looking in neighborhood windows and arguing with a mailman occupied approximately 32 seconds of the recorded interview. They did not describe the charged encounter with the victim, establish any element of false imprisonment, or contradict the victim’s firsthand account of what Appellant did to her. Rather, they concerned unrelated conduct allegedly observed by unidentified third parties.
Furthermore, immediately after the recording was played, the trial court instructed the jury that the challenged statements were not admitted for their truth, could not be considered as evidence of Appellant’s negative character, and could not support an inference that Appellant committed the charged offense. See N.T., supra, at 152-53. Jurors are presumed to follow the
12
court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014).
Moreover, the Commonwealth did not refer to the alleged prior incidents during its closing argument. Given the victim’s extended opportunity to observe Appellant, her recognition of him from the neighborhood, her distinctive firsthand description, the officers’ identification of Appellant from that description, and her unequivocal identification of him at trial, the brief reference to Appellant’s allegedly bizarre actions in his neighborhood did not supply a link in the Commonwealth’s proof, and the combined prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence was comparatively insignificant. We acknowledge that the same improper content reached the jury through two separate channels — first through the recorded interview, and again through Detective Kiesel’s live testimony — and that this repetition could, in principle, have reinforced the jury’s exposure to inadmissible material in a way that a single instance might not. Even accounting for the jury’s repeated exposure to the improper material, however, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the brief references to the unrelated prior incidents contributed to the verdict. Accordingly, their erroneous admission was harmless. Wilson, supra.
In Appellant’s last issue, he maintains that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to order a mental health evaluation prior to the sentencing hearing. Appellant argues that he has family members who
13
have been diagnosed with Huntington’s disease,3 meaning that he had a strong chance of developing the disease himself. Appellant suggests that the court should have been aware of Appellant’s need for mental health treatment and thus ordered an evaluation prior to sentencing. For context, we note that Appellant had several outbursts during his trial where he interrupted witnesses and he was admonished by the trial court to control himself. See N.T., supra, at 67, 149-51, 174, 232-34, 278. Appellant admitted to the trial court that he had difficulties in controlling himself in the courtroom. He now claims that his acting out during trial should have put the court on notice that he was experiencing mental health issues. He further argues, without evidentiary support, that his difficulties at trial may have been caused by early symptoms of Huntington’s disease.
Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.4 We note that sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 285 (Pa. Super.
____________________________________________
3 Appellant characterizes Huntington’s disease as a lifelong neurodegenerative
condition, and suggests that in light of his obstructive courtroom behavior, he may be suffering from the early signs of the disease. Appellant’s Brief at 50.
4 Although Appellant’s statement of questions presented refers to imposition
of an aggravated-range sentence, his Rule 2119(f) statement does not assert that the sentence was excessive because it fell in the aggravated range and does not otherwise develop a challenge to the length or range of the sentence. Because our substantial-question inquiry is confined to the reasons stated in the Rule 2119(f) statement, we address only his contention that the court should not have proceeded without first obtaining an evaluation.
14
2024). In this context, an abuse of discretion requires the sentencing court to have ignored or misapplied the law, otherwise acted with manifest unreasonableness, or made its decision while exhibiting partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will; a sentence will be affirmed unless the sentencing court’s determination suffers from such a lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. Id.
Further, we note that there is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 621 (Pa. 2002).
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
(1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Morrobel, 311 A.3d 1153, 1156 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his sentencing claim in his timely post-sentence motion. Appellant’s brief includes the required statement under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). With respect to whether he has raised a substantial question that the sentence imposed was inappropriate under the Sentencing Code, we note: “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
15
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McLendon, 293 A.3d 658, 670 (Pa. Super. 2023). We determine on a case-by-case basis whether an appellant has raised a substantial question regarding the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Commonwealth v. Shroat, 272 A.3d 523, 527 (Pa. Super. 2022).
“‘We examine an appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists. Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.’” Morrobel, 311 A.3d at 1157, quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359, 363-64 (Pa. Super. 2013).
In the Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief, Appellant maintains that,
during the pendency of his case, he exhibited bizarre and inappropriate courtroom behavior throughout all aspects of the proceedings, pre-trial, trial, and sentencing. Despite the odd behavior and the trial court’s awareness of the behavior, the court failed to direct that a mental health evaluation be included in the PSI.
When completed, the PSI revealed that [Appellant] disclosed that his mother, brother, and sister have or had Huntington’s disease, a genetic, neurodegenerative disease. Despite this revelation in the PSI, the sentencing court did not order a mental health evaluation. At sentencing, trial counsel pointed out the family history of Huntington’s disease, the genetic nature of the disease, the likelihood of [Appellant] having the disease given the hereditary nature of the disease, the charges, and [Appellant’s]
behavior exhibited throughout the proceedings. Yet, the sentencing court still did not order any mental health evaluation.
The existence of the pre-sentence investigation report presumes that the sentencing court reviewed its contents fully and gave
16
appropriate weight to the mitigation therein. The sentencing court could not review what it did not have, however.
This Honorable Court in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638, 641-642 (Pa. Super. 2011) detailed, the minimum contents essential in a PSI, including “the offender’s medical history and, if desirable, a psychological or psychiatric report”. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(b), the trial court has the authority to direct that a mental health evaluation be conducted to assist in sentencing.
Trial counsel attempted to highlight for the court the early signs of Huntington’s disease, which mirrored [Appellant’s] courtroom behavior. Additionally, counsel advised the sentencing court of the 50 percent chance of inheriting Huntington’s disease if a parent has the disease. Appellant contends that the failure to order a mental health evaluation to assist in sentencing was an abuse of discretion in these unique circumstances, given the prevalence of Huntington’s disease in [Appellant’s] family and given [A]ppellant’s bizarre courtroom behavior. Appellant further contends that this omission was manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances.
The issue is not one involving mis-weighing mitigating circumstances. Rather, the sentencing court exhibited manifestly unreasonable judgment under the circumstances resulting in an abuse of discretion so great as to ignore the individual, his unique circumstances, history, and background.
As such, [A]ppellant contends it was manifestly unreasonable to proceed with sentencing without a mental health evaluation or neuropsychological diagnostic evaluation to determine whether appellant suffered from Huntington’s disease and to address his rehabilitative needs, if any, as part of the sentence.
Appellant’s Brief at 30-33 (citations to record omitted).
Thus, Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement does not challenge the length or range of his sentence, nor does he claim that the court failed to consider mitigating information contained in the PSI. Rather, his claim is limited to the court’s decision to proceed with sentencing without, on its own initiative, first ordering a mental-health or neuropsychological evaluation.
17
In Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359 (Pa. Super. 2013), the appellant similarly asserted that the sentencing court abused its discretion by proceeding to sentencing without first obtaining a complete mental-health evaluation. This Court observed that, although an allegation that a sentencing court failed to consider the requisite statutory factors or failed to state adequate reasons for dispensing with a PSI may raise a substantial question, the appellant had cited no authority establishing that a substantial question arises when the court proceeds without considering a complete mental-health evaluation. Id. at 369. Accordingly, the Hill Court concluded that the claim did not present a substantial question. Id.
The same reasoning applies here. Appellant relies upon Commonwealth v. Kelly, 33 A.3d 638 (Pa. Super. 2011) in his brief, but Kelly merely addressed what information was required to be included in a PSI and the court’s obligation to explain its decision to dispense with a PSI in circumstances identified by Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(A). Here, the sentencing court ordered and reviewed a PSI. Appellant claims that the court should have supplemented the PSI by ordering a separate mental-health evaluation. However, Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(B) does not impose such a requirement. Rather, the rule provides that, after a finding of guilt and before the imposition of sentence, “the sentencing judge may, as provided by law, order the defendant to undergo a psychiatric or psychological examination.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(B) (emphasis added). Thus, Rule 702(B) leaves the decision whether to order an examination to the sentencing court’s discretion and does not establish a
18
mandatory sentencing procedure that the court violated in this case. As Appellant has not established a violation of the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process; he has not put forth a substantial question that his sentence was not appropriate.5 Because Appellant identifies no authority establishing that the court’s failure to order a mental-health evaluation before sentencing, standing alone, violates a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or a fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process, he has not presented a substantial question permitting our review of the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Hill, 66 A.3d at 369. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of his sentencing claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
____________________________________________
5 Moreover, even if Appellant had presented a substantial question, the record herein would not support relief. Rule 702(B) makes an evaluation discretionary. We note that Appellant never requested a mental health evaluation be conducted prior to sentencing, although he certainly could have done so. Further, the record contains no diagnosis or other evidentiary basis establishing that Appellant suffers from Huntington’s disease or that an examination was necessary before sentence could be imposed.
19
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 08/18/2026