J-S40010-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHAWN CORNELL DAVENPORT, JR. : : Appellant : No. 467 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 16, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0000769-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 3, 2026
Shawn Cornell Davenport, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence,
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, following his
convictions of first-degree murder,1 possession of a firearm prohibited,2
firearms not to be carried without a license,3 and recklessly endangering
another person (REAP).4 Davenport’s counsel, Spencer H.C. Bradley, Esquire,
has filed a motion to withdraw and an accompanying Anders5 brief. After
____________________________________________
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
2 Id. at § 6105(a).
3 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).
4 Id. at § 2705.
5 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See also Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). J-S40010-25
review, we affirm Davenport’s judgment of sentence and grant Attorney
Bradley’s motion to withdraw.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
On January 16, 2022, Jeret Spears [] was working security at Bill’s Caf[e] at 2312 Derry Street in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The victim, Xavier King, Jr., was in the process of paying [] Spears the entrance fee when he was shot three times. [] Spears described how he and [King] were standing very close to each other at the time of the shooting. [] Spears attempted to keep other patrons away from [King] until the police arrived. Following a review of the surveillance footage, [] Spears identified the shooter as a person that he knows by the nickname of “Stiz.” He knew Stiz as a regular patron of the cafe. [] Spears identified [Davenport] in the courtroom as the patron he knew by the nickname of “Stiz.”
Officer Derek Fenton [] was dispatched to Bill’s Caf[e] for a report of a shooting. Officer Fenton was the first officer to arrive at the scene and observed [King] lying on the ground with a gunshot to the head. Officer Fenton maintained scene security as the caf[e] was still full of shocked and stressed patrons. Forensic Investigator Duane Pyles arrived at the scene to photograph the scene, collect evidence, and to generate a crime scene sketch.
Forensic Pathologist Wayne Ross[, M.D.] of the Dauphin County Coroner’s Office conducted the autopsy on January 18, 2022, for [] King. D[octor] Ross observed two gunshot wounds to [King]’s back and one gunshot wound to the back of [King]’s head and neck area. The gunshot to the back of [King]’s head went through [King]’s cervical spine, the spinal cord, and the brain stem. D[octor] Ross determined that [Davenport] was standing behind [King] when the shooting occurred. A distinctive ring of gunshot residue around one of the gunshot wounds to [King]’s back shows that the firearm was in physical contact with [King]’s sweatshirt at the time he was shot in the back. The absence of gunshot residue on [King]’s head [placed Davenport] at least three to four feet behind [King] at the time [King] was shot in the back of the head. According to D[octor] Ross, this tends to show that [King] was in the process of falling or already on the ground when the third gunshot entered the back of his head. D[octor] Ross determined, with[in] a reasonable degree of scientific certainty,
-2- J-S40010-25
that the manner of death is homicide caused by gunshot wounds to the body.
Parole Agent Karl Martin [] reviewed the surveillance footage from the caf[e] and positively identified [Davenport] as the shooter. Agent Martin also reviewed GPS data from [Davenport]’s GPS monitor and determined that the data showed [Davenport] travelling along the shooter’s flight path away from the caf[e].
Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/25, at 2-3 (some formatting altered; citations
omitted).
On January 18, 2022, Davenport was charged with the above-
mentioned charges. Following a jury trial that took place on October 28-29,
2024, Davenport was found guilty of all charges. Sentencing was deferred
due to Davenport’s pending charges at another docket.6 On December 16,
2024, Davenport was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life in prison for
his conviction of first-degree murder, five to ten years’ imprisonment for his
conviction of possession of a firearm prohibited, two and a half to five years’
imprisonment for his conviction of firearms not to be carried without a license,
and two years’ probation for his conviction of REAP.7 Id. at 1.
On December 26, 2024, Davenport filed a post-sentence motion
requesting a judgment of acquittal, alleging the evidence was insufficient to
6 At the time Davenport was arrested for the charges underlying the instant
appeal, he was found to be in possession of another firearm and charged with person not to possess a firearm under the separate docket number 1782 MDA 2022. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 12/16/24, at 2-3, 14-15.
7 That same day, Davenport entered into a guilty plea on the persons not to
possess charge at docket number 1782 MDA 2022. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 12/16/24, at 12-17. This sentence was imposed to run consecutively to the above-mentioned sentences.
-3- J-S40010-25
support his conviction of first-degree murder, or, in the alternative, for an
arrest of judgment and a new trial because the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence. See Post-Sentence Motion, 12/26/24, at 1-5. The trial court
denied Davenport’s post-sentence motion on February 26, 2025.
Davenport filed a timely notice of appeal on March 21, 2025 and, on
May 7, 2025, Davenport filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal, raising one issue: “[The trial
c]ourt erred in failing to merge the [REAP] conviction with the [m]urder in the
[f]irst [d]egree conviction.” Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/7/25, at 1
(unpaginated). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 24, 2025.
On August 11, 2025, Attorney Bradley filed an Anders brief in this
Court, and an accompanying application to withdraw. Davenport has not
retained alternate counsel or filed a pro se response raising any additional
issues.8
Prior to addressing the merits of Davenport’s appeal, we must determine
whether Attorney Bradley has complied with the dictates of Anders and its
progeny in his request to withdraw from representation. See
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (this
8 On September 2, 2025, Davenport filed an application for extension of time
to file a reply to Attorney Bradley’s Anders brief. This Court granted the extension and permitted Davenport to file a response on or before November 3, 2025. See Order, 9/8/25. On September 19, 2025, Davenport filed a motion to withdraw his request for an extension of time. This Court granted Davenport’s motion to withdraw his September 2, 2025 application and vacated the order granting the extension. See Order, 10/24/25.
-4- J-S40010-25
Court may not review merits of underlying issues without first examining
counsel’s request to withdraw). Court-appointed counsel seeking to withdraw
from representation on the basis that the appeal is frivolous must:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw[,] stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to anything that arguably might support the appeal[;] and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise the defendant of his [] right to retain new counsel or raise any additional points that he [] deems worthy of the court’s attention.
Id.
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that a
proper Anders brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 361. Finally, this Court must “conduct an independent
review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues
overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250
(Pa. Super. 2015) (footnote omitted).
Here, our review of Attorney Bradley’s Anders brief and application to
withdraw reveals that he has complied with each of the technical requirements
of Anders and Santiago. Attorney Bradley states that he has made a
conscientious examination of the record, determined that further pursuit of a
-5- J-S40010-25
direct appeal would be frivolous, and furnished a copy of the letter sent to
Davenport advising him of his right to proceed pro se or raise issues in
response to the brief. See Goodwin, supra. Additionally, Attorney Bradley
complied with the requirements of Santiago. Accordingly, we conclude that
Attorney Bradley has substantially complied with the requirements for
withdrawing from representation and proceed with an independent review of
the merits. See Flowers, supra.
Attorney Bradley raises the following issue in his Anders brief: “Should
appellate counsel be permitted to withdraw as counsel because any appellate
issues in the instant case are frivolous?” Anders Brief, at 4 (full capitalization
omitted). Within the Anders brief, however, Attorney Bradley more
specifically identifies the following three issues purportedly preserved for
appellate review: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to prove homicide,
murder in the first degree, instead of manslaughter as well as the other
convictions; (2) the weight of the evidence for each conviction; and (3) the
legality of sentencing. See Anders Brief, at 10, 14, 19.9 Although Attorney
Bradley advances no argument in the Anders brief with respect to these
potential issues, we note that neither Anders nor McClendon requires
counsel to set forth an argument; rather, Anders requires counsel to provide
references to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354. Here, Attorney Bradley has done so.
9 The Commonwealth did not file an appellee’s brief in this matter.
-6- J-S40010-25
In his first claim on appeal, Attorney Bradley raises the issue of whether
the evidence was sufficient to prove criminal homicide, instead of
manslaughter.10 See Anders Brief, at 14-16. Specifically, Davenport avers
that the testimony and evidence presented failed to prove that he intended to
kill King. See Post-Sentence Motion, 12/26/24, at 2-3; Anders Brief, at 8.
Additionally, Attorney Bradley notes that trial counsel conceded that there was
sufficient evidence for the other charges in the post-sentence motion, but, in
the interest of thoroughness, he reviewed the sufficiency as to all charges.
See Anders Brief, at 16-19. Having done so, Attorney Bradley concluded
that any argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
other charges would be frivolous. See id.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard
of review is: [W]hether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, was sufficient to enable the fact-finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, when examining sufficiency issues, we bear in mind that: the Commonwealth’s burden may be sustained by means of wholly circumstantial evidence; the entire trial record is evaluated and all evidence ____________________________________________
10 Although this claim was not preserved in Davenport’s Rule 1925(b) statement, as set forth above, we still review this claim as part of our independent review of the record. See Flowers, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Cox, 231 A.3d 1011, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2020) (when direct appeal counsel has filed Anders brief and is requesting permission to withdraw from representation, this Court may overlook certain procedural deficiencies in appellate court filings to ensure that Anders counsel has not overlooked non-frivolous issues).
-7- J-S40010-25
received against the defendant considered; and the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence when evaluating witness credibility. This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a conviction must be based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.
Commonwealth v. Dewald, 317 A.3d 1020, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(internal citations, quotations, brackets, and indentation omitted).
Murder of the first degree is an intentional killing. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2502(a). The Crimes Code defines “intentional killing” as a “willful,
deliberate[,] and premeditated killing” of another person. Id. at § 2502(d).
To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: “a human being was unlawfully killed;
the defendant was responsible for the killing; and the defendant acted with
malice and a specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d
1128, 1133 (Pa. 2011). The Commonwealth may prove the specific intent to
kill “solely through circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Blakeney,
946 A.2d 645, 652 (Pa. 2008). Relevant in the present case is the precept
that “[a] jury may infer the specific intent to kill based upon the defendant’s
use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of victim’s body.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). The specific intent to kill can be formed in a “fraction of a second.”
Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 462 (Pa. 2019).
Conversely, third-degree murder “occurs when a person commits a
killing which is neither intentional nor committed during the perpetration of a
-8- J-S40010-25
felony, but contains the requisite malice.” Commonwealth v. Thompson,
106 A.3d 742, 759 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted); see also 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). To sustain a third-degree murder conviction, the
Commonwealth must demonstrate that the defendant caused the death of
another individual with malice. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 219 A.3d 186,
195 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Davenport was also convicted of two firearm charges. A person commits
the crime of person not to possess if they were previously convicted of an
enumerated offense and possess a firearm. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
Similarly, a person commits the offense of firearms not to be carried without
a license when he “carries a firearm in any vehicle or . . . carries a firearm
concealed on or about his person except in his place of abode or fixed place
of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license[.]” Id. at § 6106.
Finally, Davenport was convicted of REAP. A defendant commits REAP
when he “recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” Id. at § 2705. The crime
of REAP requires the creation of danger, so the Commonwealth must prove
the existence of an actual present ability to inflict harm upon another.
Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 727-28 (Pa. Super. 2003).
While the mere act of discharging a firearm does not on its own constitute
REAP, discharging a firearm near another person is sufficient to support such
a conviction. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141, 144 (Pa. Super.
2009).
-9- J-S40010-25
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence to support Davenport’s convictions. At trial, the
Commonwealth presented video evidence of the shooting in which King was
shown speaking with Spears, the bouncer of Bill’s Cafe, prior to entering the
cafe. See N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28-29/24, at 25-31. Davenport is then depicted
tapping King and firing a shot into King’s back and firing again while King was
falling. Id. Spears, who was in close proximity to King, identified Davenport
as the man in the video who shot King and testified that Davenport shot King
three times. Id. at 23, 32. Davenport himself also testified that he shot King
three times. Id. at 165. Doctor Ross, the medical examiner, stated that King
was shot in several vital areas of the body. Id. at 92-95 (Doctor Ross
testifying victim had two fatal gunshot wounds in lower back and one in neck
that damaged victim’s cervical spine, spinal cord, and brain stem); see also
Blakeney, supra. Davenport testified that, while he had past conflicts with
King, he and King did not interact prior to the shooting. See N.T. Jury Trial,
10/28-29/24, at 164-65. In sum, the Commonwealth presented evidence
that, unprompted, Davenport approached and shot King three times in vital
areas of the body. See Clemons, supra. Therefore, the Commonwealth’s
evidence was clearly sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill necessary
for a conviction of first-degree murder. See Houser, supra.
Likewise, the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to prove that
Davenport possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime and that
he had a prior conviction that prohibited him from having a firearm. See N.T.
- 10 - J-S40010-25
Jury Trial, 10/28-29/24, at 166 (Davenport testifying he had firearm on night
of shooting); id. at 205 (parties stipulating Davenport had prior conviction of
possession with intent to deliver). See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(b)
(enumerated offenses). Additionally, Davenport did not have a valid permit
to carry a concealed firearm but concealed the firearm until he shot King. See
N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28-29/24, at 150 (parties stipulating Davenport did not
have valid concealed carry permit at time of shooting). Thus, both firearm
charges were supported by sufficient evidence.
As to REAP, the Commonwealth’s evidence and Davenport’s own
testimony demonstrated that Davenport fired a gun three times while in close
proximity to both King and Spears. Id. at 30, 165. One of the bullets went
through King’s back, exited his abdomen, and reentered through his right
wrist. Id. at 94. Spears testified that if King’s wrist hadn’t been in the way,
the bullet would have hit him. Id. at 31. Thus, Davenport’s actions recklessly
endangered Spears because it was possible that the shot could have missed
King’s wrist and struck Spears instead. See Hartzell, supra. Therefore, we
find the evidence sufficient to support the REAP conviction. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth established each of the elements required for all of
Davenport’s convictions with sufficient evidence, and we agree with Attorney
Bradley that Davenport’s sufficiency claims are frivolous. See Dewald,
supra.
Next, Attorney Bradley contends that the jury’s verdict of first-degree
murder was against the weight of the evidence. See Anders Brief, at 19-20.
- 11 - J-S40010-25
However, upon review of the record, we conclude Davenport has waived this
claim for failing to include it in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the [Rule
1925(b) s]tatement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of
[Pa.R.A.P. 1925](b)(4) are waived.”).
While Davenport preserved a challenge to the weight of the evidence in
his post-sentence motion, he included no reference to that claim in his Rule
1925(b) statement. See Post-Sentence Motion, 12/26/24, at 3-5; see also
Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/7/25, at 1 (unpaginated). Therefore, the trial
court was not provided with an opportunity to address the issue in its Rule
1925(a) opinion. This Court’s standard of review restricts us to a review of
the trial court’s exercise of discretion in determining whether the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence; we may not independently weigh the
evidence to reach our own conclusion as to the underlying weight claim. See
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013) (“an appellate
court does not substitute its judgment for the finder of fact and consider the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence, but, rather, determines only whether the trial court abused its
discretion in making its determination”) (citations omitted). See
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 311 A.3d 567, *14-15 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(Table)11 (finding waiver of weight claim raised in Anders brief for failure to ____________________________________________
11 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(a)-(b) (unpublished, non-precedential memorandums of
this Court, filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).
- 12 - J-S40010-25
include claim in Rule 1925(b) statement). Accordingly, Davenport’s weight
claim is waived.12
The final issue raised in Attorney Bradley’s Anders brief involves the
legality of Davenport’s sentence. See Anders Brief, at 22-23. Attorney
Bradley initially believed that Davenport’s sentence was illegal as to the REAP
and first-degree murder convictions, alleging the two should be merged for
sentencing, but, ultimately, determined this challenge to be frivolous. Id. at
21-22. This issue implicates the legality of Davenport’s sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Quintua, 56 A.3d 399, 400 (Pa. Super. 2012). Issues
relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of law, therefore, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id.
Crimes merge for sentencing if two requirements are satisfied: first,
“the crimes arise from a single criminal act,” and second, “all of the statutory
elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other
offense.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765. Analysis of the second requirement “begins
and ends with the statutory elements of each offense.” Commonwealth v.
Edwards, 256 A.3d 1130, 1137 (Pa. 2021). “The elements required to be
proved [for REAP] are all necessary, though not sufficient, to establish the
elements of murder.” Commonwealth v. Musselman, 396 A.2d 625, 625 ____________________________________________
12 Typically, if counsel seeks to withdraw under Anders in a criminal case, “counsel shall file of record and serve on the judge a statement of intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a [s]tatement.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). Under such circumstances, we would not find waiver. However, here, Attorney Bradley chose to file a proper Rule 1925(b) statement even though he later sought to withdraw.
- 13 - J-S40010-25
n.1 (Pa. 1979). However, the crimes do not merge if the victims are different.
See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480, 488 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(defendant not charged with recklessly endangering murder victim, but for
“the danger in which [defendant] placed other individuals near the scene of
the shooting[”;] therefore, merger not appropriate when third-degree murder
and REAP convictions involve separate victims).
As in Hernandez, Davenport’s convictions of first-degree murder and
REAP each involve different victims. Davenport was convicted of first-degree
murder for King and recklessly endangering Spears and other patrons at the
cafe. The criminal complaint in this case states that Davenport was charged
for REAP because Davenport “recklessly fired a firearm inside Bill’s Caf[e]
putting other patrons at risk for serious bodily injury.” Criminal Complaint,
1/18/22, at 4. Likewise, the criminal information states that Davenport
“recklessly engaged in conduct which placed or may have placed [] Spears in
danger of death or serious bodily injury.” Criminal Information, 4/14/22, at
Count 4. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence to prove that Spears
was also placed in danger of bodily harm by Davenport’s actions. See N.T.
Jury Trial, 10/28-29/24, at 30-31. Furthermore, the jury was instructed on
REAP as it pertained to Davenport’s actions towards Spears. Id. at 198 (trial
court stating, “to find [Davenport] guilty of [REAP,] you must find that
[Davenport] recklessly did something that placed or may have spaced others,
specifically [] Spears and other bar patrons, in danger of death or serious
bodily injury.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, it is clear from the record that
- 14 - J-S40010-25
the crimes of REAP and first-degree murder involved different victims and,
thus, the crimes do not merge for purposes of sentencing. See Hernandez,
In light of the foregoing, we agree with Attorney Bradley’s assessment
that the issues raised here are frivolous. Moreover, after conducting a full
examination of all the proceedings, as required pursuant to Anders, we
discern no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal. See Flowers, supra.
Accordingly, we grant Attorney Bradley’s petition to withdraw and affirm the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw granted. Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 02/03/2026
- 15 -