Com. v. Daniels, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 25, 2023
• Docket: 1495 MDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S19037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JERRY JERON DANIELS : : Appellant : No. 1495 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 26, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004631-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2023

Jerry Jeron Daniels (“Daniels”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing

his petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1

Daniels has also filed seven pro se motions and applications for relief in this

Court. We affirm the dismissal of his petition and deny his motions and

applications for relief.

In August 2021, an officer with the Harrisburg Bureau of Police filed a

criminal complaint charging Daniels with simple assault. Daniels, who was

represented by counsel at the time (“pre-trial counsel”), pleaded guilty in the

magisterial district court, but then withdrew his plea. The magisterial district

court held the charge over for trial. The Commonwealth filed an information

which added a count of harassment. Daniels, who was represented by new

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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S19037-23

counsel (“plea counsel”), entered into plea negotiations with the

Commonwealth. In exchange for Daniels’s guilty plea, the Commonwealth

agreed to withdraw the harassment count, amend the simple assault count to

disorderly conduct graded a third-degree misdemeanor, and recommend a

sentence of one year of probation to run consecutively to his backtime for a

parole violation in an Adams County case. See Written Plea Colloquy, 6/2/22,

at 2-3 (unnumbered). Daniels signed a written plea colloquy and pleaded

guilty plea to disorderly conduct. See id. at 3; N.T., 6/2/22, at 1-3. The trial

court accepted Daniels’s plea and, that same day, imposed the negotiated

one-year probationary sentence.2 Daniels did not file post-sentence motions

or appeal the judgment of sentence.

Daniels filed a pro se petition alleging the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction because he was unlawfully detained, there was no criminal

complaint in the record, and he did not have a preliminary hearing. See

Motion for Habeas Corpus, 8/9/22, at 1-2. The court properly regarded the

2 We note that a PCRA petitioner is ineligible for relief if he has completed the

sentence he is challenging. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i), (iii) (stating that to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must be currently serving a sentence of probation or serving a sentence that must expire before commencing the disputed sentence). Here, at the guilty plea hearing, plea counsel estimated that Daniels’s probationary sentence would commence in 2025, after Daniels served his backtime in the other case. Daniels’s pro se motions to this Court also indicate that Daniels remained incarcerated at SCI- Frackville during this appeal. Therefore, despite the short probationary sentence, it appears that Daniels remains eligible for PCRA relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(iii).

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filing as a timely first PCRA petition3 and appointed counsel (“PCRA counsel”).

PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a no-merit letter pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). The court granted PCRA

counsel’s petition to withdraw and issued a notice to dismiss Daniels’s petition

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Daniels filed pro se responses and objections

and a request to amend his petition to include ineffective assistance of counsel

claims that prior counsel unlawfully induced his guilty plea. The court, upon

consideration of Daniels’s pro se filings, dismissed Daniels’s PCRA petition on

September 26, 2022. Daniels timely appealed. The PCRA court did not order

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement but attached its Rule 907 notice to a statement

in lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Daniels raises the following issue for our review:

1. Whether counsel provided effective assistance, pursuant to [the] 6th Amendment[ b]ased upon the below pleadings denying [d]ue [p]rocess where counsel:

a. Failed to object or challenge the court[’]s lack of subject matter[] jurisdiction.

b. Failed to object to defective on-the-record colloquy.

c. Failed to object, and/or challenge arraignment proceedings without a [m]agisterial [j]udge present.

Daniels’s Brief at 4.

3 Cf. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting

that the PCRA subsumes the writ of habeas corpus unless the PCRA cannot provide a potential remedy).

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Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is “whether the

determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is

free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there

is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v.

Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal citation omitted).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petition

must demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s

performance was not reasonably designed to effectuate the defendant’s

interests, and (3) counsel’s unreasonable performance prejudiced the

defendant. See Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728, 733 (Pa. Super.

2003). A petitioner may demonstrate prejudice by showing that counsel’s

alleged ineffectiveness caused an involuntary or unknowing plea. See

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 270 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa. Super. 2022). A

petitioner may also establish prejudice by showing there was a reasonable

probability that he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s erroneous

advice. See Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 369-71 (Pa. Super.

2006).

We summarize Daniels’s issues as follows: (1) no criminal complaint was

filed in the instant case; (2) the magisterial district court held him over for

trial without a preliminary hearing; and (3) his pre-trial and plea counsel were

ineffective for failing to object to defects in the preliminary hearing, the lack

of a formal arraignment, and the absence of an on-the-record guilty plea

colloquy. Daniels concludes the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,

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he is innocent, and his counsels’ ineffectiveness unlawfully induced him to

plead guilty.

The PCRA court found Daniels’s issues meritless. The court determined

that the challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction was frivolous

because the record contains the criminal complaint and, regardless of any

defect in the magisterial district court proceeding, the trial court had subject

matter jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the Crimes Code. See Rule 907

Notice, 8/29/22, at 3. The court found that Daniels had been afforded an

opportunity for a preliminary hearing, but that his decisions to plead guilty in

the magisterial district court then withdraw his plea obviated the need for a

preliminary hearing. See id. at 3-4 (discussing Pa.R.Crim.P. 550(D), which

permits the magisterial district court to proceed as though a defendant had

been held for court when he changes his plea from guilty to not guilty). The

court also held that Daniels waived his right to contest any procedural

irregularities in the prior proceedings by pleading guilty. See id. at 4-5.

Following our review, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the

PCRA court’s conclusion that Daniels’s issues lacked merit.

As to Daniels’s challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,4

we agree with the trial court that Daniels’s issue begins with the faulty factual

4 Although Daniels frames his challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction as an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, we may address the subject matter jurisdiction of the court as an independent claim of error. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(viii); accord Commonwealth v. (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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assertion that the record does not contain a criminal complaint. The criminal

complaint is in the record. See Rule 907 Notice, 8/29/22, at 3; accord

Criminal Complaint, HC-21-020304-19500, 8/27/21. Moreover, as our

Supreme Court explained, litigants often conflate subject matter jurisdiction

with a court’s power to act. See Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d

488, 495 (Pa. 2003). “[J]urisdiction relates solely to the competency of the

particular court or administrative body to determine controversies of the

general class to which the case then presented for its consideration belongs.

Power, on the other hand, means the ability of a decision-making body to

order or effect a certain result.” See id. (internal citation omitted). Here,

Daniels’s issue at most alleges procedural irregularities that do not undermine

the trial court’s competency to adjudicate violations of the Crimes Code. See

Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 211-12 (Pa. 2007). Thus, Daniels’s

subject matter jurisdiction claim lacks any basis in the record or the law.

With respect to Daniels’s claim that plea counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the trial court’s on-the-record guilty plea colloquy, his

reliance on Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 is unavailing.

The comment to Rule 590 outlines the requirement that a colloquy delve

into the defendant’s understanding of: (1) the nature of the charges; (2) the

Hemingway, 13 A.3d 491, 496 (Pa. Super. 2011) (noting that “[t]he existence of subject matter jurisdiction goes to the heart of a court’s ability to act in a particular case . . . and may be raised by any party or by the court, sua sponte . . .. (citation omitted)).

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factual basis for the plea; (3) his trial rights; (4) the presumption of

innocence; (5) the permissible range of sentences for the offenses; and (6)

the fact that the judge is not bound by the terms of a plea agreement unless

the judge accepts such agreement. See Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878

A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc); accord Pa.R.Crim.P. 590,

comment. A court may supplement an on-the-record colloquy with a written

colloquy that was read, completed, and signed by the defendant and made

part of the plea proceeding. See Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108; accord

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, comment.

Here, our review shows that the written plea colloquy, which Daniels

signed, contains substantially similar information as outlined in Rule 590 and

was made part of the record when Daniels entered his guilty plea. Thus,

Daniels’s claim that plea counsel should have objected based on Rule 590

lacks arguable merit, and we perceive no basis to conclude that he would not

have pleaded guilty had he received a full on-the-record colloquy or that his

plea was unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. Thus, no relief is due. See

Morrison, 878 A.2d at 109.

As to Daniels’s remaining claims that prior counsel should have objected

to defects in the magisterial district court proceeding or before the entry of

his plea, the PCRA court properly observed that a conviction cures defects at

the preliminary hearing, and a valid guilty plea constitutes waiver of

challenges based on other procedural deficiencies. See Jones, 929 A.2d at

211-12 (noting that “[a] plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all

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nonjurisdictional defects and defenses” (internal quotations omitted)). Here,

the written colloquy informed Daniels that he was waiving his rights to file

pretrial motions with the assistance of counsel. Daniels has not established

that his plea was unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary, or that counsel’s

failure to file pretrial motions impacted his decision to plead guilty. Thus,

Daniels’s claims fail. See Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108; see Rathfon, 899 A.2d

at 369.

Lastly, we address the pro se motions and applications Daniels filed in

this Court, including his requests for immediate release, discharge, and

supplementation of the record, as well as his assertions of fraud and other

procedural defects in the magisterial district court and the trial court. Having

reviewed the record, the arguments, and Daniels’s pro se filings, we conclude

no further relief is due because his motions and applications raise claims not

raised in the PCRA court, involve documents already contained in the certified

record, or involve documents and claims unnecessary to decide the issues

presented in this appeal.

Order affirmed. Motions and applications denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 09/25/2023

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