J-S33038-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : AARON CURRY : No. 2095 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered July 24, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007330-2023
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 21, 2026
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the suppression
motion filed by Aaron Curry (“Appellee”). We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
We glean the following facts from the affidavit of probable cause offered
to obtain the search warrant at issue in the instant appeal. On July 10, 2023,
Special Agent Kyle Boyd of the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General
viewed a livestreamed Instagram video from an account he believed belonged
to Appellee, who was pictured in several of the profile’s photos. During the
stream, Appellee was wearing a plain black t-shirt and brandishing a black
semi-automatic Glock pistol with laser and flashlight attachments. Agent Boyd
deemed the firearm to be authentic. He was also aware that Appellee was J-S33038-25
prohibited from owning a firearm pursuant to a prior conviction for possession
with intent to distribute narcotics (“PWID”).
Utilizing registration information that Appellee provided to the
Philadelphia County Probation Office, the agent conducted surveillance for two
days at 2029 Rush Street in the City of Philadelphia. While he observed
various individuals enter and exit the residence, he never saw Appellee. Agent
Boyd then confirmed with the Pennsylvania State Welfare Office that Appellee
received benefits at 661 East Clementine Street. He surveilled that house on
July 13, 14, and 17, 2023, and witnessed Appellee frequent the residence,
sometimes with a child. The agent concluded that the Rush Street address
was fraudulent, and the East Clementine home was Appellee’s actual
residence. Agent Boyd also repeatedly observed him exit that dwelling and
proceed to a nearby street corner to engage in behavior that the agent
recognized as drug activity. He further watched Appellee on that corner use
a cellphone to livestream a second video on Instagram from the same account
as the first.
Agent Boyd then outlined the following in his affidavit of probable cause:
Based upon your affiant’s training and experience, your affiant knows individuals involved in criminal activity, specifically narcotics trafficking[,] frequently conceal their true residences in order to avoid law enforcement detection.
Your affiant knows that firearms are durable goods that are generally kept over the long term and are routinely stored in one’s own residence and vehicles. Your affiant knows the fact that [Appellee]’s criminal history prohibits him from legally purchasing firearms strengthens your affiant[’]s belief that [Appellee] would
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retain possession of any and all firearms illegally obtained. Additionally, your affiant knows through his experience, that individuals who are engaged in the sale of illegal narcotics often possess firearms to protect themselves. Furthermore[,] your affiant knows that from his training and experience that probationers often give address[es] that they are not affiliated with as clean locations for county probation to check while continuing their criminal activity.
Based upon the facts and circumstances, your affiant respectfully requests the approval of this search and seizure warrant to search [the East Clementine residence for] firearms, firearm paperwork, ammunition, proof of residence, telephone utilized to record the crime and clothing worn during the commission of the firearms offense[,] any and all proof of residency as well as safes/lockeboxes [sic] that can contain any of the above listed item[s].
Affidavit of Probable Cause, 7/18/23, at 4-5 (some capitalization altered,
pagination provided).
The warrant was issued, and upon execution the agent and other officers
recovered multiple firearms, controlled substances, a cell phone, and
paperwork. Appellee was charged with several counts related to his illegal
possession of the firearms and drugs, which included heroin, fentanyl, and
Xylazine. He filed a motion to suppress all items found in his home,
maintaining that the affidavit was “insufficient to establish probable cause that
contraband or evidence of a crime was inside of the residence.” Motion to
Suppress, 3/14/24, ¶ 4. Specifically, Appellee asserted that the was no “nexus
between the crime in question and the residence that was searched.” Id. at
¶ 5. The court scheduled oral argument, and at the conclusion took the matter
under advisement.
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The court subsequently granted Appellee’s motion. The Commonwealth
timely appealed and certified that the court’s order substantially handicapped
the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). The court and the Commonwealth
further complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The
Commonwealth presents the following question for our determination:
Did the lower court err by suppressing the evidence recovered from [Appellee]’s home, where the four corners of the search warrant and accompanying affidavit plainly demonstrated a substantial basis for the issuing magistrate’s finding of probable cause that [Appellee] had in his home a firearm he was prohibited from possessing and other evidence connected to his unlawful possession of that firearm?
Commonwealth’s brief at 7.
We begin with an overview of the applicable legal precepts:
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions.
Commonwealth v. Floyd, 313 A.3d 1061, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned
up).
Rule 201 of the Pennsylvania Rules Criminal Procedure provides, in
relevant part, that:
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A search warrant may be issued to search for and to seize:
(a) contraband, the fruits of a crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed;
(b) property that is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense; [or]
(c) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense[.]
Pa.R.Crim.P. 201.
A warrant must be supported by probable cause, which “exists where
the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he
has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.”
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 655 (Pa. 2010) (cleaned up). A
search warrant must also “describe the items as specifically as is reasonably
possible.” Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1082 (Pa. 2017)
(cleaned up).
As this Court has explained, with respect to search warrant applications:
Pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test . . ., the task of an issuing authority is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. It is the duty of a court reviewing an issuing authority’s probable cause determination to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. In so doing, the reviewing court must accord deference to the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, and must view the information offered to establish probable cause in a common-sense, non-technical manner.
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Further, a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo review of the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, but is simply to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the decision to issue the warrant.
....
A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; courts should not invalidate warrants by interpreting affidavits in a hypertechnical, rather than a common[-]sense, manner.
Jones, 988 A.2d at 655 (cleaned up).
Additionally, we have held that “probable cause to believe that a man
has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to probable
cause to search his home.” Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 262 A.3d 1276,
1280 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up). Rather, “[t]he affidavit of probable
cause must establish a substantial nexus between the suspect’s home and the
criminal activity or contraband sought to permit the search of the home.” Id.
(cleaned up). That is to say, “there must be something in the affidavit that
links the place to be searched directly to the criminal activity.” Id. In that
vein, an officer’s professional experience is relevant to a probable cause
analysis “where the officer can demonstrate a nexus between his experience
and the search, arrest, or seizure of evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court primarily relied upon our High
Court’s decision in Jacoby. There, the trial court found that probable cause
supported a search warrant for Jacoby’s residence, issued fifteen months after
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the murder in question, to obtain a firearm used to kill the victim. The Jacoby
Court, though, criticized that the warrant was based only on the assumption
that “it was ‘reasonable’ to believe the murder weapon was secreted in
Jacoby’s house after such a substantial period of time because Jacoby was not
permitted to own a weapon as a felon, and therefore was likely to retain the
weapon due to the difficulty in procuring another one in light of his felon
status.” Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1083. Our High Court stated that “[p]robable
cause to search Jacoby’s home must be evaluated based upon the
circumstances of his case, his behavior, and any nexus to the location to be
searched, but not upon categorial assumptions.” Id. at 1085. Without any
other evidence that the weapon was likely to be present in Jacoby’s home, the
Court held that the “trial court approach shortcuts this bedrock inquiry with
general assumptions about human behavior, untethered to the actual facts at
hand, and was erroneous.” Id.
Notwithstanding our Supreme Court’s conclusion, we have explained
that “[t]he probable cause formulation . . . permits a court to consider
probabilities in particular factual contexts, and courts examining probable
cause tend to credit, at least in some circumstances, inferences of human
behavior related to the crimes at issue.” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d
704, 725 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). We recognized that the Jacoby
Court did not “completely foreclose some consideration of the probability that
a particular offender will behave in certain ways with respect to addressing
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whether a sufficient nexus has been established[.]” Id. at 727. Instead, this
Court clarified that Jacoby only prohibited “categorical assumptions” as the
“sole justification for probable cause.” Id. (emphasis added).
Although the trial court concluded that the affidavit “established
probable cause that [Appellee] was residing at the address in question” and
“illegal activity in that [Appellee], having a conviction making him prohibited
from possessing a firearm, was observed in an internet (social media)
livestream holding a handgun,” it nevertheless determined that the warrant
failed to justify a search of the home for the firearm, t-shirt, and cellphone
because it failed to provide a sufficient nexus between any of the objects and
the East Clementine residence. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/23/25, at 6. The
trial court explained that Agent Boyd’s statement that “firearms are durable
goods that are generally kept over the long term and are routinely stored in
one’s own residence and vehicles” was improperly used as the “sole basis” to
search the residence for the gun. Id. (citing Affidavit of Probable Cause,
7/18/23, at 4). The court held that such a “categorial assumption” was too
similar to the statement in Jacoby, which our High Court rejected as a basis
to establish a “nexus . . . for the purposes of demonstrating probable cause.”
Id. at 6-7 (citing Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1085).
The court also determined that the t-shirt to be searched for was not
described with specificity, and neither it nor the cellphone contained any
evidentiary value. Id. at 7-9. It stated that the description of the shirt had
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nothing “distinguishing” about it and therefore was not described “as nearly
as may be.” Id. at 8-9 (cleaned up). The court additionally noted that
“[n]othing in the [a]ffidavit established the evidentiary value of the black t-
shirt aside from the fact that it was worn while [Appellee] held the gun.” Id.
at 8. It further concluded that the search for the phone was unsupported by
probable cause because “a cell phone is generally not stored in a person’s
residence, [and] it typically remains with the owner.” Id. at 7. Also, the court
explained that the affidavit failed to state that the phone would contain the
livestreamed video. Id. at 8.
The Commonwealth maintains that “the probability of a connection
between [Appellee]’s home and the gun he was observed possessing was
apparent from the facts within the four corners of the affidavit.”
Commonwealth’s brief at 15. It explains that Agent Boyd “detailed a nearly
week-long police surveillance of [Appellee], both over social media and in
person.” Id. The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court “failed to give
due deference to the neutral magistrate’s evident adoption” of the inference
that Appellee was concealing his criminal activity at his residence by providing
the probation office with a fraudulent address, flashing a firearm on a live
broadcast, and continuing to engage in drug activity. Id. at 16-17. Further,
it contends that Jacoby is inapplicable here because “the lapse of time
between the crime and the issuance of the warrant was only eight days – far
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less than the lapse of time between the crime and the execution of the warrant
in Jacoby.” Id. at 18.
Additionally, the Commonwealth avers that the court erred in concluding
that the warrant did not support a search for the t-shirt and cellphone. With
respect to the t-shirt, the Commonwealth explains that Appellee wore it in the
video and that “clothing items are the type of evidence likely to be stored at
a person’s home.” Id. at 20. As to the cellphone, the Commonwealth argues
that it was used to record the commission of the crime, and “enough
information in the affidavit [supported] the likelihood that [Appellee] would
be present with his cellphone in the home when the warrant was executed.”
Id. at 19-20.
We conclude that the court erred in determining that the affidavit was
unsupported by probable cause. First, as to the firearm, the affidavit was not
legally insufficient merely because it included a generalized statement about
human behavior. See Ani, 293 A.3d at 725-27. The affidavit bears out,
rather, that the agent properly augmented this averment with distinct
observations of Appellee. Agent Boyd knew from his professional experience
that repeat offenders typically provide fake addresses to probation offices in
order to continue engaging in illegal activity, narcotics traffickers tend to keep
guns for self-protection, and firearms are usually stored in one’s home. As to
Appellee specifically, Agent Boyd was cognizant that he was prohibited from
possessing guns due to a previous conviction for PWID, discovered that
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Appellee provided a fake address to the probation office, watched him engage
in activity consistent with narcotics transactions, and witnessed Appellee
brandish a firearm during a livestreamed video on social media. Critically,
Agent Boyd’s uninterrupted observation of Appellee leaving the East
Clementine home, walking to a nearby street corner, engaging in suspected
drug transactions, and livestreaming another video provided the necessary
nexus between that address and Appellee’s criminal activity. Additionally,
unlike the warrant in Jacoby, which was executed fifteen months after the
commission of the crime, Agent Boyd searched the East Clementine home
within eight days of watching the livestream.
Accordingly, Agent Boyd properly applied his professional knowledge to
the fresh information he gleaned from his surveillance of Appellee to provide
the magistrate with specific “facts and circumstances . . . to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that a search” of Appellee’s home “should be
conducted” to obtain the illegally possessed firearm. See Jones, 988 A.2d at
655 (cleaned up). In other words, the agent supplied the requisite nexus
between Appellee’s illegal possession of a firearm to the East Clementine
residence. See Nicholson, 262 A.3d at 1280.
Further, the trial court erred in determining that the search for
Appellee’s clothing worn during the commission of the crime was unsupported
by probable cause and lacked evidentiary value and specificity. The shirt was
relevant because Agent Boyd observed Appellee sporting a black t-shirt during
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the livestreamed video when he displayed the firearm. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
201(c) (authorizing search warrants for “property that constitutes evidence of
the commission of a criminal offense”). Notably, Appellee does not argue that
his t-shirt had any unique design, logo, or other distinguishing factor that the
agent failed to note. See generally Appellee’s brief & N.T. Suppression,
5/22/24. If Appellee wore a plain black t-shirt during the stream, Agent
Boyd’s description was as specific as “reasonably possible.” Jacoby, 170 A.3d
at 1082. A common-sense approach supports the conclusion that there was
a fair probability that this shirt would be stored in Appellee’s home.
Finally, the court erred in determining that the cellphone lacked
evidentiary value and the search for it was unsupported by probable cause.
Contrary to the court’s belief, Agent Boyd did not request to analyze the
contents of the cellphone. He only sought the phone that Appellee “utilized
to record the crime.” See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 7/18/23, at 5. See
also Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 747 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en
banc) (“[I]t is well-settled that, even where a cell phone has already been
properly seized, a search of the contents of the phone requires a warrant.”).
Appellee used a cellphone to broadcast the video on social media. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 201(b) (permitting a search warrant for “property that is or has
been used as the means of committing a criminal offense”). The trial court
presumed that Appellee would not be home during execution of the warrant,
and thus the cellphone would have been elsewhere. However, this inference
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is unsupported by the record because Appellee resided at the East Clementine
dwelling. Utilizing a common-sense approach, there was a fair probability that
he would be present and with his phone in the home during the search.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s legal determinations were
erroneous. Granting deference to the magistrate’s probable cause
determination, and viewing the affidavit in a “common-sense, non-technical
manner,” there was a “substantial basis” to grant the warrant to search the
East Clementine residence. See Jones, 988 A.2d at 655. Accordingly, the
order granting the suppression motion is reversed and the matter remanded
for further proceedings.
Order reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Nichols joins this Memorandum.
Judge Beck files a Dissenting Memorandum.
Date: 1/21/2026
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