J-S52020-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
JAMES R. CRUZ, JR.
Appellant No. 1728 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 14, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001246-1993
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2017
James Cruz, Jr. appeals from the order, entered in the Centre County
Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his second Post Conviction Relief Act1
(“PCRA”) petition. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as
follows. Cruz was convicted of criminal homicide and theft on June 14, 1994
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. At trial, the Commonwealth
entered evidence relating to a number of hairs, recovered during the
underlying criminal investigation, which implicated Cruz in the
murder. Specifically, hair identified as belonging to the victim was found in
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S52020-17
the cab of Cruz’s truck, and hair identified as belonging to Cruz was found on
the ropes that had been used to bind and fatally strangle the victim.
To establish that the recovered hairs belonged to Cruz and to the
victim, the Commonwealth relied, in part, on microscopic hair analysis. FBI
Agent Chester Blythe testified at trial regarding the use of microscopic hair
analysis as a forensic method. In this testimony, Agent Blythe drew
scientific conclusions that implicated Cruz in the murder of the victim. It is
this testimony that forms the basis of Cruz’s current PCRA petition.
Per an agreement with the Innocence Project, the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) ordered the FBI to undertake a review of cases that involved
microscopic hair analysis, including Cruz’s conviction. As a result of that
review, the DOJ issued a letter on June 8, 2015 that identified several areas
in which Agent Blythe’s testimony exceeded the scientific limitations of
microscopic hair analysis. A copy of the DOJ letter was subsequently
provided to Cruz, which prompted the current PCRA petition.
As a threshold issue, a court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely
PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).
To be timely, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of final
judgment. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
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Cruz was sentenced on June 14, 1994, and this Court affirmed his
judgment of sentence on December 22, 1995. Commonwealth v. Cruz,
674 A.2d 313 (Pa. Super. 1995). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then
denied Cruz’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal on June 26, 1996.
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 678 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1996). Cruz’s judgment of
sentence thus became final on September 24, 1996, when the time expired
for him to file a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See
U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (requiring writ of certiorari to be filed within 90 days
after entry of judgment).
Cruz had one year from this date, until September 24, 1997, to file a
timely PCRA appeal. Cruz’s first PCRA petition was filed timely on March 10,
1997, and its dismissal was eventually affirmed by this Court on March 5,
2015.2 However, Cruz’s second petition, at issue here, is patently untimely.
Accordingly, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain that petition
unless Cruz established one of the exceptions to the jurisdictional time bar.
To invoke an exception, the petitioner must allege and prove one of
the following:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the ____________________________________________
2 The record does not explain the delay between the 1997 filing and the 2015 disposition of the first PCRA appeal. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, No. 384 MDA 2014 (Pa. Super. March 5, 2015) (“Appellant’s petition languished for the next 15 years until, for unstated reasons, it came to the court’s attention.”)
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claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii).
Cruz contends that the DOJ letter reflects a “newly-discovered fact,”
pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(ii), and can thus serve to excuse the
untimeliness of the current PCRA petition. He argues that he could not have
known about the deficiencies in Agent Blythe’s testimony prior to receiving
the letter, and that these deficiencies comprise the “newly-discovered fact”
which could support relief under the PCRA.
The PCRA court disagreed with Cruz and denied his petition without a
hearing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). In so doing, the PCRA court held that
Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013), is analogous and
controlling here, and that this precedent precludes the DOJ letter from
qualifying as a “newly-discovered fact.” Because we substantially agree with
the trial court’s assessment, we affirm the order dismissing Cruz’s PCRA
petition.
Our standard of review for an order denying post-conviction relief is
limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by
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evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 824 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc). The scope of our
review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial
level. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). Finding no
error of law in the PCRA court’s reliance on Edmiston, we affirm its
decision.
In Edmiston, the appellant attempted to argue that a recently-
published study by the National Academy of Sciences was a “newly-
discovered fact” because the study broadly criticized the use of microscopic
hair analysis as a forensic technique. Our Supreme Court concluded that the
study itself was not a “newly-discovered fact” but was instead a restatement
of existing facts from a new source. Because the NAS study was merely a
third party’s analysis of the existing science underlying microscopic hair
analysis, and because that science had been available in the public record
for years before the appellant’s PCRA petition, the Court concluded that the
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J-S52020-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
JAMES R. CRUZ, JR.
Appellant No. 1728 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 14, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001246-1993
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2017
James Cruz, Jr. appeals from the order, entered in the Centre County
Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his second Post Conviction Relief Act1
(“PCRA”) petition. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as
follows. Cruz was convicted of criminal homicide and theft on June 14, 1994
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. At trial, the Commonwealth
entered evidence relating to a number of hairs, recovered during the
underlying criminal investigation, which implicated Cruz in the
murder. Specifically, hair identified as belonging to the victim was found in
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S52020-17
the cab of Cruz’s truck, and hair identified as belonging to Cruz was found on
the ropes that had been used to bind and fatally strangle the victim.
To establish that the recovered hairs belonged to Cruz and to the
victim, the Commonwealth relied, in part, on microscopic hair analysis. FBI
Agent Chester Blythe testified at trial regarding the use of microscopic hair
analysis as a forensic method. In this testimony, Agent Blythe drew
scientific conclusions that implicated Cruz in the murder of the victim. It is
this testimony that forms the basis of Cruz’s current PCRA petition.
Per an agreement with the Innocence Project, the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) ordered the FBI to undertake a review of cases that involved
microscopic hair analysis, including Cruz’s conviction. As a result of that
review, the DOJ issued a letter on June 8, 2015 that identified several areas
in which Agent Blythe’s testimony exceeded the scientific limitations of
microscopic hair analysis. A copy of the DOJ letter was subsequently
provided to Cruz, which prompted the current PCRA petition.
As a threshold issue, a court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely
PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).
To be timely, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of final
judgment. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
-2- J-S52020-17
Cruz was sentenced on June 14, 1994, and this Court affirmed his
judgment of sentence on December 22, 1995. Commonwealth v. Cruz,
674 A.2d 313 (Pa. Super. 1995). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then
denied Cruz’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal on June 26, 1996.
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 678 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1996). Cruz’s judgment of
sentence thus became final on September 24, 1996, when the time expired
for him to file a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See
U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (requiring writ of certiorari to be filed within 90 days
after entry of judgment).
Cruz had one year from this date, until September 24, 1997, to file a
timely PCRA appeal. Cruz’s first PCRA petition was filed timely on March 10,
1997, and its dismissal was eventually affirmed by this Court on March 5,
2015.2 However, Cruz’s second petition, at issue here, is patently untimely.
Accordingly, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain that petition
unless Cruz established one of the exceptions to the jurisdictional time bar.
To invoke an exception, the petitioner must allege and prove one of
the following:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the ____________________________________________
2 The record does not explain the delay between the 1997 filing and the 2015 disposition of the first PCRA appeal. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, No. 384 MDA 2014 (Pa. Super. March 5, 2015) (“Appellant’s petition languished for the next 15 years until, for unstated reasons, it came to the court’s attention.”)
-3- J-S52020-17
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii).
Cruz contends that the DOJ letter reflects a “newly-discovered fact,”
pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(ii), and can thus serve to excuse the
untimeliness of the current PCRA petition. He argues that he could not have
known about the deficiencies in Agent Blythe’s testimony prior to receiving
the letter, and that these deficiencies comprise the “newly-discovered fact”
which could support relief under the PCRA.
The PCRA court disagreed with Cruz and denied his petition without a
hearing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). In so doing, the PCRA court held that
Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013), is analogous and
controlling here, and that this precedent precludes the DOJ letter from
qualifying as a “newly-discovered fact.” Because we substantially agree with
the trial court’s assessment, we affirm the order dismissing Cruz’s PCRA
petition.
Our standard of review for an order denying post-conviction relief is
limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by
-4- J-S52020-17
evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 824 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc). The scope of our
review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial
level. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). Finding no
error of law in the PCRA court’s reliance on Edmiston, we affirm its
decision.
In Edmiston, the appellant attempted to argue that a recently-
published study by the National Academy of Sciences was a “newly-
discovered fact” because the study broadly criticized the use of microscopic
hair analysis as a forensic technique. Our Supreme Court concluded that the
study itself was not a “newly-discovered fact” but was instead a restatement
of existing facts from a new source. Because the NAS study was merely a
third party’s analysis of the existing science underlying microscopic hair
analysis, and because that science had been available in the public record
for years before the appellant’s PCRA petition, the Court concluded that the
study could not be a “new fact” and therefore the petition was untimely.
Here, like Edmiston, Cruz relies on a new source of previously
knowable facts, and not on a “newly-discovered fact.” The DOJ reviewed
Agent Blythe’s testimony and concluded that some of his statements
exceeded the limits of science at the time of the trial. In so deciding, the
DOJ reviewed no new material but instead relied on an analysis of the trial
-5- J-S52020-17
transcripts as interpreted through the lens of the 2012 edition of the
microscopic hair comparison analysis standards.
To the extent that the conclusions in the DOJ letter are wholly
dependent on facts that were known at the time of the trial, the letter
cannot constitute “newly-discovered facts” as required by the PCRA statute.
As the PCRA court here noted in its opinion: “[T]he hair examiner’s
testimony did exist at the time of Petitioner’s trial and Petitioner had the
opportunity to attack the credibility of the microscopic hair comparison in the
case and the integrity of the field of microscopic hair comparison analysis in
general.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/16, at 3.
Since the underlying facts existed in the record from the moment
Agent Blythe testified in court, the letter from the DOJ represents “facts that
were previously known but are now presented through a newly discovered
source.” Edmiston, 65 A.3d at 352. Because the DOJ reviewed only the
existing testimony and scientific standards and offered its own opinion
thereon, we agree with the PCRA court that the DOJ letter does not contain
“newly-discovered facts” to support a timeliness exception under section
9545(b)(1)(ii).3
3 We also note that Cruz argues that Commonwealth v. Chruby, 304 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. December 9, 2015), should control our decision due to the significant factual similarities between that case and the instant case. Chruby, however, is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not binding precedent. See 210 Pa. Code § 65.37; see also Schaaf v. (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Accordingly, we find no error in the PCRA court’s dismissal of Cruz’s
second, untimely PCRA petition. Robinson, supra.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/2017
_______________________ (Footnote Continued)
Kaufman, 850 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. 2004) (discussing section 65.37 and corresponding limitations on use of unpublished memorandum decisions). Thus, we are not bound to reach the same result as that case. Regardless, Chruby is also distinguishable from this case as the remand in Chruby was procedurally justified due to unresolved motions pending at the time of that case’s dismissal. Here, there are no such unresolved issues to cloud the facts before us, and the dismissal by the trial court was proper.
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