Com. v. Cruz, A.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 19, 2025
• Docket: 2802 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S37006-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : AMIR CRUZ : : Appellant : No. 2802 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 4, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001726-2024

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2025

Appellant, Amir Cruz, appeals from the October 4, 2024 judgment of

sentence of 2½ to five years of incarceration entered in the Philadelphia

County Court of Common Pleas following his conviction of violations of the

Uniform Firearms Act. Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to

suppress evidence. After careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On February

22, 2024, Philadelphia Police Officers Grace Oyana—a six-year veteran of the

Philadelphia Police Department—and Jason Keen were on patrol in

Philadelphia’s 25th Police District.1 At around 10:30 PM, the officers drove past

two men, one of whom police later identified as Appellant, walking westbound ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The 25th Police District is “an area known for gun violence.” Suppression Ct. Op., 2/11/25, at 2. J-S37006-25

on the 500 block of E. Wyoming Street. After seeing the men, the officers,

who were dressed in full uniform and travelling eastbound in their marked

patrol vehicle, performed a U-turn, and pulled up beside Appellant and his

companion. They did not activate the patrol vehicle’s sirens or lights. The

officers parked the vehicle in the travel lane of the street, with a row of parked

cars separating the patrol vehicle from Appellant, who remained standing on

the sidewalk.

While still inside the patrol vehicle, Officer Oyana asked Appellant if he

had any weapons. Unsure as to whether Appellant had heard the question,

Officer Oyana opened the patrol vehicle door, turned on his body-worn

camera, and repeated the question. Appellant responded that he did not have

any weapons, and lifted the left side of his jacket, exposing the left portion of

his waistband. While lifting the left side of his jacket, Appellant held the right

side of the jacket down with his right hand.

The officers, who had by then fully exited their patrol vehicle, which was

not blocking Appellant’s path of movement, walked toward Appellant. The

officers did not demand that Appellant stop and neither officer drew a weapon.

They again asked Appellant if he had any guns or weapons on him, and

Appellant again lifted the left side of his jacket exposing the left side of his

waistband and stated “ I don’t have a gun. I wouldn’t lie to you, sir. I

wouldn’t lie to you, Officer.” N.T., 5/30/24, at 13. Notably, Appellant did not

lift the right side of his jacket and this time “bladed” his body away from

Officer Oyana to shield his right side. Officer Oyana approached closer to

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Appellant, shined his flashlight, and Appellant spontaneously asked Officer

Oyana “do you wanna search?” Id. Appellant then voluntarily turned his body

and walked toward a retaining wall, stopped, and put his hands on the

retaining wall. Officer Oyana searched Appellant, first recovering a cell phone

and then a gun tucked inside Appellant’s right waistband. After placing

handcuffs on Appellant, Officer Oyana asked Appellant if he had a permit to

carry the gun, and Appellant indicated that he did not.

The Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant with one count

each of Possession of Firearm Prohibited, Firearms Not to be Carried Without

a License, and Carrying Firearms in Public in Philadelphia. 2

On March 27, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the firearm,

claiming that the officers illegally stopped and searched him without

reasonable suspicion and arrested him without probable cause.

On May 30, 2024, the suppression court held a hearing on Appellant’s

motion at which Officer Oyana testified in accordance with the above facts. In

describing the area where this incident occurred, Officer Oyana explained that

he had responded to calls to that area “multiple times” and that the police

department has an “overnight officer stationed there because of ongoing just

shootings that happen in the early hours, late night – in the super late-night

hours, around like 10:00, and shootings that happen around like, 5:00 a.m.

There’s also like ongoing robberies, point-of-gun robberies, that happen

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively.

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around that area. So, we’re told to kind of, as we patrol, make sure we

frequent that area.” Id. at 9-10. With respect to Officer Oyana’s own

experience with the specific block in question, he testified that “there have

been a couple stores that have been robbed point of gun, a couple restaurants

kind of back to back. We’ve been responded there for, I think, one recently.

There was a shooting about a block away.” Id. at 10. Officer Oyana testified

that he has recovered firearms in the area.

Officer Oyana also explained “blading,” testifying that, in his experience,

people “do [the blading] motion when they don’t want me to see a certain side

of their body. . . . There’s typically been something on that side that’s illegal

that they don’t want me to know about.” Id. at 17. The Commonwealth also

played the video recorded by Officer Oyana’s body-worn camera that showed

Officer Oyana’s interaction with Appellant. The recording was consistent with

Officer Oyana’s testimony and confirmed that his tone of voice during the

interaction was calm.

On cross-examination, Officer Oyana testified that when he first saw

Appellant, he did not notice any bulges in Appellant clothing or any L-shaped

objects, and Appellant and his companion were not attempting to conceal

themselves.

After considering the testimony presented and the argument of counsel,

the suppression court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court

found that the interaction between Appellant and the police officers began as

a mere encounter and later became an investigative detention supported by

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the officer’s reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal

activity.

Appellant proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, following which the court

convicted Appellant of all charges. On October 4, 2024, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to a term of 2½ to 5 years of incarceration for the

Possession of Firearm Prohibited Conviction and 3 years of probation for the

Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License conviction. 3

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Did not the lower court err in denying the motion to suppress physical evidence and statements made, including any coerced permission to search, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution where the officer seized the defendant without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial

of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.”

Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted). “Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the

Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

3 The court imposed no further penalty for the Carrying Firearms in Public in

Philadelphia conviction.

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the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s

rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047–48 (Pa. 2012).

Our scope of review of the suppression court’s factual findings is limited to the

record from the suppression hearing. Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25,

39 (Pa. 2021). “Where the record supports the findings of the suppression

court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.” Evans, 153 A.3d at 327 (citation

omitted). Furthermore, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as

factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to

their testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of

the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.

Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable

searches and seizures. In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). “To

secure the right of citizens to be free from [unreasonable searches and

seizures], courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to

demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with

citizens as those interactions become more intrusive.” Commonwealth v.

Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000). There are three defined

categories of interaction between citizens and police officers: (1) mere

encounter, (2) investigative detention, and (3) custodial detention. See

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Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en

banc).

A mere encounter between a police officer and a citizen does not need

to be supported by any level of suspicion and “carr[ies] no official compulsion

on the part of the citizen to stop or to respond.” Commonwealth v. Fuller,

940 A.2d 476, 479 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). There is no

constitutional provision that prohibits police officers from approaching a citizen

in public to make inquiries of them. Beasley, 761 A.2d at 624. A mere

encounter may escalate into an investigatory detention or seizure if police

action becomes too intrusive. Id. However, “a seizure does not occur simply

because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.”

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); see also Commonwealth v.

Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (explaining that

when an officer “merely questions the citizen without suggestion of coercion,”

the interaction is a “mere encounter”).

“Both the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have held

that the approach of a police officer followed by questioning does not

constitute a seizure.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1116 (Pa.

Super. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745

A.2d 633, 638 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“search and seizure law has never been so

strictly construed as to prevent police officers from making a brief inquiry of

people they come across on a street corner”); Commonwealth v. Smith,

836 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. 2003) (“the mere approach of police followed by police

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questioning, including requests to examine identification and requests for

consent to search, generally does not amount to a seizure”). This is true even

if the officer asks the individual whether he is carrying a weapon. Coleman,

19 A.3d at 1116 (holding that officer was engaged in a mere encounter when

he approached the defendant and asked him if he had a gun).

An interaction only passes from a mere encounter to a seizure “when

the officer, by means of physical force, or by displaying or asserting authority,

restrains the liberty of the citizen…” Commonwealth v. Boswell, 721 A.2d

336, 340 (Pa. 1998) (plurality).

Our Supreme Court has recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court has

held “that law enforcement officials may briefly detain an individual for

questioning and pat down or ‘frisk’ the person based on facts that amount to

less than probable cause to arrest.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d

1195, 1203 (Pa. 2019) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). To conduct

a constitutionally valid investigative detention, or Terry stop, police must

have “reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” Id. at 1203.

Reasonable suspicion “is less than a preponderance of the evidence but

more than a hunch.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 907 A.2d 540, 543 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on

specific and articulable facts, and it must be assessed based upon the totality

of the circumstances . . . viewed through the eyes of a trained police officer[.]”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 667, 671 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation

omitted). In addition, “we must give due weight...to the specific reasonable

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inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his

experience.” Commonwealth v. Rice, 304 A.3d 1255, 1261 (Pa. Super.

2023) (citation omitted).

The presence of a concealed firearm alone is insufficient to establish

reasonable suspicion; however, the surrounding circumstances, such as the

suspect’s conduct and presence in a high-crime area, combined with a firearm,

may establish reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d

916, 938-39, 945 (Pa. 2019). Whether an officer possessed reasonable

suspicion that a suspect was armed and dangerous is determined by

examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. Although an individual’s

mere presence in a high-crime area alone does not authorize a frisk, “the fact

that [a] stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’” is a relevant factor to consider

in a reasonable suspicion analysis. In re D.M., 781 A.2d at 1163–64 (citing

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)). See also Commonwealth

v. Lewis, __ A.3d __, 2025 WL 2724795 at *1 (Pa. 2025) (reiterating that “a

suppression court may properly consider [whether an area is high in crime]

among the totality of the circumstances when assessing whether reasonable

suspicion existed at the time of a stop” and explaining that it is within the

suppression court’s “discretion to determine whether the Commonwealth has

proven an area is high in crime, as well as how much weight to assign this

factor”).

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress. Appellant’s Brief at 8-20. In particular, Appellant claims that the

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investigating officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him because they

had no reason to believe he was engaged in criminal activity or that he was

armed and dangerous. Id. at 8-12. Appellant asserts, instead, that the

officers targeted Appellant merely because of his location in a purportedly high

crime area—a factual finding that Appellant claims the record does not

support. Id. at 12-13. Appellant claims that the officers bypassed the “mere

encounter” stage of an interaction between citizens and police when they did

not ask Appellant for his name and identification. Id. at 11, 13-15. Appellant

contends, therefore, that the interaction between him and the officers was,

from the outset, an illegal investigative detention for which the officers lacked

reasonable suspicion. Id. He also claims that by repeatedly asking him

whether he possessed a firearm, despite his denials, the officers’ conduct

constituted an impermissible seizure. Id. at 15-17. Last, Appellant asserts

that his possession of a firearm did not rise to the level of criminality necessary

to justify his seizure by police. Id. at 18-20.

The trial court found that when the officers initially pulled their patrol

vehicle up to Appellant and his companion and asked them whether they had

any firearms that they had engaged in a “mere encounter.” Trial Ct. Op. at

4. The court based this finding on Officer Oyana’s testimony that the officers

“remained inside their patrol car. They spoke in a normal tone and did not

demand that Appellant stop. Moreover, their weapons were not drawn, and

the lights and sirens of their vehicle were not activated.” Id.

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The court then found that the situation “ripened into reasonable

suspicion to engage in a safety frisk/investigative detention.” Id. As the court

explained:

Appellant denied having a weapon and voluntarily lifted the left side of his jacket while holding down the right side. This conduct was suspicious and signified that Appellant was hiding a weapon. At this point, the officers exited their patrol car and walked toward Appellant. Appellant lifted the left side of his jacket once again, but this time bladed the right side of his body away from the officers to shield that portion of his body from view. This act was another indication that Appellant may have been hiding a weapon. Officer Oyana asked Appellant a second time whether he had a weapon. Before the officers could initiate a safety first, Appellant again denied having a weapon and told the officer[s] they could search him. Thus, he consented to a frisk.

In sum, the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention and Appellant consented to a search, As a result, his suppression claim must fail.

Id. at 4-5.

With respect to Appellant’s claim that the record does not support the

suppression court’s finding that the area in which the officers encountered

Appellant was a “high crime” area and that the court erred in denying his

suppression motion based on that finding, the court explained as follows:

Officer Oyana testified that the 25 th Police District, and more specifically the 500 block of E. Wyoming Street, was known for violent gun crimes. According to the officer, there were recent and multiple gunpoint robberies and shootings in that [area].

Id. at 5. Nevertheless, the court noted that its “findings did not hinge on the

description of the area but focused instead on Appellant’s actions and

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suspicious behavior on the night in question as well as his consent to a

search.” Id.

Following our review, we conclude that the record supports the trial

court’s factual findings and its legal conclusions are free of legal error. We

agree with the trial court that the officers’ interaction with Appellant began as

a mere encounter. When the officers initially interacted with Appellant, they

did so on a public street and from inside their patrol vehicle. The body camera

recording confirmed that the officers had not activated their lights, sirens, or

loudspeakers, and that Officer Oyana spoke to Appellant in a neutral tone and

with a calm demeanor, and did not brandish his firearm. In light of these

facts, Officer Oyana’s inquiry as to whether Appellant had any firearms or

other weapons in his possession did not constitute a seizure for which Officer

Oyana required reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

We further agree that the interaction then escalated into an

investigative detention when Officer Oyana developed reasonable suspicion,

based on the totality of the circumstances, that Appellant was concealing an

illegal weapon. The suppression court credited Officer Oyana’s testimony that

he was suspicious that Appellant was concealing an illegal weapon because

Appellant lifted only the left side of his jacket, while holding the right side

down, and used a “blading” motion, which he explained, in his experience

people “typically” use when “there’s something on that side that’s illegal that

they don’t want me to know about.” N.T. at 17. In addition, Officer Oyana

was familiar with the location in which he encountered Appellant and knew it

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to experience a high level of crime, including gunpoint robberies and

shootings.4 In light of these facts, we conclude that Officer Oyana’s

investigative detention and search of Appellant was legal. Thus, the

suppression court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/19/2025

4 It also bears noting that, during the course of the investigative detention,

which, as we have explained, was supported by Officer Oyana’s reasonable suspicion, Appellant offered Officer Oyana the opportunity to search him, voluntarily turned around, and spread his arms and legs onto a retaining wall, thereby facilitating Officer Oyana’s search.

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