Com. v. Crippen, R.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

v. :

: :

RAMAIR CRIPPEN :

:

Appellant : No. 1673 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004840-2024

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2026

Appellant, Ramair Crippen, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his conviction for carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia 1

in violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) and related offenses. On

appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108. Following our review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:

The trial record shows that police officers responded to a radio call regarding a “black male wearing a white t-shirt and black pants” who had pulled out a gun. When Officer Coppola and his partner arrived on the scene in their marked police vehicle, they spotted [Appellant], who matched the description, had a bleeding wound on his arm as though he had been in a recent altercation, and was the only person on the street at the time. [Appellant] told the police: “She called, come over here, she called,” and pointed down the street. When the police told [Appellant] to stop walking so they could talk, [Appellant] continued to walk away. One of the

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6108 and 6106, respectively.

police officers then exited the vehicle and [Appellant] fled on foot. As he ran, [Appellant] pulled a silver revolver out of his right pants pocket and ran into a nearby house with the gun in his hand. The police declared a barricade and [Appellant] eventually exited the house approximately one hour later after the SWAT team arrived on location. Police executed a search warrant inside the home and recovered a box of Glock 48 ammunition, one orange gun lock with key, and three fired cartridge casings. Police did not find the silver revolver. At trial, the Commonwealth presented documentation showing that [Appellant’s] permit to carry a firearm was revoked on June 8, 2022. N.T. Trial, 3/17/25, at 10- 19, 23.

On June 9, 2025, this court sentenced [Appellant] to a term of two years’ reporting probation. [Appellant] did not file any postsentence motions.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/27/25, at 1-3 (some formatting altered).

Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a)

opinion addressing Appellant’s claims.2

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for review:

Whether the trial evidence was insufficient to convict [Appellant] of violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108 (“carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia”), where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a real firearm that was operable, capable of becoming operable, or otherwise suitable for use?

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2 We note that Appellant raised additional issues challenging his convictions in

his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement. However, Appellant does not raise those arguments in his brief. Accordingly, Appellant has abandoned those issues on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “an issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived”) (citation omitted).

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Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for VUFA under Section 6108. Id. at 11. In support, Appellant

explains that “[a]t trial, a single witness[, Officer Coppola,] concluded he saw

a revolver in [Appellant’s] hand from behind, at considerable distances, and

during a frantic chase.” Id. However, Appellant contends that “[t]he

witness’s conclusion was unsupported by his own observations, body cam

video, physical evidence, or any other circumstances.” Id. Appellant

acknowledges that the trial court, as fact-finder, was entitled to credit the

officer’s testimony concerning the existence of a firearm, but claims that the

trial court “lacked sufficient evidence to also conclude his perception and

recollection of events were reliably accurate, particularly because he never

testified he saw a revolver’s hallmark cylinder.” Id. Therefore, Appellant

concludes that “the evidence was too weak, insubstantial, and inconclusive to

support [his] firearm conviction.” Id.

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are

governed by the following standard:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak

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and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 552 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted and formatting altered). “Importantly, the fact finder, which passes

upon the weight and credibility of each witness’s testimony, is free to believe

all, part, or none of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted and formatting

altered).

Here, the trial court explained:

At trial, the Commonwealth had no obligation to prove that the firearm [Appellant] carried was operable. To prove an offense under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant was carrying a firearm, rifle or shotgun “at any time upon the public streets or upon any public property in a city of the first class” and that the defendant was not licensed to carry a firearm. “Firearm” is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102 as

any pistol or revolver with a barrel length less than 15 inches, any shotgun with a barrel length less than 18 inches or any rifle with a ban-el length less than 16 inches, or any pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun with an overall length of less than 26 inches. The barrel length of a firearm shall be determined by measuring from the muzzle of the barrel to the face of the closed action, bolt or cylinder, whichever is applicable.

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However, “the Commonwealth is not required to prove that the gun that the defendant possessed was operable unless evidence has been introduced that the gun was inoperable.” Commonwealth v. Mead, 326 A.2d 1006, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2024); Commonwealth v. Santana, 2539 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 8434473 (Pa. Super. filed December 5, 2023) (unpublished mem.). . . . “A reasonable fact finder may . . . infer operability from an object which looks like, feels like, sounds like or is like, a firearm. And such inference would be reasonable without direct proof of operability.” Santana, 2023 WL 8434473 at *3.

In the case at bar, Officer Coppola testified that he observed [Appellant] take a silver revolver out of his pocket as he ran away. N.T. 3/17/25, at 16. He further testified that it was “a silver revolver firearm with a dark colored handle” and that he “saw the barrel as well as the grip,” which is how he knew it was a revolver and not a semi-automatic firearm. Id. at 17. Based upon this testimony, this court acting as fact-finder, could infer that [Appellant] was carrying an operable firearm. Because [Appellant] did not suggest at trial that the gun was inoperable, the Commonwealth was not required to present any additional evidence of operability. Accordingly, no relief is due.

TCO at 14-15 (some formatting altered and some citations omitted).

Following our review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence establishing that Appellant possessed a firearm in violation of Section

6108. See Wright, 255 A.3d at 552. As noted by the trial court, Appellant

did not claim that the firearm was inoperable or introduce any evidence to

establish that possibility at trial. See TCO at 14. Therefore, the

Commonwealth was not required to present any evidence showing that the

firearm was operable. See Mead, 326 A.2d at 1013. Additionally, although

Appellant challenges Officer Coppola’s testimony that he observed Appellant

carrying a firearm, rather than a cell phone, that claim goes to the weight, not

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the sufficiency, of the evidence.3 See Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d

1, 43 (Pa. Super. 2014). For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 8/20/2026

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3 In his brief, Appellant maintains that “[t]he evidence was too weak, insubstantial, and inconclusive” to sustain Appellant’s convictions and claims that the “evidence is equally consistent with inferences of guilt or innocence.” Appellant’s Brief at 11, 13.

We note that, to the extent Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993) in support of his claim, that case is an outlier regarding appellate review of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139 (Pa. 2012) (explaining that Karkaria and similar cases are “exceptional instances . . . where the evidence is so patently unreliable that the jury was forced to engage in surmise and conjecture in arriving at a verdict based upon that evidence.” Brown, 52 A.3d at 1165. Further, the Brown Court declined to apply Karkaria, concluding that “questions regarding the reliability of the evidence received at trial [are] within the province of the finder-of-fact to resolve, and our Court will not, on sufficiency review, disturb the finder-of-fact’s resolution. . . .” Id.