Com. v. Crews, L.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 26, 2025
• Docket: 1870 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S17017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LAWRENCE CREWS : : Appellant : No. 1870 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003714-2021

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2025

Lawrence Crews appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his convictions for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by forcible

compulsion, indecent assault victim less than 13 years old, simple assault,

corruption of minors, rape of child, attempted rape of child, and endangering

the welfare of children.1 He challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and

the denial of his motion to quash. We affirm.

In September 2021, Crews was charged with crimes related to the

sexual assault of C.H. Crews filed a motion to quash the information, which

the court denied. In November 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion to

admit out-of-court statements under the tender years hearsay exception. The

court granted the motion in part. It permitted C.H.’s mother, J.H., to testify ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(1), 3126(a)(7), 2701(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3121(c), 901(a), and 4304(a)(1). J-S17017-25

to C.H.’s out-of-court statements. However, it found C.H.’s father was not

credible and could not testify as to out-of-court statements. It also found a

video/audio recording of an interview at the Child Advocacy Center was not

admissible as substantive evidence.

In April 2022, Crews filed a motion in limine to preclude the testimony

of Commonwealth’s expert witness, Jacqueline Block Goldstein, M.S.W. Crews

argued that the Commonwealth had not informed Crews that it intended to

call Goldstein as an expert witness until February 2022. Crews also asserted

that he had not been able to locate an expert to determine the accuracy of

Goldstein’s report. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Commonwealth’s

Expert Witness, filed Apr. 13, 2022, at ¶¶ 9, 12. Crews argued the “evidence

[was] highly prejudicial and amount[ed] to a ‘surprise’ to [Crews].” Id. at ¶

14. The court denied this motion. It stated in a footnote that the witness could

not offer testimony related to the veracity of the victim’s testimony or “offer

an opinion on same.” Order, May 10, 2022.

At trial, the victim, C.H., testified that she had been abused, both

physically and sexually, by her mother’s former boyfriend “Larry,” who was

the father of her half-brother (“L.”). N.T., Oct. 25, 2022, at 139, 142-44, 160.

She testified that her mother was pregnant with L. when some of the abuse

occurred. Id. at 150-51. She stated that she did not disclose the abuse at the

time because Crews had threatened to harm her or her family. Id. at 151-52.

C.H. did not identify Crews as the perpetrator in court. She testified she

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“remembered what he used to look like, not what he look[ed] like now.” Id.

at 160.

C.H. first told her mother about the abuse when she was eight years

old. N.T., Oct. 26, 2022, at 11. She identified her brother’s father as the

abuser. Id. The disclosure occurred after a doctor visit. She testified that she

lied when asked at the medical appointment about potential abuse because

she did not want to tell her mother at that time. Id. at 18. When she was 12

years old, she disclosed the abuse to her therapist. N.T., Oct. 25, 2022, at

152-53. She again identified her brother’s father as the abuser. N.T., Oct. 26,

2022, at 12-13.

C.H. was asked about her relationship with her half-brother L., who was

Crews’s child. Crews objected to the testimony as irrelevant. N.T., Oct. 25,

2022, at 154. The Commonwealth argued it was relevant because C.H. was

going to testify that she acted aggressively toward L. because she could not

separate L. from Crews. Id. at 155. The trial court permitted the testimony

but stated counsel would be “on a tight rope.” Id. at 157. C.H. testified that

what happened with Crews affected her relationship with L. because she was

“angrier toward [L.] . . . [b]ecause to [her] [L.] looked, started looking like

[Crews], so [she] got angry, and took it out on him.” Id. at 159.

C.H.’s mother J.H. testified that in 2010, when she was dating Crews,

she became pregnant. N.T., Oct. 26, 2022, at 47. She testified that from July

through October of 2010, Crews would babysit C.H. when J.H. would work

night shifts at Wal-Mart. Id. at 49. She stated that at that time C.H. suffered

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from urinary tract infections. Id. at 54. She testified that when C.H. was eight

years old she took her to a clinic at Nemours Hospital because C.H. had vaginal

discharge with an odor. Id. at 58-59. After the doctors examined C.H., they

had a private conversation 2 with J.H. where they informed her that C.H. had

a damaged hymen. Id. at 60. The medical records indicated that J.H. informed

the doctors at this visit that she had “concerns that her old boyfriend may

have done something to [C.H.]” According to the records, J.H. said she last

had contact with the boyfriend in 2010, C.H. used to “hate” him, J.H. had

asked C.H. about inappropriate touching but C.H. had denied any, and C.H.

had gotten a lot of urinary tract infections at that time. Id. at 62. At trial, J.H.

testified that her boyfriend in 2010 was Crews and that she did not remember

this conversation with the doctors. Id. at 61-63. J.H. testified that when the

doctors at Nemour asked C.H. if anything had happened, C.H. said no. Id. at

63-64.

J.H. testified that C.H. eventually disclosed the abuse to her during a

car ride, after C.H. had had a conversation with her father. Id. at 65. J.H. said

that C.H. said to her, “Well, the other day at the doctor’s office, I told you

nothing ever happened, but something did happen.” Id. C.H. told J.H. that

she had been “touched on [her] cookie,” which was “a phrase [they] use[d]

for vagina.” Id. J.H. said that C.H. named “Larry” as the abuser. Id.

____________________________________________

2 The medical records state that the doctors “talked to mom on her own.” N.T.,

Oct. 26, 2023, at 61; Com. Exh. 3.

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J.H. testified that she had “casual relations” with another man, Larry

Stevenson, but that Larry Stevenson never interacted with or babysat C.H.

Id. at 73-74. She further testified that C.H. “was highly irritable towards [L.],”

noting she would “get randomly angry at him.” Id. at 70. Crews did not object

to this testimony. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

Q. . . . [Y]ou were telling the jury that [C.H.] was irritable, and . . . lashed out at [L.], correct?

A. Yes.

Q. All right.

A. Yes, at a later time.

Q. Okay, now and that was all because you think that she believed that . . . that was because Mr. Crews had done something to her. Is that what you’re telling the jury?

A. I just know she was irritable towards her brother, and we got her evaluated to understand why.

Id. at 85-86.

At trial, Goldstein testified as an expert in victim behavior and victim

response to sexual exploitation. She testified that she was testifying as a

“blind expert,” had not “reviewed any materials,” and knew nothing about the

case. N.T., Oct. 25, 2022, at 106.

Also testifying for the Commonwealth was Dr. June Elcock-Messam, who

was qualified as an expert in general and child abuse pediatrics. Additional

Commonwealth witnesses included Officer John Kuryan, and Officer Jose

Alvarez.

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Crews testified in his own defense. He denied the abuse and denied that

he had been alone with C.H. N.T., Oct. 27, 2022, at 15-36.

A jury convicted Crews of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by

forcible compulsion, indecent assault victim less than 13 years old, simple

assault, corruption of minors, rape of child, attempted rape of child, and

endangering the welfare of children. The court sentenced Crews to an

aggregate sentence of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration and seven years’

probation. Crews filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.

Crews timely appealed.

Crews raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Tender Years Motion of the Commonwealth?

2. Whether the evidence was insufficient regarding whether or not any crime was ever committed at all and therefore insufficient to convict [Crews] beyond a reasonable doubt; [Crews’] pre-trial motion to quash was denied in error?

3. Whether it was an error to deny [Crews’s] motion in limine to exclude the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses and ultimately error to allow the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses as such and on matters within the capability of lay understanding and whose prejudicial nature substantially outweighed any probative value of the expert testimony, if any, which resulted in unfair prejudice to [Crews]?

4. Whether the trial court erred when it permitted the surprise testimony of the alleged victim and the alleged victim’s mother regarding purported abuse by the victim against her younger half-brother because, it was asserted, he looked similar to and reminded the alleged victim of [Crews], who was thereby identified vicariously as her abuser in the case at bar due to the fact that he [Crews] was the father of the alleged victim’s half-brother, who was

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furthermore not available to testify due to the surprise, unfairly prejudicing [Crews] and leaving him without an opportunity to . . . test the veracity of these claims?

Crews’ Br. at 3-4.

Crews first maintains the trial court erred when it granted the

Commonwealth’s tender years motion. He argues the statements admitted

were highly prejudicial and denied him a fair trial because they lacked a

sufficient indicia of reliability. Crews maintains C.H.’s hearsay statements

occurred after her visit to the doctor’s office in December 2015, and he claims

that J.H., not C.H., first made statements about Crews sexually assaulting

C.H. He notes that the medical records from the visit include that J.H. told

providers that she suspected Crews of sexually assaulting C.H., but that at

the visit C.H. denied any assault. Crews claims that after the visit C.H.

mimicked J.H.’s claims. Crews further claims that C.H.’s statements were

made following questioning by her father and that therefore the statements

were not spontaneous and did not originate from C.H. Crews argues that C.H.

claims the abuse happened while she was four or five years old, but that he

had no contact with her at that time. He further maintains that at that time

J.H. had a relationship with a separate “Larry.” Crews concludes the

statements C.H. made to her mother, her father, the Chester Police

department, and the forensic examiner mirrored J.H.’s statements and were

motivated by a desire to support J.H.’s “vendetta” against Crews. Crews’ Br.

at 17. He further claims the statements during the police interview and the

forensic interview were not consistent and therefore lack reliability.

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“Questions concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence are within

the sound discretion of the trial court and may be reversed on appeal only

when a clear abuse of discretion was present.” Buchhalter v. Buchhalter,

959 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement admitted to prove the “truth of the

matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible

except as provided by [the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence], by other rules

prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.” Pa.R.E. 802.

One exception to the hearsay rule is the tender years rule. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

5985.1; see also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 286 A.3d 1288, 1295

(Pa.Super. 2022) (noting that the tender years exception “creates an

exception to the general rule against hearsay for a statement made by a

child”). “Statements admitted under this section are substantive evidence

against the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Copenhaver, 316 A.3d 1020,

1023 (Pa.Super. 2024).

The tender years exception states, in relevant part:

(1) An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was 16 years of age or younger, describing any of the offenses enumerated in paragraph (2), not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if:

(i) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and

(ii) the child either:

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(A) testifies at the proceeding; or

(B) is unavailable as a witness.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1(a)(1). Factors to consider when determining whether

an indicia of reliability exists include “the spontaneity of the statements,

consistency in repetition, the mental state of the declarant, use of terms

unexpected in children of that age, and the lack of a motive to fabricate.”

Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 173 (Pa.Super. 2018) (brackets

and citation omitted).

Here, the trial court permitted J.H. to testify to C.H.’s out-of-court

statements, but it precluded C.H.’s father from providing such testimony and

precluded the use as substantive evidence of the audio/video recording of

C.H.’s interview at the child advocacy center. Further, C.H.’s father did not

testify at trial and Crews does not specify where the recording of the interview

at the child advocacy center or any statements made during a police interview

were admitted as substantive evidence. Therefore, we will address only

whether the court erred in permitting J.H. to testify as to the hearsay

statements.

The court found that J.H.’s testimony regarding C.H.’s statements was

admissible, reasoning that C.H.’s disclosure of the abuse had been consistent

over the years and she lacked motivation to fabricate the abuse:

[C.H.’s] disclosure of the sexual abuse she suffered has been consistent, and she spontaneously offered the initial disclosure on a car ride with her mother. [C.H.] consistently repeated the same statements over a course of several years. The following exchange occurred on the record:

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COMMONWEALTH: In 2015, when you were 8 years old, and first talked about what happened to you, did you identify it as being the person that was [L.]’s father?

VICTIM: Yes.

COMMONWEALTH: And is that Larry Crews?

[N.T., 10/26/22, at 11]. [C.H.] was questioned about her interview four years later:

COMMONWEALTH: When you were being asked questions in 2019, were you being asked questions specifically about the abuse, the sexual abuse and physical abuse you had endured?

COMMONWEALTH: And when you were answering this question, were you talking about the individual that had committed that abuse?

[N.T., 10/26/22, at 13].

[C.H.] lacked a motive to fabricate the story, as evidenced by [C.H.’s] desire to hide the abuse from her mother:

COMMONWEALTH: Yesterday, when Mr. Johnson asked you when you were asked by the doctors, if anything happened, if anyone had touched you, and you said no, you told him that that was a lie, correct?

COMMONWEALTH: When he asked you why did you lie, you said you didn’t want to tell in front of your mom, is that correct?

[N.T., 10/26/22, at 18].

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. . . [C.H.’s] disclosure of events ha[s] been consistent, and she lacked any motivation to fabricate the story, as she initially wanted to hide the abuse from her mother.

Trial Ct. Op., filed Oct. 17, 2023, at 4-6 (footnotes omitted).

The court did not abuse its discretion. C.H.’s consistent disclosures over

the years and her lack of motivation to fabricate the statements provide

sufficient indicia of reliability, such that the court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting the statements. That J.H. initially told hospital personnel of the

potential abuse in a private conversation does not alter the analysis. This claim

fails.

Crews next maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash

where C.H. could not identify him at the preliminary hearing or at trial. He

points out that J.H. had two individuals names “Larry” as boyfriends around

the same time and that the other “Larry” was the boyfriend at the alleged time

of the assault.

“[O]nce a defendant has gone to trial and has been found guilty of the

crime or crimes charged, any defect in the preliminary hearing is rendered

immaterial.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 984 (Pa. 2013).

Accordingly, here, because he was convicted following a trial, Crews’s

challenge to the denial of his motion to quash based on C.H.’s failure to

identify him at the preliminary hearing is moot. Commonwealth v.

Edwards, 177 A.3d 963, 970 (Pa.Super. 2018).

To the extent Crews is attempting to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a conviction based on C.H.’s failure to identify him at trial,

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he has waived this claim by failing to present argument on the issue in his

appellate brief. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1258

(Pa.Super. 2008) (finding issue waived where appellant failed to properly

develop claim and set forth applicable case law); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-

(c).

In his third issue, Crews argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion in limine to exclude the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses, Goldstein

and Dr. Elcock-Messam. He argues that Dr. Elcock-Messam’s testimony that

C.H.’s medical records had signs of potential abuse was prejudicial because

the jury would believe a doctor concerning medical findings. Regarding

Goldstein, Crews maintains it was error to allow her testimony about the

nature of sexual abuse victims disclosing the assault and abuse. He argues it

was “an encroachment upon the province of the jury to permit admission of

expert testimony on the issue of a witness’[s] credibility.” Crews’ Br. at 29.

Crews has waived his challenges to the expert testimony. In his motion

to preclude the testimony of Goldstein, he argued the Commonwealth had

provided untimely notice of her testimony. He did not argue her testimony

was an encroachment upon the province of the jury. 3 Further, Crews raised ____________________________________________

3 Crews did not object to Goldstein’s qualifications as an expert in victim behavior and victim response to sexual exploitation or Dr. Elcock-Messam’s qualifications as an expert in general pediatrics and child abuse pediatrics. N.T., Oct. 25, 2022, at 106; N.T., Oct. 26, 2022, at 130-31.

At the hearing on the post-sentence motion, Crews argued that the expert witnesses invaded the province of the jury. N.T., Apr. 24, 2023, at 4. However, he never raised this argument before or during trial.

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no objection to Dr. Elcock-Messam’s expert testimony, by motion limine or at

trial. Because he failed to raise these issues before the trial court, he has

waived them for appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

In his last issue, Crews argues the trial court erred when it permitted

the surprise testimony of C.H. and J.H. regarding the purported abuse by C.H.

of her younger half-brother where they alleged it was because the half-brother

looked similar to and reminded C.H. of Crews, who was the half-brother’s

father. He maintains this testimony was prejudicial and irrelevant, and that

the sole purpose of the testimony was to “color the jury so that they would be

hostile towards [Crews] and find him guilty.” Crews Br. at 33.

Crews did not object to J.H.’s testimony regarding C.H.’s behavior

toward L., and he therefore waived this challenge on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.”). Further, the Rule 1925(b) statement did not

clearly challenge this testimony. Rather, it raised the following issue

challenging J.H.’s testimony, which did not identify the portion of the

testimony Crews’ challenges:

3. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in allowing impermissible and prejudicial hearsay statements, testimony, and evidence during the trial, in particular, testimony from the alleged victim’s mother, Jeanette Harris Walker, Dr. June Elcock-Messam, and Jaqueline Block- Goldstein.

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Concise Statement of Issues Raised on Appeal Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule

of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), filed Aug. 14, 2024, at ¶ 3. 4 He therefore

waived the issue for failure to raise it in the Rule 1925(b) statement. Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).

The Rule 1925(b) statement and Crews’ argument on appeal relate to

J.H.’s testimony, not C.H.’s. He therefore waived his argument that the court

erred in admitted C.H.’s testimony. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

Regardless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

limited testimony on this issue. It was relevant to C.H’s identification of Crews

as the perpetrator and any unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative

value.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 8/26/2025

4 In his post-sentence motion, Crews framed the issue in the same matter:

“The trial court erred and abused its discretion in allowing impermissible and prejudicial hearsay statements, testimony, and evidence during the trial, in particular, testimony from the alleged victim’s mother, Jeanette Harris Walker, Dr. June Elcock-Messam, and Jaqueline Block-Goldstein.” Post- Sentence Motion, filed Feb. 9, 2023, at ¶ 8.

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