Com. v. Correa, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 1492 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Sullivan

Opinion

J-A05031-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JESUS CORREA : : Appellant : No. 1492 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 28, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004360-2022

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JUNE 25, 2026

Jesus Correa (“Correa”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

following his non-jury convictions for possession with intent to deliver

(“PWID”) and knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance

(“K&I”).1 Because his claims are meritless, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history are as follows: On February 14, 2022,

Sergeant Connor Dooley (“Sergeant Dooley”) and his partner, Officer

Fuentes,2 were on duty in the Kensington section of Philadelphia, when they

stopped a car with a stolen license plate in which Correa was a passenger.

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1 See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16).

2 The certified record does not contain Officer Fuentes’s first name. J-A05031-26

See N.T., 1/10/24, at 6-9.3 Officer Fuentes approached the driver. Sergeant

Dooley approached the passenger side of the car and began to ask Correa

standard questions, including, “[Are] there any weapons in the vehicle—

firearms specifically? [Are] there any narcotics or any contraband in the

vehicle?” Id. at 9. Sergeant Dooley testified Correa, who remained on a cell

phone call during their interaction, did not give a verbal response to these

questions but looked away, slightly nodded, and shook his head, indicating

the answer “no.” See id. at 9, 17. After Sergeant Dooley asked his questions,

Correa stated he had just come from a bail bondsman where he had paid a

bond for an open gun possession case. See id. Meanwhile, the driver of the

car revealed to Officer Fuentes that he did not have any paperwork identifying

him as the owner or permitted user of the car; in light of this the officers

removed Correa and the driver from the car. See id. at 10

Based on Correa’s response indicating his open firearms charge,

Correa’s action of pressing his body against the car as he stepped out, and

Sergeant Dooley’s plan to place Correa in the back of the police vehicle during

an investigative detention, Sergeant Dooley conducted a Terry frisk on

Correa. See id. at 10. The frisk revealed what Sergeant Dooley immediately

recognized to be a narcotics package in Correa’s front waistband area. See

id. at 11. The officers recovered from Correa’s front waistband 96 packages

3 Sergeant Dooley and his partner were on patrol as part of a task force investigating illegal narcotics activity and violent crimes. See N.T., 1/10/24, at 8.

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with blue insert stamps labeled “Red Lobster,” containing 3.9 grams of

fentanyl. See id. at 12-14.

Correa filed a motion to suppress. The suppression court held a hearing

and denied the motion. See id. at 35. That same day, Correa waived his

right to a jury trial and the trial court convicted him of the above-listed

offenses. See id. at 37-46. The court imposed a sentence of one to two years

of imprisonment, followed by one to two years of probation. Correa appealed

and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Correa raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the lower court erroneously denied suppression, where police obtained evidence pursuant to a warrantless pat-down search without reasonable suspicion that [] Correa was armed and dangerous?

2. Whether the lower court erroneously denied suppression by concluding police obtained the evidence during a search incident to [] Correa’s arrest, where there was no probable cause for an arrest?

Correa’s Brief at 3-4.

In his first issue, Correa asserts the police lacked reasonable suspicion

he was armed and dangerous that would permit a pat-down.

This Court’s standard of review regarding a challenge to a suppression

ruling is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s findings of

fact are supported by the record and the legal conclusions drawn from those

facts are correct. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 A.3d 1190, 1195

(Pa. Super. 2022). Where the Commonwealth has prevailed below, this Court

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may only consider the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the defense

evidence as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as

a whole. See id. It is the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to

pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give their testimony.

See id. When the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings,

we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in

reaching its legal conclusions from those facts. See Commonwealth v.

Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

This Court’s scope of review is limited to the evidentiary record at the

suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 302 A.3d 123, 126 (Pa.

Super. 2023). When an appellant asserts legal error in a suppression court’s

ruling, it is the Court’s duty to determine if the suppression court properly

applied the law to the facts. See Commonwealth v. Byrd, 235 A.3d 311,

319 (Pa. 2020) (stating a suppression court’s conclusions and legal rulings are

subject to de novo review).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect private citizens from

unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. See

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000) (citing United

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980)). “A warrantless search or

seizure is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and

Article I, § 8, subject to a few specifically established, well-delineated

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exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 (Pa. Super.

2022) (citation omitted). One of those exceptions permits the police to

conduct a stop and frisk when circumstances warrant. See Commonwealth

v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Not every encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen

constitutes a seizure warranting constitutional protection. See

Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2019). As our

Supreme Court has explained there are three types of encounters between

police and a citizen and the nature of the encounter determines the nature of

constitutional protection, if any:

We have long recognized three types of interactions that occur between law enforcement and private citizens. The first is a mere encounter, sometimes referred to as a consensual encounter, which does not require the officer to have any suspicion that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal activity. This interaction also does not compel the citizen to stop or respond to the officer. A mere encounter does not constitute a seizure, as the citizen is free to choose whether to engage with the officer and comply with any requests made or, conversely, to ignore the officer and continue on his or her way. The second type of interaction, an investigative detention, is a temporary detention of a citizen. This interaction constitutes a seizure of a person, and to be constitutionally valid police must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The third, a custodial detention, is the functional equivalent of an arrest and must be supported by probable cause. A custodial detention also constitutes a seizure.

No bright lines separate these types of encounters, but the United States Supreme Court has established an objective test by which courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to elevate the interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often referred to as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to determine “whether, taking into account all of the circumstances

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surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.” Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.

Id. 1199-2000 (internal citations, some quotations, and brackets omitted).

When police command a suspect to stop, an investigative detention

occurs, otherwise known as a Terry stop. See Commonwealth v. Jackson,

271 A.3d 461, 464 (Pa. Super. 2021); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968); Adams, 205 A.3d at 1200. Two conditions must be present for police

to frisk a suspect during a Terry stop: “First, the investigatory stop must be

lawful.” Interest of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 417 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted).

An investigatory stop of a car is lawful where an officer has probable cause to

believe the vehicle is not in compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code and stops

the car on that basis. See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 148

(Pa. Super. 2021). “Second, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police

officer must reasonably suspect that the person is armed and dangerous.”

T.W., 261 A.3d at 417 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-27

(2009)).

“A reasonable suspicion analysis considers the totality of the

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Stoney, 347 A.3d 671, 678 (Pa. Super.

2025). “[A]n investigative detention is constitutionally permissible if an officer

identifies ‘specific and articulable facts’ that led the officer to believe that

criminal activity was afoot, considered in light of the officer’s training and

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experience.” Adams, 205 A.3d at 1205 (citations omitted). The reasonable

suspicion test is not limited to consideration of only those facts that clearly

indicate criminal conduct. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185,

1189 (Pa. 2004). “Rather, [e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken

together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Id.

(citations omitted).

In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), the United States

Supreme Court held that “police officers may seize contraband detected during

a lawful frisk if the identity of the illegal contraband is ‘immediately apparent’

upon touching the object.” T.W., 261 A.3d at 420 (citing Dickerson, 508

U.S. at 375).

Correa asserts police frisked him without reasonable suspicion he was

armed and dangerous. He states he was cooperative with the officers and

disagrees with Sergeant Dooley’s testimony he declined to respond verbally

and was on the phone during the encounter. See Correa’s Brief at 21-22.

Next, Correa argues there is no body camera footage of him pressing his body

against the car, and even if there was, that conduct occurred after he was

asked to step out of the vehicle and put his hands on the car. See id. at 23.4

Finally, Correa argues Sergeant Dooley did not develop reasonable suspicion

4Correa also argues that Sergeant Dooley created the need to pat down Correa by placing him in the back of the police cruiser.

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upon learning about Correa’s open firearms case because Correa volunteered

this information to the officers, “which is the opposite of suspicious behavior.”

See id. at 26. The legitimacy of the vehicle stop is uncontested.

At the hearing, the suppression court stated that once the officers

decided to put Correa in the police car, the officers had a right to make sure

Correa was unarmed and to perform a safety frisk before placing him in the

patrol car. See N.T., 1/10/24, at 34-35.

In its 1925(a) opinion, the suppression court stated reasonable

suspicion Correa was involved in criminal activity existed because Correa was

in a stolen car in a high-crime area where police officers were investigating

illegal narcotics activity and violent crimes. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/18/25,

at 6; N.T., 1/10/24, at 8 (Sergeant Dooley testifying Kensington and the

greater North Philadelphia area is “a very high narcotics trade and violent

crimes . . . area.”). The court further explained reasonable suspicion Correa

was armed and dangerous existed based on Sergeant Dooley’s credible

testimony. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/18/25, at 8.

The trial court did not err by finding Sergeant Dooley had reasonable

suspicion Correa was armed and dangerous, permitting a Terry frisk. Correa

was a passenger in a stolen vehicle, and neither he nor the driver could

produce registration. Seemingly in response to the questions about whether

he was armed or had narcotics on him or in the car, Correa volunteered the

fact he was returning from seeing a bail bondsman for an open firearms

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charge. See N.T., 1/10/24, at 17. Although Correa characterizes his

statement as “the opposite of suspicious behavior,” see Correa’s Brief at 26,

the existence of the firearm charge against him created a reasonable belief he

might be armed.5 See In re O.J., 958 A.2d 561, 564 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en

banc) (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (explaining “roadside encounters[]

between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may

arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a

suspect.”). Further, the interaction occurred in a high crime area, another

factor supporting the existence of reasonable suspicion; in fact, a police

officer’s observations of a defendant’s conduct in a high crime area can

contribute to a finding not only of reasonable suspicion but of probable cause,

which requires a higher quantum of suspicion. See Commonwealth v.

Joseph, 34 A.3d 855, 863-64 (Pa. Super. 2011). Here, the officers knew

Correa was in a stolen vehicle, was on bail on a firearms charge, and the

interaction occurred in a high crime area. Considering the totality of the

circumstances, Sergeant Dooley had reasonable suspicion Correa may be

armed and dangerous, permitting a Terry frisk.6 See In re D.M., 781 A.2d

5 Moreover, Correa may have chosen to reveal the gun charge knowing the

officer would discover it independently through a search on a computer in the squad car.

6 Correa cites Commonwealth v. Miller, 333 A.3d 470 (Pa. Super. 2025), to

support the proposition that Sergeant Dooley failed to articulate specific facts from which he inferred Correa was armed and dangerous. See Correa’s Brief (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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1161, 1163-64 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted) (explaining while presence in a

high crime area alone does not establish reasonable suspicion, “the fact that

[a] stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’” can be a factor establishing

reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk). 7

at 18-20. Miller, however, involved an appellant who was frisked on suspicion of drug activity alone. See Miller, 333 A.3d at 474. Correa’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Kent, 2025 WL 2159081 (Pa. Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum) is similarly misplaced; in that case, officers frisked Kent solely because the car in which he was a passenger was in a “try-and-locate” status. See Kent, 2025 WL 2159081 at *1. Neither Miller nor Kent involved a stolen car nor a passenger’s admission to an open firearms charge. Thus, those cases are inapposite.

Additionally, Correa cites Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021), to argue the area’s crime rate should have no relevance towards a reasonable suspicion analysis. However, Barr discusses the importance of a “high crime” area in the context of an analysis of the existence of probable cause to conduct a warrantless car search; it determines the police lacked probable cause to search a car without a warrant based solely on a vehicle stop and the smell of marijuana. See id. at 44. Thus, Barr does not apply here.

Finally, Correa conflates the consideration of prior arrests in sentencing with the consideration of prior arrests in a reasonable suspicion analysis. Correa cites Commonwealth v. Berry, 323 A.3d 641 (Pa. 2024), to support his proposition that a previous arrest “ultimately means nothing.” See Correa’s Brief at 27 (citing Berry, 323 A.3d at 654). However, Berry did not concern the relevance of prior arrests to an officer in the field assessing reasonable suspicion; it held that a sentencing court cannot consider prior arrests. See Berry, 323 A.3d at 655. In the context of assessing reasonable suspicion, relevant, recent case law from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agrees a suspect’s presence in a high crime area is relevant to assessing reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016, 1029 (Pa. 2025).

7 Because the police had reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry frisk, we do

not address the suppression court’s assertion of the right to conduct a “safety” (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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In his second and final issue, Correa asserts that the search incident to

arrest exception to the warrant requirement cannot apply because he was

arrested without probable cause. In other words, because his arrest was not

valid, the search incident to arrest exception did not apply.

As this Court has explained, probable cause exists:

when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested. The question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. Whether probable cause exists is a highly fact-sensitive inquiry that must be based on the totality of the circumstances as viewed through the eyes of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer guided by experience and training.

Commonwealth v. Sears, 311 A.3d 34, 39 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Correa argues the fact the car had stolen plates was insufficient to arrest

him because he was merely a passenger in the car. See Correa’s Brief at 31.

We do not reach the question of whether there was probable cause to

arrest Correa prior to Sergeant Dooley finding the narcotics. Because the stop

and frisk were valid pursuant to Terry, the existence of another exception to

the warrant requirement is irrelevant. See Simonson, 148 A.3d at 797

frisk, outside of the confines of Terry or any other exception to the warrant requirement.

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(listing the several exceptions, including stop and frisk and search incident to

arrest).8 Therefore, given our disposition of Correa’s first claim, this claim

could not provide a basis for relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 6/25/2026

8 In the event that Correa contests probable cause to arrest him after Sergeant Dooley found the fentanyl, his claim is meritless. Sergeant Dooley had years of experience and has recovered narcotics over one hundred times. See N.T. 1/20/24, at 7, 11. Sergeant Dooley testified that, upon patting down Correa, he immediately recognized the rectangular packages as a typical way in which heroin is packaged. See id. at 11-12, 18. Thus, through the eyes of Sergeant Dooley, guided by his ample experience and training, there was probable cause to arrest Correa for narcotics-related charges. See Sears, 311 A.3d at 39.

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