J-S42044-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMES ARTHUR CORBETT : : Appellant : No. 645 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 12, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002239-2019
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 26, 2026
James Arthur Corbett (“Corbett”) appeals from the order denying his
first, timely petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act1 (“PCRA”). We affirm.
On direct appeal, this Court summarized the underlying facts as
follows:2
On March 17, 2018, Alan Bocchini, Jr. [(“Decedent”),] was found dead[, due to] an overdose of heroin and fentanyl. Police arrested [Decedent’s] dealer, Kayleigh Hess [(“Hess”),] and she confirmed that she had sold opioids to [Decedent] on the day of his death. Hess also informed police that she had purchased the drugs she sold to [Decedent] from Corbett, her dealer whom she knew by the name of “Sha.”
Detectives arranged for Hess to make two controlled purchases on [consecutive days,] August 28 and August 29, 2018 from “Sha”; on each occasion, she purchased ten packets of a ____________________________________________
1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2 For ease of discussion, we have amended the Superior Court memorandum’s
references to “Appellant” to “Corbett.” J-S42044-25
white substance that tested positive for fentanyl and acetyl fentanyl, a fentanyl derivative.
Detectives also worked with another confidential informant, Linda Johnson [(“Johnson”)], who bought drugs from Corbett, whom she knew as “D.” Johnson performed two controlled purchases from Corbett on August 29[, the same day as the second purchase by Hess,] and October 16, 2018. [Corbett sold to Johnson, respectively,] ten packets of fentanyl and acetyl fentanyl and . . . ten glassine bags containing fentanyl.
Commonwealth v. Corbett, 279 A.3d 1280 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished
memorandum at 1-2) (footnote omitted and paragraph break added), appeal
denied, 289 A.3d 520 (Pa. 2022).
In connection with Decedent’s death, the Commonwealth charged
Corbett with: drug delivery resulting in death, conspiracy to commit drug
delivery resulting in death, possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance (“PWID”), and conspiracy to commit PWID. Additionally, the
Commonwealth charged Corbett with four counts of PWID, relating to the two
controlled purchases each with Hess and Johnson. Finally, the Commonwealth
charged Corbett with corrupt organizations and conspiracy to commit corrupt
organizations, for allegedly engaging in illegal drug activities with Hess and
others.
J. Richard Robinson, Esquire (“Trial Counsel”), represented Corbett.
Pertinently, Trial Counsel filed a pre-trial motion to sever the charges related
to Decedent’s death. The trial court denied this motion.
All of the above charges against Corbett proceeded to a jury trial in
2020. Hess testified regarding her purchase of drugs from Corbett, including
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the two controlled drug purchases conducted by police. On two or three
occasions, Hess accompanied Corbett and another man to New York to
purchase drugs. At Corbett’s direction, Hess “test[ed] the drugs” by injecting
them and “giving [her] opinion on them.” N.T., 9/14/20, at 254-55.3 Hess
acknowledged the Commonwealth’s promise of favorable treatment in
exchange for her testimony against Corbett. On extensive cross-examination
by Trial Counsel, Hess agreed that she faced an aggregate maximum sentence
of 232 years’ imprisonment, but she had a pending plea agreement to serve
a total sentence of one year less one day’s imprisonment to two years less
two days imprisonment, followed by seven years’ probation.
Pertinently, Johnson died prior to trial due to a drug overdose. See
PCRA Court Opinion, 5/12/25, at 5. At trial, however, the parties merely
stated that Johnson was “unavailable.” N.T., 9/14/20, at 528. York City Police
Detective Clayton Glatfelter (“Detective Glatfelter”) testified that Johnson told
him that “she could purchase heroin from a [B]lack male [whom] she knew as
D.” Id. Johnson also described “D,” the location of his apartment, and his
car, and provided his telephone number. Detective Glatfelter noted this was
the same number that Hess provided as Corbett’s number.
____________________________________________
3 The cover sheet of the trial transcript indicates that it covers the proceedings
from September 14 through September 18, 2020. For ease of review, we cite this transcript with the September 14, 2020 date only.
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Detective Glatfelter testified that he oversaw Johnson’s first controlled
drug purchase, as well as Hess’ two controlled drug purchases, all from
Corbett. See N.T., 9/14/20, at 478-79, 493. Another detective testified that
he arranged Johnson’s second controlled drug purchase. Both detectives, as
well as multiple officers, observed Corbett participate in these transactions or
observed him present in the car in which the transactions occurred.
Corbett did not testify or present witnesses or evidence. His defense
theory was that he did not sell any drugs and that Hess, an admitted drug
dealer with a favorable plea deal, was not a credible witness.
Pertinently, the trial court offered to give an accomplice/polluted source
jury instruction with respect to Hess. Trial Counsel declined this instruction.
See N.T., 10/17/24, at 9.
The jury found Corbett not guilty of the charges relating to Decedent’s
death. However, the jury found Corbett guilty of the four PWID counts related
to the controlled purchases to Hess and Johnson, as well as the corrupt
organizations and conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations charges.
On October 22, 2020, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of
twenty-three and one-half to forty-seven years’ imprisonment. The court
reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”), Corbett’s history, and
the nature of the offenses, including “the heinous nature of . . . using [Hess]
as a lab rat to engage in human testing of deadly drugs.” Corbett, 279 A.3d
1280 (unpublished memorandum at 20).
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Corbett filed a direct appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
and discretionary aspects of his sentence. This Court denied relief and
affirmed the judgment of sentence. On December 14, 2022, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.
On February 24, 2024, Corbett filed a timely, counseled PCRA petition4
by Zak Goldstein, Esquire. Corbett alleged Trial Counsel was ineffective for:
(1) not moving to sever the charges related to Johnson’s controlled drug
purchase, as well as not appealing the denial of severance of the charges
related to Decedent; (2) not requesting an accomplice/polluted source jury
instruction with respect to Hess; (3) not raising a hearsay objection to
Detective Glatfelter’s trial testimony as to what Johnson told him; and (4) at
the sentencing hearing, not presenting defense witnesses or objecting to the
trial court’s statements that Corbett sold drugs only for profit, and not to
support his own drug use.
4 Corbett did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Thus, for PCRA purposes, his judgment of sentence became final at the end of the ninety-day period for him to seek certiorari, or March 14, 2023. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also U.S.S.Ct.R. 13. Corbett then generally had one year, or until March 14, 2024, to file a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). As stated above, he filed the instant petition on February 24, 2024.
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The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing.5 Trial Counsel
testified that at the time of Corbett’s trial, he had practiced law for thirty-three
years, had practiced criminal law exclusively since 1998, and had participated
in 350 to 400 jury trials.
Trial Counsel testified as follows with respect to Corbett’s PCRA claims.
First, Trial Counsel did not believe that a motion to sever the charges involving
Johnson would have been successful, because the offenses arose from a single
investigation related to the drug delivery resulting in death. Additionally, Trial
Counsel did not pursue the trial court’s denial of severance, of the drug
delivery resulting in death and related charges, because counsel believed
Corbett could not establish prejudice, as the jury found him not guilty of those
charges. See N.T., 10/17/24, at 19-20.
Second, with respect to an accomplice/polluted source jury instruction,
Trial Counsel testified that such an instruction would have been inconsistent
with the defense theory that Corbett was not involved with Hess and that she
fabricated her testimony. When asked whether the instruction would have
allowed the jury to find that Hess was an accomplice of someone else, not
Corbett, Trial Counsel disagreed. Trial Counsel further opined that requesting
a modification of the instruction to this effect would have been improper, as a
5 The Honorable Craig Trebilcock presided over Corbett’s severance motion,
trial, and sentencing. The Honorable Amber Kraft presided over the underlying PCRA proceedings.
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finding that Hess and Corbett were accomplices was “a substantial part of the
charge.” Id. at 11.
Third, Trial Counsel testified that he did not object to Johnson’s alleged
hearsay statements, presented through Detective Glatfelter’s testimony,
because in his experience, trial courts routinely permit limited testimony about
information provided by confidential informants to explain police conduct.
Trial Counsel further explained that he sought to avoid any reference to
Johnson’s death, out of concern that the jury might draw improper inferences
between her death and Corbett.
Finally, with respect to Corbett’s sentencing claim, Trial Counsel stated
the following. After trial, he and Corbett met and discussed the pre-sentence
investigation (“PSI”) report. Although Trial Counsel had talked with Corbett’s
mother, he did not recall any conversations about presenting defense
witnesses at sentencing. In any event, Corbett had “absolutely denied” to
Trial Counsel that he sold drugs, and their defense at trial was that Corbett
did not sell drugs at all. Id. at 27. Thus, any argument, that Corbett sold
drugs to support his own drug use, would have been contradictory.
Additionally, such an argument would not have been persuasive, where “a
substantial part of” the trial court’s reasoning for the sentence was Corbett’s
“tak[ing] advantage of Hess because Hess was a drug user,” and treating her
“as a test dummy . . . with no regard for her safety.” Id. at 25-26. Although
the PSI indicated that Corbett himself reported using crack cocaine daily and
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marijuana, “there was no connection [between] the use of marijuana and
crack [and the] distribution of heroin and fentanyl.” Id. at 26-27
(unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Finally, at the PCRA hearing, Corbett called his sister, brother, and
friend, who stated they would have testified on his behalf at sentencing.
Corbett himself did not testify at the PCRA hearing.
On May 12, 2025, the PCRA court issued the underlying order and
opinion, denying Corbett’s PCRA petition. Corbett filed a timely notice of
appeal, and he and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Corbett raises four issues for our review:
1. Was [Trial C]ounsel ineffective in his handling of the motion to sever for failing to move more specifically to sever the drug charges for one alleged buyer, . . . Johnson, from the rest of the case, and in failing to appeal the denial of the motion to sever that he did file because the alleged drug sales, especially to Johnson, had little or nothing to do with the drug delivery resulting in death charge?
2. Should [T]rial [C]ounsel have requested either the standard accomplice/polluted source instruction or a modified version of the instruction where the key witness against Corbett was a testifying co-defendant who received an incredibly favorable deal from the Commonwealth in this homicide case in exchange for her testimony?
3. Should [T]rial [C]ounsel have objected to hearsay testimony from the second cooperator, . . . Johnson, to the effect that she could purchase drugs from Corbett using the same phone number that the other cooperator used given that the unfair prejudice of this inadmissible hearsay substantially outweighed any probative value with respect to the effect on the listener or the investigation?
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4. Was [Trial C]ounsel ineffective at sentencing where he failed to object to the trial court’s unsupported finding that Corbett should receive a more severe sentence because he sold drugs only for profit and was not a drug user himself given that the evidence showed Corbett was in fact a drug user who sold drugs to support his own addiction, and relatedly, should trial counsel have presented mitigation evidence such as the testimony from family and friends where such evidence was available?
Corbett’s Brief at 4-5.
In his first issue, Corbett avers Trial Counsel was ineffective for: (1) not
moving to sever the charges relating to Johnson’s controlled drug purchases;
and (2) not appealing the denial of severance of the charges related to
Decedent’s death. We first review the applicable standard of review:
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and without legal error.” “[Our] scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court level.”
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 165 A.3d 34, 40 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations
omitted).
“Counsel is presumed effective; thus, [a petitioner] has the burden of
proving otherwise.” Id.
To prevail on his ineffectiveness claims, [a petitioner] must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1): the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) [the petitioner] suffered prejudice because of counsel’s action or inaction. With regard to the [reasonable basis] prong, we will conclude that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis only if [the petitioner] proves that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually
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pursued. To establish the [prejudice] prong, [the petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s action or inaction.
Id. at 41 (citation omitted). “The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for
ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 262
A.3d 589, 595-96 (Pa. Super. 2021).
With respect to the severance of charges, this Court has stated:
[“]A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and . . . its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 583, Severance of Offenses or Defendants, provides[:] “The court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or provide other appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together.”
The prejudice of which Rule 583 speaks is . . . that which would occur if the evidence tended to convict the appellant only by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for severance by itself.
****
Normally, evidence that a particular defendant committed a prior crime is admissible only where it tends to prove (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme, plan or design embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to prove the others, or (5) to establish the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. . . .
[T]he denial of a motion for severance is not an abuse of discretion if the facts and elements of the two crimes are
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easily separable in the minds of the jurors and if the crimes are such that the fact of commission of each crime would be admissible as evidence in a separate trial for the other.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 186 A.3d 985, 993-94 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citations omitted).
On appeal, Corbett avers that “[t]his case was essentially three cases:”
(1) his alleged March 2018 sale of heroin to Hess, and Hess’ reselling of the
heroin to Decedent, who then died of an overdose; (2) Corbett’s sales of
heroin to Hess; and (3) his sales of heroin to Johnson. Corbett’s Brief at 20.
Corbett asserts that: (1) “Johnson had absolutely nothing to do with the case
involving Hess or the . . . the homicide;” and thus (2) the “evidence in a trial
involving just the charges with Johnson,” which itself was “attenuated,” “would
not have been admissible in a separate trial involving Hess or” Decedent. Id.
at 24, 26, 32. Corbett contends that “the Commonwealth was able to smear
[him] as a drug dealer by consolidating the cases.” Id. at 25-26. For the
same reasons, Corbett claims Trial Counsel had no reasonable basis for not
seeking to sever the Johnson-related charges, and in not appealing the denial
of severance of the Decedent-related charges. Finally, Corbett avers that the
evidence — that Decedent died of an overdose, and that Hess purchased drugs
from Corbett and “was very involved with Corbett’s business in that she
travelled to New York with him to test the drugs” — “was all incredibly
prejudicial.” Id. at 25. Corbett concludes that had he “been charged
separately with the three separate offenses, there is a reasonable probability
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that the verdict would have been different,” and “[t]he jury would have had
to evaluate Hess’[] credibility on its own without being bolstered by the alleged
sales to Johnson.” Id. Relatedly, Corbett insists that “Hess had major
credibility issues.” Id. at 25. For the foregoing reasons, Corbett argues the
PCRA court erred in denying relief on this ineffectiveness claim.
After careful review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant
law, we affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Kraft, which
we incorporate herein. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/12/25, at 22-25 (finding:
(1) there was no arguable merit to Corbett’s claim, where the first sale
involving Johnson occurred contemporaneously with the two sales to Hess,6
and the second sale to Johnson, “less than two months later, was clearly part
of the ongoing investigation against” Corbett, “[t]his case amounted to one
large investigation [into Corbett’s] drug dealing,” and “[e]vidence of all of
[Corbett’s] drug dealing activity was admissible to prove the corrupt
organizations and conspiracy to corrupt organizations charges and vice
versa;” (2) Trial Counsel had a reasonable basis for not seeking the severance,
where he believed that Johnson’s controlled buys were part of the
investigation of the drug delivery resulting in death charge, and the
Commonwealth would have successfully cited “the entire history of the alleged
6 The PCRA court specified that the two sales to Hess occurred on August 28
and 29, 2018, and one sale to Hess occurred on August 29, 2018. See PCRA Court Opinion, at 5/12/25, 22.
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crime;” and (3) “there was no undue prejudice from a lack of severance,”
where the jury returned not-guilty verdicts on the charges related to
Decedent’s death and thus was “clearly capable of independent evaluation of
the charges [without] confusion”). Accordingly, we determine no relief is due
on Corbett’s first issue.
In his second issue, Corbett avers Trial Counsel should have requested
an accomplice/polluted source jury instruction. This Court has stated:
It is well settled that whether to request additional points for charge is one of the tactical decisions “within the exclusive province of counsel.” We should not invade that province and declare counsel ineffective if any reasonable basis for counsel’s decision existed at the time of trial. Rather, we should scrupulously follow the presumption that attorneys act in the interests of their clients, and insist that [a petitioner] meet his burden of proving that his attorneys had no reasonable basis for their action.
[T]he standard charge for accomplice testimony[7 is] commonly referred to as the corrupt and polluted source charge.[] [“I]n any case where an accomplice implicates the defendant, the judge should tell the jury that the accomplice is a corrupt and polluted source whose testimony should be viewed with great caution.” . . . “If the evidence is sufficient to present a jury question with respect to whether the prosecution’s witness was an accomplice, the defendant is entitled to an instruction as to the weight to be given to that witness’s testimony.”
7 The standard jury instruction: (1) begins with a definition of the term “accomplice;” and (2) instructs the jury to find whether the witness “was an accomplice in the crime charged” and if so, to “apply . . . special rules to [their] testimony,” including, inter alia, “view[ing] the testimony . . . with disfavor because it comes from a corrupt and polluted source.” Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 4.01 (emphasis added).
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“The ‘corrupt source’ charge in particular is designed specifically to address situations where one accomplice testifies against the other to obtain favorable treatment. It directs the jury to view the testimony of an accomplice with disfavor and accept it only with care and caution.”
Lawrence, 165 A.3d at 44-45 (citations and footnote omitted and emphasis
added).
On appeal, Corbett first avers: “Hess was obviously an alleged
accomplice. She and Corbett were both charged with conspiracy, she testified
that she purchased drugs from Corbett and sold them to [D]ecedent, and she
allegedly worked with the police to conduct two controlled buys of heroin from
Corbett.” Corbett’s Brief at 34-35. However, Corbett claims, “[t]o avoid the
47-year sentence that Corbett received, [Hess] decided to save herself by
testifying on behalf of the Commonwealth,” and thus the jury should have
received the accomplice/polluted source instruction. Id. at 36. Corbett
further avers that Trial Counsel’s decision, to not request the instruction, was
not reasonable. In support, Corbett reasons that: (1) the instruction does not
require the jury to find the witness was an accomplice of the defendant; and
(2) accordingly, Trial Counsel could have requested “a slight modification of
the instruction,” namely a suggestion “that the defendant is [not] in fact part
of the crime, but . . . instead [the instruction is] simply a guide for how to
view the testimony of someone who has claimed to be an accomplice in the
crime.” Id. at 36-37. Finally, Corbett claims prejudice, as “Hess was by far
the Commonwealth’s most important witness[, s]he identified Corbett as the
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person who sold the drugs to her that she re-sold to [D]ecedent[, and] she
testified that she purchased heroin from Corbett as part of the controlled
buys.” Id. at 42. Corbett maintains that Hess “had serious credibility issues.”
Id. at 43.
After careful review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant
law, we affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Kraft, which
we incorporate herein. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/12/25, at 15-16 (finding:
(1) Trial Counsel, who had “vast experience with not only criminal jury trials
but[ also] with the character and any peculiarities of York County juries,” had
a reasonable basis for declining the instruction; and (2) the PCRA court
“cannot say that that . . . giving the . . . instruction would have led to a
substantially greater chance of success,” especially where “[t]he jury head
extensively about . . . Hess’ favorable agreements in exchange for her
testimony against” Corbett).
We further conclude that Corbett has failed to show his underlying claim
had arguable merit. His insistence — that the instruction does not require the
subject witness to be an accomplice of the defendant but instead may be an
accomplice with anyone, including unnamed persons — is mistaken. As
quoted by Corbett both at the PCRA hearing and on appeal, the instruction
includes the phrase, “In view of the evidence of [name of accomplice]’s
criminal involvement, you must regard [him] [her] as an accomplice in the
crime charged.” N.T., 10/17/24, at 13-14 (emphasis added); Corbett’s Brief
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at 34 (emphasis added). Thus, the instruction clearly refers to the crimes
charged in the matter at hand, and thus necessarily to the defendant at trial.
Additionally, as stated above, our case law provides that the instruction
applies “where an accomplice implicates the defendant.” Lawrence, 165
A.3d at 44 (emphasis added).
Similarly, Corbett misconstrues the reasonable basis prong of an
ineffectiveness claim. We reject his contention that even though Trial Counsel
believed the trial court would have rejected modifications of the jury
instruction, for the legal reasons given by Trial Counsel, he should
nevertheless have requested them. See Corbett’s Brief at 39. We reiterate
that a request for a point for charge is “within the exclusive province of
counsel,” and we will “not invade that province and declare counsel ineffective
if any reasonable basis for counsel’s decision existed at the time of trial.”
Lawrence, 165 A.3d at 44. For the foregoing reasons, we determine no relief
is due on Corbett’s second issue.
In his third issue, Corbett avers Trial Counsel should have objected to
Johnson’s hearsay statements, as elicited through Detective Glatfelter. This
Court has stated: “The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion
of the trial court, wherein lies the duty to balance the evidentiary value of
each piece of evidence against the dangers of unfair prejudice, inflaming the
passions of the jury, or confusing the jury.” Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17
A.3d 939, 945 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
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Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Pa.R.E. 801(c). As a general rule, hearsay is inadmissible as such evidence lacks guarantees of trustworthiness fundamental to the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. However, “an out-of court statement offered not for its truth but to explain the witness’s course of conduct is not hearsay” and thus, is not excludable under the hearsay rule.
Id. (some citations omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Yates, 613 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1992), two police
officers testified at trial as to why they converged upon a particular city block:
[A]n informant had notified them that a large [B]lack male, i.e., [the defendant], was “dealing drugs” at that location. The trial court [admitted] this testimony on the basis that it was necessary to explain the course of police conduct, reasoning that without the testimony the jury would have had no means of knowing why the police went to [this block]. The court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury, however, stating . . . that the testimony about drug dealing was admitted only to explain why the police went to [that block].
Id. at 543. Following the jury’s convictions of PWID and possession of a
controlled substance, the defendant challenged, on appeal, the admission of
the hearsay statements. See id. at 542-43. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted relief, reasoning:
The challenged statements . . . were of a highly incriminating sort. They contained specific assertions of criminal conduct, and, despite the cautionary instruction given by the trial court, were likely to have been understood by the jury as providing substantive evidence of guilt. Inasmuch as [the defendant] was charged with possession of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, the informant’s statement to police that [the defendant] was “dealing drugs” would unavoidably have had a prejudicial impact.
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Id. at 543. The Court also reasoned that the police officers could have instead
stated “that they acted ‘upon information received.’” Id. at 544. The Court
held, “We must balance the prejudice arising from statements regarding [the
defendant’s] drug dealing against the prosecution’s need to introduce such
statements to explain police conduct.” Id. The Court thus granted a new
trial. See id.
Subsequently, in Estepp, a police officer testified at trial that “a
confidential informant . . . informed police that a 50-year-old white male
named ‘Vern[,’ later determined to be the defendant,] sold prescription drugs
out of his residence on 2828 Agate Street.” Estepp, 17 A.3d at 944-45. “As
a result, [the officer] arranged for a different informant to make a controlled
drug buy at this location.” Id. at 942. The defendant objected, and the
Commonwealth responded “that the admission of this evidence would be used
solely to explain [the officer’s] course of conduct.” Id. at 945. The trial court
permitted the testimony, but instructed the jury to consider the confidential
informant’s statement solely “to help explain why [the] officer did what he did
in the course of conduct of his investigation.” Id. The jury found the
defendant guilty of, inter alia, PWID. See id. at 942. On appeal to this Court,
the defendant argued that the officer’s testimony included “inadmissible
hearsay that the Commonwealth offered as substantive evidence of guilt to
convince the jury that [he] had a criminal propensity to sell drugs.” Id. at
945. This Court denied relief, on the ground the defendant presented no
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evidence to rebut the presumption that the jury followed the court’s
instruction. See id. at 945-46.
In the instant appeal, Corbett objects to Detective Glatfelter’s testimony
that Johnson told him that she could buy heroin from Corbett, and that she
described Corbett and his car and provided his address and telephone number.
Corbett avers that Trial Counsel’s failure to object to this hearsay testimony
“allowed [Detective Glatfelter] to testify that Johnson would have identified
[him] as a drug dealer,” and “[t]his testimony helped to prove the drug
delivery and corrupt organizations charges.” Corbett’s Brief at 46. Corbett
contends Trial Counsel was mistaken in believing the trial court would have
admitted the testimony under the res gestae exception, because “the unfairly
prejudicial impact greatly outweighed any probative value.” Id. at 47.
Relatedly, Corbett reasons that the PCRA court erred in finding the hearsay
was admissible to show why the police undertook certain action. Corbett relies
on Yates, which stated: “[I]t cannot be said that every out-of-court statement
having bearing upon subsequent police conduct is to be admitted,” as some
“statements will be considered by the jury as substantive evidence of guilt.”
Id. at 53. Finally, Corbett maintains that he suffered prejudice, as “unlike
Hess, Johnson [did not] testify, [and] the police did not record any of her calls,
[nor] capture any hand-to-hand exchanges in the photographs,” yet
Detectives Glatfelter and Monte “were allowed to testify that Johnson . . .
regularly purchase[d] drugs from Corbett.” Id. at 55.
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In denying relief on Corbett’s ineffectiveness claim, the PCRA court
acknowledged that in Yates, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined
that the hearsay statements were “highly incriminating” and thus “likely to
have been understood by the jury as . . . substantive evidence of guilt.” PCRA
Court Opinion, 5/12/25, at 27. However, the PCRA court also emphasized
that Yates “did not overrule the police conduct rule[,] but rather . . . reminds
courts that there are limitations.” Id. at 28. The court then observed that
subsequent decisions, including Estepp, “decided decades after Yates,”
“clearly recognized the admissibility of such statements with a cautionary
instruction to the jury,” and “demonstrate[d] the give and take tension that is
the nature and design of our adversarial system.” Id. at 30-31.
After careful review, we determine the record supports the PCRA court’s
denial of relief. See Lawrence, 165 A.3d at 40. The PCRA court aptly pointed
out that Yates did not announce a per se rule prohibiting all statements from
a confidential informant to a police officer, which could explain the officer’s
subsequent actions. Instead, Yates cautions a court to “balance the prejudice
arising from statements regarding [a defendant’s] drug dealing against the
prosecution’s need to introduce such statements to explain police conduct.”
Yates, 613 A.2d at 544.
Additionally, Corbett ignores that regardless of Detective Glatfelter’s
testimony as to what Johnson told him, there was ample evidence that he sold
heroin to Johnson on two occasions. The detective clearly testified that: he
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observed Corbett drive past him to meet Johnson; after the transaction,
Corbett walked by him; and other officers also observed Corbett travelling to
meet Johnson. With respect to Johnson’s second controlled purchase,
Detective Monte testified that he observed a Black male approach Johnson,
walk with her, and then enter a BMW. Other officers followed the BMW after
the transaction, observed Corbett, who was the sole occupant, exit the BMW,
and photographed him. Corbett makes no argument that these additional
observations were not admissible at trial. In light of the foregoing, we
conclude that Corbett has not established prejudice in his ineffectiveness
claim. As Corbett fails to meet this prong, his entire ineffectiveness claim
fails. See Davis, 262 A.3d at 595-96. Accordingly, his third issue warrants
no relief.
In his final issue, Corbett avers Trial Counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the trial court’s statement, at sentencing, that he sold drugs solely
for profit and not to support his own drug use. Corbett asserts that the trial
court imposed “an extreme sentence in significant part because of” this view.
Corbett’s Brief at 56. He maintains, however, that the PSI showed he “had a
serious addiction to . . . marijuana and crack cocaine,” “a very addictive drug.”
Id. Corbett insists that Trial Counsel “did nothing to correct the record.” Id.
at 58. With respect to Trial Counsel’s explanation that Corbett’s proposed
argument would have been inconsistent with Corbett’s denial of selling drugs
at all, Corbett reasons: “[C]ounsel is not bound by what his client told him.”
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Id. at 60. Furthermore, Corbett contends that his witnesses at the PCRA
hearing “would have testified on his behalf at sentencing and provided
mitigation” evidence, namely “a very different picture of [him] from that
presented at the . . . sentencing hearing.” Id. at 56-57.
After careful review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant
law, we affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Kraft, which
we incorporate herein. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/12/25, at 33-36
(reasoning: (1) “it is simply beyond cavil that [the trial court] was aware of
[Corbett’s] supposed daily crack cocaine usage,” as the court stated it
reviewed the PSI; (2) at sentencing, the court referred to Corbett’s own
statements that he “last used” marijuana and crack cocaine “several years
ago,” and “that he was able to beat his drug addiction himself while . . .
incarcerated;” (3) thus, any objection to the court’s “characterization of
[Corbett] as not having a drug problem would have been overruled;” (4)
Corbett did not tell Trial Counsel that he sold drugs to support his own drug
use; (5) in any event, a claim that Corbett sold drugs to fund his own drug
use would have been “in stark contrast to his claim that he was not selling
drugs;” (6) in imposing sentence, the trial court clearly stated its concerns
with Corbett’s “many failings,” threat to the safety of the community, “lack of
rehabilitative potential based upon his record,” “callous disregard for the
humanity of . . . Hess, upon whom Corbett tested drugs,” and “sadistic and .
. . unfeeling nature of such acts;” (7) the PCRA hearing testimony of Corbett’s
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friend, Serena Schmuck, that she and Corbett previously sold drugs to support
their drug habits, “was at [also] odds with [Corbett’s] entire defense that he
had not sold drugs;” and (8) any “[g]eneral platitude[] about what a good
person [Corbett] was towards his loved ones and friends would not have
moved the needle”).
Specifically, we also reject Corbett’s claim that Trial Counsel lacked a
reasonable basis for not raising the desired argument at sentencing. Trial
Counsel clearly explained why he did not object to the trial court’s statement
that Corbett sold drugs for profit and not to support his own drug use —
because (1) their entire trial theory was that Corbett did not sell drugs at all
and Hess was lying; and (2) Corbett did not make any statement to counsel
that he in fact did sell drugs and that it was to support his drug habit. Corbett’s
present disagreement with Trial Counsel’s rationale is insufficient to show
counsel lacked a reasonable basis at the time of sentencing.
Finally, we emphasize that Corbett ignores his far-reaching challenges
to the discretionary aspects of his sentence on direct appeal. Previously,
Corbett argued to this Court that the trial court: misapplied the sentencing
guidelines; erred in directing his sentences to run consecutively, as “the four
drug sales occurred over a brief time period;” failed to state a sufficient reason
on the record for imposing an aggravated-range sentence on corrupt
organizations; miscalculated the offense gravity scores of his PWID offenses,
based on the weight of the drugs; considered improper factors by “improperly
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double count[ing] his prior record when it was already taken into account in
the sentencing guidelines;” improperly found that he lacked remorse, as such
a finding “contravened his right to remain silent; and mistakenly found that
he “transported drugs across state lines when that was finding was
contradicted by Hess’s testimony that she did not see the drugs that Corbett
brought back . . . from New York City.” Corbett, 279 A.3d 1280 (unpublished
memorandum at 13-22). This Court’s discussion of Corbett’s sentencing
claims spanned eleven pages and addressed the merits of each of the above
claims. This Court further opined:
In sum, we determine that the trial court adequately stated the reasons for its sentence and did not rely on improper factors. Moreover, in light of the trial court’s consideration of the guidelines and the PSI, its opportunity to observe Corbett and its familiarity with his history and characteristics, and the court’s proper application of the guidelines to this case, including its well- explained decision to sentence in the aggravated range on the corrupt organizations count, we do not find that the sentences imposed here were “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2). Therefore, Corbett’s discretionary sentencing issues lack merit, and we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Id. at 23. Against this background, Corbett’s present challenge to one
additional, previously un-addressed comment at sentencing, is meritless. We
conclude the record supports the PCRA court’s denial of relief on Corbett’s final
ineffectiveness claim.
In sum, we determine none of Corbett’s claims merit relief. We affirm
the denial of his PCRA petition on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion and
the reasons set forth above. We direct the parties and PCRA court to attach
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a copy of the PCRA court’s May 12, 2025 opinion to this memorandum in the
event of further proceedings.
Order affirmed.
Judge King joins this decision.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 02/26/2026
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