Com. v. Copeland, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 1250 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A07041-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JEROME ANTOINE COPELAND : : Appellant : No. 1250 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0005203-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: JUNE 26, 2025

Appellant, Jerome Antoine Copeland, appeals the judgment of sentence

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of York County (suppression court),

following a bench trial in which he was found guilty of driving under the

influence of alcohol (second offense) (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(b)). He now argues

that the judgment of sentence must be vacated because the suppression court

erred in denying his dispositive motion to suppress the evidence obtained by

police during the subject traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle. Specifically,

Appellant contends that the arresting officer lacked a lawful basis to justify

the stop, and that the suppression court applied an incorrect legal standard

when denying the motion. As the record supports the suppression court’s

ruling that the stop was lawful, Appellant’s claims have no merit, and the order

on review must be affirmed. J-A07041-25

The suppression court summarized the pertinent facts of the subject

traffic stop as follows:

On October 21, 2022, [Appellant] was driving south on North George Street towards East 6th Avenue. Officer Austin Rardain ("the Officer") turned from Route 30 (westbound) onto North George Street and began following [Appellant]. The Officer observed [Appellant] begin to make a U-turn and pulled up behind [Appellant’s] vehicle. The Officer claimed that the stop was effectuated because [Appellant] had started to make a U-turn and then stopped when the Officer pulled up behind him. There is no sign forbidding U-turns at the intersection. [Appellant] stopped briefly during the execution of his turn and blocked the intersection.

****

After being stopped by the Officer, [Appellant] was subsequently subjected to a field sobriety test and blood draw and cited for careless driving and the moving of a stopped or parked vehicle.

Suppression Court Order and Opinion, 6/5/2023, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).

Following the traffic stop, Appellant was charged with driving under the

influence (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1)); driving under the influence of alcohol

— 2nd offense (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(b)); careless driving (75 Pa.C.S.A. §

3714(a)); and moving a stopped or parked vehicle unsafely (75 Pa.C.S.A. §

3333). Appellant sought to suppress all the evidence obtained by the arresting

officer on the ground that the officer’s initial observations were insufficient to

give him the requisite degree of suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred.

See Omnibus Pretrial Motion to Suppress Evidence, 3/17/2023, at paras. 5-

19.

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The suppression court held a hearing at which the arresting officer

testified to the above facts, recounting them while a motor vehicle recording

of the incident was played in open court. See N.T. Suppression Hearing,

4/25/2023, at 3-13. The officer testified that, upon positioning his patrol

vehicle behind Appellant’s car, he saw Appellant come to a complete stop while

making a wide U-turn in the middle of an intersection. See id., at 6-7. The

officer had to apply the brakes of his own vehicle to avoid a collision. See id.

Appellant’s car was stopped in the road for a few seconds before resuming, at

which point the officer pulled Appellant over and noticed signs of his

impairment. See id., at 7.1

Although U-turns were permitted at that intersection, and Appellant

made his turn through a green light, the officer believed there was probable

cause for a summary traffic offense based on the blocking of the intersection.

See id., at 13 (“[B]locking the intersection was the actual violation that I

observed.”). The officer also believed from his training and experience that

the wide turn taken by Appellant, and his sudden stop in the intersection,

could be indicative of impaired driving. See id., at 8-9.

The suppression court denied Appellant’s motion, ruling that the

arresting officer had lawfully stopped Appellant’s vehicle because he had

reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Vehicle Code had occurred. See ____________________________________________

1 Upon pulling Appellant over and walking to his driver’s side door, the officer

smelled the odor of alcohol from his person, and Appellant admitted that he had just left a bar, where he had consumed three beers. See Officer’s Affidavit of Probable Cause, 10/25/2022, at 1.

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Suppression Court Order and Opinion, 6/5/2023, at 3. At the subsequent

bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol

(second offense). The remaining counts were dismissed upon the agreement

of the parties. Appellant was sentenced to six months of restrictive probation.

He timely appealed, and in his brief, he now raises two related issues

concerning the legality of the traffic stop:

I. Did the suppression court err in denying [Appellant’s] Pretrial Omnibus Motion to Suppress the stop and seizure of [Appellant] and his vehicle and all evidence flowing therefrom where:

a. There was no lawful basis, under either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, for police to stop [Appellant’s] vehicle?

b. The [suppression] court incorrectly applied the reasonable suspicion standard in finding the traffic stop of [Appellant] lawful?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4 (issues re-ordered, suggested answers omitted).

Appellant’s first claim is that the suppression court erred in denying his

motion to exclude the evidence yielded from the traffic stop because the

arresting officer had no lawful basis to detain him for a violation of the Vehicle

Code.

On review of the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress, the

following standards apply:

[We are] limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court's factual findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for

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the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (internal

citations omitted).

“It is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.

The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence

presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Byrd, 185 A.3d

1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823

A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

“A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”

Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa. 2008) (citing Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 (1996)). As such, motorists subject

to a vehicle stop must be afforded the protections of the Fourth Amendment

to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania

Constitution, both of which protect individuals from unlawful searches and

seizures. See Chase, 960 A.2d at 113.

“A police officer has authority to stop a vehicle when he or she has

reasonable suspicion that a violation of the [V]ehicle [C]ode has taken place,

for the purpose of obtaining necessary information to enforce the provisions

of the [C]ode.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super.

2013). “However, if the violation is such that it requires no additional

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investigation, the officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop.” Id.

(citing Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the

officers' knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in

the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth

v. Evans, 661 A.2d 881, 885 (Pa. Super. 1995). In determining probable

cause, courts consider “all the factors and their total effect.” Id. (internal

citations omitted). The court should evaluate probable cause as seen

objectively through “the eyes of a trained officer” rather than an average

citizen, and analyze probable cause in terms of “the factual and practical

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [people] act.”

Id. (internal citations omitted). “[P]robable cause does not require certainty,

but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily

even the most likely inference.” Id. at 994 (internal citations omitted).

“Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause

to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if

it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (“The Fourth Amendment does not prevent police from stopping

and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic

laws, even if it is a minor offense.”) (citing Chase, 960 A.2d at 113). “[A]ny

violation of the Motor Vehicle Code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is

merely a pretext for an investigation of some other crime.” Harris, 176 A.3d

at 1020.

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Significantly, where the suppression court has applied an incorrect

standard when assessing the legality of a traffic stop, this Court is not bound

by such legal conclusions, and the ruling will be upheld if it is supported by

the record. See Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 300-01 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (en banc) (application of the wrong legal standard did not

compel reversal of order denying motion to suppress because "the law is well

settled that if the record supports the result reached by the suppression court,

we may affirm on any ground"); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 64

A.3d 1101, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“The suppression court erroneously

applied the probable cause standard rather than that of reasonable suspicion,

but the result is the same.”).

In the present case, the initial traffic stop of Appellant was justified by

the arresting officer’s observations. It is undisputed that, moments after the

officer drove his patrol vehicle behind Appellant’s car, Appellant came to a

complete stop in the middle of an intersection. This sudden stop caused the

officer to slow down his own vehicle in order to avoid a collision.

Appellant then resumed driving his vehicle without any apparent

difficulty, indicating that the stop was not caused by a mechanical malfunction

or Appellant’s incapacity. Accordingly, the officer witnessed an apparent

violation of section 3364 of the Vehicle Code, which states that, “[e]xcept

when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law,

no person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the

normal and reasonable movement of traffic.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3364(a).

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Appellant has argued that did not visibly violate the Vehicle Code

because no traffic was impeded when he stopped his car for a few seconds in

an intersection while making a U-turn. We find this argument to be

unpersuasive because the arresting officer himself was another motorist who

was impeded within the meaning of the statute, prior to the stop. See id.;

see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102 (Vehicle Code definition of “traffic,” providing in

relevant part that the term refers to “vehicles, streetcars and other

conveyances, whether singly or together, using any highway for purposes of

travel.”).

At the suppression hearing, the officer repeatedly stated that he was

directly behind Appellant’s car when he suddenly stopped in the intersection:

[Defense counsel]: Okay. Thank you. There were no cars coming behind him, is that correct, or around him?

[Officer]: Well, I was behind him.

[Defense counsel]: I apologize. Other direction, when he made the turn, there was nobody coming towards him; is that correct?

[Officer]: It looks like a car had just past him, but --

[Defense counsel]: Sure.

[Officer]: -- I see headlights a little bit more down, but I'm not a hundred percent up close.

[Defense counsel]: So no, there's nobody behind him currently when he makes this turn?

[Officer]: Except for me, no.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/25/2023, at 11 (emphasis added).

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The officer testified further that his patrol vehicle would have struck the

rear of Appellant’s car had he not quickly applied his breaks. See id., at 6-7.

On these facts, the officer had probable cause that section 3364 of the Vehicle

Code had been violated, and the traffic stop was justified at the outset insofar

as the officer was merely addressing the violation. See Commonwealth v.

Vasquez, Nos. 1123 WDA 2021 & 1124 WDA 2021 at *11-12 (Pa. Super. filed

March 13, 2023) (unpublished memorandum).

Appellant’s second, related, claim is that he is entitled to relief because

the suppression court, in its order and opinion, had referred to the “reasonable

suspicion” standard when assessing the legality of the traffic stop. See

Suppression Court Order and Opinion, 6/5/2023, at 1-2. It is true that no

further investigation was necessary for the officer to determine that a violation

of section 3364 had taken place in his presence, and that the proper test to

determine the legality of the traffic stop on that basis2 was whether the officer

had probable cause of a Vehicle Code violation.

However, despite the suppression court’s error, the record ultimately

supports the denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress. As discussed above,

the arresting officer was driving his patrol vehicle directly behind Appellant’s

car when the violation of the Vehicle Code took place, objectively giving the ____________________________________________

2 It appears that Appellant’s act of stopping his vehicle in an intersection was

charged instead under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3333, which prohibits a motorist from moving a stopped vehicle “unless and until the movement can be made with safety.” Pulling over Appellant based on a suspected violation of that statute would have likewise required probable cause, as a traffic stop would not have enabled further investigation into whether the violation had been committed.

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officer probable cause and thereby justifying a traffic stop. See N.T.

Suppression Hearing, 4/25/2023, at 11. From there, Appellant’s visible signs

of intoxication justified the continuation of the stop so that the officer could

investigate whether any additional offenses had been committed. Thus, the

entirety of the traffic stop was lawful, Appellant’s claims have no merit, and

the order on review must be upheld.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 06/26/2025

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