J-S30042-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : BRUCE A. COOPER : : Appellant : No. 340 EDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 20, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0438741-1984
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 6, 2023
Bruce A. Cooper (“Cooper”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing
his ninth petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We
affirm.
On March 13, 1984, Cooper went to Renee Blake’s (“Blake”) house to
rob her and Joseph Daniels (“Daniels”) as part of a drug-related dispute.
Cooper entered the home and dragged Daniels into the kitchen at knife point.
Blake fled from the house and obtained help; upon returning, she saw Cooper
fleeing the house and found Daniels inside, bleeding to death from a stab
wound. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, No. 3140 EDA 2007 (Pa. Super.
2008) (unpublished memorandum).
____________________________________________
1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S30042-23
In 1985, a jury found Cooper guilty of second-degree murder, robbery,
and possessing an instrument of crime. In 1987, Cooper received a sentence
of life imprisonment. Cooper was represented at trial by Adam O. Renfroe,
Esquire. This Court dismissed his direct appeal. The Supreme Court denied
Cooper’s petition for allowance of appeal on December 16, 1987. See
Commonwealth v. Cooper, No. 3140 EDA 2007.
Cooper filed a series of unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief under
both the Post Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”)2 and the PCRA. In his sixth
PCRA petition, Cooper asserted that he had a newly discovered fact that
constituted an exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements,3 i.e., that
Attorney Renfroe was addicted to alcohol and controlled substances at the
time of trial. This Court found that Cooper’s allegations concerning Attorney
Renfroe failed to establish a newly discovered fact satisfying the time-bar
exception. See id.
In March 2021, Cooper filed the instant pro se PCRA petition asserting
government interference regarding his claim concerning Attorney Renfroe,4
and an amended petition in March 2022. In December 2022, the PCRA court
issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, to which
2 The PCHA was modified in part, repealed in part, and renamed the PCRA by
the Act of April 13, 1988.
3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i).
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Cooper did not file a response. The court did not order Cooper to file a Rule
1925(b) statement and he did not do so.
On appeal, Cooper presents the following issues for our review:
[1.] Whether the cumulative effects of the Commonwealth’s concealment of after trial material evidence of trial counsel’s fitness and mental health and drug addiction constitute interference?
[2.] Whether [Cooper] would more likely than not have received a different ruling with the [undisclosed] evidence or in its absence, received a fair appellate review?
[3.] Whether an actual duty existed for after discovered evidence to be made known to [Cooper] by the Commonwealth?
[4.] Whether the judgment against [Cooper] is questionable under the 1985-1985 representation of Attorney Adam O. Renfroe?
Cooper’s Brief at Ab.
Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-
settled:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
-3- J-S30042-23
A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Cooper’s judgment of sentence
became final on March 15, 1988, ninety days after the December 16, 1987
denial of his petition for Pennsylvania Supreme Court review when his time
for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(3); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. Cooper had until March 15,
1989 to file the instant PCRA petition, but did not do so until March 2021.
Thus, Cooper’s petition is facially untimely under the PCRA, precluding review
of the merits of the issues raised in the petition, absent a time-bar exception.
See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the
petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of three exceptions set forth under
section 9545(b)(1), which provides:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
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to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Any petition attempting to invoke one of these
exceptions must “be filed within one year of the date the claim could have
been presented,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), which require the petitioner to
plead and prove the exercise of due diligence in obtaining the information.
See Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2019).
The government interference exception applies when “the failure to raise the
claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id.
Cooper claims that the Commonwealth knowingly concealed information
concerning Attorney Renfroe’s drug addiction. The PCRA court stated that
Cooper failed to identify any interference by government officials or explain
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J-S30042-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : BRUCE A. COOPER : : Appellant : No. 340 EDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 20, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0438741-1984
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 6, 2023
Bruce A. Cooper (“Cooper”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing
his ninth petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We
affirm.
On March 13, 1984, Cooper went to Renee Blake’s (“Blake”) house to
rob her and Joseph Daniels (“Daniels”) as part of a drug-related dispute.
Cooper entered the home and dragged Daniels into the kitchen at knife point.
Blake fled from the house and obtained help; upon returning, she saw Cooper
fleeing the house and found Daniels inside, bleeding to death from a stab
wound. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, No. 3140 EDA 2007 (Pa. Super.
2008) (unpublished memorandum).
____________________________________________
1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S30042-23
In 1985, a jury found Cooper guilty of second-degree murder, robbery,
and possessing an instrument of crime. In 1987, Cooper received a sentence
of life imprisonment. Cooper was represented at trial by Adam O. Renfroe,
Esquire. This Court dismissed his direct appeal. The Supreme Court denied
Cooper’s petition for allowance of appeal on December 16, 1987. See
Commonwealth v. Cooper, No. 3140 EDA 2007.
Cooper filed a series of unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief under
both the Post Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”)2 and the PCRA. In his sixth
PCRA petition, Cooper asserted that he had a newly discovered fact that
constituted an exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements,3 i.e., that
Attorney Renfroe was addicted to alcohol and controlled substances at the
time of trial. This Court found that Cooper’s allegations concerning Attorney
Renfroe failed to establish a newly discovered fact satisfying the time-bar
exception. See id.
In March 2021, Cooper filed the instant pro se PCRA petition asserting
government interference regarding his claim concerning Attorney Renfroe,4
and an amended petition in March 2022. In December 2022, the PCRA court
issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, to which
2 The PCHA was modified in part, repealed in part, and renamed the PCRA by
the Act of April 13, 1988.
3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i).
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Cooper did not file a response. The court did not order Cooper to file a Rule
1925(b) statement and he did not do so.
On appeal, Cooper presents the following issues for our review:
[1.] Whether the cumulative effects of the Commonwealth’s concealment of after trial material evidence of trial counsel’s fitness and mental health and drug addiction constitute interference?
[2.] Whether [Cooper] would more likely than not have received a different ruling with the [undisclosed] evidence or in its absence, received a fair appellate review?
[3.] Whether an actual duty existed for after discovered evidence to be made known to [Cooper] by the Commonwealth?
[4.] Whether the judgment against [Cooper] is questionable under the 1985-1985 representation of Attorney Adam O. Renfroe?
Cooper’s Brief at Ab.
Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-
settled:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
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A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Cooper’s judgment of sentence
became final on March 15, 1988, ninety days after the December 16, 1987
denial of his petition for Pennsylvania Supreme Court review when his time
for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(3); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. Cooper had until March 15,
1989 to file the instant PCRA petition, but did not do so until March 2021.
Thus, Cooper’s petition is facially untimely under the PCRA, precluding review
of the merits of the issues raised in the petition, absent a time-bar exception.
See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the
petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of three exceptions set forth under
section 9545(b)(1), which provides:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
-4- J-S30042-23
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Any petition attempting to invoke one of these
exceptions must “be filed within one year of the date the claim could have
been presented,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), which require the petitioner to
plead and prove the exercise of due diligence in obtaining the information.
See Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2019).
The government interference exception applies when “the failure to raise the
claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id.
Cooper claims that the Commonwealth knowingly concealed information
concerning Attorney Renfroe’s drug addiction. The PCRA court stated that
Cooper failed to identify any interference by government officials or explain
how the alleged interference prevented him from filing a timely petition. It
accordingly dismissed the petition. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/20/23, at 2
(unnumbered).
Cooper cannot successfully invoke the government interference
exception because he has known for decades about Renfroe’s substance
abuse. Cf. Cooper, No. 3140 EDA 2007) (unpublished memorandum at 6)
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(rejecting Cooper’s claim that Renfroe’s drug addiction was a newly-
discovered fact where Cooper asserted that fact in a February 1999 PCRA
petition). See also PCRA Court Opinion, 1/20/23, at 2 n.3 (noting that Cooper
has asserted ineffective assistance of prior counsel concerning Renfroe’s drug
addiction since 1999). Cooper cannot satisfy the government interference
exception or show that he timely asserted his claim with the exercise of due
diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (b)(2); Bankhead, 217 A.3d at
1248. Because Cooper did not establish a valid time-bar exception, the PCRA
court properly determined that it was without jurisdiction to consider his
petition.
Order affirmed.
Date: 10/6/2023
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