NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
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RODNEY COOK :
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Appellant : No. 2180 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 5, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0000890-2023
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 31, 2026 Appellant, Rodney Cook, appeals from the judgment of sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County imposed on May 5, 2025. On appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the legality of his sentence. Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant background as follows.
On May 23, 2023, [Appellant] litigated a motion to suppress a firearm recovered from his vehicle, contending that police lacked reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle, and therefore the subsequent search warrant that was executed lacked probable cause. On June 27, 2023, upon taking the matter under advisement, [the trial court] granted [Appellant]’s motion. The Commonwealth subsequently appealed to the Superior Court,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
which reversed and remanded for further proceedings on November 13, 2024.
On February 4, 2025, [Appellant] proceeded to a stipulated bench trial before [the trial court]. At said trial, the Commonwealth presented the following stipulated evidence:
If Parole Agent Riny Kanneh . . . were called to testify, he would testify that on January 11, 2022, he called [Appellant] to his office due to a PFA order being issued against [Appellant] regarding firearm allegations.
[Appellant] reported to Agent Kanneh’s office, and [Appellant] was searched. On [Appellant]’s person was a key fob. [Appellant] repeatedly denied driving to the parole office. Said the key was for a car, but he did not drive there. Agent Kanneh went outside and clipped the key fob[,] which alerted a black two door Nissan[.]
Inside the black Nissan, Agent Kanneh observed a black semiautomatic Glock 23 handgun with an extended magazine laying on the passenger seat.
Agent Kanneh then secured the vehicle and waited for law enforcement to arrive.
If Special Agent Kyle Boyd of the Attorney General’s Gun Violence Task Force were called to testify, he would testify that he photographed and recovered the loaded Glock 23 pursuant to a search warrant from the passenger seat of the Nissan. The firearm was preserved for DNA analysis. It was later swabbed by the PPD Crime Scene Unit. Agent Boyd also obtained a search warrant for [Appellant]’s DNA and submitted the swabs of [Appellant]’s cheeks for DNA analysis.
If Agent John Murphy, Parole Task Force Officer, were called to testify, he would testify that he obtained surveillance video of the parole office on the day in question showing [Appellant] arriving in the black Nissan and entering the parole office. No other individuals were seen entering or leaving the Nissan.
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On May 20th, 2023, Forensic Scientist Jean Hess[,] of the PPD Criminalistics Unit[,] who was an expert in DNA analysis[,] completed a DNA analysis report with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty indicating the likelihood of [Appellant]’s DNA being present on the firearm. She found that it was 65.52 thousand times more likely that [Appellant] and three other individuals DNA mixture was present on the firearm [than] four random individuals in the Caucasian population, 27.92 thousand times more likely that [Appellant] and three other individuals DNA mixture was present on the firearm than four random individuals in the African American population, and 47.40 thousand times more likely that [Appellant] and three other individuals DNA mixture was present on the firearm than four random individual in the Hispanic population.
If Police Officer Raymond Andrejczak [] were called to testify, he would testify that he test fired the recovered firearm and determined it was operable.
[Appellant] is prohibited from possessing a firearm due to an enumerated felony conviction for the purposes of 18 Pa.[C.S. Section] 6105. Additionally, [Appellant] does not have a license to carry a firearm in Philadelphia.
N.T. 2/4/25, at 7-10.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the [trial court] found [Appellant] guilty of person not to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried without a license, and carrying a firearm on the public streets of Philadelphia. On May 5, 2025, upon consideration of the presentence investigation report, and all relevant facts and circumstances of this case, [the trial court] sentenced [Appellant]
to an aggregate term of 5 to 10 years incarceration, followed by one year of probation. [citing N.T. 5 /5/25, at 3-11].
On May 8, 2025, [Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the [trial court] denied on August 13, 2025. On the same date, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court, as well as a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal.
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Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/25, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).
On appeal, Appellant challenges his judgment of sentence on three grounds: the discretionary aspects of his sentences, the sufficiency of the evidence for all convictions, and the legality/constitutionality of Section 6105. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. We address each in turn.
Discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentences
Appellant claims that the sentencing court failed to properly consider all sentencing factors of Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) and any mitigating evidence when it imposed the sentence in question. Appellant’s Brief at 22. His actual argument, however, is different. Instead, Appellant claims the sentencing court imposed a “mandatory minimum sentence in the aggravated range,” without considering any mitigating factors. Id.
Challenges to the sentencing court’s failure to consider mitigating factors involves the discretionary aspects of a sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roades, 8 A.3d 912, 918-19 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such claims, we must determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issues; (3) whether Appellant's brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
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substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).
Here, the appeal was timely, Appellant preserved the issue in a post-
sentence motion to reconsider, and his appellate brief does not have a fatal defect. Therefore, we must determine whether Appellant raises a substantial question.
A substantial question will be found where an appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process. At a minimum, the Rule 2119(f) statement must articulate what particular provision of the code is violated, what fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the manner in which it violates that norm.
Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015).
In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant contends that the court violated the express provisions of the sentencing code and imposed “a mandatory minimum sentence in the aggravated range” in contravention of the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. See Appellant’s Brief, at 20. Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider the sentencing factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), as well as any mitigating factors. We conclude that Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question for our review. Generally, “a claim that the sentencing court failed to consider or accord proper weight to a specific sentencing factor does not
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raise a substantial question.” Id. at 310-11 (citing Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc).
Even if Appellant had raised a substantial question, we would conclude he is not entitled to relief.
Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9781(c), (d), and 9721(b). See, Raven, supra; Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735, 741 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Subsection 9781(c) provides:
The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
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In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c).
In reviewing the record, we consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation [(PSI)].
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).
Additionally, “[w]hen imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant[.]” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006). “A sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court's consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.” Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted). The trial court “must consider the sentencing guidelines.” Fullin, 892 A.2d at 848 (citation omitted). However, “where the trial court is informed by a PSI [report], it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court
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has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 638 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Finally, the balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant and all witnesses firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa. Super. 2023). In conducting appellate review, this Court cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose its judgment in place of a sentencing court where the lower court was fully aware of all mitigating factors. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009)).
As noted above, Appellant claims the sentencing court imposed a “mandatory minimum sentence in the aggravated range,” without considering all mitigating factors. At the outset, we are not certain what Appellant means when he refers to “a mandatory minimum sentence in the aggravated range.” An aggravated range sentence refers to a prison term in excess of standard advisory guidelines. Regardless, it seems clear that Appellant’s argument is that the court failed to consider all mitigating factors when it imposed what he considers a harsh and excessive sentence. We find no merit to this claim.
A pre-sentence investigation (PSI) was entered into evidence and the parties agreed that Appellant’s Prior Record Score (PRS) was 5; that for the lead count of VUFA § 6105, a felony of the first degree, the Offense Gravity Score (OGS) was 11 and the guidelines recommended a minimum sentence
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of 6 to 7 1/2 years, plus or minus 1 year Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. 1 With this understanding, the trial court noted that the Sentencing Guidelines recommend a minimum term of incarceration ranging from 72 to 90 months, plus or minus 12. Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/25, at 7 n.4. Notwithstanding the Commonwealth's recommendation of 7 1/2 years (90 months) to 15 years of incarceration, the court imposed a mitigated sentence of 5 to 10 years of incarceration, i.e., a minimum term of 60 months. Id. Accordingly, the record facts are at distinct odds with Appellant’s claim that he was subject to a “mandatory minimum sentence in the aggravated range.” Appellant was sentenced in the mitigated range at the lowest end of the Sentencing Guidelines for his conviction under § 6105. Sentencing on his other two convictions were for probation to commence at the same time as Appellant’s sentence for his § 6105 conviction and for a maximum period of 5 years, mirroring the minimum term of incarceration imposed for Appellant’s § 6105 conviction.
Moreover, the sentencing court, which had the benefit of the presentence investigation report, did consider “all pertinent factors and circumstances of this case, . . . including his positive behavior and completion of the ‘Inside Prison Exchange Program’ while incarcerated.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/25, at 7. While some of those factors and circumstances were
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1 Appellant has not taken any exception to this representation of the record related to us within the Commonwealth’s brief.
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not weighed as Appellant wished, that is not an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 274 (Pa. Super. 2017) (court does not abuse its sentencing discretion when it considers the relevant sentencing factors but weighs them in a manner inconsistent with the appellant’s wishes); Commonwealth v. Clark, 2025 WL 1160073, at *4 (Pa. Super., Apr. 21, 2025) (unpublished memorandum) (same).
Accordingly, Appellant is not due relief on his challenges to the discretionary aspects of his sentences.
Sufficiency of the evidence claims Appellant generally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all elements for all of his convictions. 2 He purports to do so within a mere two pages in the argument section of his brief. Id. at 24-26. It is well-established that Appellant’s “generic, boilerplate challenge to ‘all elements’ of every one of Appellant's conviction is too vague to permit appellate review,” Commonwealth v. Bynum, 2026 WL 1506900 at *2 (Pa. Super. May 29, 2026), and that such a challenge generally results in waiver. Id. In the instant matter, however, we decline to find a complete waiver of Appellant’s sufficiency claims, as a review of the argument section of Appellant’s brief
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2 “The evidence introduced at trial and all reasonable inferences derived from
the evidentiary record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is insufficient to establish all elements for the crimes for which he was charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Brief at 24 (emphasis added).
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does identify the specific claim that there was insufficient evidence to establish constructive possession of the weapon at issue, a common element to all crimes for which he was convicted. We find no merit to this claim.
The Commonwealth may meet its burden of proving a possessory crime by showing actual possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession. [Commonwealth v. Thompson, 428 A.2d 223, 224 (Pa. Super. 1981)]. “Constructive possession”
is “the ability to exercise a conscious dominion over” the contraband. Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa.
Super. 2014). It usually comes into play when police find contraband somewhere other than on the defendant’s person.
Constructive possession requires proof that the defendant had knowledge of the existence and location of the item. Thompson, 428 A.2d at 224. The Commonwealth may prove such knowledge circumstantially. That is, it may prove that the defendant had knowledge of the existence and location of the items at issue “from examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case,” such as whether the contraband was located in an area “usually accessible only to the defendant.” Id.
Commonwealth v. Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 960-61 (Pa. Super. 2018).
The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows.
[T]he evidence plainly demonstrated that [Appellant] was in possession of a firearm in Philadelphia, and that he not only was unlicensed but statutorily prohibited from doing so. More specifically, the evidence established that [Appellant] was the only person arriving in the black Nissan containing the gun, and further established that no other individuals were seen entering or leaving the Nissan at any point prior to recovery of the firearm.
Additionally, when questioned, [Appellant] repeatedly lied about driving the vehicle, thereby exhibiting a consciousness of guilt.
Further, DNA analysis confirmed that the DNA on the firearm was consistent with [Appellant]’s DNA – to the degree of a nearexclusive -scientific certainty. Finally, the evidence established that [Appellant] was prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to Section 6105 due to a prior enumerated felony conviction. In sum, accepted as true, the totality of the evidence amply supported [Appellant]’s convictions in this case. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011)
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(evidence sufficient to sustain convictions under, inter alia, Sections 6106 and 6108, where, even though firearm was found in a compartment of the passenger side of the vehicle, appellant was the only person seen inside the vehicle and provided fabricated responses to questioning, exhibiting a consciousness of guilt).
Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/25, at 10-11.
Additionally, the record also shows that Appellant stipulated at trial that he was carrying a car key fob for the Nissan, and that the firearm was in plain view on the passenger seat of the Nissan.
In light of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court’s analysis and conclusion that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to find that Appellant constructively possessed the firearm.
Constitutionality of Appellant’s Section 6105 sentence Appellant claims the sentence imposed for violation of Section 6105, an aggregate term of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration, is illegal/unconstitutional. Specifically, Appellant “asserts that his sentence was illegal because the trial court relied on 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(a), a mandatory -minimum sentence statute that imposes a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence for a conviction of Possession of Firearm Prohibited - 18 P.S. § 6105 §§ A1 – which was declared unconstitutional.” Appellant Brief at 27 (footnote omitted).
The claim is patently frivolous. The record belies the underlying premise upon which this claim is based. Appellant did not receive a mandatory minimum sentence, whether under Section 9712 or otherwise. As noted
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above, the trial court “imposed a mitigated sentence at the lowest end of the Sentencing Guidelines[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/25, at 7 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Since the claim is meritless, no relief is due to Appellant.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 8/31/2026