Com. v. Conner, R.
This text of Com. v. Conner, R. (Com. v. Conner, R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
J-S39027-24 & J-S39028-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RICHARD MARTIN CONNER : : Appellant : No. 218 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 26, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001572-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : RICHARD MARTIN CONNER : : No. 219 WDA 2024 Appellant
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 26, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002869-2020
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: January 16, 2025 J-S39027-24
In these appeals, which we now consolidate for disposition,1 Richard
Conner purports to appeal from his judgment of sentence. For the reasons
discussed below, we vacate the trial court’s order denying Conner’s nunc pro
tunc post-sentence motion and remand with instructions.
On May 12, 2022, a jury convicted Conner of multiple crimes including
terroristic threats and aggravated assault, as a result of two incidents where
he confronted his ex-girlfriend. On July 26 2022, the trial court imposed an
aggregate term of 8 to 16 years of imprisonment, to be followed by a two-
year probationary term.
On August 5, 2022, trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw, in which he
requested the appointment of new counsel and an extension of time to file
post-sentence motions. Although the court scheduled a hearing on this
motion in September, it was later continued at Conner’s request, and
ultimately argued on December 5, 2022. That same day, the trial court
entered an order granting newly appointed counsel thirty days to file a post-
____________________________________________
1 Previously, this Court issued arule to show cause why these two appeals should not be consolidated. In her response, Conner’s counsel asked that the appeals not be consolidated so that the issues could be briefed separately. Thereafter, the rule was discharged and the propriety of consolidation was deferred to this panel. We now consolidate the appeals.
In addition, we note that, at No. 218 WDA 2024, counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For the reasons expressed infra, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and, upon remand, direct the PCRA court to appoint new counsel.
-2- J-S39027-24
sentence motion. Current counsel was assigned the case on December 22,
2022.
On January 4, 2023 current counsel filed a petition for extension of time
because she “cannot file anything on behalf of [Conner] until the transcripts
are received.” Current counsel stated that she was filing a motion for
transcripts and that she was requesting thirty days “from the date the last
transcript is received by her” from the court reporters to file a post-sentence
motion. According to current counsel, “this will give [her] time to review the
transcripts and correspond with [Conner] regarding any questions she might
have in regard to the information contained therein.”
The next day, the trial court entered an order directing the court
stenographers to file “all transcripts of all proceedings” for Conner and notify
current counsel as soon as this task was completed.
Over ten months later, Conner filed a motion to reinstate his post-
sentence rights nunc pro tunc. In this motion, current counsel averred that,
although the final transcript was filed in May, she “inadvertently failed to file
the post sentence motion in a timely manner after the final transcript was
filed.” Counsel stated that, in order to preserve sentencing issues for appeal,
it was necessary to file a post-sentence motion in order for Conner to seek
modification of his sentence. The trial court directed the Commonwealth to
file a response, and the Commonwealth stated that it did not object to
Conner’s motion to reinstate his post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc, or to
a second extension of time to file the motion.
-3- J-S39027-24
On December 21, 2023, Conner filed a “Motion for Post-Sentence
Relief.” In this motion, Conner asserted that the trial court erred in
consolidating the two dockets for trial and that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. The Commonwealth filed a response in which it
contended that each issue raised by Conner was meritless. By opinion and
order entered February 6, 2024, the trial court denied Conner’s motion for
post-sentence relief. These appeals followed. Both Conner and the trial court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Before reaching the merits of either appeal, we must first determine
whether the trial court had jurisdiction to address Conner’s 2023 post-
sentence motion filed 17 months after his sentence was imposed. In response
to our rule to show cause, current counsel explained that the trial court
considered the 2023 post-sentence motion as a PCRA petition pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2013). Thereafter, this
Court received a letter from the trial court confirming counsel’s position.
Our review of the certified record in these appeals readily reveals that
counsel’s reliance upon Taylor is misplaced. In Taylor, the trial court denied
Taylor’s serial post-conviction writ of habeas corpus as an untimely post-
sentence motion, and this Court affirmed. Taylor, 65 A.3d at 464. In doing
so, however, we agreed with the Commonwealth that Taylor’s filing was not a
post-sentence motion, but rather, a serial, untimely PCRA petition. Id. at
465. We then noted that a petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed
within one year of the date the PCRA petitioner’s judgment of sentence
-4- J-S39027-24
becomes final unless the petition alleges and proves that an exception to the
PCRA’s time bar is met. Id. at 468. We determined that because Taylor did
allege and prove a time-bar exception, he waived any procedural irregularity
under the PCRA. Id.
Here, for PCRA purposes, Conner’s judgment of sentence became final
on August 25, 2022, thirty days after he failed to file an appeal to this Court.
Thus, he had until August 25, 2023, to file a timely first PCRA petition.2 As
he filed his motion for post-sentence relief in December 2023, it is untimely.
Nonetheless, as recognized and contrasted by this Court in Taylor, in cases
where an untimely motion was improperly considered outside the PCRA, “the
defendants were proceeding on what would have been their first-time PCRA
proceedings, entitling them to counsel if the motion were treated as a PCRA
petition[.]” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 866 A.2d 442 (Pa. Super.
2005), and Commonwealth v. Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502
(Pa. Super. 2000)). In these situations, PCRA counsel must be appointed
even if the PCRA petition appears untimely, to assist the petitioner in
determining whether a timeliness exception may apply. Guthrie, 749 A.2d
at 504.
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