Com. v. Coles, L.

2025 Pa. Super. 258

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 14, 2025
• Docket: 1693 MDA 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A15017-25

2025 PA Super 258

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LOUIS LEON COLES : : Appellant : No. 1693 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No: CP-22-CR-0003480-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 14, 2025

Appellant, Louis Leon Coles, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed on November 6, 2024, by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin

County. He challenges the denial of his suppression motion on the grounds

that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop. Upon

review, we affirm.

On August 9, 2023, Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Gregory

Archulet was on routine patrol watching southbound traffic around mile-

marker 74 on Interstate 81.1 N.T. Suppression, 4/30/24, at 3-4, 6. After

entering the flow of traffic, Trooper Archulet and his partner observed a gray

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Although Trooper Archulet’s vehicle was equipped with a Mobile Video Recorder (“MVR”) and he completed the paperwork necessary to preserve the video, the video ultimately was not preserved. N.T. Suppression, 4/30/24, at 18-19. J-A15017-25

Infiniti sedan with heavily tinted windows travelling in the left lane of travel

for over two miles. Id. at 7. As a result, Trooper Archulet initiated a traffic

stop. Id.

Prior to stopping the vehicle, Trooper Archulet ran the license plate and

learned the vehicle was registered to a female. Id. Appellant, a male, was

the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle and provided Trooper Archulet with

a Maryland driver’s license. Id. Initially, Trooper Archulet informed Appellant

that he “was going to do [his] best to issue [Appellant] a warning.” Id. at 10.

While speaking with Appellant, Trooper Archulet observed various air

freshener devices within the vehicle – one hanging and at least one cannister

underneath the seat. Id. at 8, 23. Trooper Archulet then returned to his

vehicle to run Appellant’s name through their system, which showed Appellant

had a criminal history, including prior convictions involving firearms and

narcotics.2 Id. at 9, 12.

Because Trooper Archulet did not obtain the vehicle registration from

Appellant during his initial contact, he returned to Appellant’s vehicle and

asked for the vehicle registration. Id. at 9. He then asked Appellant to exit

the vehicle, to which he complied and walked toward the rear of his vehicle.

Id. at 10. Trooper Archulet shook Appellant’s hand and noticed that it was

2 The preliminary hearing transcript, which was attached to Appellant’s brief

in support of his motion to suppress, indicates that Appellant had a history of narcotics convictions, the most recent was in the late 1990’s. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 8/24/23, at 4. Trooper Archulet did not testify that Appellant had a history of firearms convictions at that time.

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moist, which indicated that Appellant was nervous. Id. Appellant’s

nervousness appeared to increase after exiting the vehicle and during their

continued conversation. Id. at 10-11. Trooper Archulet noted that it was

unusual because most people become less nervous after learning that they

will only receive a warning. Id. He returned to his patrol vehicle and

continued conducting the traffic stop. Id. at 11.

During this time, Appellant stood outside of the passenger side of the

patrol vehicle and answered Trooper Archulet’s questions. Id. Appellant

confirmed that the vehicle belonged to his friend. Id. at 11. When asked

about his criminal history, Appellant admitted that he was arrested for a

domestic violence charge in the 1980’s. Id. at 12. He omitted, however, the

firearms and narcotics convictions that Trooper Archulet had learned were part

of his criminal history. Id. At that point, Appellant was visibly agitated and

his nervousness increased. Id.

Moreover, Appellant said he came from Allentown, which based on

Trooper Archulet’s training and experience, is a source city for narcotics. Id.

Trooper Archulet asked Appellant if there was anything illegal in the vehicle,

to which Appellant said no. Id. at 13. Trooper Archulet then specifically asked

if there were any firearms in the vehicle and Appellant again said no. Id.

Appellant also specifically denied that there were any narcotics in the vehicle.

Id.

Based on Trooper Archulet’s observations of the illegal window tint,

multiple air fresheners, increased nervousness, travelling from a source city,

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and Appellant’s untruthful answers regarding his criminal history, he believed

there was evidence of a crime inside Appellant’s vehicle and asked for

Appellant’s consent to search the vehicle. Id. at 13. Appellant denied

consent. Id. at 14. Trooper Archulet then requested a canine unit to the

scene to conduct an exterior sniff of Appellant’s vehicle. Id. He testified that

it was his duty as a trooper to investigate whenever he observes behaviors

that are consistent with previous criminal cases. Id. at 27. It took

approximately 45 to 50 minutes for the canine to arrive. Id.

After arriving on scene, the canine did an exterior sniff and alerted for

the presence of narcotics. Id. at 16. Thereafter, Trooper Archulet again

requested consent to search Appellant’s vehicle roadside and advised that if

he denied consent, the vehicle would be towed to apply for a search warrant.

Id. at 16-17. Appellant denied consent. Id. at 17. He was detained, the

vehicle was towed and Trooper Archulet applied for a search warrant. Id. at

17. A search of the vehicle revealed 20 grams of crack cocaine, a single razor

blade with white residue, a plastic bag that contained small blue plastic bags,

and a bag of small black rubber bands. Id. at 18.

Appellant was charged with manufacture, delivery, or possession with

intent to manufacture or deliver (“PWI”), use or possession of drug

paraphernalia, and the summary offenses of driving in the right lane and

improper sunscreening. He filed a motion to suppress and argued that the

vehicle “stop extended beyond the period needed to complete the traffic stop

and police lacked reasonable suspicion to continue the stop and conduct a

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canine sniff[.]” Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 3/26/24, ¶ 2. Following a hearing,

the trial court denied suppression. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial

wherein Appellant was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to an

aggregate two and a half to five years’ imprisonment, which was stayed by

the trial court pending disposition of this appeal.

Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following for our review:

Whether the suppression court erred in finding that police did not violate [Appellant’s] Article I, Section 8 and Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures and searches where:

a. the stop went beyond the time required to provide [Appellant] with a ticket or warning and holding [Appellant] at the stop for one hour was unreasonable and;

b. police did not possess reasonable suspicion to continue the stop.

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

Our standard of review when addressing a challenge to the denial of a

suppression motion is

limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted.

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Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (internal

citations omitted). Our scope of review is limited to the record created during

the suppression hearing. In re L.J., supra.

“It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa. Super. 2019). “If there

is sufficient evidence of record to support the suppression court’s ruling and

the court has not misapplied the law, we will not substitute our credibility

determinations for those of the suppression court judge.” Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187 (Pa. 2014).

Here, Appellant does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop.

Instead, Appellant argues he was unlawfully seized when the officer prolonged

the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion. See Appellant’s Brief, at 18-19.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens against

unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement. See U.S. Const.

amend. IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. In Pennsylvania, officers must demonstrate

ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens.

Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 792 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted). Generally, a motor vehicle stop is an investigative detention which

requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Id.

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In the context of a traffic stop, the Supreme Court of the United States

explained

that the duration of police inquiries “is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’ – to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . and attend to related safety concerns.” A stop becomes unlawful when it “lasts . . . longer than is necessary” to complete its mission, the rationale being that the “authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are – or reasonably should have been – completed.” The Supreme Court elaborated that “the critical question . . . is not whether the inquiry occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but whether it prolongs –, i.e., adds time to – the stop.”

“An officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop” such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Further, tasks relating to officer safety are also part of a traffic stop’s mission when done purely in an interest to protect the officers. This safety interest stems from the fact that “traffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers, so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely.”

Id. at 792-93 (citing Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)) (brackets

omitted). We are further guided by the following principles:

To effectuate the safety of officers, during a lawful traffic stop, the officer may order the driver of a vehicle to exit the vehicle until the traffic stop is completed, even absent a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Further, an officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. To that end, for their own safety, officers may ask drivers whether they have a weapon or anything concerning as a matter of course during a traffic stop.

Importantly, not all inquiries during a traffic stop qualify as ordinarily incident to the stop’s mission, as measures aimed at finding evidence of other crimes or safety precautions taken to

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facilitate detours from the mission do not pass constitutional muster.

Id. at 793 (citations omitted). To establish grounds for reasonable suspicion

the officer must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and the person he stopped was involved in that activity.

In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In making this determination, we must give due weight . . . to the specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 164 (Pa. Super. 2023).

In Commonwealth v. Mattis, 252 A.3d 650 (Pa. Super. 2021), a

trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding. Id. at 652. The driver and sole

occupant of the vehicle, the defendant, provided his documents and the

trooper confirmed there were no active warrants. Id. at 652, 656. The

trooper noticed the defendant was extremely nervous and constantly

fidgeting. Id. at 656. Based on this observation, the trooper asked the

defendant to exit the vehicle to figure out why the defendant was so nervous.

Id. at 656.

We concluded that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong

the traffic stop:

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The trooper did not [request the defendant to exit his vehicle] in furtherance of his investigation for the speeding violation. Rather, the trooper sought to obtain additional information unrelated to the initial traffic stop. Significantly, once the primary purpose of the initial stop for the speeding violation ended, the trooper’s authority to order [the defendant] to exit his car had extinguished.

Id. at 656. The defendant’s nervousness, by itself, was not a sufficient basis

to warrant an investigatory detention. Id.

Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Owens, 2023 WL 4346820 (Pa. Super.

filed July 5, 2023) (unpublished memorandum)3, a trooper stopped a vehicle

for excessive speeding and following another car too closely. Id. at *3. When

the trooper approached the vehicle, the driver was smoking a cigar and there

were several backpacks and duffel bags in the back seat. Id. The vehicle was

a rental, and the defendant’s license was suspended. Id. The trooper asked

the driver and female passenger about their travel plans. Id. They were

travelling from Georgia to New York to attend two graduations for family

members. Id.

Shortly into the traffic stop, the trooper advised that if the passenger

had a valid license and was able to drive, he would let them leave. Id. The

passenger provided her license and the trooper confirmed she was capable of

driving. Id. “At this point, the initial purpose of the traffic stop was

satisfied[,] and the investigative detention had ended.” Id.

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).

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Even though the initial purpose of the stop had been satisfied, the

trooper continued to question the pair about their travel plans. Id. During

this questioning, the trooper noted a “significant” discrepancy in the couple’s

travel plans – the driver said they were going to Brooklyn, New York, while

the passenger said they were travelling to New York, New York. Id. He held

them on the side of the road for over an hour while awaiting a canine unit to

conduct an exterior sniff of the vehicle. Id.

We concluded that “smoking a cigar, driving a rental car, and not

knowing a passenger’s exact age did not create a reasonable suspicion that

[the defendant] was engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at *4. Because the

traffic stop was completed when the trooper determined that the passenger

could drive the vehicle, and he did not learn of the “conflicting itineraries” until

after the stop was completed, it was “irrelevant to the ‘reasonable suspicion’

analysis.” Id. at *4 n.6

Conversely, we concluded there was reasonable suspicion to prolong a

traffic stop in Commonwealth v. Garcia, 311 A.3d 1138 (Pa. Super. 2024).

There, the defendant was pulled over for driving while wearing headphones.

Id. at 1142-43. The vehicle was a rental. Id. at 1143. During the officer’s

initial contact with the defendant, he learned that the rental was in a third-

party’s name, the defendant was not an authorized driver, and he was

travelling from Connecticut to Youngstown, Ohio, to visit his brother who

allegedly rented the vehicle. Id. Despite the defendant stating that he would

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be in Ohio for five days, there was no luggage visible. Id. When the officer

ran the defendant’s information in their system, it showed that he had a prior

criminal case with a $750,000 bond. Id. As a result, the officer asked the

defendant to exit the vehicle and began questioning him without returning the

documents or issuing a citation. Id. When the defendant denied consent to

search, the officer requested a canine to the scene for an exterior sniff. Id.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we concluded that the

prolonged stop was constitutional because the officer had reasonable

suspicion to believe the defendant might be transporting narcotics. Id. at

1147. Reasonable suspicion was based upon the following factors: (1)

travelling from Connecticut to Ohio, which the defendant said he did quarterly;

(2) the duration of the stay; (3) driving a long-term rental as an unauthorized

driver; (4) travelling without luggage; and (5) sizable bail for a prior crime.

Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180 (Pa. Super.

2017), a trooper stopped the defendant’s vehicle for a speeding violation. Id.

at 182. When the trooper approached, the defendant, who was the sole

occupant, appeared extremely nervous.4 Id. at 181-82. The trooper

recognized both the defendant and the vehicle from prior traffic stops. Id. at

182. Approximately three months earlier, the trooper stopped the vehicle,

4 The defendant’s lips and area around his lips were trembling and his carotid

artery was pulsating. Green, 168 A.3d at 182.

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which was being operated by the owner at the time, and found a hypodermic

needle during the stop. Id. On another occasion, the trooper stopped the

vehicle, in which the defendant was an occupant, and found cocaine and

marijuana in a hidden engine compartment. Id.

When the trooper asked the defendant for the vehicle registration, the

defendant responded that the vehicle was not registered to him. Id. The

defendant said he was returning from dropping his son off in Philadelphia. Id.

When the trooper ran a criminal history check it revealed a history of assault

and drug offenses. Id. Thereafter, the trooper called for backup and asked

the defendant to exit the vehicle. Id. The defendant denied consent to search

the vehicle; therefore, the trooper requested a canine to conduct an exterior

search of the vehicle. Id.

We concluded that the trooper possessed reasonable suspicion to

believe the defendant was trafficking drugs, and the prolonged stop was

constitutional. Id. at 184. The factors to support reasonable suspicion

included: (1) nervousness; (2) vehicle owned by an absent third-party; (3)

returning from Philadelphia, a source location for narcotics; (4) lengthy

criminal history of assault and drug offenses; and (5) prior police contacts

with the defendant and the vehicle.

Here, Trooper Archulet testified that he had reasonable suspicion to

believe there was evidence of criminal activity inside Appellant’s vehicle based

upon: (1) illegal window tint; (2) multiple air fresheners; (3) Appellant’s

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increased nervousness after being informed he would likely be issued a

citation; (4) travelling from Allentown, a known source city for narcotics; and

(5) Appellant’s untruthful answers regarding his criminal history.

This case is more akin to Garcia and Green. Trooper Archulet stopped

Appellant’s vehicle for travelling in the left lane without passing another

vehicle, and illegal window tint. The vehicle was registered to a female.

Appellant, a male, was the sole occupant and driver. He provided Trooper

Archulet with his driver’s license and insurance information. Trooper Archulet

returned to his vehicle and confirmed that Appellant’s documents were valid,

and there were no active warrants.

Since he did not obtain the vehicle registration initially and knowing that

it was registered to a female driver, Trooper Archulet returned to Appellant’s

vehicle and asked for the registration. He also asked Appellant to exit the

vehicle and stand next to his patrol vehicle while he finished checking the

vehicle registration. While speaking with Appellant, Trooper Archulet learned

that Appellant was travelling from Allentown, a source city for narcotics, and

was untruthful about his criminal history. Unlike Owens, Trooper Archulet

learned this information before the initial purpose of the stop was satisfied;

therefore, it was relevant to a reasonable suspicion analysis.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court

that Trooper Archulet had reasonable suspicion that Appellant was trafficking

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drugs. Therefore, the prolonged traffic stop was constitutional. No relief is

due.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2025

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