Com. v. Clemm, M.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, : PENNSYLVANIA :
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
MICHAEL CLEMM, :
:
Appellant : No. 75 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 18, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005917-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, NICHOLS, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2018
Michael Clemm (Appellant) appeals nunc pro tunc from the May 18,
2017 judgment of sentence entered after he pled guilty to one count of
robbery. We affirm.
We provide the following background. On February 21, 2017,
Appellant pled guilty to one count of robbery. On May 18, 2017, the trial
court sentenced him to four to ten years of incarceration, followed by two
years of probation.1
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 This sentence is within the mitigated range of the sentencing guidelines.
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc2 alleging his
sentence is manifestly unreasonable and excessive because the trial court
failed to account for his rehabilitative needs relating to his drug addiction.
Post-Sentence Motion to Modify Sentence, 12/1/2017, at ¶ 13(i). By order
filed December 19, 2017, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. This
timely-filed appeal followed.3
On appeal, Appellant argues that his sentence is “manifestly excessive
and an abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion in that the court failed to
consider … all required sentencing factors set forth in … 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9721(b).” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We
consider this issue mindful of the following.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
***
2 Though no order reinstating Appellant’s post-sentence and appellate rights appears in the record, the trial court indicated in its order filed December 19, 2017, which denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion to modify sentence, that it had granted Appellant’s Post Conviction Relief Act petition to file nunc pro tunc post-sentence motions and a direct appeal. Order, 12/19/2017.
3 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
When imposing [a] sentence, a court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the following four factors:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(some citations omitted).
Appellant has satisfied the first three requirements: he timely filed a
notice of appeal; he sought reconsideration of his sentence in a post-
sentence motion; and his brief includes a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement.
Therefore, we now consider whether Appellant has presented a substantial
question for our review.
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d
825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question exists only when the
appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions
were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code;
or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Appellant contends in his Pa.R.A.P 2119(f) statement that his
“sentence is contrary to the norms underlying the sentencing process
because the sentence is unduly harsh and does not consider his
rehabilitative needs as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).” Appellant’s Brief
at 10.
An appellant making an excessiveness claim raises a substantial question when he “sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the sentencing code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” [Commonwealth v.] Mouzon, 812 A.2d [617, 627 (Pa. Super. 2002)]. Applying Mouzon, this Court has held that an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014). Based
on the case law cited supra, we find Appellant has raised a substantial
question for our review.4 Thus, we proceed to address the merits of his
claim.
A trial court must consider the factors set forth in subsection 9721(b)
when imposing a sentence. Id. That subsection provides, in relevant part,
that when imposing a judgment of sentence,
the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. … In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, modifies a sentence, resentences an offender following revocation of probation, county intermediate
4 Nevertheless, as recognized by this Court in Commonwealth v. Dodge,
[w]e are, of course, mindful that it is apparent that this Court’s determination of whether an appellant has presented a substantial question in various cases has been less than a model of clarity and consistency. Compare Commonwealth v. Montalvo, [] 641 A.2d 1176, 1186 ([Pa. Super.] 1994)] (“allegation that the sentencing court ‘failed to consider’ or ‘did not adequately consider’ facts of record” does not present substantial question); Commonwealth v. Rivera, [] 637 A.2d 1015, 1016 ([Pa. Super.] 1994) (same); … with Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 151–152 (Pa. Super. 2004) (finding substantial question where defendant argued “that his sentence was manifestly excessive and that the court erred by considering only the serious nature of the offenses and failing to consider mitigating factors such as his age (19) at sentencing, his rehabilitative needs, his limited education, his years of drug dependency, and his family dysfunction.”); … Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. Super. 2010) (failure to consider rehabilitative needs and the protection of society in fashioning a sentence raises a substantial question).
Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1272, n.8 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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