J-S34043-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHAWN C. CLARK : : Appellant : No. 285 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 7, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-62-CR-0000271-2018
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2019
Appellant, Shawn C. Clark, appeals from the aggregate judgment of
sentence of 32 to 64 months of confinement, which was imposed after he
pleaded guilty to recklessly endangering another person and persons not to
possess, use, etc. firearms.1 We affirm.
The facts underlying this case are as follows. Appellant pointed a loaded
gun at his father’s head during a domestic dispute, while in the presence of
Appellant’s eight-year old son. At the time of the incident, Appellant was
prohibited from possessing a loaded firearm, having been previously
involuntarily committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and
treatment. On the count of reckless endangering another person, Appellant
was sentenced, with the deadly weapon used enhancement, to 12-24 months
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2705 and 6105(c)(4), respectively.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S34043-19
of confinement in a state correctional institution. On the count of persons not
to possess, he was sentenced to 20-40 months of confinement, with sentences
to run consecutively. Following sentencing, on December 17, 2018, Appellant
filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. Following oral argument,
Appellant’s motion was denied by order filed on January 25, 2019. On
February 22, 2019, Appellant filed this timely notice of appeal.2
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Was the sentence imposed upon [Appellant] unreasonable, manifestly excessive and an abuse of discretion?
Appellant’s Brief at 9 (unnecessary capitalization and answer omitted).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d
472, 489 (Pa. Super. 2018). An appellant challenging the discretionary
aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part test analysis to determine: (1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
2Appellant was ordered to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and did so on February 25, 2019. The sentencing court entered its opinion on March 5, 2019.
-2- J-S34043-19
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied,
909 A.2d 303 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
Appellant complied with the first three parts of the test by filing a timely
notice of appeal, a post sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence, and
the inclusion of a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. We thus must determine
whether Appellant’s appeal presents a substantial question.
A claim that the trial court imposed consecutive sentences does not
generally raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-
Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he imposition of
consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences may raise a substantial
question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the
aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and
the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365,
372 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (emphasis added). Nor does a claim that a
sentence is unreasonable and excessive, without further explanation, raise a
substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 964 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (stating “a bald allegation that a sentence is excessive does not
raise a substantial question”). However, Appellant argues that the sentencing
court focused only on the gravity of the offense, and failed to consider the fact
that the two crimes to which he pleaded guilty stemmed from the same
domestic dispute that took place at the same time and place, and thus
amounted to one criminal act. We conclude, therefore, that Appellant has
presented a substantial question, and will address the merits of the issue.
-3- J-S34043-19
See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(en banc) (excessive sentence claim, in conjunction with an assertion that the
court failed to consider mitigating factors, raises a substantial question); see
also Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 227 (Pa. Super. 2016) (claim
that sentencing court failed to set forth adequate reasons for the sentence
imposed raises a substantial question).
Our standard for review for challenges to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
Initially, we note that Appellant concedes that the doctrine of merger3
is inapplicable in this case; nevertheless, he asserts that in the interests of
3 The statute governing merger provides as follows:
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the necessary elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9765.
-4- J-S34043-19
justice, it is logical and reasonable that since his crimes occurred at the same
time and place, his sentences should therefore be concurrent. However, the
crimes to which Appellant has pleaded guilty clearly do not arise from a single
criminal act; indeed, Appellant counsel acknowledged at the sentencing
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J-S34043-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHAWN C. CLARK : : Appellant : No. 285 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 7, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-62-CR-0000271-2018
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2019
Appellant, Shawn C. Clark, appeals from the aggregate judgment of
sentence of 32 to 64 months of confinement, which was imposed after he
pleaded guilty to recklessly endangering another person and persons not to
possess, use, etc. firearms.1 We affirm.
The facts underlying this case are as follows. Appellant pointed a loaded
gun at his father’s head during a domestic dispute, while in the presence of
Appellant’s eight-year old son. At the time of the incident, Appellant was
prohibited from possessing a loaded firearm, having been previously
involuntarily committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and
treatment. On the count of reckless endangering another person, Appellant
was sentenced, with the deadly weapon used enhancement, to 12-24 months
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2705 and 6105(c)(4), respectively.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S34043-19
of confinement in a state correctional institution. On the count of persons not
to possess, he was sentenced to 20-40 months of confinement, with sentences
to run consecutively. Following sentencing, on December 17, 2018, Appellant
filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. Following oral argument,
Appellant’s motion was denied by order filed on January 25, 2019. On
February 22, 2019, Appellant filed this timely notice of appeal.2
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Was the sentence imposed upon [Appellant] unreasonable, manifestly excessive and an abuse of discretion?
Appellant’s Brief at 9 (unnecessary capitalization and answer omitted).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d
472, 489 (Pa. Super. 2018). An appellant challenging the discretionary
aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part test analysis to determine: (1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
2Appellant was ordered to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and did so on February 25, 2019. The sentencing court entered its opinion on March 5, 2019.
-2- J-S34043-19
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied,
909 A.2d 303 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
Appellant complied with the first three parts of the test by filing a timely
notice of appeal, a post sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence, and
the inclusion of a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. We thus must determine
whether Appellant’s appeal presents a substantial question.
A claim that the trial court imposed consecutive sentences does not
generally raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-
Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he imposition of
consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences may raise a substantial
question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the
aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and
the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365,
372 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (emphasis added). Nor does a claim that a
sentence is unreasonable and excessive, without further explanation, raise a
substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 964 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (stating “a bald allegation that a sentence is excessive does not
raise a substantial question”). However, Appellant argues that the sentencing
court focused only on the gravity of the offense, and failed to consider the fact
that the two crimes to which he pleaded guilty stemmed from the same
domestic dispute that took place at the same time and place, and thus
amounted to one criminal act. We conclude, therefore, that Appellant has
presented a substantial question, and will address the merits of the issue.
-3- J-S34043-19
See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(en banc) (excessive sentence claim, in conjunction with an assertion that the
court failed to consider mitigating factors, raises a substantial question); see
also Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 227 (Pa. Super. 2016) (claim
that sentencing court failed to set forth adequate reasons for the sentence
imposed raises a substantial question).
Our standard for review for challenges to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
Initially, we note that Appellant concedes that the doctrine of merger3
is inapplicable in this case; nevertheless, he asserts that in the interests of
3 The statute governing merger provides as follows:
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the necessary elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9765.
-4- J-S34043-19
justice, it is logical and reasonable that since his crimes occurred at the same
time and place, his sentences should therefore be concurrent. However, the
crimes to which Appellant has pleaded guilty clearly do not arise from a single
criminal act; indeed, Appellant counsel acknowledged at the sentencing
hearing that the charges of recklessly endangering another person and person
not to possess were separate and distinct criminal acts, and that the trial court
could elect to sentence Appellant to consecutive sentences for the two crimes.
N.T. at 8.
Furthermore, Appellant’s assertion that the trial court gave particular
weight to the gravity of the offense, and failed to consider the fact that both
charges stemmed from the same domestic dispute are belied by the testimony
at the December 7, 2018 sentencing hearing. There, the trial court clearly
considered each of the separate criminal acts to which Appellant pleaded
guilty, noting, with regard to the persons not to possess charge, that Appellant
had a previous conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license and
was well aware at the time of the altercation that he was not permitted to
have a weapon. N.T. at 15. The trial court discussed the information contained
within the pre-sentence investigation report, and considered the events
described by the Commonwealth, wherein Appellant’s eight-year old son called
911 and remained on the phone with the police “begging them to hurry up
and get there, giving them a play-by-play of what [was] going on while
[Appellant] and [Appellant’s father] argued and had the altercation in the front
-5- J-S34043-19
yard and in the house.” N.T. at 11. In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court
noted that the consecutive sentences were both within the standard range,
and voiced its concern that Appellant’s reckless behavior will affect both his
father and his eight-year old son long after Appellant has served his
sentences. Trial Court Opinion at 3. We do not agree that the trial court
focused unduly on the gravity of the offense, and note that the weighing of
sentencing factors is exclusively reserved to the judge imposing the sentence,
and an appellate court may not substitute its own weighing of the factors.
Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 876 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Accordingly, Appellant has not demonstrated that the sentencing court
misapplied or ignored the law, exercised its judgment impartially or with
prejudice, bias or ill will, or that the sentence imposed was manifestly
unreasonable. Conte, 198 A.3d at 1176. Based on the foregoing, Appellant
is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge McLaughlin joins the Memorandum.
Judge Dubow Concurs in the Result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
-6- J-S34043-19
Date: 8/7/2019
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