J-A22016-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JARROD MICHAEL CLAPPER : : Appellant : No. 1163 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 4, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-05-CR-0000241-2022
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: January 21, 2025
Jarrod Michael Clapper appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following his convictions for institutional sexual assault, corruption of a minor,
and unlawful contact with a minor.1 He challenges the sufficiency and weight
of the evidence, the court’s allowance of an exhibit during jury deliberations,
and his sexual offender registration as required by the Sexual Offender
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”).2 We affirm.
The Commonwealth charged Clapper, who worked for the Bedford Area
School District, with the above offenses following sexual contact with a
student, R.M. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of three
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3124.2(a.2), 6301(a)(1)(i), and 6318(a)(1), respectively.
2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42. J-A22016-24
witnesses: John Diehl, the Director of Technology for the Bedford Area School
District; R.M.; and R.M.’s friend, T.C. The witnesses testified as follows.
Diehl testified that he hired Clapper in July 2021 as a computer
technician for the Bedford Area School District. N.T. Trial, 4/20/23, at 43.
Clapper was 24 years old at that time. Id. at 52. Diehl stated that Clapper’s
job duties included “support[ing] students and teachers with technology
support[.]” Id. at 44-45. Diehl testified that Clapper worked in both the middle
school and high school. Id. at 47. Clapper would be at the middle school in
the mornings, and then would go to the high school in the afternoons. Id.
Diehl said that Clapper would “work with kids and teachers to make sure their
technologies were . . . efficient.” Id. at 45. Diehl stated that each student had
an iPad and “if a teacher is having any issues or a student is having issues
with their devices the technician would be [the] first line of support so they
go into the classroom, help kids or teachers with making sure their devices
are efficient, work functioning.” Id. at 48.
Diehl further testified that Clapper provided support to students in an
elective class called “student technology assistance program.” Id. at 48-49.
There, high school students would gain real-world technology experience,
such as learning to do a help desk or design a website. Id. Diehl explained
that students who were interested in technology would “work hand in hand
with members of the technology department to gain that real work []
experience[.]” Id. at 49. Diehl testified that all members of the school’s tech
department, including Clapper, would be supporting the students as they were
-2- J-A22016-24
learning technology in this class, which involved providing guidance and
support to those students. Id. at 49-50.
R.M. testified that in December of 2021, she was 17 years old and a
junior at Bedford Area High School. Id. at 54. She stated that she met Clapper
in August or September 2021 at Bedford Area High School. Id. at 55. She
knew Clapper as the “IT tech person of our school.” Id. at 56. She was also
familiar with Clapper since he was friends with her older sisters. Id. at 55.
R.M. stated that students at her school ran an Instagram page where they
posted funny pictures of people’s shoes. Id. at 56. She said that one day, she
took a picture of Clapper’s cowboy boots while they were at a sports practice
and posted it on the Instagram page. Id. She testified that after she posted
the picture, Clapper contacted her through direct message on Instagram. Id.
The two then started communicating through Snapchat. Id. at 57. R.M. said
she sometimes saw Clapper at school in an office belonging to a teacher, Ms.
Baker. Id. She explained that she was an online student and Ms. Baker
oversaw the online school. Id. at 58. R.M. said that she and Clapper would
not talk at school except for comments such as, “[H]ey or how’s your day
going at school[.]” Id. at 57. The Commonwealth introduced into evidence a
spreadsheet showing R.M.’s and Clapper’s Snapchat conversations. Id. at 59-
61. Some of the messages were sexual in nature. Id. at 66, 69, 72.
R.M. testified that on December 23, 2021, her friend, T.C. was at her
house. Id. at 73. That evening, T.C. wanted to go hang out with a boy, L.S.,
so R.M. tried to find someone to hang out with. Id. at 74. R.M. contacted
-3- J-A22016-24
Clapper through Snapchat and he agreed to meet with her. Id. R.M. testified
that she took a marijuana gummy because she was anxious as “it was [her]
first time hanging with [Clapper] without anyone else around[.]” Id. at 75.
She stated that she made arrangements with Clapper to meet at a trail near
the Bedford Springs Resort. Id. at 76. L.S. picked up T.C. and R.M. and drove
to the trail. Id. R.M. stated that she sat in L.S.’s vehicle until she saw Clapper
pull up in a white Cadillac. Id. at 77. She then got out of L.S.’s vehicle and
got into the passenger side of Clapper’s vehicle. Id. R.M. said that L.S. and
T.C. left and Clapper then drove R.M. to the Bedford County Airport because
Clapper wanted to show R.M. his airplane. Id. at 75, 77-78.
R.M. testified that once they got through the airport’s gate and parked,
Clapper put his hand on her inner thigh and leaned over and kissed her. Id.
at 79. He then put his hands in her pants and told her to get into the back
seat. Id. She said that they then both got into the backseat. Id. R.M. testified
that Clapper then took her pants off, kissed her, pulled her on top of him, and
had sexual intercourse with her. Id. at 79-80. R.M. testified that while they
were having sexual intercourse, T.C. called her and told her she was done
hanging out with L.S. Id. at 80. Clapper then drove R.M. back to her house.
Id. R.M. could not recall if she told T.C. what happened when they were both
back at the house. Id. at 81. The next day, R.M. told her best friend, C.B.,
what happened. Id. R.M. testified that she did not report the incident to the
police or to school officials because she “gave [her] consent and [she] did not
want [Clapper] to get in trouble.” Id. However, rumors about the incident
-4- J-A22016-24
spread around the school and the principal approached her about it. Id. at 82,
104-06. R.M. eventually talked to the Pennsylvania State Police and told them
what happened. Id. at 82.
On cross-examination, R.M. testified that Clapper never sent her any
inappropriate pictures or asked her for sex. Id. at 90, 93. She agreed with
defense counsel that she was trying to have sex with Clapper. Id. at 89. R.M.
also confirmed that there was context missing from the Snapchat messages
that the Commonwealth introduced. Id. at 91-93. She stated that the
marijuana gummy she took on the night of the incident may have affected her
recollection of what she told T.C. that night, but she had a clear recollection
of what happened with Clapper. Id. at 111, 113.
R.M.’s friend, T.C., testified that on December 23, 2021, she was staying
overnight at R.M.’s house. Id. at 117-118. T.C. said that she made plans to
see L.S., and R.M. made plans to hang out “with a guy named Jarrod.” Id. at
118-19. T.C. said that R.M. told her that she and Clapper were messaging
each other on Instagram, and had “been snapping back and forth” on
Snapchat. Id. at 119-20. T.C. recalled that L.S. picked her and R.M. up at
R.M.’s house, and then dropped R.M. off near the Bedford Springs Resort. Id.
T.C. saw a vehicle there when they dropped R.M. off, but she did not see the
person in the vehicle. Id. at 120, 124. T.C. testified that later that night, L.S.
dropped her off at R.M.’s house. Id. at 121. She said R.M. was already home
and “seemed completely normal” and not under the influence of any drugs.
Id. at 121, 125-26.
-5- J-A22016-24
Clapper presented four character witnesses, including family friends and
his pastor. Id. at 136-155. The defense then rested. The parties proceeded to
closing argument and the court gave the jury instructions. Shortly before the
jury began to deliberate, the court asked counsel what their position was on
whether the spreadsheet of R.M.’s and Clapper’s Snapchat messages should
go back with the jury during deliberations. Id. at 202. Defense counsel
objected to the exhibit going back, stating that only a portion of the
spreadsheet was read into the record and “[t]here’s a lot of testimony about
context and what’s missing and what’s not and we don’t know.” Id. at 203.
The court overruled the objection, noting that the exhibit was admitted and
“there was cross examin[ation] on what may be missing from it[.]” Id.
Following deliberations, the jury found Clapper guilty of the above
offenses. The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven to 23
months’ imprisonment plus three years’ probation. The court also ordered
Clapper to register as a Tier II sex offender pursuant to SORNA. Clapper filed
a post-sentence motion arguing the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
Clapper raises the following issues:
I. Did the trial court err in finding sufficient evidence to convict [Clapper] of all charges where:
a. For the institutional sexual assault charge, the Commonwealth failed to prove that [Clapper], as an IT technician, was an “employee” who had “direct contact” with students at the Bedford Area School District as defined by the statute or that [Clapper] worked at the same school that the complainant attended given that
-6- J-A22016-24
the complainant attended an online program which was different from the regular middle school or high school for which [Clapper] worked?
b. For the corruption of minors charge, the Commonwealth failed to prove that there is anything inherently illegal or immoral about a 24-year-old having consensual sex with a 17-year-old given that 16 is the age of consent in Pennsylvania and [Clapper] did not have any involvement in the complainant’s education in his role as an IT technician?
c. For the unlawful contact – sexual offenses charge, the only charged sexual offense was institutional sexual assault, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for that offense, and the Commonwealth did not prove that [Clapper] had contact with the complainant for the purpose of engaging in any prohibited sex act?
II. Whether the trial court erred denying the post-sentence motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence?
III. In the alternative, whether the trial court violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 646 by allowing the jury to review a Snapchat communication chart of messages exchanged between [Clapper] and the complainant during jury deliberations because the chart arguably served as a written confession from [Clapper]?
IV. Whether the trial court erred in requiring [Clapper] to register pursuant to SORNA without holding an individualized evidentiary hearing because SORNA’s mandatory, irrebuttable presumptions violate [Clapper’s] right to reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution?
Clapper’s Br. at 10-11 (suggested answers omitted).
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Clapper’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, which is
a question of law. “Our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review
is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Mikitiuk, 213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa.Super.
-7- J-A22016-24
2019). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
“must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 23 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citation omitted). “Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier
of fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.” Id. (citation
omitted). This standard applies equally where the Commonwealth’s evidence
is circumstantial. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1229
(Pa.Super. 2018). The factfinder, “while passing on the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence — is free to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa.Super.
2017). This Court “may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.”
Commonwealth v. Griffith, 305 A.3d 573, 576 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal
denied, 319 A.3d 503 (Pa. 2024).
Clapper first argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him for
institutional sexual assault. He contends that the Commonwealth failed to
prove that he was an “employee” of the school, as defined under the
institutional sexual assault statute. Clapper’s Br. at 26. He maintains that the
statute, by its terms, does not apply to all employees of a school. Rather, it
only applies to the designated employees listed in the statute “such as
principals, teachers, and others who are specifically mentioned in the statute”
-8- J-A22016-24
and those designated employees are “almost all employees who work directly
with students and who have some sort of supervisory or educational role.” Id.
Clapper points out that the list of employees in the statute “plainly does not
include computer technicians or IT workers.” Id.
Clapper acknowledges that the statute also applies to “any other
employee who has direct contact with school students.” Id. (quoting 18
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3124.2(a.2)(2)(ii)(A)(I)) (emphasis removed). Clapper,
however, argues the Commonwealth failed to prove he had “direct contact”
with the students at the Bedford Area School District because it did not prove
he “provided care, supervision, guidance, or control to the school students,”
as required by the statute. Id. at 26-27. He argues the evidence only
established that his job was to fix devices that had problems and provide tech
support. Id. at 28. Clapper notes that Diehl testified that Clapper worked as
a computer technician at the school, but he did not testify that Clapper had
direct contact with students as defined by the statute. Id. at 27. According to
Clapper, “[c]are, supervision, guidance, and control all involve an essentially
teacher-like roles of educating the students” and “does not automatically
involve working on the school computers or fixing a student’s electronic device
should the device malfunction.” Id. at 27-28.
Clapper further argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he
worked at the same school that R.M. attended “given that [R.M.] attended an
online program which was different from the regular middle school or high
school for which he worked.” Id. at 24-25, 28-29. Clapper lastly points out
-9- J-A22016-24
that he and R.M. “already knew of each other before she ever met him at
school” as “they were close in age, and [he] was friends with her two older
sisters.” Id. at 29.
The crime of institutional sexual assault occurs when “a person who is a
volunteer or an employee of a school or any other person who has direct
contact with a student at a school . . . engages in sexual intercourse, deviate
sexual intercourse or indecent contact with a student of the school.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.2(a.2)(1).
An “employee” is statutorily defined as including enumerated jobs, as
well as “any other employee who has direct contact with school students.” 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.2(a.2)(2)(ii)(A)(I). An “employee” also statutorily includes
“[a]n independent contractor who has a contract with a school for the purpose
of performing a service for the school[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3124.2(a.2)(2)(ii)(A)(II). The statute provides that an “employee” includes
the following:
(I) A teacher, a supervisor, a supervising principal, a principal, an assistant principal, a vice principal, a director of vocational education, a dental hygienist, a visiting teacher, a home and school visitor, a school counselor, a child nutrition program specialist, a school librarian, a school secretary the selection of whom is on the basis of merit as determined by eligibility lists, a school nurse, a substitute teacher, a janitor, a cafeteria worker, a bus driver, a teacher aide and any other employee who has direct contact with school students.
(II) An independent contractor who has a contract with a school for the purpose of performing a service for the school, a coach, an athletic trainer, a coach hired as an independent contractor by the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
- 10 - J-A22016-24
Association or an athletic trainer hired as an independent contractor by the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.2(a.2)(2)(ii)(A) (emphasis added). The statute explicitly
excludes from the definition of “employee” “[a]n independent contractor or
any employee of an independent contractor who has no direct contact with
school students.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.2(a.2)(2)(ii)(B)(II). “Direct contact”
means “[c]are, supervision, guidance or control.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3124.2(a.2)(2)(i).
Clapper’s argument that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had
direct contact with students at the school, as defined by the statute, is without
merit. Diehl testified that Clapper worked at the middle school and high school
and would “work with [the] kids” to make sure their technologies were
efficient. N.T. at 45. This included Clapper going into classrooms to assist the
students. Id. at 48. Diehl also testified that Clapper participated in the
“student technology assistance program” where he would “work hand in hand”
with students so that they could gain real work technology experience. Id. at
48-49. When asked whether Clapper provided guidance and supervision to
those students, Diehl responded, “Absolutely.” Id. at 49-50.
Clapper’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he worked
at the same school that R.M. attended because R.M. attended online school is
likewise without merit. The evidence showed that although R.M. attended
online classes, she was still considered a student at Bedford Area High School
and was physically present at times at the school. R.M. testified that in
- 11 - J-A22016-24
December of 2021, she was in 11th grade and went to “Bedford Area High
School.” Id. at 54. She further testified that she took a picture of Clapper’s
shoes at a Bedford Area High School sports practice and posted it on the
school’s shoes Instagram account. Id. at 56. R.M. also testified that she would
sometimes see Clapper at school when she was in Ms. Baker’s office and would
exchange comments with him such as, “[H]ey or how’s your day going at
school[.]” Id. at 57-58.
This evidence was sufficient to show that Clapper was an “employee” of
the school and had “direct contact” with students by providing “[c]are,
supervision, guidance or control,” as defined under the institutional sexual
assault statute. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3124.2(a.2). Thus, the evidence was
sufficient to support Clapper’s conviction for institutional sexual assault.
Clapper next argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
corruption of a minor. He maintains that he did not corrupt the morals of R.M.
because she was 17 years old at the relevant time, and the age of consent in
Pennsylvania is 16 years old. Clapper’s Br. at 31, 33. Clapper emphasizes that
the law does not prohibit consensual sex between a 17-year-old and a 24-
year-old. He points out that R.M. “repeatedly sought sexual intercourse from
him by texting him in an extremely direct manner.” Id. at 31. According to
Clapper, “there is nothing inherently corrupting about having consensual,
otherwise legal sexual intercourse with a computer technician at the area high
school.” Id. He concludes that he and R.M. “were close in age, they did not
- 12 - J-A22016-24
interact at school, he did not have any supervisory role over her, and he
worked not as a teacher but as a computer technician.” Id. at 32.
A person commits the crime of corruption of minors where, in relevant
part, he is over 18 years old and “by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the
morals of any minor less than 18 years of age[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
“Actions that tend to corrupt the morals of a minor are those that would offend
the common sense of the community and the sense of decency, propriety and
morality which most people entertain.” Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205
A.3d 329, 339 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Further,
[c]orruption of a minor can involve conduct towards a child in an unlimited number of ways. The purpose of such statutes is basically protective in nature. These statutes are designed to cover a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare and security of our children. Because of the diverse types of conduct that must be proscribed, such statutes must be drawn broadly. It would be impossible to enumerate every particular act against which our children need be protected.
Commonwealth v. Decker, 698 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa.Super. 1997) (citation
omitted).
Here, there is no dispute that Clapper was over 18 years old and R.M.
was a minor at the relevant time. R.M. testified that Clapper engaged in sexual
contact with her while she was a student at the school where he worked. Such
testimony was sufficient to support Clapper’s conviction for corruption of a
minor. Contrary to Clapper’s suggestion, the statute does not provide any
exception if the sexual contact was consensual. No relief is due on this claim.
- 13 - J-A22016-24
Clapper next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction for unlawful contact with a minor. Clapper’s Br. at 33. He asserts
that the statute for unlawful contact with a minor requires an underlying
offense and the only alleged sexual offense in this case was institutional sexual
assault. Clapper claims that since the evidence was insufficient to support the
underlying offense of institutional sexual assault, his conviction for unlawful
contact with a minor cannot stand. Id.
Relevant here, a person commits the offense of unlawful contact with a
minor “if the person is intentionally in contact with a minor . . . for the purpose
of engaging in an activity prohibited under . . . [a]ny of the offenses
enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses).” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
6318(a)(1).
Here, the Chapter 31 offense was institutional sexual assault. See N.T.
at 195 (trial court charging jury that institutional sexual assault was the
predicate offense to the unlawful contact with a minor charge). Since we have
found that the evidence was sufficient to support Clapper’s conviction for
institutional sexual assault, his claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for unlawful contact with a minor necessarily fails.
II. Weight of the Evidence
Clapper next argues that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. He maintains that the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial was so
unreliable that the verdict shocks the conscience. Clapper’s Br. at 36. He
points out that R.M. “testified that she was under the influence of a marijuana
- 14 - J-A22016-24
edible which affected her memory enough that she could not remember if she
told [T.C.] about the alleged incident.” Id. Clapper argues that the text
messages between himself and R.M. “did not reflect Clapper ever agreeing to
meet up with her for sex or any discussion of it afterwards.” Id. He emphasizes
that there were no other witnesses or any physical evidence, and he did not
make any incriminating statements. Id. According to Clapper, “[n]one of the
conversations between [R.M.] and [Clapper] corroborated her allegations, and
the evidence instead suggested that [R.M.] had told her friends a story to
impress them and then she was stuck repeating that story once the authorities
heard the rumors and became involved.” Id. at 37. He concludes that his
“good character alone was enough evidence to constitute reasonable doubt[.]”
Id.
“We review a trial court’s order denying a weight challenge for an abuse
of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1107 (Pa.Super.
2022). Because the trial court heard the testimony firsthand, we must “give
the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). A weight claim requires
the defendant to first convince the trial court that “the evidence is so tenuous,
vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.”
Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court then reviews the
trial court’s decision in this regard for an abuse of discretion. Id. Further,
- 15 - J-A22016-24
“[t]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of
the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa.
2003) (citation omitted). “When the challenge to the weight of the evidence
is predicated on the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court’s
decision is extremely limited.” Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254,
1262 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court found that R.M testified credibly. Trial Court
Opinion, filed 11/16/23, at 3. It noted that her demeanor on the witness stand
was credible, and her testimony contained numerous details. Id.
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the
verdict did not shock the conscience. The jury was free to believe all, part, or
none of the evidence presented in judging the credibility of the witnesses and
evidently credited R.M.’s testimony. Champney, 832 A.2d at 408. No relief is
due.
III. Allowance of Exhibit During Jury Deliberations
Clapper argues that the court erred in permitting the spreadsheet of his
and R.M’s Snapchat messages to be sent to the jury during deliberations.
Clapper’s Br. at 37. He asserts that his messages were tantamount to a
confession because they showed he did not respond appropriately to R.M.’s
sexually explicit messages. Id. at 38. In his view, the court violated
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646 when it gave the exhibit to the
jury, as Rule 646 prohibits giving the jury during deliberations “a copy of any
- 16 - J-A22016-24
written or otherwise recorded confession by the defendant.” Id. at 37-38
(quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(C)(2)). Clapper argues that he was prejudiced
because by “allowing the jury to focus improperly on the purported Snapchat
messages during deliberations caused the jury to lose sight of the rest of the
evidence or lack thereof” and his “failure to respond by telling [R.M.] to stop
or ceasing all communications would have been viewed by the jury as
incriminating and as a confession.” Id. at 41.
Clapper has waived this issue. At trial, Clapper did not object to the
exhibit going back to the jury during deliberations on the basis that the
messages were a confession. Rather, he only objected based on lack of
context. See N.T. at 202-03. This claim is therefore waived. See Pa.R.A.P.
302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal”).
Even if not waived, the issue lacks merit. Rule 646 prohibits confessions
from being sent out with the jury during deliberations. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
646(C)(2). The exhibit here was not a confession. None of Clapper’s messages
admitted that he had sex with R.M. or that he committed a crime. Further, the
jury heard testimony at trial that portions of the messages were missing or
were out of context. Since the exhibit was not a confession, the trial court did
not violate Rule 646 by allowing the jury to have the exhibit during
deliberations.
IV. SORNA
- 17 - J-A22016-24
Clapper’s final issue is that the court erred in failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing when it imposed SORNA registration requirements.
Clapper’s Br. at 41. He argues that SORNA’s irrebuttable presumptions violate
his right to reputation and due process under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Id. at 41, 43. He asserts that other cases raising this argument have been
remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to make a factual record.
Id. at 42.
This claim is without merit due to our Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 316 A.3d 77 (Pa. 2024) (“Torsilieri II”).
While the instant appeal was pending, our Supreme Court held that the
presumption that adult sexual offenders posed a high risk of reoffending did
not violate due process, and that SORNA’s Revised Subchapter H registration
requirements were not punitive in nature and did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. See id. at 99-100, 109-110.3 Because Clapper’s claims
are the same as those raised in Torsilieri II, we conclude that Clapper is
likewise not entitled to relief.4
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
3 Torsilieri II was decided on May 31, 2024.
4 Clapper acknowledges that his constitutional claims are the same that were
raised in Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020) (“Torsilieri I”) and that the case was pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at the time of the filing of his brief. Clapper’s Br. at 43.
- 18 - J-A22016-24
DATE: 01/21/2025
- 19 -