J-S14038-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CANDACE CHRISTY
Appellant No. 878 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 20, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006458-2016
BEFORE: OTT, J., MCLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2018
Appellant, Candace Christy, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
two years of reporting probation, imposed January 20, 2017, following a
stipulated trial resulting in her conviction for possession of a controlled
substance and purchasing a controlled substance from an unauthorized
person.1 We affirm.
On December 5, 2015, Appellant was arrested and charged with the
above-mentioned offenses near the 7500 block of Torresdale Avenue and
Oakmont Street in the City and County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Appellant litigated a motion to suppress before the Municipal Court.
____________________________________________
1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16) and (a)(19), respectively.
* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court. J-S14038-18
At the suppression hearing, Philadelphia Police Officer Stan Galiczynski
testified that he has been a police officer for eighteen years and has been
assigned to the Narcotics Enforcement Team for ten to twelve years. See
Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 6/22/16, at 9. During his employment as a police
officer, he has witnessed thousands of narcotics sales. Id.
Around 6:00 p.m. on December 5, 2015, Officer Galiczynski and other
members of the 15th Police District Narcotics Enforcement Team set up
surveillance in the area of 7500 Torresdale Avenue and Oakmont Street to
investigate complaints of open air drug sales. See N.T., 6/22/16, at 6-7. At
approximately 6:45 p.m., Officer Galiczynski observed Appellant approach
Jamil Parker and Martin Hoffman. Id. After engaging in a brief conversation,
Appellant offered Mr. Hoffman money. Id. at 7. In exchange, Mr. Hoffman
reached into his jeans pocket, removed small objects from his pocket, and
handed them to Appellant. Id. Officer Galiczynski’s experience led him to
believe that this transaction was consistent with narcotics sales. Id. at 9.
Appellant left, walking northbound on Torresdale. Id. at 7. Officer
Galiczynski radioed her description to backup officers. Id. Appellant was
stopped on the 4700 block of Meridian Street by Officer Stephen Burgoon. Id.
She was arrested and transported to the 15th district. Id. at 22-24. From
Appellant’s purse, officers recovered two clear plastic packets containing an
off-white chunky substance, later identified as crack cocaine, and two pill
bottles, one containing thirty-three pills of hydrocodone, and the other
containing thirty-eight pills of Xanax. Id. at 7-8.
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Counsel argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest at the
moment Appellant was stopped, because her person was not searched until
she was taken back to headquarters. Id. at 24-26. Essentially, counsel
contended that at the time she was stopped, police officers did not know she
possessed drugs. Id. at 26.
Appellant’s motion to suppress was denied; the matter proceeded
immediately to trial; and she was convicted of the above charges. Appellant
timely appealed for a trial de novo to the Court of Common Pleas, and the
matter proceeded to a stipulated waiver trial in August 2016, at which time
the facts as presented by Officers Galiczynsi and Burgoon were read into the
record. Counsel presented no argument regarding the evidence. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court convicted Appellant of possession and
purchase of controlled substances.
In December 2016, after trial but prior to sentencing, counsel made an
oral motion for extraordinary relief pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B), and
argued that suppression counsel was an inexperienced attorney who did not
present “the best arguments.” See N.T., 12/12/16, at 6-7. Accordingly, she
requested the court reconsider the suppression hearing, because the
“testimony of the officers in this case does . . . cast a level of uncertainty as
to whether their version of what led them to stop Ms. Christy actually makes
sense.” Id. at 7. The court noted it could not reconsider the suppression
-3- J-S14038-18
issue, as it was litigated in the Municipal Court, and denied the motion.2 Id.
at 9.
On January 20, 2017, the court sentenced Appellant to two years of
reporting probation and ordered her to continue drug treatment. Appellant
filed a motion seeking reconsideration of her sentence in which she asserted
her innocence. However, the trial court denied this motion.
Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following question for our review:
Did not the lower court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence as the police lacked probable cause to search and arrest appellant?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Here, Appellant argues for the first time that there was no probable
cause to stop her because Officer Galiczynski did not provide sufficient
information regarding his training such that it could be considered by the
suppression court. Id. at 11-15. Accordingly, she contends the nexus
between his training and experience and his observation of an exchange
between Mr. Hoffman and Appellant was rendered ambiguous. Id.
With regard to a motion to suppress,
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn ____________________________________________
2 See Phila. Cty. Crim. Div. R. 630 (outlining the procedure for Common Pleas review of a suppression motion litigated in Municipal Court).
-4- J-S14038-18
from those facts are correct. ... [W]e must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Those properly supported facts are binding upon us and we may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 997 A.2d 368, 372 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Moreover,
appellate review of an order denying suppression is limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 444, 856 A.2d 767, 778 (2004) (concluding appellant’s claim of a Fifth Amendment violation was waived because such claim was not the “particular” theory advanced at the suppression hearing); see also Commonwealth v. Doyen, 848 A.2d 1007, 1011 (Pa.
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J-S14038-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CANDACE CHRISTY
Appellant No. 878 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 20, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006458-2016
BEFORE: OTT, J., MCLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2018
Appellant, Candace Christy, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
two years of reporting probation, imposed January 20, 2017, following a
stipulated trial resulting in her conviction for possession of a controlled
substance and purchasing a controlled substance from an unauthorized
person.1 We affirm.
On December 5, 2015, Appellant was arrested and charged with the
above-mentioned offenses near the 7500 block of Torresdale Avenue and
Oakmont Street in the City and County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Appellant litigated a motion to suppress before the Municipal Court.
____________________________________________
1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16) and (a)(19), respectively.
* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court. J-S14038-18
At the suppression hearing, Philadelphia Police Officer Stan Galiczynski
testified that he has been a police officer for eighteen years and has been
assigned to the Narcotics Enforcement Team for ten to twelve years. See
Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 6/22/16, at 9. During his employment as a police
officer, he has witnessed thousands of narcotics sales. Id.
Around 6:00 p.m. on December 5, 2015, Officer Galiczynski and other
members of the 15th Police District Narcotics Enforcement Team set up
surveillance in the area of 7500 Torresdale Avenue and Oakmont Street to
investigate complaints of open air drug sales. See N.T., 6/22/16, at 6-7. At
approximately 6:45 p.m., Officer Galiczynski observed Appellant approach
Jamil Parker and Martin Hoffman. Id. After engaging in a brief conversation,
Appellant offered Mr. Hoffman money. Id. at 7. In exchange, Mr. Hoffman
reached into his jeans pocket, removed small objects from his pocket, and
handed them to Appellant. Id. Officer Galiczynski’s experience led him to
believe that this transaction was consistent with narcotics sales. Id. at 9.
Appellant left, walking northbound on Torresdale. Id. at 7. Officer
Galiczynski radioed her description to backup officers. Id. Appellant was
stopped on the 4700 block of Meridian Street by Officer Stephen Burgoon. Id.
She was arrested and transported to the 15th district. Id. at 22-24. From
Appellant’s purse, officers recovered two clear plastic packets containing an
off-white chunky substance, later identified as crack cocaine, and two pill
bottles, one containing thirty-three pills of hydrocodone, and the other
containing thirty-eight pills of Xanax. Id. at 7-8.
-2- J-S14038-18
Counsel argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest at the
moment Appellant was stopped, because her person was not searched until
she was taken back to headquarters. Id. at 24-26. Essentially, counsel
contended that at the time she was stopped, police officers did not know she
possessed drugs. Id. at 26.
Appellant’s motion to suppress was denied; the matter proceeded
immediately to trial; and she was convicted of the above charges. Appellant
timely appealed for a trial de novo to the Court of Common Pleas, and the
matter proceeded to a stipulated waiver trial in August 2016, at which time
the facts as presented by Officers Galiczynsi and Burgoon were read into the
record. Counsel presented no argument regarding the evidence. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court convicted Appellant of possession and
purchase of controlled substances.
In December 2016, after trial but prior to sentencing, counsel made an
oral motion for extraordinary relief pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B), and
argued that suppression counsel was an inexperienced attorney who did not
present “the best arguments.” See N.T., 12/12/16, at 6-7. Accordingly, she
requested the court reconsider the suppression hearing, because the
“testimony of the officers in this case does . . . cast a level of uncertainty as
to whether their version of what led them to stop Ms. Christy actually makes
sense.” Id. at 7. The court noted it could not reconsider the suppression
-3- J-S14038-18
issue, as it was litigated in the Municipal Court, and denied the motion.2 Id.
at 9.
On January 20, 2017, the court sentenced Appellant to two years of
reporting probation and ordered her to continue drug treatment. Appellant
filed a motion seeking reconsideration of her sentence in which she asserted
her innocence. However, the trial court denied this motion.
Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following question for our review:
Did not the lower court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence as the police lacked probable cause to search and arrest appellant?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Here, Appellant argues for the first time that there was no probable
cause to stop her because Officer Galiczynski did not provide sufficient
information regarding his training such that it could be considered by the
suppression court. Id. at 11-15. Accordingly, she contends the nexus
between his training and experience and his observation of an exchange
between Mr. Hoffman and Appellant was rendered ambiguous. Id.
With regard to a motion to suppress,
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn ____________________________________________
2 See Phila. Cty. Crim. Div. R. 630 (outlining the procedure for Common Pleas review of a suppression motion litigated in Municipal Court).
-4- J-S14038-18
from those facts are correct. ... [W]e must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Those properly supported facts are binding upon us and we may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 997 A.2d 368, 372 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Moreover,
appellate review of an order denying suppression is limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 444, 856 A.2d 767, 778 (2004) (concluding appellant’s claim of a Fifth Amendment violation was waived because such claim was not the “particular” theory advanced at the suppression hearing); see also Commonwealth v. Doyen, 848 A.2d 1007, 1011 (Pa. Super .2004) (stating that although the appellant challenged the admission of wiretap evidence by way of a pre- trial suppression motion, his failure to raise a specific challenge to the authenticity of a particular judge’s signature precluded him from raising such a challenge for the first time on appeal), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 700, 857 A.2d 677 (2004).
Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272–73 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Here, suppression counsel argued solely that the police lacked
reasonable suspicion and probable cause due to the fact that Appellant was
not searched upon being stopped. Counsel did not argue that officers lacked
probable cause based on inadequate testimony from Officer Galiczynski
regarding his training and experience. In her motion for extraordinary relief
following trial, counsel argued only that 1) suppression counsel was an
inexperienced attorney who did not present “the best arguments,” and 2) the
testimony of the police officers was rendered “uncertain.” However, because
-5- J-S14038-18
these arguments were not, in fact, presented at the suppression hearing, we
cannot now revisit them on appeal. Id. at 1272.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 4/26/18
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