Com. v. Chichkin, I.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
:
:
IGOR NIKOLAIEVI CHICHKIN :
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Appellant : No. 21 EDA 2026
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 26, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-MD-0003288-2025
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2026 Igor Nikolaievi Chichkin (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after the trial court found him in indirect criminal contempt of a temporary Protection From Abuse 1 (PFA) order obtained by Olga Chichkina (Olga); sentenced Appellant to 41 days in the Bucks County Correctional Facility, with credit for time served, and 6 months’ concurrent probation; and issued a final, 3-year PFA order. After careful review, we affirm.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122.
On October 14, 2025, the trial court granted a temporary PFA order to protect Olga from Appellant, her husband.2 The trial court summarized Olga’s account of the incident giving rise to the indirect criminal contempt charge as follows:
[Olga] testified that she had given a copy of the temporary PFA to Appellant on November 12, 2025…. The following night, on November 13, 2025, [Olga] … was at home, in the residence that the parties share.3 She stated that while she was trying to finish work, Appellant became aggravated and started asking her for cigarettes. Then, when [Olga] denied him any cigarettes, Appellant went into the kitchen and started emptying out the cabinets and throwing the contents on the floor. [Olga] testified that Appellant was yelling and swearing at her. [During Olga’s testimony,] Appellant interrupted court from his seat at the defense table to say … that he called [Olga] “motherfucker” and “son of a bitch.” [Olga] confirmed that those were the names Appellant called her…. [Olga] said that Appellant pushed her out of the way and said, “I’ll kill you,” as he exited the kitchen and went to the garage.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/26, at 3 (citations to record omitted; footnote added).
2 Significantly, the original PFA petition and temporary PFA order are not contained in the certified record. During the indirect criminal contempt hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the temporary PFA order, which protected Olga from October 29, 2025, to January 28, 2026. N.T., 11/26/25, at 3-4; see also Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/26, at 2.
3 Olga testified that the terms of the temporary PFA order allowed Appellant
to remain in the house and to speak with Olga. N.T., 11/26/25, at 14. Further, during closing arguments, Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that the temporary PFA order provided that Appellant “shall not abuse, harass, stalk” or threaten Olga. Id. at 26, 28.
Olga called the police, and officers were dispatched to the parties’ home.
One of the officers read the temporary PFA order to Appellant, who interrupted to inform the officer he was already aware of the order. N.T., 11/26/25, at 17; see also Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/13/25. After speaking with Appellant and Olga, police officers arrested Appellant for violating the temporary PFA order. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6113(a) (arrest for violation of order). On the same date, police filed a criminal complaint charging Appellant with indirect criminal contempt.
The trial court conducted a hearing on November 26, 2025. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Olga and Northampton Township Police Officer Arthur Dingley, one of the officers who had responded to the parties’ home. Appellant also testified on his own behalf. Significantly, Appellant testified that he knew about the existence of the temporary PFA order, and he confirmed that he understood its terms. N.T., 11/26/25, at 20.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court found Appellant in contempt of the temporary PFA order. The trial court found Olga credible and Appellant not credible. Id. at 30. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 41 days in the Bucks County Correctional Facility, with credit for time served, and a concurrent 6 months’ probation. Additionally, the trial court converted the
temporary PFA order into a final PFA order, and extended its term to three years.4 This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue for review:
Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to support Appellant’s conviction for indirect criminal contempt, where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [PFA] order was definite, clear, and specific, resulting in []
uncertainty in the mind of Appellant regarding which conduct was prohibited?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization modified).
Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain his indirect criminal contempt conviction. Id. at 10. Appellant argues the trial court did not examine the language of the temporary PFA order, “and no testimony demonstrated [Appellant’s] awareness of its terms[.]” Id. Thus, according to Appellant, the trial court incorrectly determined the order was definite, clear, and specific. Id. Appellant also suggests that both his and Olga’s testimony demonstrated confusion regarding the terms of the order. Id. at 16-17.
“A trial court’s finding of contempt will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Perkins, 292 A.3d 1144, 1146 (Pa. Super.
4 The trial court indicated that, in imposing sentence, it considered a 2017 final PFA order protecting Olga from Appellant, as well as Appellant’s 2022 conviction of simple assault against Olga. N.T., 11/26/25, at 34-35.
2023) (citation omitted). “A trial court abuses its discretion in this context if it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason.” Fetzer v. Fetzer, 336 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted).
Additionally, as Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his indirect criminal contempt conviction,
we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
As an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 288 A.3d 126, 131 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).
“Indirect criminal contempt … is committed by obstructive conduct that occurs outside of the court’s presence.” Perkins, 292 A.3d at 1147 (citation omitted). “Where a PFA order is involved, an indirect criminal contempt charge is designed to seek punishment for violation of the protective order.” Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove the following elements:
(1) the order must be definite, clear, specific and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; (2) the contemnor must have had notice of the specific order or decree; (3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and (4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 766 A.2d 328, 331 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).
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