Com. v. Chatman, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 22, 2024
• Docket: 2768 EDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S17007-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DERRICK CHATMAN : : Appellant : No. 2768 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 21, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0002971-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 22, 2024

Derrick Chatman appeals from the judgment of sentence of three to ten

years of incarceration imposed upon his conviction for possession with intent

to deliver, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug

paraphernalia. We affirm.

We glean the following facts from the certified record. At approximately

10:00 p.m. on July 24, 2020, Sergeant Raymond Fanelli of the Falls Township

Police Department was driving an unmarked police vehicle on Lincoln Highway

in Falls Township, Bucks County when he observed a pick-up truck stopped

on the shoulder of the road, on the “blind side” of a hill near a major

intersection. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 2/6/23, at 9. Sergeant Fanelli

drove by the vehicle three times and witnessed Appellant, as well as a woman

later identified as Bobbie Sherman, both wearing dark clothing, running into

the highway, and waving other motorists around them as they retrieved items J-S17007-24

from the road. On the third pass, Sergeant Fanelli radioed for assistance from

marked units. In his request, he told the officers that there may have been a

traffic accident. He also believed he had witnessed a violation of various traffic

laws requiring pedestrians to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic in a

roadway.1

A few minutes later, officers Ryan Murphy and Michael Parnes arrived

on the scene, parked behind Appellant’s vehicle, and activated the emergency

lights. Sergeant Fanelli and the officers approached the vehicle, where both

Appellant and Ms. Sherman had returned. Appellant was seated in the driver’s

seat and Ms. Sherman in the passenger’s seat. As he walked towards the

vehicle, Officer Murphy observed wood debris and “a number of metal spoons,

small metal spoons” in the roadway. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 2/6/23,

at 56. The officers requested Appellant’s driver’s license, which he provided,

and inquired as to the events that occurred at the scene. Appellant denied

having been in an accident and instead reported that less than five minutes

before the officers arrived on the scene, a box was thrown at his truck from

another vehicle and was then struck by oncoming traffic. This, however, was

inconsistent with the observations of Sergeant Fanelli, who had witnessed

Appellant and Ms. Sherman retrieving items from the road for more than

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1 Sergeant Fanelli stated that he had witnessed, among others, the following

Pennsylvania Vehicle Code violation: “Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a crosswalk at an intersection or any marked crosswalk shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3543(a).

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fifteen minutes. Appellant and Ms. Sherman were also speaking over each

other during this encounter.

Officer Parnes and Officer Murphy directed Appellant to step out of the

vehicle. As he exited, Officer Murphy observed two plastic containers in plain

view in the bottom compartment of the door: one contained a pill that he

recognized from his extensive narcotics training and police experience as

Ecstasy, and the other contained a small tab of tinfoil, which he knew often

stored LSD. The officers simultaneously requested that Ms. Sherman exit the

vehicle and, as she did, Sergeant Fanelli observed a broken lockbox and a

clear container in the passenger’s footwell. The container held a white

crystalline substance that the sergeant recognized from his training and

experience as methamphetamine. The box itself was consistent in material

and design with the wood debris found on the highway. As a result, the

officers placed Appellant and Ms. Sherman under arrest.

Appellant’s vehicle was secured and transported for a later inventory

search, where police recovered various forms of methamphetamine, LSD,

Oxycodone, nitroglycerin, MDMA, Gabapentin, amphetamines, Delta-9-THC,

and assorted drug paraphernalia. Subsequently, Sergeant Fanelli questioned

both Appellant and Ms. Sherman. During her interview, Ms. Sherman

admitted that the box containing methamphetamine had fallen from

Appellant’s vehicle and as it fell, Appellant exclaimed “words to the effect of,

my shit just fell off.” N.T. Suppression, 2/6/23, at 22.

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Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with

possession with intent to deliver, conspiracy to commit possession with intent

to deliver, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug

paraphernalia, and driving with a suspended license. Appellant filed a motion

to suppress the evidence obtained from his vehicle during the initial encounter

with police and the subsequent inventory search. A suppression hearing was

held on February 6, 2023, wherein each of the three officers attested to the

aforementioned events. The court denied the motion on the same day.

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on August 2, 2023, and was convicted of

possession with intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance, and

possession of drug paraphernalia. Subsequently, Appellant was sentenced as

indicated hereinabove.

This timely appeal followed. Appellant filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement, and the trial court issued a responsive Rule 1925(a)

opinion. Appellant raises the following three issues on appeal:

A. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress because the initial stop and detention of Appellant was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause?

B. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress because the detention of Appellant was not supported by reasonable suspicion?

C. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress because the continued detention of Appellant was not supported by reasonable suspicion?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up).

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All of Appellant’s arguments assert that the trial court erred in denying

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. Our standard of review in this

context is well-established:

An appellate court’s standard of reviewing the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Thus, our review of questions of law is de novo. Our scope of review is to consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the suppression record as a whole.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 209 A.3d 957, 968-69 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted).

In his brief, Appellant does not contest the trial court’s factual findings.

Rather, in arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress,

he maintains that the officers subjected him to a seizure that was not

supported by either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Appellant’s

brief at 10.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees

individuals the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. See

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa.Super. 2019). To secure

this right, “courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to

demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with

citizens to the extent those interactions compromise individual liberty.”

Commonwealth v. Hampton, 204 A.3d 452, 456 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation

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omitted). For this purpose, the Pennsylvania courts have organized these

interactions into three categories: mere encounters, investigative detentions,

and custodial detentions. Id.

Preliminarily, we note that the police seized Appellant when they parked

their police vehicle behind him and activated the emergency lights. See

Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 625 (Pa. 2017) (holding that

when a police vehicle pulls behind or alongside an individual’s vehicle and

activates the emergency lights, a reasonable person would not feel free to

leave, and therefore, the interaction amounts to a seizure). Further, this was

an investigative detention, since it did not rise to the level of an arrest. See

Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 167 (Pa.Super. 2023) (explaining

that a seizure qualifies as an investigative detention when it subjects an

individual to a period of detention but does not “become so coercive as to

constitute the functional equivalent of arrest”).

An investigative detention has “elements of official compulsion, [and

therefore,] it must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that

the person seized is engaged in criminal activity[.]” Hampton, 204 A.3d at

457. To meet this standard, the detaining officer must identify “specific and

articulable facts which, in conjunction with rational inferences derived from

those facts,” provide reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Id.

at 459. A court must consider “the totality of the circumstances” to determine

whether the officer possessed reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v.

Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 326 (Pa.Super. 2010).

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Generally, this reasonable suspicion requirement applies to traffic stops

as well. See Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 282 A.3d 796, 800 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(concluding that a traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment). A traffic stop amounts to an investigative detention, and

thus, must be supported by “sufficient facts to provide an officer with

reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle or driver was in violation of a

provision of the Vehicle Code.” Id. However, where the violation requires no

additional investigation, such as a speed limit infraction, the officer must

possess probable cause of the violation to initiate the traffic stop. Id.

Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge

of the officer at the time of the detention “are sufficient in themselves to

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the suspect has

committed or is committing a crime. See Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39

A.3d 358, 362 (Pa.Super. 2012).

In denying Appellant’s motion to suppress, the trial court deduced, inter

alia, that the officers possessed both reasonable suspicion and probable cause

to support the validity of the traffic stop. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/24,

at 12, 14. Specifically, it stated the following:

Here, [Sergeant] Fanelli observed, on no less than three separate occasions, Appellant and his passenger exit their vehicle and enter the southbound traffic lane to pick up objects from the road. Further, they were doing so at night and on the backside of a blind hill on a busy road. Indeed, they had to actively wave traffic around them to avoid being hit.

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Id. at 13 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court found that the

circumstances supported a lawful traffic stop, and by implication, that a man

of reasonable caution would believe a Vehicle Code violation concerning failure

to yield to traffic had occurred. Id. Thus, the court noted that the officers’

order to alight from the vehicle was also appropriate as part of a valid traffic

stop. Id. at 14.

In response, Appellant argues that his interaction with the officers was

not supported by either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See

Appellant’s brief at 10. He contends that the officers did not possess probable

cause to order Appellant out of the vehicle because, even if Appellant violated

the Vehicle Code by failing to yield to traffic, the command served no purpose

relevant to the suspected violation. Id. at 31. Additionally, Appellant

maintains that the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion of a crime

because both Sergeant Fanelli and Officer Parnes testified that they had not

seen any evidence of criminal activity prior to asking Appellant to exit the

vehicle. Id. at 29-30. Furthermore, Officer Murphy’s observation of metal

spoons in the road did not identify criminal activity because spoons are legal

eating utensils. Id. at 21. As such, Appellant claims that it was unlawful for

the officers to require Appellant to step out of the vehicle.

On review, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s

motion to suppress. Given that the Vehicle Code violation of failing to yield to

traffic did not require any additional investigation, probable cause was

required to justify the stop. The officers possessed probable cause, as the

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evidence presented at the hearing supported the determination that a

reasonable person would have believed that a traffic violation occurred.

Sergeant Fanelli testified that he had seen Appellant and Ms. Sherman running

into the roadway as cars were approaching to retrieve items and waving other

motorists around them in the process. See N.T. Suppression, 2/6/23, at 12.

Consequently, he asserted that he believed this was a violation of the

applicable traffic law. Id. at 45.

Based on this testimony, the officers possessed probable cause to

initiate a traffic stop. Further, in any valid traffic stop, law enforcement

officers have an absolute right to order the occupants of the vehicle to exit

the vehicle for the duration of the traffic stop to assure the officers’ safety.

See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 17 A.3d 1274, 1277 (Pa.Super. 2011). Since

the officers’ interaction with Appellant constituted a valid traffic stop, they

were entitled to require him to exit the vehicle. For this reason, we agree with

the trial court that the police did not subject Appellant to an unreasonable

seizure.2

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to

suppress, and we therefore have no cause to disturb his convictions.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

2 Given that the seizure of Appellant was lawful, when the officers observed

drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view as Appellant and Ms. Sherman opened their doors, they developed probable cause to search the vehicle.

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Date: 7/22/2024

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