NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :
v. :
: :
RONALD CHAPMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 1574 EDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0004286-2008
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 1, 2026
Appellant, Ronald Chapman, appeals pro se from the order entered in
the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied as untimely his
petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1 We affirm.
This Court has previously set forth the relevant facts of this case as
follows.
Janet Woodrow testified that on May 10, 2008, she was working as the “shift runner” or supervisor during the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift at the Wawa store located on Bristol Oxford Valley Road in Falls Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Woodrow testified that an armed robber wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt with hood up and baggy pants held her up at gunpoint and demanded cash from the register and safe. A second suspect wearing black and baggy clothes assisted. After the robbers left, she and her fellow employee Tammy Boyd called police, and they were taken to another crime scene where Woodrow identified co-
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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
defendant Kaylan Walker as the hooded armed robber from her store. Woodrow could not definitively identify Appellant as the other robber.
Tammy Boyd also testified about her observations of the robbery, and described how she was able to see the other robber’s face, noticed he held a gun in his left hand, and was able to describe his clothing to police in detail. Boyd, however, was unable to positively identify either robber when brought to a separate location by police.
Officer Kimberly Caron, an officer with the Bristol Township Police Department, testified that she patrols the Croydon section of that Township, and was on duty for the “midnight to 8:30” shift on May 10, 2009, when police radio reported this armed robbery. After notifying the only other convenient store open in the area that the Wawa eight miles away had just been robbed, Officer Caron parked her patrol car across the street and waited for unusual activity. She subsequently noticed a gold or tan Ford Explorer pull into the lot of a closed business directly behind the convenient store. After five minutes with no activity coming from the vehicle, Officer Caron called for backup.
Other officers testified that, minutes later, they descended on the vehicle and found Appellant and his co-defendant asleep inside. Co-defendant and Appellant matched the descriptions given by the Wawa clerks, with Walker dressed in a grey hooded sweatshirt with a rolled up black ski mask ‘wrap’ around his head and dark cargo pants, and Appellant was wearing baggy black pants. Both men wore shoes covered in mud, a point of interest to police since muddy footprints were discovered at the Wawa store just robbed. A Wawa bag was also found in the car, along with several rolls of wrapped coins, two or three cigarette cartons, $311 in U.S. currency bundled in specific denominations, and a black hooded sweatshirt with a fully operational Colt .45 revolver and a neoprene ski mask to cover from the nose down found rolled up inside. When asked his name, Appellant falsely identified himself as “Jeffrey Jones.”
Because co-defendant Walker was a juvenile, police contacted his mother, who came to the station. After speaking privately with his mother for one-half hour, Walker
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told police he would sign a prepared statement if police drafted one as he explained what happened. He confessed to committing the robbery at the Wawa and admitted the bag found in their car along with the money was from the robbery. He described the crime in detail and admitted that “I know the person I was arrested with,” that “I was not driving the silver SUV with New Jersey plates. I was the front passenger[,]” “I did not cut the phone wire,” and “I did not have a gun, I stuck my hand in the pocket of my hoodie and pointed it.” This statement was read at trial.
Commonwealth v. Chapman, No. 1513 EDA 2012, unpublished
memorandum at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed Jan. 11, 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Chapman, No. 58 EDA 2009, unpublished memorandum
at 3-4 (Pa.Super. filed Dec. 15, 2010), citing Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/09, at
2-14) (internal brackets omitted).
Procedurally:
[On December 3, 2008, Appellant was convicted of robbery, conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and possessing instruments of crime.] On December 4, 2008, Appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for no less than 22½ years to no more than 45 years in a state correctional institution. Appellant filed a direct appeal, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ultimately affirmed the judgment of sentence on December 15, 2010. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allowance of appeal on July 14, 2011. [See Commonwealth v. Chapman, 58 EDA 2009 (Pa.Super. Dec. 15, 2020) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 639, 24 A.3d 361 (2011)]. Appellant then filed his first PCRA Petition, which was denied by the [PCRA] [c]ourt on May 1, 2012. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this [PCRA c]ourt’s ruling on January 11, 2013. Appellant filed his second PCRA Petition on March 7, 2013, which was denied on September 24, 2015. Appellant did not appeal this denial until almost six months later and his appeal was dismissed by the Superior Court on August 18, 2016.
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While his second PCRA Petition was pending, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 29, 2013. The District Court denied the Petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability on July 19, 2023. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also denied Appellant’s application for a certificate of appealability on February 21, 2024. Appellant then requested to reopen the District Court’s judgment via a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 600(b), which the District Court denied on April 26, 2024. On February 6, 2025, Appellant filed the instant Petition, his third PCRA Petition. On March 3, 2025, the Commonwealth responded to Appellant’s third PCRA Petition. On March 20, 2025, this [c]ourt issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. [On April 10, 2025, Appellant filed a motion to amend his PCRA petition, attaching a proposed amended petition; the court took no action on Appellant’s motion to amend.] On June 3, 2025, this [c]ourt denied Appellant’s third PCRA Petition.
(PCRA Court Opinion, dated 8/26/25, at 3). Appellant timely filed a notice of
appeal on June 18, 2025. On July 1, 2025, the court ordered Appellant to file
a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
which Appellant filed following a grant of an extension on July 24, 2025.
Preliminarily, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional
requisite. Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013),
appeal denied, 625 Pa. 649, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA petition must be
filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is “final” at the conclusion of direct
review or at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3). The statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow very limited
circumstances to excuse the late filing of a petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
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9545(b)(1)(i-iii).
Specifically, to obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than
one year after the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must
allege and prove at least one of the three timeliness exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). As well, “[a]ny petition invoking an
exception…shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
“The proper question with respect to [the governmental interference]
timeliness exception is whether the government interfered with Appellant’s
ability to present his claim and whether Appellant was duly diligent in seeking
the facts on which his claims are based.” Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 218
A.3d 963, 975 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 658 Pa. 538, 229 A.3d 565
(2020) (internal citation omitted). In other words, an appellant is required to
show that he would have filed his claim sooner, if not for the interference of a
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government actor. Commonwealth v. Staton, 646 Pa. 284, 184 A.3d 949
(2018). Where a petitioner’s allegation of governmental interference is based
on an alleged violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,
10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), “the proper questions with respect to timeliness in
this case are whether the government interfered with Appellant’s access to
the [allegedly withheld evidence], and whether Appellant was duly diligent in
seeking [that evidence].” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 598 Pa. 574, 581, 959
A.2d 306, 310 (2008). Further, an appellant may not “begin with a discussion
of the merits of a Brady claim; rather, [he] must begin with a discussion of
why the instant petition was timely filed.” Id. at 580, 959 A.2d at 310.
To meet the “newly-discovered facts” timeliness exception set forth in
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner must demonstrate that “he did not know
the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those
facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown,
111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 761, 125 A.3d
1197 (2015). Due diligence requires the petitioner to take reasonable steps
to protect his own interests. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164
(Pa.Super. 2001). A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned
the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence; this rule is strictly
enforced. Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076 (Pa.Super. 2010),
appeal denied, 610 Pa. 607, 20 A.3d 1210 (2011). Additionally, the focus is
on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing
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source for previously known facts. Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d
1228, 1232 (Pa.Super. 2023).
Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on October 12,
2011, after expiration of the time for Appellant’s right to file a petition for writ
of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 (allowing 90
days to file petition for writ of certiorari in U.S. Supreme Court). Thus,
Appellant had one year thereafter to file a timely petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s current petition filed on February 6, 2025, is
patently untimely. See id. Appellant now attempts to invoke the
“governmental interference” and “newly-discovered facts” exceptions to the
PCRA time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-ii).
With respect to the governmental interference exception, Appellant
alleges that Detective Hanks and Deputy D.A. Twombly failed to disclose to
Appellant prior to trial that co-defendant Walker had absolved Appellant of
involvement in the robbery during post-arrest interviews. Appellant claims
that he did not know of, nor could he have learned earlier than July 2024 of,
this interference by government officials. In support of his claim, Appellant
relies on an affidavit executed by Walker dated July 25, 2024, in which Walker
avers that he told Detective Hanks and Deputy D.A. Twombly prior to trial that
Appellant was not involved in the robbery. Appellant insists that in past
attempts to communicate with Walker, Walker had always told Appellant that
he could not discuss the case with him, based on the advice of Walker’s
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counsel. Appellant details the steps both he and his family members took to
communicate with Walker after trial, none of which were successful. Appellant
contends that the Commonwealth committed a violation under Brady by
withholding Walker’s post-arrest statements from Appellant, which Appellant
claims were exculpatory. Appellant insists that he timely filed his PCRA
petition on February 6, 2025, within one year of July 2024, when Appellant
first learned of Walker’s exculpatory post-arrest statements.
Regarding the newly-discovered fact exception, Appellant reiterates that
he did not know that Walker had absolved Appellant of guilt in post-arrest
interviews with Detective Hanks and Deputy D.A. Twombly, and that it was
not until July 2024 that Appellant learned of this new fact. Appellant repeats
that he could not have learned of this fact sooner with the exercise of due
diligence because Walker had always previously refused to discuss the case
with Appellant based on the advice of Walker’s counsel. Appellant insists that
he tried to contact Walker numerous times following their convictions, but his
efforts were thwarted by a Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy which
precluded Appellant from contacting Walker.2 We disagree that Appellant has
satisfied a time-bar exception.
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2 Appellant makes additional arguments, claiming that he has satisfied the underlying claim of after-discovered evidence, established a Brady violation, and pled and proved ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Appellant’s Brief at 13-22). Nevertheless, as Appellant has failed to satisfy the initial jurisdictional threshold as discussed infra, we need not further discuss these underlying claims.
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Here, the PCRA rejected Appellant’s proffered time-bar exceptions as
follows:
First, Appellant makes no credible argument demonstrating governmental interference. … Essentially, the claim in Appellant’s third PCRA Petition is that, in April of 2024, his co-defendant, Kalyn Walker, signed an affidavit admitting that Appellant “played no part” in the 2008 robbery and that Mr. Walker told the District Attorney this information but the District Attorney told him to “just say it was [Appellant]” and she would “let [Mr. Walker] out of jail.” However, Appellant’s own PCRA Petition belies the claim that it was governmental interference that precluded him from learning this information. He admits that he often spoke to Mr. Walker in the Bucks County Correctional Facility (hereinafter “BCCF”) when they were both housed there from May 2008 to December 2008. Appellant asked Mr. Walker several times what Mr. Walker told police, but Mr. Walker said he was advised by his counsel not to discuss the case. Therefore, these averments reveal that the Commonwealth did not prevent Mr. Walker from testifying on Appellant’s behalf, but rather it was Mr. Walker’s own attorney that advised him to stay silent in accordance with his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Moreover, Appellant provides no credible argument that the Commonwealth engaged in conduct prohibited by Brady.
* * *
Here, Appellant had equal, if not greater, access to Mr. Walker prior to trial. If Appellant truly were not at the scene, he would have known from the start that Mr. Walker could testify that he had no involvement with the armed robbery. Further, if Appellant did believe Mr. Walker’s unwillingness to testify on Appellant’s behalf was due to governmental interference based on the interactions he had with him in BCCF in 2008, he provides no explanation as to why this issue could not have been raised in his first PCRA Petition filed in 2011. Therefore, Appellant’s claim that he could not comply with the jurisdictional time-bar due to governmental interference is meritless.
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Likewise, Appellant does not establish the newly discovered fact exception. …
* * *
In the case at bar, Appellant fails to demonstrate exactly what “previously unknown fact” he recently discovered and why it could not have been discovered sooner. Appellant knew of Mr. Walker’s existence and, again, if Appellant truly were not at the scene of the robbery, he would have known that Mr. Walker could testify to the same. New sources of old information do not qualify as “newly discovered evidence.” … As such, it is clear that Appellant’s attempt to elicit the “unknown facts” exception must also fail.
(PCRA Court Opinion at 6-8) (internal citations omitted).
We agree with the PCRA court that no relief is due. Significantly,
Appellant has failed to demonstrate due diligence in uncovering the
information from Walker that forms the basis of his claim, as required by each
of the proffered time-bar exceptions. Appellant maintains that he was not
present at the scene, which is a fact that both he and Walker would have
known since the date of the offenses. Appellant also states that when he
spoke with Walker pre-trial, Appellant repeatedly asked Walker what Walker
had told police and if Walker would execute an affidavit, and that each time
Walker stated that he was instructed not to discuss the case with Appellant on
the advice of counsel. (See Appellant’s Brief at 6) (stating that from May to
December 2008, while awaiting trial, Appellant repeatedly asked Walker what
Walker had told police after his arrest and requested that Walker execute
affidavit that Appellant had no involvement in robbery; each time Walker
responded that on advice of counsel, he could not discuss case or execute
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affidavit). Appellant insists that following trial, he was prohibited from
communicating with Walker based on a DOC policy that prohibited Appellant
from doing so. Notably, however, Appellant does not explain why his prior
appointed counsel in connection with Appellant’s first PCRA petition was
unable to contact Walker. Appellant does not indicate that anything would
have prohibited appointed counsel from attempting to interview Walker to
uncover this information sooner, particularly where Appellant would know that
Walker could help to exonerate him (assuming Appellant’s allegations are
true). As the Commonwealth points out: “Surely, PCRA counsel could have
sought an investigator to speak with Walker, visited Walker…in prison to
interview him, or subpoenaed him to appear at the hearing on the first PCRA
petition. [Appellant] offers no explanation as to why this did not happen
beyond the mere assertion that PCRA counsel did not do so.”
(Commonwealth’s Brief at 25).3
To the extent Appellant faults prior counsel for failing to interview
Walker at the time of Appellant’s first PCRA petition (see Appellant’s Brief at
21), such an allegation does not rise to the level of governmental interference.
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3 While Appellant suggests that the PCRA court should have granted his motion
for leave to amend his PCRA petition to correct this deficiency (see Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5), Appellant fails to acknowledge that the proffered amended PCRA petition he attached to his motion to amend made no mention of why prior counsel could not have tried to uncover information from Walker sooner on Appellant’s behalf. (See Amended PCRA Petition attached to Motion to Amend, filed 4/10/25).
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See Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1206 n.7 (Pa.Super. 2021),
appeal denied, 672 Pa. 41, 268 A.3d 1072 (2021) (stating: “To the extent
Appellant includes his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his argument
regarding the governmental interference exception, we note defense counsel
is not considered a governmental official for the purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(i)”). See also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 635 Pa. 592, 597-
98, 139 A.3d 178, 185-86 (2016) (observing “well-settled proposition that
couching post-conviction issues in terms of ineffectiveness cannot ‘save’ an
untimely filed PCRA petition that does not fall into any of the exceptions to the
PCRA’s jurisdiction time bar”); Commonwealth v. Gamboa Taylor, 562 Pa.
70, 80, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (2000) (observing that claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel does not save otherwise untimely petition for review on
merits). Thus, Appellant has failed to show that he exercised due diligence in
uncovering the information from Walker upon which he bases his claims to
satisfy either of the proffered time-bar exceptions. See Chimenti, supra;
Brown, supra. See also Monaco, supra. As such, Appellant’s current filing
is time-barred. See Turner, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Date: 9/1/2026