J-S17037-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JULIE LENORE CHAFFER : : Appellant : No. 1760 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 16, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000167-2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2026
Appellant, Julie Lenore Chaffer, appeals the judgment of sentence
imposed by the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas after the trial court
found her guilty of disorderly conduct by making unreasonable noise. 1 She
argues that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal due to a breakdown in
court procedure and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
lone conviction. We affirm.
The trial court has summarized the underlying facts of this matter as
follows:
On October 16, 2023, police were dispatched to Peak Motor Auto Sales after being contacted by the manager of that establishment about a distraught female in the parking lot of the business. When police arrived, [Appellant] was speaking to [emergency medical ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(2). J-S17037-26
technicians] outside of her vehicle. [Appellant] told police that she was driving from her home in Mountainhome[, in Barrett Township, Monroe County,] and became distraught while driving and pulled into the parking lot. [Appellant] was eventually placed into custody after a series of [Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (“ARIDE”)] tests were performed. According to the [trial] transcript, one of the troopers that responded to the call testified that[,] while attempting to read [Appellant] her Miranda[2] rights[, Appellant] was yelling very loudly towards the manager that initially called the police. The trooper then asked [Appellant] if she understood her rights and she responded that she did not. He attempted to re-read [Appellant] her Miranda rights at which point [Appellant] again began to scream. The trooper also testified that [Appellant] showed some resistance when an attempt was made to place her into custody and that [Appellant] was screaming at onlookers to help her.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/25, 1-2 (record citations omitted).
On April 16, 2025, Appellant proceeded to be tried at a non-jury trial
for, inter alia, disorderly conduct. The Commonwealth presented testimony
from Pennsylvania State Police Troopers Jenna Pacella and Bryan Kolodziej.
Trooper Pacella was the first responding trooper and obtained Appellant’s
consent to submit to standardized field sobriety tests. See N.T.
Trial/Sentencing Hearing, 4/16/25, 5-10. She described Appellant, with
respect to the relevant incident, as having “various mood swings,” “pinpoint”
pupils, and “red blood[-]shot, watery eyes,” and recalled that Appellant “kept
complaining about … having a dry mouth.” Id. at 8, 13.
Trooper Kolodziej arrived at the scene at the request of Trooper Pacella
and conducted the ARIDE tests of Appellant. See N.T. Trial/Sentencing
Hearing, 4/16/25, 12, 17-19. He described Appellant during the tests as
____________________________________________
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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“fidgety, frantic in a way, and hard to communicate with. Just kind of all over
the place.” Id. at 19.
Trooper Pacella took Appellant into custody shortly after the ARIDE tests
conducted by Trooper Kolodziej. See N.T. Trial/Sentencing Hearing, 4/16/25,
23. Trooper Pacella described Appellant’s screaming, which formed the basis
for her disorderly conduct conviction, as follows:
While in my car, I attempted to read her [the] Miranda rights and warnings. Through that time, it was very difficult. I did read it all the way through while she was yelling very loudly towards the manager, you know, the complainant of the call. At the end, I asked her if she understood her rights, she related she did not. Therefore, I attempted to re-read the Miranda rights and warning. She began screaming again; therefore, I discontinued during the second time trying to read it to her.
…
During the actual incident, obviously the [emergency medical technicians] were there, the troopers were there, the complainant was there. However, he kept going inside the business, you know, to separate himself from it. He later came back out, and that’s when [Appellant] began screaming as we attempted to put her into custody. There was some resistance there, and she was screaming to him, [“H]elp me,[”] things of that nature.
Id. at 25-26. In addition to the presentation of the live testimony from the
troopers, the Commonwealth played a motor vehicle recording from Trooper
Pacella’s marked police car. See id. at 5, 28-29.
Appellant declined to present any evidence. See N.T. Trial/Sentencing
Hearing, 4/16/25, 31. After considering the Commonwealth’s evidence and
the arguments of counsel, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the above-
referenced count of disorderly conduct by making unreasonable noise and
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found her not guilty of the other pending charges in the case. 3 See, e.g., N.T.
Trial/ Sentencing Hearing, 4/16/25, 35; Order (Bench Trial), 4/16/25, 1. On
the same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to pay a fine of $100.00 for
the lone summary offense conviction, along with the imposition of court costs.
See id. At the conclusion of the combined non-jury trial and sentencing
hearing, the trial court did not orally advise Appellant as to any deadlines for
filing a post-sentence motion or an appeal. Nor did the court include a
reference to any filing deadlines for a post-sentence motion or appeal in its
order entering the verdict and imposing the sentence. 4 See Order (Bench
Trial), 4/16/25, 1.
3 The charges for which Appellant was found not guilty were: (1) driving under
the influence: controlled substance – impaired ability, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2); (2) careless driving, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(a); and (3) resisting arrest, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
4 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(D) provides that “[t]here shall
be no post-sentence motion in summary case appeals following a trial de novo in the court of common pleas[, and t]he imposition of sentence … shall constitute a final order for purposes of appeal.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D). Because Appellant’s case originated in the Court of Common Pleas based on a misdemeanor charge for which Appellant was not found guilty, Rule 720(D)’s prohibition on the filing of post-sentence motions is inapplicable in the instant matter. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Meinsler, 2024 WL 3311322, *4 n.3 (Pa. Super., filed July 5, 2024) (unpublished memorandum cited for persuasive value) (noting that Rule 720(D) was inapplicable to a case that originated in a Court of Common Pleas based on a misdemeanor charge that was later amended to a summary offense); Commonwealth v. Rizk, 2021 WL 2666983, *2 n.2 (Pa. Super., filed June 29, 2021) (unpublished memorandum cited for persuasive value) (finding that Rule 720(D) “had no bearing” where Rizk was convicted of summary harassment after a bifurcated jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas, and noting, “Since no trial de novo occurred, the rules covering trials de novo are irrelevant”).
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On May 8, 2025, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion in which she
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for her summary conviction. See
Post-Sentence Motion, 5/8/25, ¶¶ 5-7. On May 19, 2025, the trial court
ordered a hearing on the post-sentence motion at which hearing the trial court
heard arguments from counsel and denied the motion on June 25, 2025. See
N.T. Post-Sentence Motion Hearing, 6/25/25, 2-5; Order (Post-Sentence
Motion Denial), 6/25/25, 1. On July 8, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.
See Notice of Appeal, 7/8/25, 1. Appellant and the trial court subsequently
satisfied their obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(b). See Order (Rule 1925(b)), 7/11/25, 1; Rule 1925(b) Statement,
8/1/25, 1; Trial Court Opinion, 9/19/25, 1-3.
While this appeal has been pending, our Court issued a rule to show
cause order directing Appellant to explain why this appeal should not be
quashed as untimely filed where her notice of appeal was filed more than thirty
days after the imposition of her sentence and her post-sentence motion was
not filed within ten days of sentencing. See Superior Court Order (Rule to
Show Cause), 11/12/25, 1, (citing Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d
1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (a timely post-sentence motion tolls the
appeal period; an untimely motion does not)). Appellant filed a response,
acknowledging that her post-sentence motion was untimely filed without a
request for permission for nunc pro tunc review, but asserted that her appeal
should be considered timely based on a breakdown in court process because
the trial court did not advise her of the deadline for filing a timely notice of
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appeal, either at the hearing on the post-sentence motion or in the court’s
order denying the post-sentence motion. See Response to Rule to Show
Cause Order, 11/21/25, ¶¶ 2-4, 8-9. We discharged our rule to show cause
order and referred the question to the panel assigned to decide the merits of
this appeal. See Superior Court Order, 1/7/26, 1.
On January 8, 2026, we directed the trial court to amend its docket to
properly reflect that Appellant’s judgment of sentence was imposed on April
16, 2025, rather than the incorrect docket notation of April 17, 2025. See
Superior Court Order (Docket Amendment), 1. The trial court subsequently
complied with that order. See Trial Court’s Response to Superior Court Order,
1/13/26.
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
1. Whether this appeal should be dismissed as untimely?
2. Whether there was insufficient evidence of disorderly conduct where there was no evidence of intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk of unreasonable noise?
Appellant’s Brief, 6 (suggested answers and unnecessary capitalizations
omitted).
In her first issue, Appellant addresses the issue raised in her response
to this Court’s rule to show cause order. She asserts that, even though her
untimely filed post-sentence motion did not toll the thirty-day deadline for
filing her notice of appeal, we have jurisdiction to entertain her direct review
appeal due to a breakdown in court operations when the trial court failed to
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advise her of the deadline for filing a timely notice of appeal either at
sentencing or when it denied her untimely post-sentence motion. See
Appellant’s Brief, 18-22 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Patterson,
940 A.2d 493, 500 (Pa. Super. 2007) (trial court’s failure, in denying
Patterson’s untimely post-sentence motion for reconsideration, to advise
Patterson of the deadline for filing an appeal constituted a “breakdown” that
excused the untimely filing of a notice of appeal), and Commonwealth v.
Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 791 (Pa. Super. 2001) (excusing the filing of an
untimely notice of appeal based on a “breakdown” in court operations where
a trial court misstated the time-period for Appellant’s deadline to file a timely
notice of appeal)).
We agree that we have jurisdiction to review this appeal. 5 Ordinarily,
“[j]urisdiction is vested in the Superior Court upon the filing of a timely notice
of appeal,” Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(en banc), and an appellant must file a notice of appeal “within 30 days after
the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). We
may not extend the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.
105(b). However, we may excuse the untimely filing of a notice of appeal in
the event of a breakdown in the operations of the court. See
5 The Commonwealth has filed a brief incorporating the analysis in the trial
court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, see Appellee’s Brief, 3, and the trial court’s opinion does not address this claim because the trial court satisfied its obligations under Rule 1925 prior to the filing of this Court’s Rule to Show Cause Order.
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Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(noting that the official note to Pa.R.A.P. 105 makes clear that the appellate
courts retain the power to grant relief from the effects of a breakdown in the
court system).
Here, the trial court did not inform Appellant of the deadline for a timely
notice of appeal either at sentencing, in its sentencing order, or when denying
the post-sentence motion. See N.T. Trial/Sentencing Hearing, 4/16/25, 35;
Order (Bench Trial), 4/16/25, 1. This is a breakdown in the court system,
because a sentencing court “shall determine on the record that the defendant
has been advised,” inter alia, “of the right to file a post-sentence motion and
to appeal, of the time within which the defendant must exercise those rights,
and of the right to assistance of counsel in the preparation of the motion and
appeal.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(C)(3)(a). The trial court, in this matter, defaulted
on that obligation when it announced Appellant’s sentence, recapped its
preceding verdict, and merely announced that the court was “adjourned.”
N.T. Trial/Sentencing Hearing, 4/16/25, 35. The court’s failure to advise
Appellant of her appellate rights and the time in which she needed to file a
timely notice of appeal constituted a breakdown in court operations that now
requires us to excuse the untimely filing of her notice of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Floyd, 257 A.3d 13, 17 (Pa. Super. 2020) (trial court’s
failure to advise Floyd of his appellate rights after imposing sentence or
determine on the record that Floyd had been advised of his appellate rights
constituted a breakdown in the operations of the court).
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In her second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting her disorderly conduct conviction. See Appellant’s Brief, 22-36.
She acknowledges that, at the time of her arrest, she was having “a mental
health episode” and was “distraught and sobbing in a business parking lot.”
Id. at 22. She agrees that, “[w]hen [she] was arrested, she asked the
business’[s] manager for assistance.” Id. She asserts that “[a] loud tone and
an annoying persistence” did not turn her speech “into unreasonable noise”
for purposes of the disorderly conduct statute. Id. She then proceeds to
argue that the evidence did not prove that she committed the actus reus for
the crime, i.e., that she made unreasonable noise, or that she did so with the
requisite mens rea, the intent to cause or recklessly create the risk of public
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. See id. at 23-36.
For challenges to the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal
conviction, we employ a well-settled standard of review:
[T]he standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof [of] proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually
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received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Kim, 888 A.2d 847, 851-52 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation
Appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct under Section 5503(a)(2),
which states, in relevant part: “A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with
intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance[,] or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof, [s]he … makes unreasonable noise.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
5503(a)(2). We have explained this offense:
is not intended as a catchall for every act which annoys or disturbs people; it is not to be used as a dragnet for all irritants which breed in the ferment of a community. It has a specific purpose; it has a definite objective, it is intended to preserve the public peace.
Commonwealth v. Forrey, 108 A.3d 895, 897 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
The actus reus requirement of this offense “requires proof that a
defendant’s actions or words created noise that was unreasonable.”
Commonwealth v. Bertothy, 307 A.3d 776, 781 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation
omitted). Noise is unreasonable for purposes of Section 5503(a)(2) where it
is “not fitting or proper in respect to the conventional standards of organized
society or a legally constituted community.” Forrey, 108 A.3d at 898 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 674 A.2d 284, 287 (Pa. Super. 1996), and
Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2005)).
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“Ultimately, … what constitutes the [actus reus] of ‘unreasonable noise’ under
the disorderly conduct statute is determined solely by the volume of the
speech, not its content.” Id. (quoting Maerz, 879 A.2d at 1269; emphasis
in original). “A court looks to the content of a person’s speech only to infer
the requisite mens rea (intent or recklessness).” Id. (citing Maerz, 879 A.2d
at 1269).
The mens rea requirement of Section 5503(a) demands proof that a
defendant by her actions “intentionally or recklessly created a risk of causing
or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance[,] or alarm.” Bertothy, 307
A.3d at 783 (quoting Maerz, 879 A.2d at 1269; brackets added in Bertothy).
“The specific intent requirement of [Section 5503] may be met by a showing
of a reckless disregard of the risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or
alarm, even if the [defendant’s] intent was to send a message to a certain
individual, rather than to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.”
Commonwealth v. McConnell, 244 A.3d 44, 51 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting
Maerz, 879 A.3d at 1269).
The police motor vehicle recordings entered into the evidentiary record
at trial reflected Appellant’s participation in field sobriety tests and her
subsequent arrest in the parking lot of the Peak Motor Auto Sales business.
See Trial Exhibit 2 (flash drive containing video files including an MP4 video
file titled, “JennaPacella_202310161744_N620_7142588” (“Front Facing
Video”)). After the officers asked Appellant to turn around and put her hands
behind her back and told her to “not to make a scene,” Front Facing Video,
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26:52-26:14, Appellant yelled, “Sir” and “Sir, can you help me,” while raising
her right hand in an apparent attempt to get the attention of someone outside
the frame of the patrol car’s front facing camera view. Id. at 27:18-23. She
identified the person her yelling was directed to as the manager of the
business by remarking that the person was the one “who originally called the
police.” Id. at 27:20-27:25. Appellant thereafter argued with the police
extensively about her circumstances and questioned the actions of the police
officers but those communications, while somewhat loud and emotional, were
not at the same volume as her yelling toward the business manager. As those
arguments continued, Appellant resumed yelling, “Sir,” to the business
manager three more times after the officers told her that they were putting
her in their patrol car. Id. at 29:17-29:28.
When the officer attempted to place her in the back of the patrol car,
she yelled, “Help me, mister, help me,” and then continued yelling repeatedly,
“Help me” and “Sir.” Front Facing Video, 29:51-30:06. She also yelled at the
officers, “For what? Why? Why? Give me one reason that’s good,” before
professing her rights and again disputing the reason for her detainment at a
lower volume. Id. at 30:09-30:37. She then yelled, “Sir,” again. Id. at
30:35. In her ensuing statements to the police officers, Appellant stated, “I
would like that gentleman to come out,” seemingly referring to the business
manager, and mentioned that she wanted to ask him a question. Id. at
31:46-31:56. After Officer Pacella made a “shh” sound and instructed her to
“stop yelling,” Appellant yelled, “Please just ask him” and “Excuse me, he
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doesn’t have the right…” Id. at 32:02-32:17. She yelled, “Sir,” again at a
later point after expressing that she wanted to ask the business manager for
a favor. Id. at 34:35-34:40. Between the initiation of the arrest and
Appellant’s eventual removal from the parking lot, Appellant continually
maintained a loud, combative tone with the police officers, but we have
highlighted here the loudest statements that could be reasonably
characterized as yelling.
With respect to the actus reus element for her offense, Appellant
compares her yelling with the yelling of a defendant to a neighbor to indicate
that the police were wrong for trying to tow the neighbor’s car, which we found
to be insufficient to prove disorderly conduct in Gilbert. See Appellant’s Brief,
23-24. Notably, in Gilbert, the evidence did not demonstrate that Gilbert
“was especially loud, or that his remarks incited the neighbors or endangered
the police,” the evidence only proved that the arresting officer was annoyed
by Gilbert’s expression of disagreement with the police officer’s intention to
tow the neighbor’s car, and the requisite intent for disorderly conduct could
not be inferred from the officer’s annoyance with Gilbert. 674 A.2d at 452-
54. Thus, in Gilbert, we concluded that evidence was insufficient to prove the
mens rea element for disorderly conduct or that Gilbert’s “conduct was
unreasonably noisy,” in that it was “not unreasonable, loud, boisterous, or
unseemly.” Id. at 454-55.
We disagree that Appellant’s yelling was comparable to the yelling in
Gilbert. Unlike Gilbert, Appellant engaged in loud, intermittent yelling that
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went on for minutes while the police were trying to arrest her and she was
being uncooperative with their directions. Additionally, Appellant was not
engaging in communications with a fellow neighbor in a residential
neighborhood during the incident in question. She was in the middle of a
parking lot of a commercial automobile sales business that, based on the
police motor vehicle recording, where other individuals were present.
Appellant claims that “[N]o member of the public heard” her or “was present
at that time.” Appellant’s Brief, 27. Her assertion is belied by the fact that
she was yelling at a business manager present at the scene, as confirmed by
the officers. See Trial/Sentencing Hearing, 4/16/25, 26 (“the complainant
was there. However, he kept going inside the business, you know, to separate
himself from it. He later came back out, and that’s when the defendant began
screaming as we attempted to put her into custody … and she was screaming
to him”). Furthermore, the police motor vehicle recording depicts multiple
people walking around the lot immediately behind her just prior to her arrest
and at least one person walking through the parking lot during her arrest.
See Front Facing Video, 8:57, 15:56, 34:08-34:26.
We do not agree with Appellant that her “yelling” was “nothing more
than a loud speaking voice.” Appellant’s Brief for 30. The trial court as the
fact-finder at trial describes the communications at issue as “screaming [that]
does not fit into conventional standards of organized society,” Trial Court
Opinion, 9/19/25, 2, and our review of the police motor vehicle recording
footage aligns with the trial court’s characterization. The noise was also not
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brief as Appellant alleges, see Appellant’s Brief, 32, it continued intermittently
for minutes on the police motor vehicle recording. It was not comparable to
a single outburst of a person screaming an expletive that Appellant cites as
support in a recent unpublished memorandum of this Court in which we
concluded a lack of evidence to support disorderly conduct under Section
5503(a)(2). See Appellant’s Brief, 32-33 (citing Commonwealth v.
Barbara, 2026 WL 100787 (Pa. Super., filed Jan. 14, 2026) (unpublished
memorandum) (495 MDA 2025)).
As for the mens rea element, Appellant asserts, “No evidence was
presented that anyone was disturbed or annoyed except, perhaps, the officer
herself.” Appellant’s Brief, 27. That assertion fails to consider that the
testimony and the content of Appellant’s yelling pointed to the presence of the
business manager for the automobile sales company and the motor vehicle
recording showed people in the parking lot before and during Appellant’s
arrest.
The fact that the business manager contacted the police to begin with
to respond to Appellant, see Trial/Sentencing Hearing, 4/16/25, 6, and yet
Appellant spent minutes yelling for this person to somehow intervene in her
arrest demonstrated that Appellant was acting, at a minimum, with a reckless
disregard of the risk of alarming the business manager. The police testimony
demonstrated the manager’s presence but the police motor vehicle recording
did not show any effort by him to intervene. As Appellant thereafter persisted
in yelling for this person’s assistance for minutes, we can easily infer that
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Appellant purposely continued her yelling at this person in an attempt to force
the manager to intervene in her arrest by trying to alarm or annoy him. In
any event, this evidence amply demonstrated Appellant’s necessary mens rea
for her offense.
This was not merely a case, as Appellant suggests, where her yelling
simply achieved the annoyance of a police officer by interrupting the officer’s
reading of the Miranda warning. See Appellant’s Brief at 27. The evidence
demonstrated, through the presence of the business manager and people
passing through the business parking lot, that Appellant was interrupting a
commercial business while it was conducting business. Section 5503 provides
a definition for “public,” which for purposes of the statute “means affecting or
likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group
has access.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(c). That definition specifically includes “places
of business … which are open to the public.” Id. Appellant’s disruption of the
business where she persisted in her continued yelling during her arrest
squarely fits within the language of the disorderly conduct statute. To
continue yelling in an operating business open to the public clearly
demonstrates reckless conduct reflecting a conscious disregard of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that public annoyance or alarm would occur.
See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 731 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(“The reckless creation of a risk of public alarm, annoyance or inconvenience
is as criminal as actually causing such sentiments.”) (citation omitted).
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Appellant’s final point is that “[t]here was no evidence that the noise
violated community tolerance or standards.” Appellant’s Brief, 27. Appellant
suggests that her noise at issue in this case merely involved her objecting to
her arrest: “Briefly raising one’s voice to object to an arrest … is not the type
of conduct that constitutes unreasonable noise.” Id. at 32. This is not a fair
characterization of the noise at issue, and certainly not consistent with the
proper standard of review. Appellant engaged in extensive efforts to object
to her arrest in her arguments with the police but that was not the focus of
the evidence sustaining her offense. Here, the content of Appellant’s yelling
that sustained her conviction involved her attempt to get a third-party, the
business manager, to intervene in the police officers’ efforts to arrest her.
This is a sufficient factual basis to sustain her disorderly conduct conviction.
“The cardinal feature of the crime of disorderly conduct is public
unruliness which can or does lead to tumult and disorder.” Commonwealth
v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. 1999). While the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution dictates that people must have latitude to express
objections to their arrest and their treatment at the hands of the police, our
community standards do not extend approval or toleration to unreasonably
loud requests to third-parties to intervene in routine, non-violent, lawful
arrests conducted by police. We have previously found persuasive that
“[o]rderly and safe law enforcement demands that an arrestee not resist a
lawful arrest and a bystander not intervene on his behalf unless the arrestee
is actually about to be seriously injured or killed.” Commonwealth v.
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French, 578 A.2d 1293, 1298 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citation omitted). Applying
that reasoning to the instant case, there was no reason for the business
manager to intervene in Appellant’s arrest, and Appellant ran afoul of the
disorderly conduct statute by continuing to request the business manager to
improperly intervene in her arrest by yelling at him in his place of business.
As an improper intervention or interruption of a lawful arrest by a third-party,
not involved in the arrest, could easily “lead to tumult or disorder,” Appellant’s
yelling in this instance fits within the ambit of the disorderly conduct statute.
Appellant’s conduct went beyond an effort to annoy the arresting police
officers, which by itself would not be sufficient to violate the statute. See
Hock, 728 A.2d at 947 (“It does not follow, however, that Section 5503(a)
may be used as a vehicle to protect the police from all verbal indignities … The
police must expect that, as part of their jobs, they will be exposed to daily
contact with distraught individuals in emotionally charged situations.”).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Commonwealth, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain disorderly conduct under
Section 5503(a)(2).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 5/26/2026
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