Com. v. Ceo, W.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 3, 2025
• Docket: 3097 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S19018-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WALTER A. CEO : : Appellant : No. 3097 EDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-1201781-1993

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2025

Appellant, Walter A. Ceo, appeals pro se from the October 22, 2024,

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which dismissed

as untimely his petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

In reviewing Appellant’s appeal from the PCRA court’s dismissal of his

prior serial PCRA petition, this Court set forth the factual background and

procedural history of this matter. See Commonwealth v. Ceo, 812 A.2d

1263 (Pa. Super. 2002); rev’d, 845 A.2d 199 (Pa. 2004) (citing

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003)). The facts and

procedural history relevant to the instant appeal are not at issue. Briefly,

On November 1, 1995, a jury convicted [Appellant] of second- degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated assault, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and four counts of reckless endangerment. On April 17, 1996, the Honorable Eugene H. Clarke, Jr., sentenced J-S19018-25

[Appellant] to serve a term of life imprisonment for the murder conviction, and a consecutive term of four to ten years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault with concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.

Ceo, 812 A.2d at 1264.

Appellant filed a PCRA petition in 1996, requesting reinstatement of his

right to appeal nunc pro tunc, which was granted in 1997. Yet, Appellant did

not file a direct appeal. Appellant then filed another PCRA petition on

December 9, 1998, once again requesting reinstatement of his appellate rights

nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court granted the relief requested. Appellant filed

a notice of appeal but never filed a brief. We dismissed the appeal on July 28,

1999. In 2001, Appellant filed another PCRA petition, his fourth, seeking,

again, reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court

denied relief. We reversed the PCRA court upon finding that the fourth petition

was an extension of litigation of his first timely PCRA petition. See

Commonwealth v. Ceo, 812 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super. 2002). On February 24,

2004, our Supreme Court reversed our decision. See Commonwealth v.

Ceo, 845 A.2d 199 (Pa. 2004). Since then, Appellant filed additional PCRA

petitions, which were all dismissed as untimely.

On July 29, 2022, Appellant filed the underlying petition, which he titled

“Petition for Habeas Corpus.” Appellant supplemented said petition on August

24, 2022. On October 22, 2024, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as

untimely. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the lower court should have treated

Appellant’s underlying petition challenging the legality of his detention as a

-2- J-S19018-25

petition for habeas corpus.1 Appellant also avers that the lower court erred in

not finding direct counsel ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal. See

Appellant’s Brief at 7.2 We disagree.

It is well-established that a challenge to the legality of a sentence is

cognizable under the PCRA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d

214, 223 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 998 (Pa.

2021) (concluding a void for vagueness challenge to Section 1102(b) is

cognizable under the PCRA – overruling Commonwealth v. Rouse, 191 A.3d

1 (Pa. Super. 2018)). It is also well-established that the PCRA subsumes the

writ of habeas corpus and is “the sole means of obtaining collateral relief”

where the PCRA provides a remedy for a petitioner’s claim. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9542; Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1998). In

light of the foregoing, we conclude that the lower court correctly treated the

underlying petition as a PCRA petition.

As Appellant’s claim is cognizable under the PCRA, he was required to

bring it under that statute and to comply with all applicable requirements,

including timeliness. See Peterkin, supra at 640; see also Fahy, 737 A.2d ____________________________________________

1 Specifically, Appellant argues that his confinement is illegal because Section

1102(b) – the section Appellant was convicted of – “was void at the time it was applied to . . . him because it was inaccessible.” See Appellant’s Brief at 9; see also PCRA Petition, 7/29/22, at 3-5. The inaccessibility claim seems to relate to Appellant’s perceived inconsistency between the mandatory minimum set forth in Section 1102(b) and the sentencing court’s options set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a).

2 Below, Appellant also argued that two of his PCRA counsel were ineffective

for failing to file briefs on his behalf.

-3- J-S19018-25

at 223 (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the

PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the

exceptions thereto.”).

Appellant’s sentence became final August 9, 1997, after the time for

appealing his sentence to our Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. Appellant

had one year to file a timely PCRA. Appellant filed the underlying petition on

July 29, 2022, approximately 25 years late. Thus, his petition is facially

untimely, and he has neither plead nor proven any of the timeliness exceptions

available. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). His petition is, therefore, untimely.

Because the timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in

nature, the lower court did not have jurisdiction to address the merits of

Appellant’s petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267

(Pa. 2007). Accordingly, the lower court correctly dismissed the underlying

petition as untimely.

Alternatively, Appellant raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel. As the PCRA court also noted, it is unclear “what, if any, time bar

exception [Appellant] is attempting to establish on the basis of these claims.”

PCRA Court Opinion, at 3 (unnumbered).

It is established that a petitioner cannot rely on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel to circumvent the PCRA’s time bar. See, e.g., Peterkin,

722 A.2d at 643 n. 5; see also Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911,

915 (Pa. 2000) (“we have repeatedly held that claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel do not automatically qualify pursuant to the exceptions to the one-

-4- J-S19018-25

year time limitation provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii).”); Bennett,

753 A.2d at 1272-73 (except when postconviction counsel abandons his client

for purposes of appeal, allegation of postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness

cannot be invoked as a newly-discovered “fact” for purposes of the exception).

Because Appellant failed to plead and prove that his claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel met any of the timeliness exceptions, neither the PCRA

court nor this Court can entertain Appellant’s claims. 3

Order affirmed.

Date: 11/3/2025

____________________________________________

3 In light of our disposition, Appellant’s Application to Stay, filed on May 29,

2025, is denied.

-5-